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Abstract 
The sudden end of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011 led to a change towards a democratic 
political system in Tunisia. While researchers acknowledge the importance of social 
movements for the initial protests, there is no systematic proof of civil society influence on 
the Tunisian state. The thesis takes this blind spot and looks at the mechanisms by which 
civil society can have ideational influence. As the role of civil society for democracy and 
democratization is often discussed, the thesis asks how organizations perceive democracy 
and whether they diffuse a democratic framing towards the state. Organizational networks 
are analyzed to see who works with whom and which ministries are approached. These 
ministries are then asked on their networks to verify the connection between organizations 
and ministries. Afterwards the democratic framing of organizations and ministries is 
compared to see whether more interaction causes similar framing. Finally, the results of the 
analysis show mechanisms that influence framing and wider policies. Different possibilities 
for influence, be it direct effects or mediated indirect effects via the media, organizational or 
coalitional influence orient the thesis. The research is based on interviews with movement 
leaders and higher-level civil servants in ministries as well as organizational documents and 
media analysis. The research shows very specific influence, oriented towards concrete 
ministries. Personal contacts as well as institutionalized integration are useful to realize 
demands. The most effective interactions to promote a democratic framing exist between 
the Women Movement and the Ministry of Women and Family. Other interactions are found 
on a continuum between very restricted to no interaction and more intense interactions. 
There is not one democratic framing but several ones with different orientation. 
Résumé 
La fin soudaine du régime de Ben Ali en janvier 2011 a entraîné un changement vers un 
système politique démocratique en Tunisie. Bien que les chercheurs reconnaissent 
l’importance des mouvements sociaux dans les manifestations initiales, il n'y a pas de preuve 
systématique de l’influence de la société civile sur l’état tunisien. La thèse aborde cet angle 
mort et examine les mécanismes avec lesquels les organisations peuvent avoir une influence 
sur les idées. Comme le rôle de la société civile est souvent discuté, la thèse demande 
comment les organisations perçoivent la démocratie et si elles transmettent ces perceptions 
à l’égard de l’État. Les réseaux organisationnels sont analysés pour voir qui travaille avec qui 
et quels ministères sont abordés. Il est demandé à ces ministères de relever leurs réseaux 
afin de vérifier s’il existe une relation entre les organisations et les ministères. Puis, le 
framing de la démocratie des organisations et des ministères est comparé pour voir si plus 
d'interaction signifie aussi un framing similaire. Ensuite les résultats de l'analyse sont utiles 
pour montrer les mécanismes capables d’influencer le framing et les politiques plus larges. 
Différentes possibilités d'influence, qu'il s'agisse d'effets directs ou indirects (via les médias), 
d'influences organisationnelles ou collective orientent la thèse. La recherche repose sur des 
entretiens avec des dirigeants des organisations et des fonctionnaires de haut niveau dans 
des ministères et sur une analyse des documents et des médias.  Cette influence est très 
spécifique et orientée vers des ministères concrets. Les contacts personnels ainsi que 
l’intégration institutionnalisée sont utiles pour réaliser les revendications. Les mécanismes 
les plus efficaces sont en place entre le mouvement féministe et le Ministère de la Femme et 
de la Famille. On trouve d’autres interactions sur un continuum entre des interactions très 
limitées, voire nulles, et des interactions plus intenses. En termes de framing démocratique, 
il n'y a pas un seul framing, mais plusieurs avec une orientation différenciée.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
“We have reason to expect at least a correlation between democratization and the 
proliferation of social movements in many countries” (Tilly 1993/1994:21). 
 
In comparison with other countries in the region such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya or Egypt 
with persistent autocratic governments, unstable political situations or return to autocracy, 
Tunisia developed a new constitution, had several free and fair elections and developed new 
institutions. Civil society and social movements have been and are seen as vital and active in 
Tunisia and even critical analysts underline the positive developments of the country 
towards more democracy that is often attributed to civil society (Stepan 2012; Clark 2012; 
International Crisis Group 2014; Bellin 2013; Hanelt and Behrendt 2013; Ratka 2017; della 
Porta 2016). When Tunisia saw a change of the political system starting in 2010, social 
movements played and continued to play a key role for the transition (Paciello 2011; Gelvin 
2015). After the end of the authoritarian regime, the number of organizations changed 
radically in Tunisia. As El-Khawas notes, around “fifteen hundred new civil society 
organizations were established […] to promote democracy, gender equality, social justice, 
and human rights” (El-Khawas 2012:15). 
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As the origin of the Arab Spring, Tunisia started uprisings in 2010, followed by the end of the 
Ben Ali regime in 20111. While the uprisings started with the self-immolation of a young 
Tunisian, following a confiscation of the production cart and public humiliation by a 
policewoman on December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, this was by no means the only reason as 
corrupt rulers, economic stagnation as well as several other elements mobilized people 
(Dewey et al. 20122; Brynen et al. 2012). In the following days “sustained, cross-class, 
geographically widespread, mass demonstrations” spread in the country putting pressure on 
the government (Angrist 2013:547). In January 2011, President Ben Ali fled the country and 
the repressive regime ended (Paciello 2011). Researchers underline that the prospects for 
social movements have been limited before the regime change (Bayat 2000; Paciello 2011). 
Not surprisingly, most political scientists did not foresee the Arab Spring as a whole 
especially as Arab Regimes had low rates of regime change and as Tunisia was seen as a 
stable autocracy (Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012; Volpi 2017; Gerges 2015; Hinnebusch 
20183). Consequentially, research on movements in Tunisia is mainly of younger nature and 
focuses on the post-2011 period. The Tunisian post-uprisings period seems to be an ideal 
terrain for movements and organizations and thus for the analysis of them. 
 
While civil society is very active in Tunisia and often seen as important factor for the 
democratic development, the question emerges if and eventually why Tunisian movements 
and organizations are effective enforcing democracy. While the initial citation suggests that 
either democratization promotes movements, or movements support democratization, the 
question merits a more detailed answer. Tilly in his articles on democratization thought 
about the second (Tilly 1993/1994). The thesis thus retraces the influence of selected 
Tunisian organizations in terms of framing democracy and its diffusion. This allows a better 
understanding of the role and importance of movements and organizations in post-2011 
Tunisia. Not only organizations supporting democratization, but also conservative, less 
favorable organizations exist, which can produce counter framings to democracy-oriented 
organizations and challenge actors in the public discussion (Deane 2013). As a consequence, 
                                                     
1 For a discussion on the term Arab Spring look for example Al-Sumait et al. 2015 who argue for the term Arab 
Uprisings. 
2 Dewey called it an injustice frame, a term that will become discussed later. 
3 For further literature on the stability of the old regime see also: Geisser 2012; Gaub 2014; Bayat 2017; Haas 
and Lesch 2013; El-Khawas 2012; Pace and Cavatorta 2012; Schraeder and Redissi 2011; Zemni 2015; Brownlee 
et al. 2015; Camau 2012; Hudson 2015; Schwedler 2015. 
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it is not just important to analyze how movements frame democracy, but also whether state 
actors consider those and adopt a framing of democracy. 
 
Although the literature acknowledges that movements played a main role and still influence 
democratization processes, researchers often state without explanation that there is 
influence of organizations (on the important role see: Stepan 2012; Chomiak 2016; Clark 
2012; Brownlee et al. 2015). It is not clear how Tunisian civil society ensures links towards 
the state and transmits ideas. In addition, little is known on the Tunisian political system and 
the interaction between movements and the state. While literature on the initial uprisings 
becomes abundant, there is still a blind spot when it comes to civil society influence in post-
2011 Tunisia in a changed political system with a new constitution and renewed institutions. 
Consequentially, the thesis takes up the concept of diffusion of ideas and ideational impact 
and analyses the influence of four organizations on Tunisian ministries, directly and via 
public discussions. As the change of the system towards a democracy was an important 
outcome of the uprisings, democracy and how it is framed by organizations (democratic 
framing) and the state (represented by ministries) will be an element of analysis. Retracing 
connections between movements and the state as well as their quality allows to identify 
mechanisms for diffusion. However, little research exists on the ideational impact of 
movements and the connection of democratic framing, movement impact and networks4. 
Movements may support democracy passively using granted liberties or actively promoting 
ideas about democracy. As little is known about framing impact of movements and less in a 
Tunisian context, the research is to a large part inductive and exploratory. The approach is 
constructivist in the sense that perceptions are seen as shaped in interaction. 
 
To find an answer on the current influence of some organizations as part of movements in 
post-2011 Tunisia, the thesis uses a qualitative analysis of three types of data: Thirty-eight 
semi-structured interviews, media reports from the two main French-writing newspapers 
and documents provided by the organizations. Leaders of organizations as well as civil 
servants in ministries were interviewed on their conceptions of democracy as well as on 
                                                     
4 Two notable exceptions include Glenn (2015) who connects democracy and framing arguing on a democratic 
master frame for the democratization after the end of the Cold War. Hadden (2015) connects framing, 
networks and outcomes to show how strategies and actions, but also framing content influence especially the 
divisions within the international environmental movement. 
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their contacts towards each other. Building on this data, the framing of democracy is 
analyzed to determine whether movements and ministries understand democracy in the 
same way. The idea is to identify a framing that gets diffused through mechanisms, the latter 
identified by retracing networks towards each other. Those mechanisms are generally 
distinguished between direct elements like personal or organizational contacts, 
institutionalized access in committees as well as public elements that get mediated via the 
public. The media analysis enables to account for the second form of influence, the influence 
via public discussions and allows to identify whether democratic framing by organizations 
gets heard in public. The diffusion of democratic framing can consequentially take two 
forms, direct interaction and indirect interaction mediated by for example the media. 
 
The thesis starts with a detailed problem formulation, research questions and a discussion 
on its relevance before outlining the context and descriptions of the four analyzed 
organizations. Chapter two is devoted to a literature review and theory building, before 
chapter three explains the methods. The empirical chapters include chapter four on the 
relations between actors, chapter five on the framings by organizations and chapter six on 
the framings by civil servants. The idea is to first verify whether and what kind of 
connections exist for the organizations analyzed to show whether interactions are frequent 
or not, thereby enabling or excluding certain mechanisms of diffusion. By looking at the 
ways framing can be diffused, chapter four establishes what ministries are relevant for the 
analyzed organizations, as well as whether those organizations work alone or in a coalition. 
The ministerial perspective that verifies whether those relations are similarly perceived by 
the ministerial side is a second element of chapter four. Chapter five then uses the framing 
of democracy by organizations to show what kind of democratic framing is present among 
organizations (single framing) and across organizations (coalitional framing). Having outlined 
the framing of and across organizations, chapter six then takes the ministerial perspective 
and outlines their democratic framing which is compared to the individual and collective 
movement perspective. Chapter seven takes up findings from chapters four to six and shows 
the mechanisms of diffusion by which organizations can exercise ideational influence as well 
as those that are not working well. Chapter seven establishes a link between frame diffusion 
and wider outcomes. The final chapter eight summarizes the results and gives ideas for 
future research. 
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1.1 Introduction of the context, problem, research question and cases 
The first chapter outlines the role of movements and civil society for the Tunisian context 
and discusses and problematizes the research question that guides the thesis. The first part 
describes the relevance of the research, before the context of Tunisia is outlined. As not 
every reader is familiar with the Tunisian political system and the developments since the 
2010 Uprisings, the factors influencing the initial uprisings, the relevant political aspects at 
the time of analysis as well as the situation in terms of protest and movement activities are 
outlined. The third section of chapter one is devoted to a case description of the four 
analyzed organizations where similarities and differences as well as the reasons for their 
inclusion are discussed. Like for every chapter, a short conclusion sums up the main 
elements of the chapter. 
1.1.1 Influential movements or just overenthusiastic researchers? 
Tunisia developed from a closed autocracy to a political system that appears to rely on civil 
society and movement activity (see literature on the role of movements and civil society 
above). As little research exists on the relations between civil society and the state, hardly 
anything can be said on whether this represents reality. To fill this gap, mechanisms by 
which movements can take ideational influence and position their ideas are formulated. 
While organizations have regularly internal discussions, they equally argue and frame 
problems and enter into claim-making vis-à-vis the state (at least the organizations analyzed, 
as will be outlined later not all movements or organizations have claims towards the state). 
This discussion may be concrete with the responsible person at a ministry, or may be 
realized via media or the public as well as via protest. Through those interactions, framings 
on democracy are exchanged and can get integrated. If movements have a clear framing of 
democracy (something to show equally) at least parts of this framing should be taken over 
by state actors, especially if we think about a strong civil society and a relatively weak state 
administration5. On the other hand, movements can change their own framing in order to 
align with the state and to make their own framing more suitable to state framing. In any 
case, interaction is expected to make framing similar to a certain degree that should be 
identifiable through the research. While I primarily state that movements or organizations 
                                                     
5 The argument builds on Kriesi et al. (1995) who state that civil society becomes a resource in terms of 
expertise and knowledge when administration is weak. As will be shown later, administration in Tunisia has 
effectively limited resources following several changes after the Uprisings that should be favorable towards the 
inclusion of civil society. If proposals in general are transmitted, this should then similarly be true for 
perceptions of democracy that get equally transmitted when exchanging on topics. 
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can influence the state, it shall be verified at the end, whether it is not the state that 
influences movements. 
 
At the moment, it is neither clear what framings on democracy exist among movements, nor 
what type of democratic framing can be identified among state representatives. A better 
comprehension of the movements’ and state’s perspective on democracy can indicate what 
type of democracy is desired. Less democratic perceptions can be highlighted in the framing. 
From a normative perspective, best practices towards democratic ideals are identifiable. 
 
In addition, networks among civil society in Tunisia have not been retraced on a national 
level leaving us with limited knowledge on network structures. Neither have contacts or 
mechanisms of influence been identified. New knowledge on interaction, ideational 
influence of movements and organizations and the state can be generated. 
 
To analyze the impact and framing of movements, four organizations have been selected 
representing wider movements. The choice is based on different fields of activities, such as 
the women movement, the human rights movement, the labor movement as well as the 
environmental movement. The organizations allow not only to compare across topics, but 
also in terms of resources, members, and repertoires among other factors. The diversity of 
organizations allows to retrace whether those factors matter, so whether for example a 
larger organization has more ideational influence. In addition, their framing of democracy is 
expected to vary according to their field of activity. The Union Générale Tunisienne du 
Travail (UGTT), the Association Tunisienne de Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), the Forum 
Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux (FTDES) and the Ligue Tunisienne pour la 
Défense des droits de l’Homme (LTDH) are included. All except the FTDES were officially 
allowed under Ben Ali but more or less repressed. All have organizational structures that 
easily allow to identify leaders. Three (ATFD, FTDES, LTDH) qualify as organizations as part of 
larger movements, while the UGTT is a labor union, something discussed later in detail. The 
FTDES is one of few working on environmental aspects, but also on other aspects like 
migration. On the state side, the focus is on ministries and their interaction with movements 
as well as their democratic framing. While parliament and other state levels or political 
parties would be equally interesting to analyze, ministries are an important part of different 
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stages of the policy process that can allow a wider diffusion of ideas. In addition, the 
Tunisian party system is not yet well developed, while the administration at least existed 
under Ben Ali (although different, especially personnel, changes occurred). Using the four 
organizations as well as twelve ministries, different mechanisms and degrees of interaction 
as well as degrees of similar framing can be identified. The analysis thus includes cases with 
little interaction as well as with intense interaction to show differences and similarities. 
1.1.2 Research Question 
The research question leading the thesis is “How does a democratic framing diffuse across 
actors in Tunisia?” 
 
The research explains how civil society diffuses democratic framing and thereby democracy 
to state representatives in Tunisia. When democracy is well integrated into the framing of 
movements, they not only promote specific causes but also democracy. In interaction with 
the state, they try to convince civil servants on their own perspective and specific framings. 
The question responds to the missing knowledge on state-movement interactions in Tunisia 
as well as on the transmission of ideas in the form of democratic framing. As was shown 
earlier, research on post-2011 state-civil society interaction in Tunisia remains very limited 
although authors acknowledge an important role of the civil society. 
 
To answer the question, three distinct, but linked elements of theory are used, namely 
interaction, framing and diffusion as part of an outcome oriented literature. Democracy 
related aspects are a focus (democratic framing). The combination of networks and 
ideational influence allows to retrace mechanisms of influence of movements and 
organizations. This framing diffusion can take different channels like direct interaction, 
indirect links (via the media or public opinion) and joint links (both types; the approach is 
inspired by the impact model of Giugni and Passy 2003). If there is more interaction through 
for example direct face-to-face discussions, then framing of organizations and civil servants 
should resemble each other. 
 
In order to answer the question, the links of the four organizations and their relations 
towards the state are identified to verify whether organizations actually target the state (and 
which part). The networks of organizations enable to evaluate whether there is a single 
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influence by one organization or a coalitional by several organizations. In chapter four the 
relations of the ministries towards civil society actors are outlined. Afterwards the framing of 
democracy by organizations and state actors are outlined and compared. This allows to 
identify whether and what type of democracy is actively promoted, or whether a different 
cause is promoted and democracy comes as a by-product. In addition, it allows to evaluate 
the common elements across organizations but also towards the state. Finally, the 
interaction between the state and civil society is regarded in order to identify which 
mechanisms are used to promote a democratic framing. The final step summarizes the 
influence of organizations in terms of framing and evaluates the possibility of a wider 
influence on policies. Different sub-questions that guide each chapter are built in the theory 
chapter (see 2.6.3). 
1.1.3 The relevance of the thesis 
The contributions of this thesis are of theoretical and empirical nature. From a theoretical 
perspective especially the combination, but also testing of theories on ideational influence, 
framing and networks are major contributions. From an empirical point of view the thesis 
adds to the very few empirical studies on post-2011 Tunisia and generates knowledge on the 
political system. I emphasize the contribution to the research on influence of framing, the 
combination of different theoretical approaches such as frame diffusion and networks, the 
contributions to the study of democracy and the new context for knowledge generation.  
Influence of democratic framing 
The research is particularly relevant from a perspective on ideational influence of 
movements and organizations. This perspective is linked to the wider literature on outcomes 
that is limited. As Rasler puts it, there is currently little information why and how contention 
is successful (Rasler 2016). This is also related to methodological problems in identifying 
causal chains (Giugni 2009; Kolb 2007; Amenta 2005). Consequentially, a number of scholars 
turned their attention to mechanisms of influence that could indicate causal chains. Andrews 
for example underlined the importance of mechanisms through which organizations 
influence institutions (Andrews 2001; similarly, Kolb asks to focus on processes and 
mechanism Kolb 2007). More related to Northern Africa, Bennani-Chraïbi underlined the 
importance of mechanism and processes for change in Northern Africa (Bennani-Chraïbi 
2017). While some models are identified, those are not often tested in different empirical 
contexts (Giugni and Passy 2003; since 2003 this did not change much although some more 
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studies like Hadden 2015 exist). The results from the thesis add to the literature on framing 
outcomes and identify which mechanisms enable organizations to influence the state. While 
the focus is on diffusion and its mechanisms, the research builds the basis for other analysis 
on movement outcomes. The research enlarges the existent literature to a Tunisian context 
and towards specific elements, namely framing of democracy that becomes an element of 
analysis. Outcomes in terms of framing are even less researched. 
 
Studies on framing impacts are limited and studies on outcomes indicating the importance 
of framing independent of opportunities or resources are even rarer (Polletta and Ho 2006; 
Martin, G. 2015). Framing literature is seen as not systematic and is not comparing across 
different organizations, adding additional relevance for comparing the framing of several 
organizations (Benford 1997). In this research, the analysis of framing is connected with 
diffusion of ideas. By focusing on ministries as representing the state, the research shows 
how framings enter into different parts of the administration and highlight how those ideas 
can contribute to policy influence. The study explores the movement-state relationship and 
the chances of influencing a state in transition. 
Combining frame diffusion and networks 
This work aims to develop the literature on movement and organizational influence by 
combining the mechanisms of diffusion with networks and framing. The combination of 
different theoretical perspectives is a main contribution. Already Kriesi advocated to 
combine theories on social movements with revolutions, democratization or nationalism, 
but also with theories on interest groups, communication or electoral studies (Kriesi 2009). 
Similarly, della Porta called to bring social movement theory into the study of democratic 
transitions (della Porta 2016). This combination of different sections of the social movement 
theory such as framing, networks and outcomes but also theories on democracy is at the 
heart of this thesis and contributes to different fields of research. 
 
Networks are one of those research fields. The network structures of organizations tell much 
about how organizations try to take influence. As Knoke and Wisely underline: “Analyzing 
the structure of interactions among SMOs and among SMOs and the polity members is 
critical to any comprehensive understanding of a movement’s rise and fall” (Knoke and 
Wisely 1990:77). Linking the structure and internal perspective of networks and outcomes is 
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a relatively new research field (Hadden 2015). Recent studies include Diani’s work on the 
cement of civil society (Diani 2015). As he outlines, relational patterns between actors, 
whether movement organizations cooperate or whether they prefer working alone, matter 
for outcomes (Diani 2015). Coalitions are not necessarily pro-democratic and also 
antidemocratic coalitions exist in transitioning countries (Bermeo and Yashar 2016). In this 
sense, interaction through established networks in Tunisia can show which actors are better 
positioned and more influential. 
The study of democracy 
The study adds to the literature on democratic transition (“transitology”) and investigates a 
field that became prominent over years: The role of the civil society for democratization 
processes (Linz and Stepan 2010; Norton 1995; Bermeo 1997; Mercer 2002; Tilly 1993 and 
1994; LeBas 2011; Johnston 2014). As the Arab Spring showed, democratization is not always 
easy. Despite having deficits in terms of civil liberties and press and Internet freedom, 
Tunisia was the first in the MENA region to be declared “free” by Freedom House, an 
international index measuring democracy (Fagan 2015). However, just in 2014, the Freedom 
House Index ranked Tunisia as only ‘partly free’ – thus not entirely democratic -, while other 
countries like Egypt clashed back from ‘partly free’ in 2013 towards ‘not free’ in 2014 
(Freedom House 2013; Freedom House 2014a). Tunisia showed great improvements, while    
other countries in the region clashed back to autocracy. Tunisia today is still to be seen in a 
wider context of the Arab Spring. Dupont and Passy stated: “The Arab Spring is a formidable 
terrain to improve our knowledge as it adds new social and political contexts for studying 
protest politics” (Dupont and Passy 2011:448, in a similar direction argue Diani and Moffatt 
2016). Tunisia is the most promising candidate for a democratic and peaceful transition in 
the region (Smith 2013; Sadiki 2015; Risse and Babayan 2015; Brownlee et al. 2015). Those 
elements make it particularly valuable to identify success factors and best practices that can 
be used to distinguish the Tunisian case from others. Apart from the scientific relevance, the 
social relevance is highlighted as successful models for democratization through civil society 
can be identified. 
 
An additional scientific interest lies in testing qualitative measures of democracy in a 
different context (see for example Lauth 2011). As empirical evidence on qualitative 
measures of democracy is still missing, the research contributes to fill this gap. Scientists 
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often see democracy in a Western context. After the end of the Cold War, researchers 
discussed whether democracy is the last remaining successful political structure, while states 
in Northern Africa remained autocratic for a long time until the Arab Spring. The changed 
circumstances give new opportunities for research as King et al. state “observations from a 
different time period, or even a different part of the world may provide additional 
observable implications of a theory” (King et al. 1994:48). 
A new context for testing theories and generating empirical findings 
The scientific relevance of the topic is high as it gives insights on social movements and 
organizations in a non-Western context. Scholars such as Amenta criticize the focus on 
movement consequences in democratic and especially the U.S. context (Amenta 2014). Bosi 
and Uba state that “the consequences of mobilization in Western Europe have been 
examined less frequently, and even less is known about the outcomes of social movements 
in other regions” and that applying the theory to new contexts tests the theory and helps to 
nuance the arguments (Bosi and Uba 2009:411). In addition, the Middle East and Northern 
Africa has “been on the sidelines” of social movement theory (Beinin and Vairel 2013). 
 
Although a lot is known about the initial Tunisian Uprisings as mentioned earlier, knowledge 
about current political configurations is limited and especially civil society-state relationships 
are not well researched. This surprises given that researchers assign the importance of civil 
society as mentioned earlier. Comprehension of the Tunisian consolidation of democracy 
may provide insights for other countries of the region or in the world. The thesis thus adds 
to fill several blind spots; be it on the ideational influence of movements, network 
configurations and mechanisms, democracy and frame diffusion or the regional knowledge 
on Tunisia and the Arab Spring. 
 
Before detailing more on the theoretical basis in relation to networks, framing and diffusion, 
the national context is outlined to gain a better understanding of actors and developments. 
1.2 The context: a country on its way towards democracy 
This section familiarizes readers with the context of the Tunisian revolution and its 
aftermath. As we have seen before, much literature on the initial uprisings, some on the 
political system and much less on political processes after 2011 exist. The aim is to give a 
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short overview on the younger historical and current context in which the state and 
organizations operate. This context oriented the interviews and media reporting and is 
integral for their understanding. I am looking at a specific point in time, while the process of 
transition from one political system to another is an ongoing process. Thus, actors and 
processes can change over time and require a short elaboration on the situation that 
influenced the time of analysis. The description of the context is part of a literature review 
that is only oriented towards the country in question. The literature review on theory 
follows in the second chapter. 
 
It is not the idea to go into detail into the pre-revolution context under Ben Ali or to give a 
complete history on Tunisian political development including for example colonialism or the 
Bourguiba phase, but to give an overview on younger developments. The order is 
chronological and the description of the political context selective on certain key events that 
are important to understand the Tunisian context. Starting with the 2011 uprisings, a first 
review on the Tunisian revolution reveals the main drivers for change and describes the role 
of organizations and movements for this development. A number of scholars highlight 
different reasons for protest and underline the role of some of the analyzed organizations. In 
the following, the development of the political system like the new constitution is outlined. 
Taking the revolution as starting point of recent Tunisian history, the chapter gives later an 
overview on the political context at the time of interviews (between 2015 and 2016) to put 
the analysis in context. Finally, the situation of movements and civil society is described and 
main actors are identified, before section one point three introduces the four organizations. 
1.2.1 How democracy started in Tunisia: from the initial uprisings towards a democratic 
political system  
This section gives an overview on the initial time frame from the revolution to the setting up 
of a democratic political system6. It starts by outlining the factors favorable for the initial 
Uprisings before summarizing main developments since the Uprisings as those still motivate 
ongoing protest activities and claim making as is shown later. Important milestones like the 
new constitution or the first elections are presented. 
                                                     
6 For a good overview on the developments so far see ATFD 2011b. 
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Research on the initial protest 
A wide range of literature analyzed the persistent autocracy before the revolution. Tunisia 
was a prototype of a police state with a clear leader and a system based on surveillance and 
fear, as well as “very limited pluralism” (Bennani-Chraïbi 2017:8; compare also Grewal 2016; 
Hmed 2015; Daguzan 2017). Filiu reminds, “only puppet opposition and government-
inspired “NGOs” (GONGOs) were not facing restriction and harassment” (Filiu 2011:15). 
Similarly, Ayari recalls that especially student activists got imprisoned under Ben Ali. Ben Ali 
reigned since 1987 where he overturned the former leader Bourguiba, who is still seen as 
the father of independence (Ayari 2016). Before the uprisings, elections have been 
manipulated and the presidential party controlled the political space (Murphy 2016). Filiu 
reminds that Arabs have often been seen as exceptional in terms of democratic attitudes, a 
belief that was destroyed by the Arab Spring (Filiu 2011). 
 
In the beginning literature on Tunisia and its transition was based on NGO or think tank 
reports as well as early articles on the transition that were very descriptive. From 2016 
onwards, scientific articles multiplied, became abundant and gained more prominence7. A 
number of international think tanks, like the International Crisis Group or Freedom House, 
occasionally provide reports on the developments in Tunisia, related to elections and current 
political developments (International Crisis Group 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018 or Freedom 
House 2014a and b). These reports are used because they provide on-the-ground knowledge 
that supplements academic literature, although it is less systematic and can include 
organizational bias. One part of the literature is country specific; on the other hand, plenty 
of research compares the macro-level perspective on the Arab Spring. 
 
A number of researchers underline that protest movements developed in Tunisia over the 
last years of Ben Ali, illustrated by the protests in 2008 or Ben Guerdance or Regueb in 20108 
(Hibou 2011a; Volpi et al. 2016; Yousfi 2015; Lim 2013; Bayat 2013; Alexander 2011b; Beinin 
2014; Chomiak 2011; Allal 2013; Marks 2015; Zemni 2015; Willis 2016; Murphy 2016; Hmed 
2012). Yousfi highlights that the 2008 protests were already supported by ATFD, LTDH, 
opposition parties and emigrated Tunisians abroad (Yousfi 2015). Less concrete, Mallat and 
                                                     
7 Consequentially the literature basis was rather limited at the beginning and expanded during the research. 
8 For an overview on protest data in relation to Tunisia see Della Porta 2016, however some caution is 
necessary as discussed later. 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
14 
 
  
Mortimer insist that resistance existed throughout the Arab region before 2011 and that 
especially resistance in Tunisia “was not all expressed in the street” (Mallat and Mortimer 
2016:12). Notwithstanding, Allal warns to see the protests between 2008 and 2010 as 
necessary precondition, because logics of engagement were different for the 2010/2011 
uprisings (Allal 2012). As Beau and Lagarde or Gelvin underline, the protest remained limited 
to some areas, where protest was then oppressed by the regime and unionists were 
arrested (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Gelvin 2015). However, in the retro perspective, Volpi et 
al. argue that especially bottom-up challenges were not seen as powerful and sustained 
enough and thus ignored in favor of explaining stability in Tunisia and the region (Volpi et al. 
2016). Thus, while protest existed, it was mainly ignored by researchers or seen as marginal. 
The Uprisings then turned scholars’ attention to protest activities. 
Protest and its diverse reasons 
A major part of research on Tunisia analyzes the initial processes of transition, where the 
role of extraordinary social movements and their unexpected development is analyzed 
(Hibou 2011b). Regarding protest and its spread, especially in the beginning of the transition, 
scholars like Angrist, Schraeder and Redissi or Clancy-Smith provide university-educated 
youth unemployment, unemployment following the 2008 crisis, rising food prices, 
facilitation through social media and diversity of those protesting as important factors 
(Angrist 2013; Schraeder and Redissi 2011; Clancy-Smith 2013). Several scholars argue in a 
similar direction (Kilani 2014; Zemni 2015; Willis 2016; Chalcraft 2016; Sela 2016; Wolf and 
Lefèvre 2012; Hinnebusch 2018; regarding food prices Gelvin 2015; Dakhli 2014). Further 
explanations refer to the political economy, material factors, but also emotions, norms and 
values (Hibou 2011b; Chomiak 2016, regarding emotions Merone 2013; regarding moral 
condemnation Zeghal 2013). Others place economic factors more prominently: El-Khawas 
states that the regime change “was not a cry for democracy but a demand for jobs” (El-
Khawas 2012:8; in a similar direction argue Amami 2013; Moumneh 2011; Chomiak 2011; 
Hibou 2011a; Beinin 2016). Bayat goes further and relates the uprisings to the neoliberal 
economic orientation as well as the neoliberal city like Tunis (Bayat 2017). Activists linked 
demands for democracy with social and economic claims (Yousfi 2013a). 
 
Others see it as purely anti-Ben Ali and anti-regime movement nourished by corruption of 
the regime and mismanagement (Ferjani 2011; regarding corruption: Smith 2013; Gherib 
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2012; Clancy-Smith 2013; Allal 2013; Allal and Pierret 2013; Sela 2016; Filiu 2011). Anderson 
takes a mixture of those perspectives, when she states that a range from “aging leaders and 
corrupt and ineffectual governments to their educated, unemployed, and disaffected youth” 
explains the protests not only in Tunisia, but in the whole region (Anderson 2011:2). Allal, 
Lecompte and Zemni underline the diversity of backgrounds and reasons for protest (Allal 
2012; Allal 2013; Lecompte 2013; Zemni 2015). On the other hand, Hmed emphasizes the 
religious and ethnic homogeneity in Tunisia as well as the presence of the state that avoided 
wider conflict (Hmed 2011). Volpi argues that protest was not a strategy to highlight socio-
economic or political tensions and does not explain the sudden eruption of protest (Volpi 
2017). Mallat and Mortimer underline the non-violent perspective of protest that was 
important for its success (Mallat and Mortimer 2016). As we see from the very diverse and 
different explanations, researchers do not see one factor as particularly important, but 
several ones as contributing. 
A leaderless movement and its diversity 
While organizations were initially not included in the protest, they took over at a later point. 
Allal as well as other scholars underline that not the organized civil society organizations 
influenced the revolution, especially neither the UGTT nor Islamist activists, but the protest 
without leader, command or structure (Allal 2013; Filiu 2011; Ayari 2013; Hibou 2011a). 
Haugbølle and Cavatorta highlight that neither parties, nor Unions or politicians did start the 
protest and it was more horizontal and unstructured (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2014; 
Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012). While this is true for the initial protest, it contradicts other 
descriptions of a use of existing structure especially for the UGTT. Haugbølle and Cavatorta 
underline the role of social movements and ordinary citizens as “agents of change” 
(Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2014). It was especially the UGTT (local level) that played a key 
role for the mobilization and spread during the transition and as mediator (national level) 
following the end of the old regime (Allal 2012; International Crisis Group 2014; Bishara 
2014; Angrist 2013; Beinin 2016; regarding the transition: Mizouri 2012; Elloumi 2013; 
Brownlee et al. 2015; Murphy 2016; Hmed 2012). Murphy underlines that the LTDH and the 
Committee for the Defense of Liberties and Human Rights played a role (Murphy 2016). 
Yousfi argues in a similar direction, that the UGTT is not only a labor union, but “rather a 
political organization where social claims have historically been closely linked to political and 
national claims” (Yousfi 2013b:23, in a similar direction argue Brownlee et al. 2015). Kerrou 
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supplements that beneath trade union activists, lawyers, cyber-activists and unemployed 
graduates played a key role (Kerrou 2013). However, political parties have been absent from 
the initial protest (Wolf 2014a). 
 
Schraeder and Redissi state that it was particularly important, that “old and young, men and 
women, urbanities and rural dwellers, and professionals along with blue-collar workers” 
participated in the movements (Schraeder and Redissi 2011:13). In a similar direction argue 
Gaub, Behr or Camau saying that a wide alliance of society members ensured change (Gaub 
2014; Behr 2012; Camau 2012). It has thus been a great variety of the population that got 
mobilized. Angrist discusses the non-involvement of the military as well as the mobilization 
of formerly silent people and even co-opted ones (Angrist 2013, regarding the military also 
Mongin 2011; Brownlee et al. 2015; Nepstad 2015; Filiu 2011; Volpi 2017; Bennani-Chraïbi 
2017; Lynch 2014a). The non-involvement leads directly to the next point, a possible failure 
in repression. 
A failure in repression 
Some researchers describe the ongoing mobilization for toppling the regime as failure in 
repression (Camau 2012). Honwana adds that the Tunisian government might have been 
able to handle protest by just one group of the population like the poor and marginalized, 
but as protest enclosed different political classes and religious and social groups across 
different age groups and locations, it allowed Tunisians to topple the government (Honwana 
2013). Wolf sees loss of control and missing own mobilization of the RCD as important 
factors (Wolf 2017). Similarly, Bennani-Chraïbi argues that repressive responses of the state 
showed an inadequate crisis management that led to a perceived loss of power (Bennani-
Chraïbi 2017). In addition, the abruptness of the revolution and the high speed are 
underlined as Ben Ali had been forced out of power within one month (El-Khawas 2012; 
Ferjani 2011). On the other hand, Ayari brings unique explanations, namely, that clientelistic 
resources of the RCD declined especially in Sidi Bouzid causing reduced loyalty towards the 
regime (Ayari 2013). 
 
Another often-disregarded point is that not only collective mobilization against Ben Ali, but 
also counterdemonstrations, so pro-regime demonstrations occurred (Stewart et al. 2015). 
In relation to counter-measures against protest, Willis underlines some mistakes by the 
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regime, namely shooting of demonstrators and incapacity to control the Internet as decisive 
for the initial revolution (Willis 2016). However, the issue of counter mobilization and 
counter framing raise the question on whether those frames still exist today. 
Breaking a taboo and framing 
Beneath changed power relations, researchers underline more cognitive factors. Hibou and 
others stress, that Tunisians broke a taboo when protesting, namely the one of fear and 
silent obligation (Hibou 2011b; Bessis 2011; Hmed 2012). Here a notion of agency and 
mobilization in the sense that protest became a veritable mean of protest can be found. 
 
Halverson et al. focus on the narrative of the self-immolation. They underline the description 
of Mohamed Bouazizi – the one who immolated himself – as martyr - and as a victim of the 
government (Halverson et al. 2013; Hibou and Kadri 2011; Kilani 2014; Filiu 2011; DeGeorges 
2013; for a critical analysis of the ‘white lies’ in relation to Bouazizi see Lim 2013). Jasper 
underlines the importance of “moral shocks” for creating injustice frames that are 
connected with blame and outrage and Nepstad as well as Khatib describe the self-
immolation as a trigger (Jasper 1998; Nepstad 2015; Khatib 2016). Chalcraft remarks that 
self-immolations due to desperate situations existed before but had not the same effect 
(Chalcraft 2016). It was a ‘win’ of the master frame on Bouazizi over Ben Ali’s framing as 
underlined by Lim (2013). The initial injustice frame seemed to play an important role for the 
mobilization during the transition where the death of Bouazizi created outrage connected 
with anti-regime sentiments, it is however not the only factor. Shortly summarized, the 
initial injustice of the confiscation of a young street vendors cart is discussed from diverse 
perspectives and explications vary, while especially Gamson warns about seeing it as only 
factor (Gamson 2011). There have been a number of facilitating elements like the social 
media coverage of the events. 
A social media uprising? 
Another often-discussed aspect of the uprisings in Tunisia is the role of social media. Breuer 
for example uses citations from interviews and analyzes how videos showed the injustices 
like women beaten or people killed and contributed to the emotional mobilization of protest 
(Breuer 2016). While many scholars contest that social media use caused the revolution, 
researchers see it as crucial factor for its achievements or at least for its speed in interaction 
with other factors (in a different direction argue: Halverson et al. 2013; Kilani 2014; Kahlaoui 
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2013; on the limited role also Alimi 2016; Filiu 2011; Lecompte 2013; Markham 2014; for 
taking it as an accelerator argue: Elloumi 2013; Toska 2015; McGarty et al. 2013; Alexander 
2011a; Breuer 2016; Hussain and Howard 2013; Diani and Moffatt 2016; Lynch 2014b). 
Others warn, that social media is not only a mean for democracy, but is equally used by 
autocrats (Gunitsky 2015; Breuer 2016). It needs to be underlined that acceleration played a 
role in toppling the Tunisian regime (see for example Rossi and della Porta 2015). 
 
Zuckerman or Ayari note that Tunisians went to the streets not due to Facebook or 
WikiLeaks but due to frustration (Zuckerman 2011; Ayari 2013). Martin or Mallat and 
Mortimer underline that offline activism still plays an important role (Martin, A. 2015; Mallat 
and Mortimer 2016). Zayani describes, that Facebook is not only supporting political 
activism, but also access to information and to misinformation (Zayani 2016). 
Off the radar 
A different explanation lies on the international level. Gerges, who takes an international 
relations perspective, demands regarding the protest “in a broader set of global dynamics, 
causes, and discourses” and argues for the “power of norms, such as human rights, justice, 
equality, and dignity” (Gerges 2015:11). Nepstad identifies close ties towards Western 
democracies that influenced the initial revolution, especially because the discourse on 
human rights and democratic liberties between Western and autocratic leaders poses 
dilemmas for autocratic leaders to lose those ties in case of protest repression or to enable 
more protest by insisting on these values (Nepstad 2015). 
 
Willis underlines, that Tunisia was off the radar for Western powers and thus no foreign 
influence caused or strongly oriented the Tunisian revolution (Willis 2016). Similarly, 
Hinnebusch notices the relatively low interference by international actors that can have 
been conducive to its development as international intervention can also have negative 
consequences (for example Libya; Hinnebusch 2018). 
Other (non-) explications 
A point, not highlighted by other scholars is the “element of Tunisian national culture, 
attachment to values of procedure, process, and forms of legality, rather than a simple 
aversion to violence” (Willis 2016:52). This would have been particularly important for the 
ongoing democratization. The notion of compromise and dialogue that is dominant in the 
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political system is positive for democratization as it goes against violent conflict resolution. 
Other explanations emphasize the role of music or culture among others (Filiu 2011). The 
role of religion as hindering or supporting the initial uprisings is however rejected by scholars 
(Filiu 2011, while Ennahdha was forbidden under Ben Ali, they played no role during the 
initial uprisings, but became more important later on). The list of different explications can 
probably be enlarged, it was however the aim to highlight some important ones. Given the 
multitude of factors it is doubtful whether researchers will ever agree on a limited set of 
necessary or sufficient conditions for the uprisings. 
Not one cause, but several contributing factors 
To summarize, researchers agree that it is difficult to identify one cause for the uprisings. 
Brownlee et al. assign in relation to the Arab Spring: “Until now readers have encountered 
important explanatory variables – from the uses of social media to the calculations of 
repressive agencies to the power of diffusion - but seldom found an overarching explanatory 
framework” (italics in original, Brownlee et al. 2015:8). The literature review reveals a list of 
initial factors that influenced the Tunisian regime change and scholars warn to use one-
cause explanations (Alimi 2016). Figure 1.1 summarizes the main factors that were 
mentioned, ranging from elements that refer to the economic system, to perceptions of the 
Ben Ali regime, spontaneous decisions of actors as well as the framing of developments. It is 
however difficult to identify a clear hierarchy and all factors appear to have contributed to 
the initial uprisings. 
Figure 1.1 Factors that influenced the Tunisian Uprisings of 2011 
 
Note: based on literature review, not hierarchical 
Elements 
of the 
Tunisian 
transition
Unemployment (especially graduates)
Economic downturn (Financial Crisis)
Corruption of the regime
Food Prices
Diversity of those protesting
Spread of images etc. through social media
Non-engagement of the military
Martyr Mohamed Bouazizi
Supporting Role of the UGTT
Anti-regime sentiment/ regime without morality/dignity
off the radar for international actors
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Having outlined several factors for the initial protest, that partially - like economic factors – 
still influence protest today, I now turn to the political system that developed from those 
contentious actions. 
The Tunisian political system 
While the initial role of movements is often debated, the ongoing role is seldom discussed. 
Much less literature exists on the political system that emerged out of the initial protest. 
Directly after the revolution, protest like the Kasbah I and Kasbah II protests put pressure on 
political actors to pursue the perspective of the revolution (Beau and Lagarde 2014). As a 
consequence, a constitutional assembly has been elected in 2011 and a new constitution 
was elaborated and accepted in 2014. Tunisia adopted a semi-presidential system (Koehler 
and Warkotsch 2014). 
 
Regarding the new constitution, scholars assigned that there is still “the shadow of the old 
constitution” (Bousbih and Yaalaoui 2015:20). Others outlined, that the constitution remains 
partly vague due to the search for compromise, but also that the constitution guarantees 
political freedoms and a separation of powers or freedom of opinion and freedom of speech 
(Hmed 2016; Böckenförde 2015). The compromise is a result of negotiations between 
various political actors including civil society9. During the process on the constitution, civil 
society pressured political parties to counter conservative, Islamic pressure exercised 
especially by Ennahdha (Beau and Lagarde 2014). Volpi underlined that the pre-
institutionalization of several actors in Tunisia supported the transformation towards 
democracy (Volpi 2017). Actors that existed already under Ben Ali, but which have been 
more or less sidelined, could now influence the constitutional process. This initial weight of 
the civil society still has consequences today as will be shown later. 
 
Other articles and reports emphasize the role of elections as Tunisia already held free and 
transparent elections in 2011 as well as the elections for parliament and for president in 
2014, but saw political violence like the assassination of politicians in 2013 (Hmed 2016; 
Reuters 2011; International Crisis Group 2013; Brownlee et al. 2015; Antonakis-Nashif 2013; 
Volpi et al. 2016). Further studies focus on the role of Ennahdha, the most important Islamic 
                                                     
9 For a very detailed overview of the negotiations and the system transformation see Brownlee et al. 2015 or 
Antonakis-Nashif 2013. 
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party in Tunisia and its role for democracy (Gerges 2013; Wolf 2014a and b). Since Nida 
Tounes won the Parliament Elections and Béji Caid Essebsi became president in the same 
year, a coalition formed the government under Prime Minister Habib Essid, who was 
replaced by the government Chahed in August 201610(for a detailed analysis of the elections 
see for example Wolf 2014b; Marks 2014). While the government Chahed is already the 
seventh since the revolution, the previous six governments were not a sign of political 
stability (Ratka and Roux 2016). No local elections have been held until end of 2016, but 
were realized in 201811. To summarize, Tunisia already hold several free and fair elections 
since the end of the Ben Ali regime and mainly two political parties (Nida Tounes and 
Ennahdha) gained seats in the 2014 elections, while several smaller parties exist. 
 
Honwana underlines that not only pro-democratic forces, but also members of the RCD, the 
old government party, demonstrated in the name of democracy for their inclusion (Honwana 
2013). A number of them got integrated in the new political system. Current president 
Essebsi served as minister in 1980 and President of Parliament under Ben Ali, but also 
expressed hostility towards Ben Ali (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Ghribi 2014). His party, Nida 
Tounes, is called a catchall party taking also old RCD members (Goujon 2015; Gana 2013; 
Willis 2016; Beinin 2016; Gelvin 2015; Wolf 2014a; Wolf 2017; Boubekeur 2015; Marks 
2014). While political parties are not a focus of analysis, the configuration with two 
important parties has nevertheless its influence on the perceptions by movement leaders as 
will be shown later. The inclusion of former party members in political parties is also a point 
of criticism that will be evoked later on. Given its influence, I shortly elaborate on the 
situation at the time of analysis. 
1.2.2 The political and economic situation at the time of analysis, 2015 and 2016 
The time of analysis – 2015 to 2016 - was not without changes in the political system. 
Following power struggles between former Prime Minister Essid and President Essebsi, the 
president designed Youssef Chahed as new head of government in summer 2016. Nine 
political parties, the UGTT and the UTICA have been involved in the negotiations for the new 
government and the pact of Carthage has been signed (Limburg 2016). Six political parties 
are involved in the government as well as several technocrats and even former members of 
                                                     
10 Composed of Ennahdha, Nida Tounes, The Free Patriotic Union and Prospects for Tunisia and Afek Tounes, 
Jamaoui 2015 
11 On the related problems see for example Volpi et al. 2016 
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the UGTT (Limburg 2016) 12. The coalition government until 2016 represented a neoliberal 
economic model and gave priority to fighting terrorism. Jamaoui or Hmed describe the 
coalition as right-wing (Jamaoui 2015; Hmed 2016). As the composition only changed 
slightly, the general orientation of the government remained the same except of a focus on 
fighting corruption. In 2016, a split within Nida Tounes, the party that originally won most 
seats during the elections, has caught the coalition. This split was foreseen by some analysts 
as a consequence of “lack of communication between the party’s MPs on the one level, and 
between members nominated either as ministers and secretaries of state or as the 
president’s assistants and advisors” (Jamaoui 2015:5; see also Wolf 2014b on different 
ideological positions within Nida Tounes)13. As a consequence of the internal divisions, Nida 
Tounes lost the status as biggest fraction to Ennahdha, the main Islamist party that has its 
origins in a social movement. Consequentially, parliamentary commissions were re-
attributed on the basis of strength of political blocs in spring 201614. 
 
Secular political parties have been criticized for a “lack of internal democracy” and the 
strong leader role of Essebsi for Nida Tounes (while Ennahdha has a stronger internal 
democracy; Wolf 2014a). Tunisian parties, except Ennahdha, are characterized by an 
underdeveloped internal structure and missing anchorage in society (Yardimici-Geyikci and 
Tür 2018). One also needs to mention the Destourian (constitution) movement, which was 
important during the fight for independence and which later transformed into the Neo-
Destour which became integrated in the former government party RCD (Wolf 2014b). The –
often-negative – mention of the Destourian appears several times in interviews. To 
summarize, the party system lacks resources and still changes a lot, while few parties appear 
as relatively stable elements of the system. 
 
Beneath the problems in the party system, the media landscape shows some problems. El 
Issawi underlines, that the Tunisian media was government controlled and consisted mainly 
                                                     
12 Composed of Ennahdha, Nida Tounes, Afek Tounes, Democratic and Social Path, Al Joumhouri, Democratic 
Alliance as well as a number of independents, see Directinfo (2016a). 
13 At the time of writing, the coalition, still under the Chahed government, underwent additional crisis. Caused 
by disputes between the Nida Tounes party leader and Prime Minister Chahed the latter formed a new bloc in 
parliament including new alliances, making his coalition the biggest bloc in parliament. Additional 
reconfigurations of the party belongings in parliament are under way at the time of writing in preparation for 
the elections of President foreseen for 2019. 
14 For an extensive overview on the Tunisian party system see Yardimici-Geyikci and Tür 2018, for an earlier 
overview Allal and Geisser 2011. 
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of monopolies, supervising all media outlets (El Issawi 2016). While a press code has been 
agreed on after the revolution, legally binding agreements are not ratified and the role of 
the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) is discussed (ibid). 
State owned media continued its operation following the revolution, but editorial teams 
changed (ibid). El Issawi criticizes that while many media platforms emerged, media 
production becomes barely the expression of opinions (ibid). Consequentially, the role of the 
media may be problematic in the sense that professional summaries of different positions 
are lacking. 
 
Corruption is another problem. There are a number of structural problems of transforming 
the old system and solving the issue of corruption (reports show existing corruption 
including ministerial levels: Aliriza 2016; Ratka and Roux 2016; International Crisis Group 
2015; International Crisis Group 2017). Civil society organizations also underline the lack of 
justice and criticize police violence or torture (Aliriza 2015a; Nawaat 2015). 
 
Problems of missing economic development like inadequate job creation and the threat of 
terrorism are other factors influencing the transition and democratization in Tunisia. Fighting 
terrorism for example restricts individual freedoms (World Bank 2014; Trabelsi 2014; Hmed 
2016; Alkebsi and Malouche 2015; Beinin 2016; Ratka 2017; Labidi 2014; Fatafta 2016). In 
addition, radicalization of the Tunisian youth who joins radical Salafist movements is a 
problem (Wolf 2013; see also Dworkin 2014). 
 
Cronyism and rent extraction are still in place years after the revolution and open security 
questions may make some Tunisians think of the secure Tunisia under Ben Ali (World Bank 
2014; International Crisis Group 2015). In addition, the feeling that coastal regions are 
preferred over those in the interior of the country rises (Burgess 2016; similarly underlining 
regional discrepancies: Boukhars 2017; Ratka 2017; Rousselin 2015; Daguzan 2017; Schäfer 
2017; Meddeb 2017). Notwithstanding different economic development, Tunisia is described 
as a very homogenous country (Gelvin 2015; Ayari 2016; Bennani-Chraïbi 2017). In relation 
to economic problems motivating protest, Chomiak argues, that “non-institutional and 
informal political contention will likely expand in scope, support, and activity in light of the 
public perception of looming economic austerity programs and contracted public sector” 
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(Chomiak 2016:3). Similarly, Youngs recalls: “The social drivers of the 2010-2011 revolution 
have not been addressed” (Youngs 2015:1; in a similar sense argue Dakhli 2013; Schmitter 
and Sika 2017). In addition, people get disenchanted with the revolution as researchers 
described (Cohen-Hadria 2017; Dworkin 2014). 
 
Zeghal sees a potential that “the authoritarian state founded by Bourguiba and re-
appropriated by Ben Ali might very well endure under a democratically elected government” 
(Zeghal 2013:270). She argues on the basis of the Islamism – secularists divide were Islamists 
used arguments of religious freedom to restrict freedom of expression. On the other hand, 
Haugbølle et al. underline that some old opposition forces strengthened their position and 
mention especially the quartet (Haugbølle et al. 2017)15. The research community is divided 
between pessimists who warn about an autocratic revival and optimists who see the 
transition towards democracy as finished as well as those in between that see some 
achievements but still many challenges. 
 
Tribes, which have been weakened under Ben Ali, are not seen as playing a major role in the 
Tunisian political system (Sadiki 2015). This appears less surprising given that scholars 
already underlined that kinship ties play a more important role in Islamic movements (Sigillo 
2016). On the other hand, one of the main political divisions (perhaps even a cleavage - to 
verify by future research) is between the youth and political elites. Political elites remain the 
same or “just” changed from the (suppressed) opposition to ministries or official positions, 
leaving the youth underrepresented. This is in line with young Tunisians losing trust in 
political institutions like the parliament (Yerkes 2016). 
 
The political situation appears more or less stable, dependent on phases. While government 
shifts and party disputes regularly re-erupt, the political system has stabilized as actors 
arranged with the system. Notwithstanding this acceptance of a democratic system, scholars 
outlined the inherent dangers of some actors that were already active under Ben Ali and 
whose commitment to democracy is unclear. In addition, economic problems prevail and 
some of the problems that caused the revolution are not solved causing regular unrest, a 
factor that is regarded in the following. 
                                                     
15 For an excellent overview on the role of the quartet and the national dialogue see Haugbølle et al. 2017 
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1.2.3 Movement activities at the time of analysis  
As the process of democratization is still ongoing, it is particularly relevant to enlarge the 
picture towards movements and civil society. Movements played a key role for the 
mobilizations in December 2010 and January 2011 (Paciello 2011; Stepan 2012). Existing 
intermediate level studies focus on the role of the UGTT during the transition; Yousfi’s dense 
and rich analysis for example offers insights on the functioning of the organization during the 
initial days of transition (Yousfi 2013b). Yousfi provides a short comment not only on the 
activities of the UGTT, but also the Tunisian Human Rights League and the Lawyers Union 
(Yousfi 2013a). Apart the UGTT, the LTDH or the ONAT, Chomiak highlights the role of the 
UDC, the Union of Unemployed Graduates (Chomiak 2016). While those descriptions of the 
initial uprisings are frequent, information on activities at the time of analysis are rare and 
systematic analysis even rarer. 
 
Researchers agree that civil society is strong and particularly syndicalist activities are 
important (Stepan 2012; Clark 2012; Brownlee et al. 2015; International Crisis Group 2014). 
For 2013 and 2014 for example numerous strikes and even violent protest has been 
reported (Martin and Rohac 2014; Clark 2012). Similarly, in their regular analysis of 
mobilization, the Tunisian Social Observatory, linked to the FTDES, reports between 280 and 
480 protest activities per month between April and June 2015, most of them on social and 
political issues (Observatoire Social Tunisien 2015). In January 2016, the same organization 
acknowledged even more than 1500 protest activities, most of them in Tunis and Gafsa 
(Observatoire Social Tunisien 2016). This augmentation of protest activities is also 
underlined by other sources for 2016 (Huffpost Tunisie 2016b). Protest in 2016 includes for 
example a strike in Ben Guerdane over border closure towards Libya, protest on Kerkennah 
on waste and other problems as well as protest in Kasserine following a suicide 
(Middleeasteye.net 2016; Marzouk 2016; Chomiak 2016; Burgess 2016). Protest like the one 
in Kasserine rests on a local level and follow what Chomiak calls the “logic of non-
institutionalized contention” (Chomiak 2016:2). Others like the protest in Kerkennah are 
brought to Tunis. 
 
Following the initial regime change, mobilization continued mostly in the interior of the 
country and remerges occasionally (Koehler and Warkotsch 2014; Boukhars 2017; Chomiak 
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2016). In the interior of the country, political marginalization is frequent and state 
authorities are not well accepted, while there is a divide between the pro-European cultural 
perspective in the north and east and the more traditional interior (Ratka and Roux 2016). 
 
Especially the role of the quartet, which received the Nobel Peace Prize, compromised of the 
UGTT, the ONAT, the UTICA and the LTDH, is important for the search for compromise at a 
difficult time with political assassinations in 2013 (Brownlee et al. 2015). In a critical phase, 
the national dialogue saved the revolution. Brownlee et al. and Ratka elaborate on the 
argument of compromise between political actors and see the origins in the configuration of 
the Tunisian system based on economic development and urbanization (Brownlee et al. 
2015; Ratka 2017). Notwithstanding, there are also scholars that speak of a “wishful 
projection” when describing the Arab Spring and mobilization as vibrant (Markham 2014). 
 
The role of movements and civil society today is partly related to the state. Especially the 
main labor union, the UGTT, plays a role and has close relations with the Tunisian state16. 
While the UGTT is originally a Labor Union, they acted as movement in times of transition. 
However, as Hibou or Mizouri describe, the role has been rather ambivalent before as Ben 
Ali, especially on the national level, coopted the UGTT (Hibou 2011b; Mizouri 2012). Other 
often connected and mobilizing actors include the women movement, represented among 
others by the ATFD (Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates), AFTURD (Association 
des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement) or CREDIF (Centre de 
Recherches, d'Etudes, de Documentation et d'Information sur la Femme), the human rights 
movement composed of LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la défense des Droits de l'Homme), 
Centre against Torture and others, and connected movements and organizations that 
express claims towards the state like the ONAT (Ordre National Des Avocats De Tunisie), the 
Association of Journalists or the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et 
Sociaux). Newer mobilizing structures include for example the platform Jamaity or initiatives 
like Tun’Act. Here, the possible divide, even cleavage, between young and existent elites, is 
present as well, between those who existed before the end of the Ben Ali regime and those 
who mobilized afterwards with different consequences on respective resources or networks. 
                                                     
16 Mentioned in own interviews, especially the four plus four format with four UGTT members of the national 
executive board and four ministers is to name, as will be detailed later. 
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While we have already seen that the four analyzed organizations are part of a larger network 
that will be verified later, I now turn to a detailed description of the four organizations. 
1.3 Case description of the analyzed organizations 
While the case selection is described in detail in chapter three, I shortly introduce the 
background of the four analyzed organizations as it is linked to the context. As Volpi et al. 
note, the UGTT, LTDH, ONAT or ATFD are among the most institutionalized organizations in 
Tunisia and while being active in the aftermath of the revolution, they were of lower 
importance for the very initial uprisings (Volpi et al. 2016). Three of them are part of 
movements, while the fourth, the UGTT, qualifies as labor union. The UGTT is by nature 
more integrated in the political system than the other organizations and is not a movement 
on all its levels and in all its activities. Therefore I use the term civil society, enclosing 
movements and labor unions, throughout the thesis. When the term movement is 
mentioned, it includes the movement activities of the UGTT; meaning mobilization and claim 
making and not salary negotiations. The aspect of being a labor union will enter regularly in 
the discussion; even though, a number of characteristics are very similar if not equal to 
movements. However, especially the structures towards the state are of different quality. 
 
Each case description includes a short history of the organization, the role during the 
uprisings as well as repertoires and resources. This is done to provide an overview on what 
every organization wants and where it comes from. It also creates awareness on differences 
in size and topics and allows to verify later on whether influence is only due to size and 
resources and not due to ideas and framing. 
1.3.1 The UGTT: a guarantee for stability or a driver for change? 
Yousfi describes the UGTT as the most important and oldest organization of today’s Tunisia 
(Yousfi 2015). Among the civil society organizations, the UGTT is described as exceptional 
due to its history and activities (Deane 2013). Beau and Lagarde underline that the UGTT, 
founded by Farhat Hachet, is a key actor since independence (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Beinin 
2016). 
 
Since 1973 the UGTT has the right to negotiate salaries and working conditions with the 
professional organization UTICA (Beinin 2016). Similarly, at least since 1970, the UGTT is 
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seen as political heavyweight; originally as a counter power, but later under pressure by the 
state (Sadiki 2002; Volpi 2017). The activity depended on the level of co-optation by the 
government during the Ben Ali era. Beinin or Zemni underline that even though parts have 
been coopted, local, regional and some of the sectoral unions remained partially 
autonomous (Beinin 2016; Zemni 2013). Yousfi argues that the UGTT always remained 
independent, but that the degree of independence changed considerably (Yousfi 2015). The 
UGTT played a double role, between official condemnation of protest and support for local 
leaders as well as for protest like in Gafsa and Redeyef in 2008 (Filiu 2011). During the 
December 2010 uprisings, the UGTT became an important actor for redressing the political 
system (Yousfi 2015). Especially the ambiguous role of the UGTT on national level under Ben 
Ali reminds what LeBas described for some African countries, namely that state-labor 
alliances guaranteed state control of labor and questions whether unions can free 
themselves entirely from that control (LeBas 2011). This is well in line with the complying 
national level and the more autonomous local and regional ones. Critics like Beinin assign 
that the UGTT was never an organization built for struggles, but for ensuring its own position 
in the Tunisian political system (Beinin 2016). 
 
Under Ben Ali, the UGTT served as a haven for political activism and struggles for human 
rights and general freedoms (Bishara 2014; Hmed 2015; Yousfi 2015). Ayari describes that 
leftist and extreme leftists were active in the UGET and the UGTT during the 1980s (Ayari 
2016). This also means that left-wing activists in other organizations passed by the UGTT. 
Beinin recalls that the UGTT did not demand democracy or regime change for a long period 
of its existence, but limited its role to wage negotiations and working conditions (Beinin 
2016). On the other hand, Ayari underlines that labor union activism was for a long time 
associated with the democratic initiative in Tunisia, including organizations like the LTDH, 
Amnesty International, ATFD, AFTURD or other human rights associations which quasi 
excluded an activism for MTI-Ennahdha at the same time (Ayari 2016). 
 
Worker mobilization played an important role during the uprisings as Bishara, Yousfi or 
Breuer outline (Bishara 2014; Yousfi 2013b; Breuer 2016). While this was less the case at the 
beginning, the national level supported the demands a bit later. The UGTT took leadership 
during the regime change following internal pressure of its militant member unions and 
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having a situation some years earlier in mind where the UGTT did nothing, leading to 
criticism from workers and some local branches (Angrist 2013). The UGTT facilitated the 
spread of demonstrations through its network and provided their offices as meeting point 
for protest organizers (Angrist 2013; Amami 2013). However, the central level reacted late 
and in January 2011, they gave green light for local sections to organize protest (Zemni 
2015). Later, the UGTT mediated between government and opposition in the aftermath of 
the uprising and is an attentive partner of the government, able to block reforms (Youngs 
2015; Murphy 2016; Hmed 2016). Following the revolution, the organization sent ministers 
to the appointed cabinet, but resigned from government in order to prevent former RDC 
members from remaining members of the government (Brynen et al. 2012). Soon after the 
revolution, the UGTT, like the LTDH or the ONAT, became part of several newly created 
councils to control government activities on whether those confirm with the goals of the 
revolution (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Volpi 2017). It is seen as the driving force behind the 
national dialogue of 2013 and can support or oppose important projects (Marks 2015). 
 
The post-revolution role of the UGTT is not limited to the defense of worker rights. Yousfi for 
example assigns that the UGTT is more than a classical labor union, as it not only represents 
workers, but also middle-class actors (Yousfi 2015; La Presse.tn 2015). It served as 
gatekeeper for the whole political system since independence and as supervisor of protest 
activities (Ayari 2016). The UGTT played and plays also a political role and politicians and 
ambassadors have to pass by the headquarter of the UGTT (Nawaat 2015). It is described as 
mediator of social demands (Yousfi 2012; Beinin 2016). Yousfi stresses that while the UGTT 
seeks to represent civil society and the Tunisian people and to support not only workers, but 
also the institutions; leaders are willing to take political roles especially in times of crisis 
(Yousfi 2012). Beinin critically recalls that the UGTT is bureaucratic and involved in 
undemocratic practices and does rewrite its internal history today (Beinin 2016). 
 
However, the UGTT is not a unitary actor, but presents different perspectives. Beinin 
underlines that the UGTT consists of Arab nationalists, Maoists, Trotskyists, social democrats 
and leftists (Beinin 2016). Yousfi describes internal struggles between those that see the role 
of the UGTT as defender of workers’ rights only and those that advocate a more political role 
as national counter-power (Yousfi 2015). While the UGTT is in a tripartite configuration 
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including the professional organization UTICA and the state, it takes a role of a horizontal 
veto-player to the government at the same time (Beinin 2016; Dakhli 2013). 
 
The repertoires of the UGTT are divided between confrontation and dialogue (Yousfi 2015). 
As scholars outline, the UGTT mainly relies on street mobilization and strikes as tool for 
pressure (Bishara 2014; Labidi 2015; Beinin 2016). Nevertheless, the UGTT calls for dialogue 
and listening and opposes wildcat strikes (Beinin 2016). The local level of the UGTT is 
normally more engaged in organizing strikes than the central office (Martin and Rohac 2014; 
Beinin 2014; Gherib 2012; Yousfi 2012). 
 
Numbers of members vary according to sources: Some scholars report about seven hundred 
thousand adherents in 2014 and 2015; Ghilès and Yousfi speak about five hundred 
seventeen thousand for 2012, while Filiu speaks just about four hundred thousand people 
(Wolf 2014a:14; Yousfi 2015:25; Haugbølle et al. 2017:14; Ghilès 2012:1, Yousfi 2012:1; Filiu 
2011:68). The difference might be explained by rising membership following the end of the 
Ben Ali regime with an increase from three hundred fifty thousand to seven hundred 
thousand members (Bishara 2014:6; Beinin 2016:126 mentions even seven hundred fifty 
thousand in 2014). 
 
The UGTT consists of twenty-four regional unions, nineteen federal sections and twenty-one 
base unions. There are four levels, the local, regional, federal and national level, while the 
national council, elected by the national congress, serves as national leadership (Yousfi 2012; 
Yousfi 2015). Different unions are more or less militant. In one of the interviews conducted 
by Yousfi appear the unions on primary education as well as several regional unions like Sidi 
Bouzid or Gafsa as more active (Yousfi 2015). Beinin outlines that schoolteachers, 
healthcare, postal and telecommunication workers are the most militant UGTT members 
(Beinin 2016). 
 
The UGTT is not free of criticism. Bishara outlines tensions between a political and social 
role, as seen above, as well as problems like internal corruption or internal democracy 
(Bishara 2014; on corruption also: Yousfi 2015). In addition, Beinin states: “The most 
undemocratic aspect of the renewed UGTT is the marginalization of women” (Beinin 
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2016:124; see also Yousfi 2015 on the role of women in leader positions). The executive 
committee of the UGTT has a number of privileges that through the union’s bureaucracy also 
benefit members (Yousfi 2015). 
 
Literature identified relations to other actors apart from the state like the UTICA as well as 
the already named ONAT. While cooperation with the UDC was only occasional, Beinin 
assigns that the UGTT sought to control the UDC (Beinin 2016; Yousfi speaks of an 
instrumental perspective: Yousfi 2015). Although several other labor unions like the CGTT or 
the OTT exist, the UGTT remains unchallenged as biggest union (Bishara 2014). 
1.3.2 The LTDH and human rights networks 
The LTDH was founded in 1976 and was subject of harassment during the Ben Ali regime, 
while they survived due to the support of the FIDH (Filiu 2011). It was the first non-
governmental human rights organization in the Arab region (Gelvin 2015; Beinin 2016). Ayari 
describes the LTDH in the 1970s consisting mainly of people from the extreme left or urban 
liberals as well as destourians (Ayari 2016). During the Ben Ali period the level of criticism 
varied with more criticism at the beginning of the 1990s as well as at the end interrupted by 
repression and jailing of members (Langohr 2004; Chouikha and Gobe 2009; Volpi 2017; 
Haugbølle et al. 2017). It served as political refuge under Ben Ali and built a reputation for 
protest as it remained independent (Chouikha and Gobe 2009; Deane 2013). Following the 
revolution and like the UGTT, ONAT and UTICA, the LTDH was part of the national dialogue 
that ensured political discussion during difficult times (Brownlee et al. 2015). 
 
Areas of activity include women rights, migration, education on human rights, social and 
economic rights, justice, youth and civil liberties (Euromedrights 2016). Human rights are the 
focus of activities since its beginning (Chouikha and Gobe 2009). The fight against torture as 
well as for liberties is important for the LTDH (Huffpost Tunisie 2016c). Compromises 
between political authorities and civil society describe well the relationship between 
associations defending human rights and the government (Chouikha and Gobe 2009). 
 
The LTDH has around four thousand five hundred fixed members, which is also explained by 
the reluctance to give membership cards during the Ben Ali period to ensure trust and avoid 
infiltration (Chennaoui 2016; Jürgensen 2004:241). It has offices in Gabes, Medenine, Beja, 
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Kélibia, Sfax, Kébili, Metlaoui, Ariana, Sousse, Tozeur and Jendouba and its national 
headquarter in Tunis (Jamaity 2016). The LTDH is part of the FIDH that builds a network 
structure connecting Arab countries and coordinates actions (Filiu 2011). Chennaoui reports 
internal critics on its very hierarchical structure, missing stable finance, a lot of bureaucracy 
and missing resources as well as a lot of competition from other organizations (Chennaoui 
2016). 
 
Apart from few studies, the LTDH is less researched than the UGTT or the ATFD. Available 
information is much rarer. 
1.3.3 The ATFD and the women movement 
The ATFD was founded in 1985 and legalized in 1989 (Honwana 2013; El-Masri 2015). The 
women movement dates back to the 1920s as part of the national movement (Mahfoudh 
and Mahfoudh 2014). With the foundation of the state sponsored UNFT, women policies 
became controlled by the state. The missing independence has been underlined by several 
scholars (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014; El-Masri 2015; Labidi 2015). In the 1970s an 
independent women movement, consisting of students and integrated in the labor union 
structures, emerged with initial demands on the regional disequilibrium, the integration in 
the world economy and structural reform programs (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). The 
beginnings are associated with the feminist club Thar Haddad and with socialist ideas that 
were guiding (Antonakis-Nashif 2016)17. While activists were also driven by disappointment 
with the UGTT due to lack of democracy or patriarchal networks, they nevertheless 
associated with students at the university, cultural clubs and labor union commissions or 
with the LTDH (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). 
 
Under Ben Ali additional administrative structures like the Ministry of Women and Family 
and the CREDIF have been founded (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). However, the CREDIF 
and also the Center of Arab Women for Training and Research (CAWTAR) were seen as (too) 
close to the regime by other activists (Labidi 2015). While the ATFD was legal under Ben Ali, 
women rights activists were silenced by the regime (Honwana 2013; Labidi 2015). 
 
                                                     
17 For an additional overview on organizational beginnings including the foundation of the UNFT and the 
divisions within the movement, see Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014; Labidi 2015. 
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Women played an important role for the uprisings, as did the youth (Trabelsi 2014; El-Masri 
2015). A number of new organizations were founded, however Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 
underline that most of the founders were already part of the independent women 
movement before (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). 
 
Following the regime change, the ATFD has been criticized – unreasonable as Labidi finds - 
for its closeness to the Ben Ali regime by more conservative women movements close to 
Ennahdha (Labidi 2015; see also Debuysere 2016). Something very difficult to verify as the 
ATFD has also been repressed by the old regime. 
 
Topics include equality and power relations in families, work related questions, inclusion in 
higher positions, freedom of body and sexuality, sexual stereotypes, poverty and sexual 
harassment (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). The claim for democracy is advocated 
together with the LTDH and the UGTT; with the latter the women movement formed a 
commission on women in 1983 as part of the UGTT (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). In 
terms of democracy, the claims are based on the rule of law, labor, freedom, dignity, 
equality and citizenship as well as general support for democratic consolidation (Mahfoudh 
and Mahfoudh 2014). Haugbølle and Cavatorta argue that fighting Islamism was seen more 
important by the women movement than fighting for democracy (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 
2011). Following the revolution, Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh underline the fight for individual 
liberties and equality in the constitution as important (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 201418). 
 
Gender issues and human rights were already advanced under Ben Ali and gender equality 
was formally achieved (Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012). The situation in terms of women 
rights has been rather good in Tunisia and the modernity has often been used as part of the 
Ben Ali government’s propaganda (Clancy-Smith 2013). The ATFD surely profits from the 
personal status law in Tunisia. This personal status code regarding the role of women dates 
back to 1956 and was long without comparison in the Arab World; family law is described as 
relatively liberal (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Labidi 2015; Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016). 
 
                                                     
18 While one of the two authors is one of the founders (Dora Mahfoudh) of the contemporary women 
movement in Tunisia, their article is nevertheless regarded with some reserves in terms of impartiality 
especially when evaluating Islamic movements. 
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The ATFD has a reputation in Tunisia. As Antonakis-Nashif describes: “The history of activism 
has provided it [ATFD] with a significant degree of credibility as a moral resource, in 
particular among the liberal camp and in the civil society landscape, which it helped pioneer” 
(Antonakis-Nashif 2016:134). The ATFD (as well as the AFTURD) is described as heavyweight 
when it comes to women rights organizations in Tunisia (Norbakk 2016). 
 
As of 2014 the ATFD was reported to have one hundred fifty to two hundred active 
partisans, mainly with a high educational level (Antonakis-Nashif 2016:133f.). The ATFD has 
local offices in Tunis, Ben Arous, Bizerte, Sfax, Sousse and Kairouan (Arfaoui and Moghadam 
2016; Antonakis-Nashif 2016). Apart from advocating, the ATFD occasionally provides micro 
credit grants for legal services (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016). Debuysere underlines that 
organizations like the ATFD mainly resonate with upper class women in coastal cities 
(Debuysere 2016). Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh describe the double inscription of militants in 
the women and national movement as well as their urban, educated, even higher-class 
status that allows them to resist social pressure (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). The ATFD 
is criticized for its elitism by other organizations (Norbakk 2016). 
 
The ATFD is well connected in the women movement. Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh describe 
one network as build from coalitions among several associations like Doustourna, Kolna 
Tounes and Wamdha (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). Another network is called Hrayer 
Tounès and includes the historic organizations of the ATFD, AFTURD, but also the women 
commissions of LTDH and UGTT, the Collectif pour les femmes de Tunisie or Doustourna 
(Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). On the other hand, the ATFD shows little interest in 
working with Islamic civil society. The unwillingness to cooperate with some women rights’ 
associations became obvious during the 2013/2014 Dialogue of Women because of the 
ATFD’s insistence on a universal human rights perspective (Debuysere 2016). Ennahdha is 
considered as enemy, what is not surprising. Arfaoui and Moghadam for example outline 
that Ennahdha’s referral to Islamic law and tolerance of Salafist violence against women 
raised attention of feminists in Tunisia (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016). Arfaoui and 
Moghadam equally describe that a coalition of AFTURD, ATFD, LTDH, UGTT, Amnesty 
International Tunisia and the National Council for Freedom in Tunisia urged for women 
having a full citizen status during the constitutional process when Islamists tried to modify 
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the proposal for a constitution towards complementarity of men and women (Arfaoui and 
Moghadam 2016; Labidi 2015). Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh emphasize international links 
towards the UN, European agencies, the foundations, international NGOs as well as towards 
embassies (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). While the ATFD claims political neutrality, other 
organizations like religious actors question their independence (Debuysere 2016). 
 
Among their activities are writing reports, organizing seminars, petitions, sensitization 
campaigns, creating databases and building solidarity networks (ATFD n.d.; ATFD 2011c; 
ATFD 2014c). 
1.3.4 The FTDES: umbrella organization for diverse issues 
While the FTDES has originally been selected for working on environmental issues, there are 
many other fields of activity of the organization19. The FTDES was officially founded in 2011 
to defend social and economic rights and has local offices in Kairouan, Monastir, Gafsa and 
Kasserine (FTDES 2016b). However, it has been active during the protest in 2003 in the 
textile industry, as well as 2008 in Redeyef and was founded by members of the UGTT and 
LTDH (CCFD Terrre Solidaire 2014; Hmed 2015). According to their own description, they 
work on rights of worker, women rights, environmental rights as well as rights of migrants 
(FTDES 2016b). Especially on migration, the FTDES developed a profile that is recognized by 
researchers due to its protest activities and coordination on migration (Khalifa 2013; Bartels 
2015). In September 2013, it founded the Observatoire Social Tunisien (OST) with the aim to 
discuss social and economic rights, migration, suicides, gender or environment from a 
scientific perspective and to provide proposals and solutions (FTDES 2014a; Mattes 2016). 
Martyrs of the revolution are another issue addressed by the FTDES (FTDES 2014a). 
 
The FTDES describes targets as migrants, migrant families, workers in textiles, unemployed, 
scientific communities, journalists, associations, political deciders like the ministers (Prime 
Minister, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of the Environment) as well as political parties, parliament, national and 
international NGOs as well as UN organizations or the EU (FTDES 2014a; FTDES 2012b). 
 
                                                     
19 On their work on environment see FTDES 2016a among others. 
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The FTDES organizes protest events in Tunis and coordinates the actions of other 
movements (Webdo 2016). The Forum also organizes sit-ins and strikes, demonstrations, 
seminars, cultural activities, press conferences as well as site visits (FTDES 2014a). It works 
as coordinator with the Euromed Human Rights network in order to support mobilization 
(Thebti 2016). Coordination between existing protest activities and its documentation are 
the main aims of the FTDES. However, in comparison to the ATFD or the UGTT, the FTDES is 
not (yet) well researched and data on adherents does currently not exist. However, the 
FTDES appears to be well-financed as it has a number of employees that elaborate reports or 
do the media work20. The FTDES was the main organizer of the two World Social Forums of 
2013 and 2015 in cooperation with other organizations. 
1.4 Conclusion to chapter one 
The introduction set the stage, namely a country in transition towards democracy where one 
specific point in time is regarded. The moment of analysis is embedded in a process of 
transition and consequentially main elements of the Tunisian younger history like the 2011 
revolution, the new constitution as well as elections and the situation of the political and 
party system have been introduced. Throughout the first chapter we have seen that scholars 
assign that movements and civil society played and play a role for this democratization 
process. Some elements like the role of the women movement in building the constitution 
have been described; however, what currently lacks is a systematic analysis of diffusion of 
framing in relation to democracy. When civil society and movements are drivers of the 
Tunisian transition, they should have a clear democratic framing and there should be 
mechanisms that ensure their influence. This leads to the research question: “How does a 
democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?” 
 
As shown, the question how movements diffuse their framing towards the Tunisian state is 
particularly relevant as no studies exist proofing this influence. It is often stated by 
researchers that there is an influence, but the type and extent is not proved. This is not just a 
phenomenon for Tunisia, as overall studies on especially ideational influence of movements 
and organizations remain very limited. The thesis thus builds knowledge on how framing 
ensures that organizations can influence state actors, in my case ministries. The research 
contributes to the research on networks, overall on diffusion and mechanism as well as on 
                                                     
20 Also observed during own visits of their offices. 
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framing and uses a context that has not been used before for many of those theories: Post-
2011 Tunisia. Using a country in transition, it gives further insights for the study of 
democratization. 
 
Important actors of the political system at the time of analysis like President Essebsi, Prime 
Ministers Essid and Chahed as well as important parties like Ennahdha and Nida Tounes have 
been introduced. At the same time, it became clear that there are still problems in terms of 
political parties, media landscape, corruption, economic development as well as terrorism; 
problems that influenced also the interviews with leaders as will be shown later on. 
 
The organizations are regarded within their political context. Especially when it comes to the 
influence, the context becomes important to understand the citations used for the analysis. 
The presentation of cases showed that the four organizations are of different size and scope 
and cover different topics. This is in line with the research design that searches to control for 
different influencing factors, in my case resources and size among others. The presentation 
equally indicated that the UGTT has a very specific position in comparison to the others, 
being a labor union and a movement, at the same time with political and social positions. 
The analysis covers consequentially three organizations that are part of movements and one 
labor union (although with some movement activities).  
 
Having outlined the context that orients the research, the thesis uses a threefold theoretical 
perspective focusing on networks, framing and diffusion. In chapter two, those strains of 
literature are discussed in order to find an answer for the above-mentioned research 
question.
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Chapter Two 
Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Networks, framing and impact 
The second chapter gives an introduction on the main strands of literature relevant to 
answer the research question on how democratic framing diffuses across actors. The chapter 
starts with a short definition on civil society and social movements and discusses the tension 
between movements and labor unions. In a second step, the interaction between actors is 
presented, before in a third step framing is discussed. The concept of democratic framing 
that is built for this thesis is presented afterwards. The final section looks at diffusion, the 
channels available for the diffusion of framing and the literature on outcomes to situate 
ideational impact.  
 
All steps identify the state of research and discuss problems and blind spots in the literature. 
A theoretical framework combining what was presented before is developed in the final part 
of this chapter. Interaction is seen as precondition for the diffusion of a democratic framing. 
When diffused, the democratic framing can influence the wider policy process. The research 
question is discussed in detail and further questions that orient each chapter are derived. 
2.1 Civil Society and movements 
The question what is a social movement shall be elaborated in the following, while the 
question of civil society is discussed afterwards. Different definitions exist and there are 
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some aspects that are repeated across authors while others are specific. I start with three 
definitions of social movements by Tillly, Diani and Amenta et al., while all are of different 
orientation: 
“a sustained series of interactions between national authorities and persons 
successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal 
representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible 
demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those 
demands with public demonstrations of support” (Tilly 1981:6). 
 
“as networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups 
and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of 
shared collective identities” (Diani 1992:1). 
 
“We define political social movements as actors and organizations seeking to 
alter power deficits and to effect social transformations through the state by 
mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” (Amenta et al. 
2010:288). 
 
The first definition by Tilly focuses on interactions and claim making by challengers. The 
second by Diani equally highlights the interactive elements, but includes a shared identity 
that is not part of Tilly’s concept. While Diani does not relate the definition to the state 
(although the state can be an addressee), it is an essential element for Amenta et al., who 
equally highlight citizen mobilization to realize change. Amenta et al. also underlined 
sustained political action. Other definitions claim that movements exist on a given period of 
time and - in order to distinguish movements from parties - add the missing predefined 
criteria for membership in movements (Rucht 2005). Saunders discusses the degree of 
organization and formalization and argues to include organized and non-organized actors in 
the definition of social movements (Saunders 2013). 
 
While I agree with Tilly’s definition, I acknowledge that for the types of organizations I 
analyze, equally shared identities like in Diani’s definition are useful. However, not all 
contention has to include a shared identity if being purely based on instrumental claims. 
While interest groups are necessarily promoting elements in the interest of its constituents 
(and thus rationally observable claims), movements can but must not include instrumental 
claims. They often refer to claims that promote public goods that once established benefit 
all and not particular groups. In case of particular interests, the difference towards interest 
groups becomes more complicated, but one can easily imagine protest for sanitation for 
example that simply bases on personal needs. Interest groups will prefer lobbying instead of 
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protest. There is however no strict border between interest groups and movements and it is 
more a continuum between different causes, instrumental claims or identities, different 
constituents, different forms of action and in some cases different organization. 
 
While not all movements are oriented towards the state, for movements and for those 
organizations that I analyze, the state is a major addressee. In this sense, also Amenta’s 
definition oriented towards the state becomes applicable, while it would not be applicable 
to all movements. To sum up for my analysis, social movements are organized or 
unorganized actors that regularly interact with the state (and other actors) in order to 
achieve changes in policy or society that benefit the public. I look at organizations that are 
part of a wider movement. They only represent a part of the movement, but the selection of 
cases is made to include organizations that well present the connected movements. 
 
Movements fulfill different functions and roles. According to Tilly, social movements use 
“claim-making routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: bosses and workers, 
peasants and landlords, rival nationalist factions, and many more” (Tilly cited in Tarrow 
2008:237). Movements can be challengers and excluded from policymaking or be part of the 
policy process (see Tilly 2000). This distinction is however not dichotomous. Movements can 
at the same time be part of the political system and be challengers. Especially labor 
movements find themselves in tripartite arrangements with political parties, the political and 
economic system (Kriesi 2009). This means that due to negotiations on salaries and working 
conditions they necessarily interact with the state and professional organizations. This is to 
keep in mind with relation to the UGTT. 
 
Johnston refers to Tilly assigning that social movements are analyzed by regarding the 
groups and organizations that mobilize, the events that take place and the ideas that guide 
protest (Johnston 2014). Following these three aspects, the ideational-interpretative sphere 
or the ideas are the central point of research. This ideational-interpretative approach is 
embedded in younger social movement theory. Theories on movements developed over 
time from griefs, over rational choice, the role of resources or political opportunities 
towards new social movement theory that focuses also on framing (for an overview see 
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Johnston 2014; on the focus on ideational elements: Martin, G. 2015; Buechler 1995; 
McClurg Mueller 1992).  
 
Concepts of social movement theory gained prominence also for Middle East Studies 
(Chalcraft 2016 for an overview). Most pertinent for this thesis is an approach on framings 
and collective action frames within theories on movements, but equally transcending 
theories on diffusion, outcomes and networks. As I look at the ideational perspective on how 
ideas can be transmitted from one actor to another, framing theories as well as theories on 
networks and influence are particularly useful. Numerous approaches use political 
opportunity structures as well as resources to explain the impact of movements. Using 
ideational elements and looking at the ideational influence of movements is less common, 
but has the potential to generate interesting results. 
Distinguishing movements, organizations and civil society 
As we have seen earlier, one of the analyzed organizations, the UGTT, has a different status 
than the others as it is a labor union in a tripartite configuration. It is consequentially not 
necessarily a challenger, but in some cases only a social partner of the government. Thus, I 
use the term civil society that also encloses NGOs to include the UGTT in this definition. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned that even the UGTT fits a wide number of elements 
of movements provided by Tilly but does not lack representation due to its status. The 
analysis covers therefore three organizations that are part of movements and one labor 
union and thus different parts of the Tunisian civil society. 
 
When talking about movements, the question emerges how they relate to civil society as a 
whole. Burstein and Linton argue, that while scholars divide between political parties, 
interest groups and social movements, especially the latter two are difficult to distinguish 
and scholars inconsistently categorize the two (Burstein and Linton 2002). This already 
shows the closeness of interest groups and movements which is also represented in the 
literature on NGOs that sees movements as people’s organizations and as sub-category of 
NGOs (Clarke 1998). In the case of the four organizations, all have a legal character, simply 
because it included some kind of acceptance under Ben Ali or is necessary to operate on a 
sustainable basis. All four analyzed actors are part of a wider movement (the UGTT with 
some reserves as outlined above) and can be defined as NGOs. As outlined above, it is more 
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a continuum between loose and informal protest and highly organized and structured actors 
as well the orientation towards public interests that are used to distinguish movements from 
interest groups and other terms. 
 
The idea of this thesis is not to have a strict division between different types of actors, but to 
talk about a continuum that allows to place organizations in context. Scholars like Saunders 
or Diani criticize the strict differentiation between interest groups and social movements as 
artificial (Saunders 2013; Diani 2015). The consequence is not to drop both or one of those 
elements, but to be aware that movements might act as interest groups or have a 
configuration similar to those simply because it may be required by legislation or because 
organizations emerged out of the movement. The question of the level of institutionalization 
to distinguish movements is more or less artificial, but may indicate consequences for 
contentious action.  
 
In this research, the preference is given to organizations, as those are easily approachable. 
Thus, this choice is mainly due to feasibility to identify unofficial leaders in informal 
movement networks. The analyzed organizations are part of movements and thus can be 
regarded under different prism, be it from a movement’s perspective, from a NGO 
perspective or from a civil society perspective. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the 
UGTT is part of the civil society, but by definition is only partly a movement (especially local 
levels lacking formal representation can qualify more as a movement), but a labor union 
with institutionalized access. As we will see, this has consequences for the evaluation of 
their relations towards the state. 
2.2 Interaction in networks 
Having reviewed the status of the organizations analyzed, I turn to connections between 
organizations and towards the state. As part of the approach on framing diffusion, networks 
are essential from several perspectives. As diffusion depends on interaction, networks 
enable diffusion. The quality of interactions as well as whether it is influence by one 
organization or coalitional influence is outlined. Finally, the connection towards framing and 
its diffusion is built. 
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2.2.1 Structure and meaning construction 
Networks have different functions. They can build confidence among interacting partners 
and can be used for the diffusion of ideas. Networks describe interaction between actors 
(Crossley 2016; Passy and Monsch 2014; Diani 2015). They do not only provide solidarity, but 
are also gluing movements together or opening possibilities for new contacts towards other 
actors (Saunders 2013). They are deeply linked to social movements: Scholars like Crossley 
or Diani and Moffatt argue that movements are by definition networks and that methods of 
network analysis become particularly valuable to analyze configurations (Crossley 2016; 
Diani and Moffatt 2016). Mainly two perspectives on networks exist: Interactions can be 
regarded as structural in the sense of political opportunity structures or as interpretative 
that construct for example identities (Passy and Monsch 2014). As part of this research, it is 
especially the latter perspective on interpretation and interaction that is highlighted. 
However, it is not to forget that those networks also serve as structure for the actors 
involved and determine with whom actors hold ties. 
 
A basic distinction between organizational and individual level networks can be made. Giugni 
and Passy distinguish individual and collective ties between actors (Giugni and Passy 1998). 
While a lot of literature on individual networks exists, the focus of this thesis is given on 
group relations even though these are not totally independent from personal ones21. My 
approach is similar to Weible et al. underlining that policy process literature looks at 
individuals embedded in collectives instead of only looking at collectives to create or change 
policies (Weible et al. 2011). This is to keep in mind when analyzing who diffuses framing, 
even on an organizational level. While I look at ties between movements and the state, I 
equally highlight partners and coalitions used by movements to take the influence via or 
together with allies into account. By showing the structure of interactions, it becomes clear 
by which mechanism organizations can influence the state. The networks build possible 
channels for diffusion. 
 
The interaction of movements and organizations has several recipients and thus networks go 
in different directions. Analyzing networks shows the channels used by actors (Hadden 
2015). In my case, networks between organizations and towards the state play a role. The 
                                                     
21 Cornwell and Harrison provide a good overview on embedded activism and how individuals integrate in 
organizations and use different network levels (Cornwell and Harrison 2004). 
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latter is much discussed in the literature on state-civil society interactions. Reese claims that 
networks can increase access to policymakers and consequentially enable the negotiation of 
agreements (Reese 2005). The interaction with policymakers can even confuse the limits. 
Knoke summarizes that boundaries between nongovernmental organizations and the state 
are blurred through interaction (Knoke 1990). In addition, social movement organizations 
interact not only with power-holders, but also with the public (Passy and Monsch 2014). To 
summarize, interactions with other actors include not only other civil society actors, but also 
different state levels, the public and other actors. 
 
Networks can also be distinguished in size and connectivity, so how many organizations are 
included and how those are connected (Hadden 2015). The network position reflects relative 
power as access to information or resources are guaranteed (Knoke 1990). Knoke states that 
network analysis is composed of nodes (objects) and relations (edges) (Knoke 1990; see also 
Crossley 2016; Ingold and Leifeld 2016). Diani gives the following advice: 
“When analyzing civil society, we should focus on the structure of the 
cooperative ties that develop between voluntary organizations (as well as 
between them and other types of actor); we should try to identify the lines of 
segmentation within civic networks as well as the positions within them that 
secure their overall integration (if any); finally we should explore the matches 
and mismatches between the characteristics of civil society actors and their 
network position” (Diani 2015:13). 
This leads directly to the question whether individual organizations take influence or 
coalitions. 
2.2.2 Who works with whom and who does what? Coalitions and roles 
One argument that is important for the Tunisian civil society, are coalitions of actors and 
their influence as will be outlined later. Allies can be important for the diffusion of framing. 
Regarding coalitions, literature highlights several by times contradicting elements. McCarthy 
describes coalitions as “more or less formally constituted agreements among pre-existing 
groups, organizations, and, sometimes, individuals to cooperate in the pursuit of common 
purposes” (McCarthy 2005:89). While coalitions can be based on existent networks, they can 
also build the basis for new networks. Literature is not clear on whether coalitions based on 
sustained networks or ad-hoc coalitions are more successful. Research on the international 
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level shows that inter-organizational coalitions coordinate their action in order to achieve 
outcomes (Hadden 2015). On the other hand, ad-hoc coalitions (like on immigration issues) 
are also used to achieve concrete outcomes (Reese 2005). Regardless of the effectiveness, 
Diani underlines the path dependency of coalitions, as choices of partners become repeated 
due to a common construction of reality once coalitions are established (Diani 2015). 
 
Literature is divided on the question of large, same size or small, as well as diverse or narrow 
coalitions. Arguments for all sides exist in the literature. Diversity of coalitions can be an 
advantage but has also the potential for division and collapse (Grattet 2005). Hadden argues 
that larger networks are normally less connected (Hadden 2015). Smaller organizations may 
hesitate to join coalitions including bigger organizations as they fear being sidelined (Reese 
2005). The opposing argument, that smaller organizations can expand their reach through 
coalitions, makes equally sense. On the other hand, Knoke states that “structurally 
equivalent actors may lack direct ties to one another, but maintain highly similar relations 
with the same set of actors” (Knoke 1990:12). Literature is neither clear whether large or 
narrow coalitions are more effective achieving desired outcomes, nor what type of actors 
work together or hesitate to cooperate. Furthermore, coalitions are not the only factor for 
influence as Giugni underlines: Protest and political alliances jointly support the impact of 
movements as does public opinion (Giugni 2004). 
 
Literature is divided when it comes to perceptions hold by actors in networks. Carroll and 
Ratner argue that similar frames can be found among those who are closely tied together 
(Carroll and Ratner 1996). On the other hand, movement coalitions may evaluate a policy 
outcome enabled by movements different as movements have different political aims and 
coalitions may be fluid based on ad-hoc alliances (Meyer 2005). Actors working together can 
hold similar perceptions, but political aims may differ. Whether perceptions or even values 
are similar, probably depends on the form of coalition as reasons can also be instrumental: 
Diani and Moffatt or McCarthy describe the possibility of coalitional modes across 
movements that show interactions without building identity bonds, mostly focused on an 
instrumental logic (Diani and Moffatt 2016; McCarthy 2005). Both logics attribute a different 
importance to framing, while the framing can be expected to be more congruent among 
coalition members in case of an identity-based coalition. However, literature does not give a 
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clear understanding whether identity-based coalitions with common values are more 
effective, whether a purely instrumental logic may be sufficient or whether a combination of 
both is ideal in order to realize influence. I will however argue later, that identity-based 
coalitions with shared framings are conducive to a consistent framing across organizations 
and helpful for more trustful interactions. Given the vagueness of literature it cannot be 
excluded that findings will show a different framing across organizations and that 
instrumental cooperation is equally effective or that both get combined. One indicator that 
might be helpful to explain specific framing or who does what are roles in coalitions. 
Roles in coalitions 
Literature assigns that different roles exist within coalitions. Diani reminds that if civil society 
organizations are seen as interdependent, one should search for distinct roles within those 
interactions (Diani 2015). Diani further describes that organizations may have different tasks 
and divide labor where each organization focuses on specific issues or that organizations 
cover the same issues depending on the organization of the field (Diani 2015). Giugni and 
Passy add that cooperation depends on issues and that some issues are more complex than 
others (Giugni and Passy 1998). In a similar sense, Knoke underlines the specialization in 
order to more effectively use and exchange resources (Knoke 1990; see also Weible et al. 
2011 on specialization for influencing policies). Specialization does not only include 
specialization on topics, but also on tactics as Biggs and Andrews outline, arguing that some 
movements  focus on protest and others on bargaining with political elites (Biggs and 
Andrews 2015). Researchers underline that a reputation as being influential or expert on 
specific topics can lead to influence on policy makers (Ingold and Leifeld 2016; Knoke 1990).  
I later argue that especially reputation on a specific topic can become relevant for achieving 
influence. 
 
To summarize, literature on coalitions is divided on the efficient forms, size and 
organizations. Thus, it is particularly difficult to have clear expectations about what can be 
observed in the Tunisian case and how framing may diffuse across actors (in coalitions, by 
specialized actors). The next section looks at how networks towards the state and policy 
members looks like and why it is important to distinguish between insiders and challengers 
when evaluating influence on state institutions. 
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2.2.3 Insider and Challenger – relations towards the state 
While I already stated that diffusion is dependent on interaction, it is important to clarify 
state-civil society interactions in order to identify channels by which frames can get diffused. 
Baumgartner and Mahoney underline the interdependency of governments and movements 
(Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). Banaszak argues that movements are not complete 
outsiders, but often overlap with the state (Banaszak 2005).  This leads to the question of 
insiders and challengers, basically going back to Tilly (Tilly 2000; Tilly 1995). Insiders are   
included into decision making circles, while challengers do not have this access and 
consequentially rely on different channels of diffusion. From a political opportunity 
structures perspective, Amenta argues that favorable regimes are more open towards 
challengers and amplify impact, while unfavorable regimes hinder impacts of movements 
(Amenta 2005). Similarly, Tarrow, referring to Tilly, argues that variations in government 
capacity and the level of democracy limit or enable contestation (Tarrow 2008).  
 
Literature assigns that the degree of integration influences the tactics and channels 
available. Movements that became insiders can use insider and outsider tactics at the same 
time (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). Melucci and Lyyra as well as Amenta underline the 
importance of membership in polity and the inclusion into decision making as it becomes 
easier to pass ideas (Melucci and Lyyra 1998; Amenta 2005). On the other hand, Kriesi et al. 
argue that social movement organizations may be coopted by the state (Kriesi et al. 1995). In 
addition, if challenger target bureaucrats they are more successful if it fits the legislative and 
administrative context (Amenta 2005). Amenta states that failed initiatives that gained wide 
support can show administrators the significance of an issue (Amenta 2005).  
 
On the basis of rational choice arguments that bigger groups have more impact, Amenta et 
al. argue that a “challenger needs mainly to demonstrate that it has support, such as 
through writing letters, holding rallies, petitioning, initiating public awareness campaigns, 
staging limited protest, or even engaging in visible internal events” (Amenta et al. 2005:521). 
Thus, being active becomes central for movements in order to be heard. In addition, long-
lasting existence builds an advantage. Biggs and Andrews argue that “pre-existing movement 
organizations […] have a positive impact on success” (Biggs and Andrews 2015:422). Amenta 
summarizes that research indicates that “organizing is often central to movement influence” 
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as well as the ineffectiveness of disruption to influence policies (Amenta 2014:17). Scholars 
highlight that researchers should equally analyze the targets of movements (in my case the 
state), how they perceive protest as well as how they react (Bosi et al. 2016; Biggs and 
Andrews 2015). Thus, unorganized protest has different chances of success, if it is even 
disruptive its chances to influence policies are even lower. 
Interactions with civil society and channels for diffusion 
Taking the state perspective, motivations to include civil society can be diverse. One of the 
needs of legislators are information and the connections of issues or reframing of 
information (Burstein and Hirsh 2007; Uba 2009). Clemens underlines that state officials 
become habituated to certain types of actions and messages become familiar to state 
officials (Clemens 1998). Giugni points out, that movements may influence decision makers 
not on the short term but with a time lag (Giugni 2004). Button as well as Kolb remind that 
the implementation of policy programs may take years (Button 1978; Kolb 2007). While this 
is true for policy influence, it is probably realistic to a similar degree for frame diffusion. 
Thus, retracing the process of claim realization can be difficult. Consequentially, this 
research can only be a point of departure for future research on ideational consequences of 
movements in Tunisia. On the other hand, Tunisia changed the constitution and needs to 
change a number of laws now, so that policy changes and changes in framing may happen 
faster than in established democracies. 
 
The channels used by civil society depend on how the state is conceptualized. Descriptions 
of the state differ in literature as some scholars see the state as unitary actors, while others 
underline that the state consists of multiple actors (Banaszak 2005). This division is 
important and will be considered later as it influences the direct channels for diffusion. 
Researchers highlight for example direct influence via former members: Movement 
members winning an office following elections shows movement influence; however, Meyer 
does not see it as sufficient for having influence (Meyer 2006). Banaszak showed the 
influence on the Ministry of Women in France, but also that this ministry is marginalized in 
comparison to other ministries (Banaszak 2005). I return to the question of different 
channels and mechanisms of diffusion for framing later. Now, I turn to the diffusion of ideas 
via networks and how literature discusses it. 
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2.2.4 Diffusion of ideas via networks 
Networks can not only show how organizations take influence, but also how ideas and 
concepts get diffused. Passy and Monsch recall that regular interactions have a higher 
probability to shape cognitions and cultural meanings than occasional ones (Passy and 
Monsch 2014; compare also Jasper 2014). Equally, the role of framing is discussed in relation 
to networks. Krinsky and Crossley emphasize the diffusion of frames through networks 
towards a wider audience (Krinsky and Crossley 2013). Glenn, analyzing democracy and 
framing in Eastern Europe, states that "frames must be linked to networks” (Glenn 2001:57). 
Taking a combination of networks, outcomes and framing, Hadden argues, that “network 
structure influenced the tactics and framing choices of civil society organizations” (Hadden 
2015:10). She claims that the combination of framing and tactical choices influences political 
outcomes (ibid). Networks thus establish or reinforce identities, tactics or frames and 
organizational decisions are equally relational (ibid). Carroll and Ratner suggest that “master 
framing and cross-movement networking probably condition each other” (Carroll and Ratner 
1996:616). There are good arguments to link the diffusion of framing to networks as those 
show what and by which channels frames get diffused. 
 
Carroll and Ratner showed that certain master frames are linked to certain movements as 
well as certain types of networks (Carroll and Ratner 1996). Literature gives many examples 
on how ideas and framing are diffused in networks. In my perspective, the framing of 
democracy is expected to be diffused from one actor to another through networks, while 
different parts of the framing are more important to some organizations within a network. 
Through the diffusion of framing, shared meanings get created and interpretation of 
problems becomes more similar. This translates into policy formulation in accordance with 
those framings. What framing actually means is discussed in the next section. 
2.3 Framing a problem 
The third part of this chapter looks at framing before the fourth continues with how 
democracy is defined. As the concept of framing democracy is at the heart of this thesis, the 
section highlights important elements in line with the three concepts that orient the thesis, 
networks, framing and diffusion. Two aspects are important in relation to framing: framing 
occurs in interaction between actors, but also via the public. Both parts are discussed in 
relation to the diffusion of framing in section 2.5. 
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2.3.1 What is framing 
There is plenty of literature on movements and framing as well as collective action frames. 
According to Polletta and Jasper, this is due to gaps in political process theory, resource 
mobilization approaches and explanations for mobilization apart from material incentives 
(Polletta and Jasper 2001). Collective action frames gained prominence since mid-1980 and 
framing became accepted as “meaning construction” (Benford and Snow 2000:612ff; 
Benford 1997; Adler 2012). Collective action frames (CAF) are defined as “emergent action-
oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspire and legitimate social movement activities 
and campaigns” (Benford 1993:199). A frame is defined as interpretative framework to 
evaluate actions and words to make sense of it (Johnston 2002; Johnston 2014; Benford and 
Snow 2000; Trumpy 2016; Kretsedemas 2000). Benford and Snow use a model of frame 
alignment including a “diagnosis of the situation, a prognosis of what should be done, and 
motivation to do it” (Jasper 1997:75). As Gamson underlines, collective action frames limit or 
require some forms of action (Gamson 1995). For this research, framing is seen as meaning 
construction to evaluate, create and legitimate activities. While framing itself is processual, I 
look at how frames are combined in order to retrace how meaning is constructed.  
 
Referring to Benford and Snow, Adler describes one part of movements’ main work “to 
produce, negotiate, and maintain interpretive collective action frames” (Adler 2012:295). 
Apart from the definition in social movement studies, other definitions of framing exist, for 
example combining attributes voluntarily for inclusion on the media agenda, however still in 
the form of interpretative schemata (Scheufele 2000). These approaches base on the idea 
that small changes in wording can affect the resonance of frames (ibid). In this sense, Kelly 
defines framing as alternative interpretations of the same or simply a different wording 
(Kelly 2012). However, this definition has only few things in common with what Benford and 
Snow or Gamson define as framing, where not only words are different, but whole “sets of 
beliefs” are behind a different wording (and content). Woodly describes frames as 
“arguments that co-occur together repeatedly” (Woodly 2015:11). The combination of 
arguments should be kept in mind for the later theory building. This being said, it is the 
social movement approach towards framing that is followed in this research. 
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Benford and Snow see framing as “active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and 
contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). They assign 
that collective action frames are not constructed on the basis of individual perceptions, but 
through negotiation in society (Benford and Snow 2000). Woodly describes framing as a 
primarily public process when it comes to persuade others about policies (Woodly 2015). 
When accounting for the framing influence, it is equally important to include a perspective 
on public resonance of framing.  
 
Benford and Snow differentiate between diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing22 
(Benford and Snow 2000). Particularly injustice frames are discussed in literature as 
motivating action (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1992). These injustice frames must be shared 
in public to construct meaning and to enable individuals to recognize that an injustice frame 
is collectively identified and that there is awareness on the issue (Gamson 1992). 
 
The reduction towards injustice frames seems “handy” as it combines an unjust 
interpretation with actions. However, the definitions by Benford and Snow and by Gamson 
clearly distinguish perceptions of a problem from proposed actions and their realization. In 
reality, this distinction between types of frames may be less clear as is explained later. 
 
Within this research, framing is seen as social construction and combination of topics, issues, 
ideas or frames. It is especially about the connection of aspects and whether it is seen as a 
problem, a solution or a mobilizing factor. The thesis uses collective framing to answer how 
actors imagine democracy. Taking a similar direction, della Porta argues that “as frames of 
democracy […] did consolidate, they constituted benchmark values against which the 
practices of representative democracy had been assessed and, often, criticized” (della Porta 
2016:84). Democracy can become an overarching frame in society, but can also serve as part 
of collective frames of civil society. I return to framing democracy later. 
Challenges for assessing framing influence 
Research on frames is not without criticism. Polletta and Ho criticize that theory on framing 
is thin in relation to political contexts and that the impact of frames on institutions is not 
                                                     
22 Diagnostic framing identifies the problems, prognostic framing proposes a solution and motivational framing 
gives incentives to mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000, compare also Gamson on identity, injustice and 
agency frames, Gamson 1995). 
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well developed (Polletta and Ho 2006). Other criticism refers among others to few 
systematic empirical studies, regarding frames as static, elite focus as well as reductionism 
(Benford 1997). Johnston finds that definitions of frames are mixed with ideologies and 
discourses and that claims for frames are more frequent than their empirical verification 
(Johnston 2002). Limited research exists on whether movement frames influence the state. 
Trevizo underlines that the role of frames for social movement influence is not often a focus 
of research (Trevizo 2006). It is less clear whether a frame needs to be consistent in terms of 
sense or repeated in order to realize influence and/or resonance.  
 
Another related question is whether frames are constructed on individual or collective 
levels. Kretsedemas reminds that frames are interpreted on the basis of personal, thus 
individual, experiences (Kretsedemas 2000). Polletta and Ho discuss whether people have 
identical perceptions or whether rules for interpreting ideas are shared (Polletta and Ho 
2006). I argue for the latter, perceptions are not completely identical due to different 
personal experiences, but rules for interpretation (mindsets) are shared. Benford and Snow 
criticize Johnston or Klandermans for using collective action frames in the sense of schemas, 
a more psychological concept, where collective action frames are aggregations of individual 
perceptions and not – as Benford and Snow argue - existent on a collective level (Benford 
and Snow 2000). From my perspective, individual and collective levels are intertwined. In 
this thesis I focus on collective interpretations and reduce individual influences where 
possible to identify the collective framing of democracy. Frames also have a public 
dimension that is introduced in the following. 
2.3.2 Frame resonance 
The public dimension of frames is found in the literature on frame resonance and master 
frames.  This becomes later of importance as not only direct transmission of frames, but also 
via public opinion is analyzed. Polletta and Ho recall the importance of frame resonance with 
an audience as well as the importance of master frames for movements (Polletta and Ho 
2006). Master frames are wide reaching frames that resonate much in public. Benford and 
Snow refer to the size of the problem that is framed, with larger problems targeting more 
groups, but also in terms of inclusivity, flexibility or scope of frames (Benford and Snow 
2000). Frame resonance is thus an important element of frame diffusion as it adds another 
channel, the public. However, master frames or resonant frames may not be strong enough 
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to convince people with different ideologies, but they can reduce the likelihood of effective 
counter-framing (Diani 1996). On the other hand, Polletta warns that some messages are 
more difficult to frame to be successful as not all frames resonate equally (Polletta 2008). 
Jasper as well as Clemens argue that actors try frames to identify those that resonate in 
public or towards a wider audience or incorporate new elements (Jasper 2014; Clemens 
1998). Trying frames does however not result in repeated framing if frames do not resonate 
(given that the actor acknowledges the missing resonance). In my perspective, combinations 
of different frames can be used to build master frames and narratives that get repeated over 
time and that are useful to identify frequent and important frames (especially in the media).  
 
It is important to account for resonance when assessing the public influence of framing that 
is detailed later (2.5).  The combinations of ideas and what elements of frames get repeated 
over time is of importance when analyzing frames that may have an impact in the public 
sphere. Before discussing the channels of diffusion, I outline what I understand as 
democratic framing, a concept at the center of this thesis. 
2.4 (Framing) democracy and its critics 
What makes my concept specific is the referral to democracy as part of the framing. In a 
democratizing country, I expect perceptions of democracy to play a role influencing actors 
and policy in a desired direction. In the following I outline what democracy is and what I 
mean by framing democracy. 
2.4.1 What is democracy? 
The concept of democracy is contested with a great number of different, even contradicting 
understandings (Coppedge 2012; Coppedge et al. 2011; Croissant 2002; Burnell 2013; 
Vandewoude 2015; Lauth 2011; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Giebler et al. 2018). This variety is 
related to various traditions of democracy, signified by added adjectives like deliberative, 
representative, direct or liberal democracy, the latter being prominent today. 
 
Democracy is a generic term, describing a variety of political systems, which are signified as 
“government of the people, by the people and for the people” (Lincoln cited in Schmidt 
2004:147). In other words, democracy is a form of decision-making through collectively 
binding rules that are controlled by the people (Dahl 1989; Abromeit 2002; Hadenius 2008; 
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Schmitter and Karl 1991). Today, it is understood as much more than just elections. Bermeo 
and Yashar emphasize that the understanding of democracy developed over time and does 
not only include rights but also accountability and transparency (Bermeo and Yashar 2016). 
As several researchers outline, there is not one form of consolidated democracy, but several 
(Linz and Stepan 2010; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Brisson 2009; Merkel 2000). 
 
It is to note, that “democratic theory is, when compared with other theoretical enterprises, a 
distinctively normative affair (...)” (Kelly 2012:2). Kelly underlines different arguments why 
democracy is good, like procedural aspects including deliberative aspects, competencies or 
stability (ibid). Keeping the normative dimension in mind is important when evaluating the 
influence of movements at the end. In the rest of the analysis, there is no distinction 
between any better or worse form of democracy or less democracy. For example, questions 
on democracy during interviews have been formulated in a neutral way in order to allow the 
expression of own conceptions of democracy. 
 
There is continuous interest in a minimal definition of democracy. Although we have seen 
above that different forms of democracy exist, there are some common elements that are 
shared among researchers. Scholars normally focus on fair and secret elections and universal 
franchise as minimal elements, as well as guarantees of political freedoms, fairness, justice, 
deliberation and political rights while procedures and context dependency are additional 
elements (O’Kane 2004; Abromeit 2002; Dahl 1989; Schmitter and Karl 1991; for a good 
overview on the role of elections see Hadenius 2008). Other scholars talk about dimensions: 
rule of law, vertical and horizontal accountability, competition, freedom and equality, 
responsiveness and participation are for example identified (Lauth 2011; Lauth 2013). 
Scholars like Coppedge et al. use different typologies to distinguish between democracies, 
namely electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian democracy 
(Coppedge et al. 2011). As mentioned earlier, liberal democracy is much discussed today. 
Core elements of liberal democracy are elections (and the choice between alternatives), 
representation with binding rules based on equity, pluralism and tolerance, as well as 
freedom of association and freedom of speech, self-determination, responsibility and the 
control of the government (O’Kane 2004; Bobbio 1988; for self-determination and 
protection of right: Dahl 1989; further approaches: Bauzon 1992; Ezrahi 2012; Coppedge et 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
55 
 
  
al. 2011). Other forms like deliberative democracy are more focused on processes, 
participatory democracy or direct democratic ways of taking influence; egalitarian 
conceptions on redistribution of resources (Coppedge et al. 2011). While it would be easy to 
choose one of these forms of democracy, it is not clear what kind of democracy is preferred 
and thus it is difficult to apply one form of democracy in a context of democratization where 
the preferred form of democracy is perhaps not yet clear. Consequentially it becomes crucial 
to use an approach that can include all forms of democracy for Tunisia. 
 
Lauth summarizes the dimensions of political freedom and individual political equality as 
necessary elements of democracy and regards political control in line with rule of law as a 
third dimension (Lauth 2010; Lauth 2013; Lauth 2011; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). Scholars 
analyzing indexes on democracy argue for the existence of two axes, the names however 
differ. Munck and Verkuilen talk about contestation or competition and participation or 
inclusion, Hadenius uses elections and political liberties and Bowman et al. talk about 
political liberties and political rights (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Hadenius 2008; Bowman et 
al. 2005). In addition, it is contested whether democratic output should be used to evaluate 
a democracy (Lauth 2013; Lauth 2010). Lauth argues that a “trade-off” between different 
dimensions of democracy exists and ideal democracies cannot completely realize political 
liberty, political equality and political and judicial control at the same time (Lauth 2013; see 
also Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018 for a renewal of the argument of interdependence of 
dimensions). Coppedge et al. take a similar perspective stating that conceptions of 
democracy, like liberal or majoritarian conceptions, can be in conflict with each other 
(Coppedge et al. 2011). 
 
I agree that the concepts of political freedom and political equality are central. Political 
control is a third dimension, focusing on the accountability and restrictions of a government. 
This is best summarized in a three-dimensional approach on control, equality and freedom. 
As we have seen, dimensions are in tension with each other and different political systems 
can emphasize different aspects of democracy. In the following, I open a different 
parenthesis for democratization, as Tunisia is currently in a process of democratization. 
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The whole picture - Democratization and social movements 
A short review of processes of democratization helps to position the political context in 
Tunisia. The role of movements in democratization processes is much discussed and does 
not only allow to show the relevance, but also the possible actions taken by movements to 
support democratization. Democratization is defined as a process of economic, societal and 
political transformation (Ottoway 2007; Grugel 2002; Banegas 1993).  
 
As Tilly states, “democratization does not follow a single path” but multiple and involves 
“movement towards broad citizenship, equal citizenship, binding consultation of citizens, 
and protection of citizens from arbitrary state action” (Tilly 2000:1f; see also: Tilly 1995; Tilly 
2002; Guggenberger 2005; Vanhanen 1992). Similarly, Carothers and other researchers state 
that the ‘old’ model on stages of opening, breakthrough and consolidation is unstable 
regarding speed and direction of development and should be described as chaotic processes 
or multi causal pathways (Carothers 2010; LeBas 2011; Bermeo and Yashar 2016). It is not a 
short-term process, but lasts “years or decades” and no blueprint exists (Tilly 2000:2; 
Schwedler 2006). This long-lasting element is underlined by Merkel et al. who describe the 
need for democratic culture as part of citizenship, arguing that democracy becomes effective 
when one generation got socialized within it (Merkel et al. 1996; Merkel 2000; Barber 1984). 
 
Following processes of democratization, countries in transition do not necessarily become 
democracies. Similarly, it cannot be said for sure, that democratic countries remain 
completely democratic. Stepan and Linz for example see an uncertainty for Tunisia (Stepan 
and Linz 2013). Tilly argues that processes that promote democratization when being 
inversed promote de-democratization (Tilly 2007). In this sense, Tunisia is still in a process of 
democratization and generations of people get slowly socialized with it. Here, the diffusion 
of democratic ideas plays a role (Schweitzer 2015; Bermeo and Yashar 2016). 
Movements and democratization 
While movements are not the only actors in democratization processes, they certainly play a 
role. Movements and mobilization are important for democracy not only controlling state 
power, but also legitimating states based on rule of law (Linz and Stepan 2010; Norton 1995; 
Bermeo 1997; Mercer 2002). Tilly underlines that there is at least a correlation between 
democratization and the proliferation of social movements, also including that social 
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movements cause democratization (Tilly 1993 and 1994:21; see also LeBas 2011; Johnston 
2014; Schmitter and Sika 2017). Giugni sees democratization as connected with the 
emergence of social movements - at least in the Western world - and states that the 
proliferation of social movements referring to rights and obligations increases the impact on 
democratization (Giugni 1998a; compare the importance of civil society, but also political 
parties: Ahmed and Capoccia 2014; LeBas 2011; Bermeo and Yashar 2016; Clarke 1998; 
Stepan 2012).  
 
The influence of movements on democratization processes is related to several aspects. 
Several scholars underline that social change and contentious actions such as strikes or 
protests are connected to active citizenship in line with democratic values and long-term 
transformation of the political system (Pancer 2015; Nepstad 2015; Bermeo and Yashar 
2016). Sandoval argues that movements defending citizen rights, increasing participation 
and introducing pro-active demands support democratization (Sandoval 1998). Nord states 
that organizations like trade unions or human rights organizations serve as “arenas of 
democratic experiment and education”, where democratic perceptions are built (Nord 
1995:37). On the other hand, movements promote aspects of democracy directly and profit 
from granted freedoms (Gutmann 2003). By claiming rights, movements promote 
democracy. To summarize with the words of Tilly, the construction of democracy bases on 
the creation of “a set of political arrangements whose effects are democratic” and of 
“shared understandings, the culture, that people create for themselves” (Tilly 1995:368). 
 
However, scholars warn for overestimating the role of movements and mobilization. Burnell 
remarks that a vibrant civil society may neither be neither a precondition nor an indication 
for a healthy democracy (Burnell 2013; similarly argue Howard and Walters 2015). Tilly sees 
limitations for the impact of social movements on democratization when movements do not 
refer to a great variety of claims as well as explicit claims for democracy and when the state 
misses capacity to implement claims (Tilly 1993 and 1994). Risse and Babayan underline, 
that the balance of forces on the ground plays a role for the success of democratization 
apart from possible autocratic challengers and international support (Risse and Babayan 
2015). Democratization is thus not only about movements and civil society, but can be 
related. In addition, some scholars support the perspective that ongoing mobilization may 
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be destabilizing young democracies (LeBas 2011; Koehler and Warkotsch 2014; Bermeo 
1997). Thus, the reasons why there is not one path towards democracy may be connected to 
the different outcomes mobilization can have.  
 
While some scholars underline the role of political parties, movements and civil society, 
others acknowledge that democratization is favored by economic development, equitable 
distribution of income (especially relevant in Muller and Seligson’s study), few religious and 
ethnic divides as well as few internal cleavages (Schweitzer 2015; Muller and Seligson 1994; 
Schmitter and Sika 2017) 23. This focus on economic development should be kept in mind for 
the later analysis. 
 
Younger research includes the Arab Spring in relation to democratization and poses the 
question of transferability of concepts. Lamont et al. argue that the Arab Spring is not about 
diffusion from the West to other parts of the world as it is unable to explain divergent 
political orders (Lamont et al. 2015; see also Valbjørn and Bank 2010 on transferability). 
Scholars underline the role of elites that try to maintain power in the MENA region (Diani 
and Moffatt 2016). Lamont et al. remark that democratization literature is not well suited to 
explain political transformations in the Arab Middle East (Lamont et al. 2015). While this 
might be true for some concepts of democracy, it does not per se contradict the assumption 
that civil society plays a role in the Arab World. Coppedge recommends to test in other 
context when stating that case studies in a Western context have been used to analyze 
democratization and thus argues to enlarge case studies on democratization towards the 
Middle East and Africa (Coppedge 2012).  
 
I summarize that democratization processes are not necessarily linear, can be inversed and 
are context dependent. There is a continuum between democracy and autocracy. The role of 
civil society and social movements is discussed with divided arguments. What I take 
especially from Tilly are the clear pro-democratic claims by civil society and the state 
capacity to respond. It becomes important whether movements have a number of claims, 
are actively promoting democracy and whether those claims are incorporated by the state. 
                                                     
23 The inclusion of economic aspects goes in the direction of the concept of embedded democracy where 
economic aspects build some kind of basis for democracy, for a good summary see Merkel 2000. 
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This leads to the question how democracy can be analyzed and how a democratic framing 
can be identified. 
2.4.2 How democracy can be analyzed 
This section focuses on the theoretical arguments related to measuring democracy. A 
second, method-oriented discussion is found in the method chapter. Here I discuss 
indicators for an operationalization of the concept. Democracy is often measured by a 
number of indicators that give an index or by expert interviews (Coppedge et al. 2011; 
Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Bowman et al. 2005)24. Qualitative measures of democracy 
underline free and fair elections, an open and accountable government, civil and political 
rights and a democratic society including civil society and media (Lauth 2011). Further 
measures like social, economic and international dimensions of democracy do not 
necessarily lead to a more exact definition of democracy (ibid). As Coppedge et al. remark, 
elements of democracy may include “components [that] may not be entirely independent of 
one another” (Coppedge et al. 2011:251). 
 
Another prominent aspect in research on democracy is the analysis of the quality of 
democracy, which is applicable also to non-democratic contexts (Munck 2014; Coppedge et 
al. 2011; Giebler et al. 2018). These approaches underline the problems of democracies and 
warn not to search for the ideal democracy that does not exist (Munck 2014). In addition, 
they do not judge whether a representative or direct democracy would be better, but 
measure which elements of democracy are emphasized. The aim is to identify the most 
important aspects and to evaluate the problems of democracy. The approach on the quality 
of democracy is in line with criticism on necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy. A 
number of scholars like Dahl, Lipset or Przeworski used models of necessary and sufficient 
conditions to analyze democracy. This is however not unchallenged: Tilly criticizes scholars 
working on democratization as being focused on path-tracing, as no clear path can be 
identified, and notes that theories on democratization came away from necessary and 
sufficient conditions (Tilly 2000). A family resemblance model as Goertz describes it might be 
more adequate given the number of different paths towards democracy, something to be 
discussed in the method chapter (Goertz 2006). 
                                                     
24 Munck and Verkuilen 2002. provide a good interview on different data sets that measure dimensions of 
democracy 
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One far reaching and relatively open approach towards democracy includes the following 
nine main indicators (see Figure 2.1) according to the Democracy Barometer as part of the 
NCCR Democracy that respects the actual state of research (Bühlmann et al. 2014). The 
underlying concept for the Democracy Barometer as well as for this research is broad in 
order to account for the complexity of democracy itself (Jäckle et al. 2012). Individual 
liberties, rule of law, public and exchange of opinions, competition of political actors, 
division of power, governance capacity, transparency, participation and representation are 
part of the three dimensions control, freedom and equality as shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Quality of democracy 
 
Source: Illustration based on Democracy Barometer 2014 
Scholars like Munck add that economic factors support the perspective on the quality of 
democracy (Munck 2014; compare also Lipset 1959 for an older argument on economic 
aspects)25. Hadenius emphasizes that economic factors and development go together with 
education and that the latter is favorable to democracy (Hadenius 2008). In the case of the 
Democracy Barometer, economic elements are transcending and appear for example in 
                                                     
25 Munck 2014 provides a comparison of different approaches towards the quality of democracy and compares 
the Democracy Barometer approach to others. From this table, Munck identifies that final outcomes like for 
income or health as well as satisfaction with democracy are not included in the Democracy Barometer 
approach, while several other dimensions are, also in comparison to other approaches; Bowman et al. 2005 
similarly provide an operationalization of political liberties and political rights 
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terms of inequality or corruption. However, it can be kept in mind that neither education nor 
economy takes a prominent role in the Barometer. Other criticism relates to the unclear 
operationalization on lower concept levels that are not shown in Figure 2.1 (Jäckle et al. 
2012; Jäckle et al. 2013). The question of how democracy gets operationalized will be re-
discussed in the method chapter (chapter three). Here, only theoretical perspectives are 
outlined. 
 
From a normative perspective, democracy – as rule by the people – remains desirable, as 
dominance of individual interests and repression are reduced. However, democracy is often 
regarded as Western ideal that is applied on other countries and regions. Scholars like 
Hussain and Howard argue that democracy may look different in Muslim countries (Hussain 
and Howard 2013; see also Grugel 2002; Ezrahi 2012). Some scholars reject that democracy 
can be measured by similar instruments in different countries as the political context, like 
more or less homogeneous society structures or different electoral systems, require 
different forms of democracy (Lauth 2011 referring to Abromeit and Stoiber26). However, 
due to limited experience, there is no agreement on how a Muslim democracy may look like. 
Consequentially, the easiest way to measure democracy is to be aware of possible problems 
and to test an originally Western concept that is open towards non-Western democracies 
where liberal democracy may not be the desired ideal. 
 
Although being developed for quantitative analysis, the Barometer summarizes dimensions, 
elements and sub-elements and thus different aspects of democracy that can be related to 
the concept in qualitative terms. Therefore, the framing of democracy by Tunisian 
movements should allow to retrace a combination of factors named above. 
2.4.3 The concept of framing democracy 
In the following, (democratic) movements and organizations are seen as one factor for 
democratization; it is only one aspect of democracy and necessarily places other aspects – 
like parties or institutions - aside. Movements and organizations incorporate core elements 
of democracy in their collective framing when promoting democratization. 
 
                                                     
26 The latter propose to account also for heterogeneity of a society, dominance structures, institutional 
complexity and formalization of decision-making systems (Lauth 2011).  
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Jasper sees worldviews as a “cluster of meaning that fit together into a coherent package” 
forming a “common vocabulary that anyone can use” (Jasper 1997:169). I argue that 
framings on democracy are integrated into frame building and share a vocabulary on 
democracy. Democracy is relatively abstract; however, sub-elements can be used as parts 
for framing like injustice frames on corruption and transparency. In order to analyze 
movements and civil society, their perception and framings of democracy is regarded. The 
democratic framing model encloses worldviews and perceptions (“shared meanings”) on the 
group level. Democracy may be an explicit movement goal, but may also be implicit when 
fighting for example human rights violations, highlighting the contingent goals (Boudreau 
2016). A practical example is a movement that integrates the fight for political liberties into 
its collective group framing and combines it with existing frames of problems. The 
democratic framing across movements can be described as master frame, as relatively open 
in terms of interpretation, inclusive and flexible as several notions of democracy exist27.  
 
In terms of Benford and Snow’s diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, democracy 
identifies autocratic behavior and tendencies as potential enemy or autocratic tendencies to 
be changed. In addition, a prognostic ideal of a democratic Tunisia will be built; this can be a 
representative, deliberative or different form of democracy. Elements of democracy like 
freedom of association or inclusion emphasize the possibility to change policies and 
represent motivational framing. A democratic framing is defined as group framing that 
incorporates factors outlined by the Democracy Barometer (like support for rule of law). Not 
all aspects of democracy need to be incorporated as democracy can be defined differently 
according to the context and more than one type of democracy exists. A similar approach 
towards a social construction of democracy has been taken by a number of scholars 
illustrated by Andrews and Chapman: As “politics and state-building are inherently cultural 
activities, collective processes of conferring authority”, the construction of democracy, the 
meaning giving towards this rather abstract concept occurs through social interaction 
(Andrews and Chapman 1995:5). 
 
I highlight the openness of the approach that gives the possibility to identify a Tunisian 
framing on democracy. Therefore, no particular perspective on for example liberal 
                                                     
27 As part of this research the democracy frame is seen as master frame that is mediatized in the sense that it 
describes a democratic ideal that shall be realized in the ideal case. 
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democracy is given to avoid a predetermined perspective on what can be a movement’s 
perspective. It is possible that the approach of the Democracy Barometer is not sufficient 
and that additional elements emerge. The approach on democracy becomes thus a mixture 
of deductive and inductive reasoning. While this opens the possibility to criticize the 
openness or missing concreteness towards one specific perspective on democracy, it fits well 
with the exploratory approach towards movements and avoids pre-determination. 
 
The concept of a democratic framing has normative elements. The normative dimension 
should not be underestimated and the analysis enables an evaluation whether movements 
behave more or less democratic. Democracy is not seen as based only on institutionalized 
factors like elections or an elected government, but as a mix of institutional and social 
practices. Thus, the suggestion by Gerges to choose between institutionalized forms of 
democracy and on-going processes of democracy is consciously rejected and replaced by a 
complementary perspective (Gerges 2015). The aim of movements promoting democracy is 
not only to make claims on problems, but to combine these problems with a demand for 
democracy. They try to convince others in interaction leading to the concept of diffusion. 
2.5 Impact, diffusion and mechanisms 
This section focuses on the impact of movements and explains ideational impact as well as 
mechanisms for the diffusion of framing. The section starts discussing impact and outcomes 
before channels and mechanisms are outlined. The last part focuses on ideational impact 
and links impact to the question of frame diffusion and implications for policy outcome.  
2.5.1 Defining impact, outcomes and the problem of causality 
The study of impact and outcomes is a field of research where only few studies exist 
although the number of studies grew over the last years, especially since the 1990s as Bosi 
et al. outline (Bosi et al. 2016). While outcomes are seen as concrete in the form of 
attributed goods or policies, impact refers to a more general influence that is less visible. 
Several concurring approaches exist. It is often about the mechanisms that enable or hinder 
impact or more concrete policy outcomes. Scholars agree on the methodological and general 
problems when identifying causal claims on the impact of movements (Giugni 2009; Bosi and 
Uba 2009; Meyer 2006; Amenta 2005; Kolb 2007; Cress and Snow 2000). Giugni mentions a 
number of problems including the systematic study of movement outcomes covering “causal 
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attribution, the problem of time reference and effect stability, the problem of goal 
adaptation, the problem of interrelated effects, and the problem of unintended and 
perverse effects” (Giugni 2004:31). Policy and other impact can be influenced by a number 
of other actors that make it difficult to identify clear causal mechanisms (parliamentarians, 
parties, enterprises, media coverage, salience of topics and so on, compare also 
Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). In addition, it is difficult to assess the influence of 
organizations due to the diversity of movements themselves, a number of possible 
consequences, not all intended, and the discussions on different mechanisms as well as the 
possibility to shape a story of influence (Meyer 2006). Melucci and Lyyra argue that another 
difficulty for analyzing impact lies in the tendency to see movements as producing positive 
outcomes, while movements are also antagonists (Melucci and Lyyra 1998). 
 
While I share many of the objections towards finding causal links, I nevertheless argue that 
the Tunisian case is special as influence of civil society is reported to be large. It is a young 
democracy where administration depends on external knowledge as the state apparatus 
after the uprisings is much modified. Following these arguments, it should be easier to 
retrace movement influence in a state where parties as well as other political actors are seen 
as weak. In my specific case, mechanisms are seen as sustained interactions that enable the 
transmission of ideas. In addition, given the problems with causation and impact, it is crucial 
to equally discuss the role of other actors and their influence, especially when analyzing 
interviews with civil servants. I agree with McAdam and Schaffer Boudet who underline the 
need to show the impact of social movements, not only assume it (McAdam and Schaffer 
Boudet 2012). Assuming an impact is however often done in the Tunisian context so far, a 
problem that shall be reduced by this thesis. It is principally about ideational impact and less 
about concrete outcomes in terms of desired legislation, although it will be discussed how 
ideational influence can shape policy outcomes as an additional step. 
Why I won’t speak about success 
Related to impact is the question of success. Jasper or Meyer underline that definitions of 
success are often complicated, in particular when it comes to mobilizing or attaining specific 
goals (Jasper 1997; Meyer 2005). Giugni argues that the notion of success of movements 
underestimates the heterogeneity of movements which means that there may be little 
agreement on specific claims (Giugni 2004). Similarly, one needs to underline, that it is not 
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only about movement’s success, but that success also creates failure for other elements 
(Martin, G. 2015; Kolb 2007). In addition, not every success is claimed. Meyer emphasizes 
that claiming success includes dangers in relation to other organizations as well as for 
motivating participants (Meyer 2006). On the other hand, perceived failure may not be a 
failure in reality. Amenta et al. argue on the basis of collective benefit arguments; even a 
movement that fails in achieving its goals can have success because of for example new 
rights get introduced for all (Amenta et al. 2010). Following these arguments, claims may not 
be realized one by one, but can have partial and even unforeseen impacts. 
 
Scholars like Mello or Amenta argue to replace the concept of success by the one of impacts 
(be it positive or negative, on a content or repertoire level; Mello 2015; Amenta 2006). As a 
consequence, I speak about impact or the diffusion of a certain framing. Before returning to 
ideational impact, I shortly discuss what other researchers showed for impact. 
Empirical evidence for impact 
The focus of research is very diverse and consequentially are its results. Uba and Romanos 
describe the state of research on impact and outcomes as focused on aspects like public 
opinion, allies or strategies for mobilization (Uba and Romanos 2016). However, literature is 
far from extensive and not all aspects are covered. According to Giugni, a substance gap 
exists in form of missing qualitative research on the processes and mechanisms behind 
movement outcomes (Giugni 2004). This did not change and retracing processes and 
mechanisms remains limited.  
 
While literature often assumes impact of movements, the question of how much impact has 
seldom been discussed before Burstein and Linton presented their study and found 
relatively little influence, although statistically significant (Burstein and Linton 2002). Later, 
Burstein and Hirsh systematically summarized the literature on interest groups and 
outcomes and underlined the mixed results in relation to impacts. They found studies 
showing only negligible effects and warned for overestimating the impact of public opinion 
on policy (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Others similarly trace a divided picture. Kolb or Amenta 
et al. summarize that evidence for impact of movements on political change is mixed 
between studies showing impact as well as those arguing for limited influence (Kolb 2007; 
Amenta et al. 2010). One can summarize that results on social movement outcomes are 
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diverse and often not connected with one another; or simply too limited or not well 
executed (Kolb 2007). It is therefore difficult to say when impact occurs and the influence in 
terms of ideas is even more difficult to assess. I consequentially focus on the channels and 
mechanisms of influence, before relating it to ideational influence. 
2.5.2 Channels for influencing state actors 
Research underlines a number of channels to realize impact. Research ranges from the 
influence of movements on media reporting to the influence on administration or the role of 
networks. Meyer showed that free media and freedom of expression give movements the 
possibility to place content that does concern them in the public sphere (Meyer 2005). 
Another way to influence administration is shown by Banaszak: She shows that members of 
the women movement were part of the Kennedy administration and that activists in 
institutional settings increase the chances of success for policy outcomes (Banaszak 2005). 
Kolb agrees that the better activists are integrated in institutional positions, the stronger is 
their impact (Kolb 2007). Other examples include Burstein and Hirsh who retraced the flow 
of information during U.S. congress hearings towards parliamentarians that then guided 
their decisions (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Amenta argues that the widespread discussion of a 
problem can potentially influence new legislation (Amenta 2006). Research on networks and 
impact shows on the international level and especially for climate change networks that 
these networks can influence changes in politics (Hadden 2015).  
 
From those examples, especially the approach by Hadden, who combines framing, outcomes 
and networks, comes close to my own approach although her results on framing are 
relatively limited at the end (she mainly emphasizes the network structure as important for 
repertoires and strategies). It is to note, that a number of direct channels for influence, be it 
in direct discussion, in committees or via members in the administration exist, that can 
diffuse a framing towards the state.  
 
The importance of resources and professionalization for outcomes is also discussed. Volpi et 
al. confirm that “professionalization of their role, a mobilization of local resources, and an 
effective dialogue with the state administration” increased the chances of influencing 
outcomes in the direct aftermath of the revolution (Volpi et al. 2016:373). However, when 
including the targets’ needs, Burstein and Linton argue that resources, be it in terms of 
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number of members or financial means “are unlikely to strongly influence policy change” 
(Burstein and Linton 2002:387). The question of resources, professionalization as well as 
other factors should be taken into account although the focus lies on ideational outcomes. 
 
From these findings, a distinction between direct channels of influence and indirect ones via 
public opinion or the media emerges. Discussions can be direct, for example in committees, 
or indirect via public opinion.  
Influencing public opinion  
Public opinion is often discussed in relation to movement outcomes. Integration of new 
ideas in the public discourse is seen as impact of movements by scholars (Meyer 2006; 
Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni 2004). Kriesi underlines the role of the public and thus of 
media by which movements can reach their targets and, especially in case of elected people, 
exercise pressure (Kriesi 2009; for reelection see also Kolb 2007).  
 
However, evidence for the influence of public opinion is not clear and Uba found it 
impossible to show that public opinion enhanced effects by movements (Uba 2009). On the 
other hand, Woodly shows that movements can influence public discourse not only through 
contestation but also through credible views and proposals (Woodly 2015). Polletta and Ho 
indicate that activists would modify their frames so that they fit institutional insiders rather 
than the public because the public has no influence on policy making (Polletta and Ho 2006). 
I do not share the perspective by Polletta and Ho as for example mediatized protest can   
shape public opinion and force state actors that want to represent the peoples’ will to adapt. 
While evidence is divided, it may be useful to use Kriesi’s distinction between reactive and 
proactive effects, where especially the reactive element, to prevent disadvantages, is 
realized via public opinion, which get mobilized in order to preserve the status quo. On the 
other hand, public opinion can be seen as less influential for policy proposals. 
 
Based on Burstein’s model of indirect effects on policies, Giugni mentions changing public 
preferences, increasing public concern and changing the decision makers’ perspectives on 
the former preferences and concern (Giugni 2004). Public preferences and concern are often 
seen as discussions in media, although it is not the same. Scheufele criticizes the link 
between public opinion and media coverage as findings show that news coverage is not 
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affected by public opinion (Scheufele 2000). For Tunisia, a practical problem arises: As no 
systematic opinion polls apart from the very general Arab Barometer and few other surveys 
exist, a reliance on media coverage appears as better option. Whether media can influence 
state actors is a connected question of responsiveness of political leaders. While scholars 
show responsiveness for public opinion in Western countries, it is not clear whether a 
“young” democracy as Tunisia shows the same features (for a summary in Western contexts 
see Giugni 2004). 
 
In media, claims by movements are present. A claim is not exactly the same as a frame, but 
the combination of several concepts within arguments can be part of a specific framing. 
While every claim includes a prognostic or also a diagnostic framing, not every framing 
includes claims as especially motivational framing like a call for action can be interpreted 
separately from claims. Both are nevertheless very close and claims are taking up only some 
elements of framing. Therefore an oral explanation by movement leaders is seen as more 
complete as a condensed (and eventually modified) version in form of claims in public. 
Movement claims are fluent and can change over time (Sandoval 1998; Andrews 2001). 
Claims of movements are regarded for combinations of arguments that are part of a wider 
framing. The question of claims is discussed later when analyzing articles. 
Influence models 
Taking direct and indirect influence channels together leads to different influence models. 
Giugni and Passy outline three influence models: a direct-effect model, a joint-effect model 
and a mediated-effect model (Giugni and Passy 2003). In the first case, there is a direct tie 
between movements towards authorities’ responsiveness; in-direct or mediated ways use 
public opinion or alliances while a joint approach uses both channels (Giugni and Passy 
2003). Giugni describes indirect transmission, where allies “carry” claims into institutions; 
once they entered they may enter into policies (Giugni 2004). Figure 2.2 summarizes the 
different effect models as described by Giugni (2004). Indirect effect models use other actors 
or public opinion to achieve policy changes, while a direct model focuses on movements 
only. In reality, several effects get combined (see joint-effect model), leading to policy 
changes. 
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Figure 2.2 Direct/Indirect/joint effect model 
 
Note: Illustration based on Giugni 2004:125, each step includes another point in time 
Giugni underlines that a “social movement interpretation”, a joint effect of movement 
actions, public opinion and media coverage can change legislation (Giugni 2004; see also 
Amenta 2014). Giugni highlights the role of the media in this model. However, Giugni and 
Yamasaki as well as Kolb also assign that several paths towards outcomes exist, causing 
problems for causality as outlined earlier (Giugni and Yamasaki 2009; Kolb 2007). Different 
policy areas have different degrees of complexity and thus different numbers of causal paths 
(Giugni and Yamasaki 2009). Giugni and Yamasaki emphasize that the joint-effect model fits 
differently according to national contexts; for example, less for Italy than for the United 
States (ibid). This should be kept in mind when applying the model to the Tunisian case. In 
my case it is about policy changes in the very end. Ideational influence in terms of a shared 
democratic framing is much more important for this thesis. In order to identify the 
mechanisms of influence that exist and what kind of effect model fits, I use networks that 
serve as vehicle to transport democratic framing.  
2.5.3 Political and ideational impact: influencing the policy process 
Giugni summarizes that political, cultural and individual biographic effects by movements 
can be identified (Giugni 2009; Bosi et al. 2016). As part of this thesis, political consequences 
and what I call ideational impact are of interest. Ideational impact is transcending elements 
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that can enter and influence different policies. I also relate policy influence to the 
administration.  
 
Framing and ideas are seldom discussed when talking about impact. Nevertheless, some 
examples for framing and outcomes exist. Woodly argues that impact of movements does 
not depend on the organization, but on ideas and political meaning (Woodly 2015). Meyer 
advances the concept of framing to analyze movement outcomes (Meyer 2006). Other 
researchers connect impact not only with directed, plausible framing, but also with 
mobilization, strategies and resources (Amenta et al. 2005). Nevertheless, analyzing impact 
from a framing perspective remains an exception and is worth to be tested. Amenta et al. 
underline that it is difficult to examine framing in relation to political outcomes as frames 
need to be resonant and plausible (Amenta et al. 2010). Creating a resonant and plausible 
framing does not depend on resources. Even organizations with few resources can have a 
huge impact by creating – through framing - a perception that their organization is 
important and by creating a dominant interpretation of a topic. As we have seen above, 
empirical evidence is divided between researchers seeing few influences and those who 
argue for specific outcomes. It is thus worth to look at the different types of influence. 
 
Burstein and Hirsh use a detailed distinction and identify five modes of government 
responsiveness: Access responsiveness (the willingness to hear organizations, similar to 
Gamson’s acceptance, see below), agenda responsiveness (accepting the importance of a 
problem highlighted by an organization), policy responsiveness (accepting a policy proposal), 
output responsiveness (realizing implementation) or impact responsiveness (reducing the 
impact of the original problem) which is seen as a process which occurs stepwise (Burstein 
and Hirsh 2007; the approach is equally highlighted by Giugni 2004 and Amenta 2005). Kriesi 
et al. as well as Kolb distinguish between proactive success, meaning that movements gain 
advantages, or reactive, so that they prevent disadvantages (Kriesi et al. 1995; Kolb 2007).  
 
A lot of social movement theory on outcomes bases on Gamson’s approach on acceptance 
and it is outlined here as it builds the basis for Burstein and Hirsh’s model. Acceptance as a 
political actor means being seen as “valid spokesman” or spokeswoman while the 
advantages can be in the form of passing a desired legislation or similar (Gamson 1990:29; 
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Giugni 1998b). Amenta et al. remark that scholars working on outcomes of movements 
“have moved away from addressing whether movements or organizations are successful in 
gaining new benefits or acceptance (Gamson 1990) and have turned to examining the causal 
influence of movements on political outcomes and processes drawn from political sociology 
literature” (reference in original, same book as included in bibliography; Amenta et al. 
2010:289). While the idea of acceptance is still present, the typology of impact got more 
sophisticated over time. Table 2.3 summarizes main distinctions of impacts. I focus on 
responsiveness and its relation to democratic framing. When it comes to mechanisms, both 
distinctions by Burstein and Hirsh as well as by Kriesi et al. are used to show the possible 
(ideational) influence of organizations on the state. 
Table 2.3 Typology of Impact according to different authors 
Burstein and Hirsh 2007 Kriesi et al. 1995 
Access responsiveness Proactive impact 
Agenda responsiveness Reactive impact 
Policy responsiveness  
Output responsiveness  
Implementation 
responsiveness 
 
Diffusion of ideas and policies 
The core of the thesis is about the diffusion of ideas and about their influence on policies. It 
is therefore useful to connect it with literature on policy diffusion that not only regards the 
diffusion of policies, but also of ideas. Policy diffusion is defined as “the process whereby 
policy choices in one unit are influenced by policy choices in another unit” (Maggetti and 
Gilardi 2016:89). Gilardi and other scholars further elaborate that not only policies spread, 
but also ideational frameworks (Gilardi 2012; see also Börzel and Risse 200928). Units 
between which ideas or policies diffuse can be states, cities, organizations and other actors. 
This already shows that diffusion is often related to an international context. In this sense 
and related to the diffusion of democracy, especially studies on human rights and democracy 
promotion are to mention. Interdependence of actors is one important element of diffusion 
and is not only linked to specific policies. Gilardi does not only state that diffusion is a 
consequence of interdependence, but also that “diffusion does not occur only at the 
international level, that national governments are not the only relevant units, and that it is 
                                                     
28 Gilardi provides an extensive overview on different forms of diffusion, be it the level (international, national 
etc.) or the types of diffusion (Gilardi 2012), Börzel and Risse (2009) provide equally a good overview on 
different forms of diffusion. 
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not only specific policies that diffuse” (Gilardi 2012:2; see also Simmons et al. 2006 for an 
argument on interdependence).  
 
Gilardi notes that diffusion is not equivalent to convergence, as diffusion is the process by 
which the outcome of convergence is achieved (Gilardi 2012). In this sense “convergence 
can, but need not, follow from diffusion” (Gilardi 2012:3). Linked to my research, the framing 
of ideas comes close to the research on the diffusion of principles or templates as 
overarching guidelines (Gilardi 2012). Also democracy has been regarded from a perspective 
of diffusion across countries (Gilardi 2012). Diffusion is often measured through the already 
evoked convergence. It is observed through spatial or temporal clustering (Gilardi 2012). I 
focus on the spatial clustering of actors that are compared on their level and orientation of 
democratic framing. The diffusion of a democratic framing is expected to be from civil 
society to the Tunisian state. In this sense, the approach of comparing civil society actors and 
the state is similar to the approach used on an international level. The second element is 
then the interdependence of actors and the possible diffusion mechanisms that is accounted 
for in the network analysis.  
 
Literature on diffusion also identifies mechanisms. Maggetti and Gilardi provide an overview 
on policy diffusion literature and distinguish between three forms of (transnational) 
diffusion: Learning, emulation and competition (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016; for older 
overviews see Marsh and Sharman 2009; Simmons et al. 2006 or Börzel and Risse 2009). 
These forms of diffusion are threatened as mechanisms, while some researchers name the 
forms differently or add others (Marsh and Sharman 2009 for example speak about learning, 
competition, coercion and mimicry, see also Shipan and Volden 2008). Learning is seen as 
influence on policies through the consequences of policies in other cases, emulation is seen 
as conformity with normative expectations and competition is linked to policies that in other 
cases attracted (or retained) resources (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016; Meseguer and Gilardi 
2009; Gilardi 2012). It is also the mechanism most in line with constructivist approaches 
(Simmons et al. 2006). However, mechanisms are a much discussed concept as mechanism 
of policy diffusion are defined and operationalized in different ways across literature 
(Maggetti and Gilardi 2016). In addition, Meseguer and Gilardi warn that not every 
mechanism may be sufficient as different mechanisms have different importance (Meseguer 
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and Gilardi 2009). Scholars also underline the “multiple causation” when it comes to policy 
diffusion as different mechanisms are at work at the same time (Marsh and Sharman 
2009:273). 
 
As other scholars noted, literature on policy diffusion is well developed, the diffusion of 
policies is empirically documented, but much less is known about mechanisms of diffusion 
(Shipan and Volden 2008). A lot of the studies, including many of the examples cited by 
Gilardi, include policy diffusion on an international level (Gilardi 2012).  At the same time, it 
is assigned that policy diffusion, including the diffusion of ideas, also happens at a national 
level. There are numerous empirical studies on policy diffusion on different levels and topics 
- like the work of Tews, Busch and Jörgens arguing that diffusion happens not only due to 
perceived efficacy, but also to increase legitimacy, the work of Shipan and Volden on 
antismoking policy diffusion across U.S. states or works by Greenhill on the diffusion and 
socialization of human rights norms (Tews, Busch and Jörgens 2002; Shipan and Volden 
2008; Greenhill 2010). Other studies like the work by Lodge on policy transfer underline the 
possible pressures by other organizations, the configuration of the state (whether the state 
is open to learning) as well as the possible access of societal actors (Lodge 2003). While 
Lodge focuses on institutional learning, it should be emphasized that these categories 
overlap with those found in social movement studies where protest and openness of the 
political system are underscored. 
 
I look at the circumstances under which diffusion of democratic framing occurs. However, 
diffusion is not taken for granted and first it needs to be shown whether diffusion of 
democratic framing occurs. The question is still, whether the threefold division on 
mechanisms of diffusion as learning, competition and emulation is also true on a national 
level. In the case of democracy, emulation is seen as the most probable mechanism, while 
learning on the bases of old policies seems difficult as most policies are new in Tunisia. Old, 
still existent policies can however be modified through learning. Competition can be seen as 
idea competition, where ideal practices would be consistent framings of democracy. When 
actors adopt a successful framing of democracy, this framing is expected to diffuse 
automatically due to the perceived wide acceptance. Similarly, emulation is seen as “process 
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whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed properties” 
(Gilardi 2012:22). 
Influence on policies 
The focus on ideational impact as part of this thesis is finally linked to the question of 
policies influenced through democratic framing. This final step links the more abstract 
framing of democracy to the possibility of shaping policies. However, the policy process itself 
is very complex and consists of different phases (Weible et al. 2011; Schlager and Weible 
2013). Due to this diversity, Cress and Snow describe that pathways for achieving movement 
outcome are multiple (Cress and Snow 2000) 29. Amenta et al. divide the process into agenda 
setting, legislative content preparation, passage and implementation (Amenta et al. 2010; 
Amenta 2005). Weible et al. add evaluation and termination as additional stages (Weible et 
al. 2011). Based on these divisions, one can argue that the role of networks and the 
organizational perception as experts can play a role for agenda setting and the elaboration 
of the legislative content. The passage and implementation processes, but also agenda 
setting may be dominated by protest. Professional input through experts is for example less 
important for the issue creation phase in comparison to the policy formulation phase 
(Grattet 2005). I do not consider everything that follows the adoption of a law (/change) - 
the implementation, termination and evaluation phase - as my data only covers the policy 
process up to the passage. A focus is taken on the ideational influence on policies. 
 
Woodly argues that movements have more power when influencing general policies through 
agenda setting and giving solutions instead of concrete policy proposals (Woodly 2015). 
However, Amenta et al. underline that movements may be less influential in later stages of 
the policy process, meaning that mobilization in later stages may not be useful or that 
protest as a strategy might not help (Amenta et al. 2010). According to Amenta: “It is easiest 
for challengers to influence policy in its earliest phase, before a program of policy becomes 
highly institutionalized” (Amenta 2006:28; compare also Bosi et al. 2016). 
 
As a consequence, literature on policy influence is not clear about which stage of the policy 
protest is most adequate for a certain type of movement action. Research only states that 
                                                     
29 Cress and Snow give also a good overview on different factors that can influence outcomes: Cress and Snow 
2000. 
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the type of policy-making processes influences the chances of success of coalitions 
depending on targets and timing (Reese 2005). Weible et al. state that “success or failure in 
the policy process is a matter of odds, but these odds can be changed favorably […]” (Weible 
et al. 2011:3). While Amenta argues that it is easier to influence early phases, it is not related 
to a specific type of action which effectively can be of different importance according to 
stages of the policy process. Thus, it should be kept in mind that (ideational) influence at 
different levels of the policy process can be different in terms of actions used as well as in 
terms of proposal/opposition. This brings us back to Kriesi’s distinction between pro-active 
and reactive influence that equally can play a role. 
 
As mentioned earlier, policy processes are complex. Meyer assigns that policy processes are 
often not linear and can be influenced by various actors and events (Meyer 2005). Kolb 
remarks that the influence of other political actors such as parties, government and so on 
should be considered for research to avoid “pseudo outcomes” that can lead to an 
overstatement of the impact of movements (Kolb 2007:22).  
 
Whether protest can influence policy processes is another question that is discussed by 
scholars. Some scholars even argue that given the limited costs for ignoring protest or given 
its disruptive potential, protest does not matter at all, is counterproductive or has just a very 
limited effect (Biggs and Andrews 2015). Protest may be seen as less credible in comparison 
to lobbying by policymakers (Uba 2009). Protest is seen as one mean to gain attention, be it 
directly or via the media.  
2.6 Towards a theoretical framework 
Chapter 2.6 takes up the findings from the literature review and develops the theory of the 
thesis. Theories on framing democracy are connected with theories on diffusion and 
networks. All this to answer the research question: “How does a democratic framing diffuse 
across actors in Tunisia?” 
 
Section 2.2 outlined the role of networks. The importance of interdependence for the 
diffusion of ideas was highlighted. The ties established towards different actors of the 
political system as well as the media help to account for the scope of ideational influence 
that each organization can exert. Network configurations pre-determine whether 
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movements can influence certain actors. It is not only single organizational influence but also 
collective influence that is taken into account. The argument of a movement coalition is used 
as certain concepts/ideas may only be promoted through a wide alliance of movements 
(2.2.2). The existence of such a coalition and/or organizational ways to influence is 
highlighted in the analysis. The networks indicate which actors are closer to the state and 
which actors are challengers. Networks do not only allow access to other actors, but also let 
ideas travel (2.2.4). The interaction of actors in a social constructivist perspective will thus 
shape their meaning making and allow democratic framing to travel.  
 
Movements refer to frames more or less in line with democracy and combine these with 
their issues of interest (for example women rights for the ATFD). The main three dimensions 
of democracy freedom, equality and control are divided in several sub-elements in order to 
identify whether movements consistently promote all, few or specific elements of 
democracy (2.3 and 2.4). The assessment of a democratic framing shows whether 
organizations focus on freedom, equality or control, so whether they promote a libertarian, 
egalitarian or majoritarian conception of democracy. The combination of elements of 
democracy helps to identify specific elements of each organizational framing. 
 
The third part of literature used for analysis is the literature on diffusion, influence and 
mechanisms (section 2.5). Different channels of influence exist be it through direct or 
indirect ways. The types of influence (agenda impact, policy access and so on) differ. The 
direct and indirect influence is analyzed through networks between the state and 
organizations as well as via a media analysis that stands for public opinion. The diffusion of 
ideas is especially well researched on an international level, but is applicable to ideas and 
national levels. Especially normative diffusion through emulation appears relevant. The 
proactive and reactive influence is kept in mind.  
 
Mechanisms are important for the diffusion of ideas. Mechanisms are sustained interactions 
that enable the transmission of ideas. Better influence mechanisms thus easier promote a 
specific framing of democracy. If movements are successful as stated in literature (see 
chapter one), democratic framing should already have entered the state and successful 
mechanism will have let to congruent framing between organizations and ministries. This 
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congruence is highlighted by the literature on diffusion, while it is to keep in mind that it not 
necessarily proofs diffusion without assessing the ways ideas can diffuse.   
 
The theory starts by outlining the reasoning and details how concepts are combined. The 
chapter concludes with some critical reflections on the approach. The interactions of 
movements with the state (and vice-versa) enable in combination with framings on 
democracy to identify efficient mechanisms of influence. As part of this thesis, especially the 
questions if framings diffuse and how orient the questioning. Finally, the influence of a 
democratic framing on policies is discussed.  
2.6.1 Ontological reflections 
A social constructivist perspective builds the basis of the thesis. The world is seen as 
intersubjective constructed and meaning is given through the interaction of people who 
assign attributes to things (Berger and Luckmann 2012). Similarly, Klandermans states that 
social beliefs and collective perceptions become part of a social reality when they are shared 
and as a consequence become independent of the individual (Klandermans 1992). 
Interaction, arguing and bargaining or non-verbal interactions construct worldviews and 
framings. Lapsley and Narvaez evaluate it from a psychological perspective: “Persons and 
contexts are not static, orthogonal effects, but they are instead dynamically interacting” 
(Lapsley and Narvaez 2009:194). Interaction is crucial because a face-to-face interaction 
allows to present oneself and to interpret others (Berger and Luckmann 2012). The meaning 
of the term democracy for example is shaped through interaction. This includes that an 
understanding of democracy by a social movement actor in Tunisia may differ from a 
Western perspective or even from perspectives hold by other actors. The meaning may be 
influenced by the Western perspective, but be adapted to the Tunisian context. Thus, 
democracy can be defined differently. The perspective on democracy is influenced by how 
groups, in my case organizations, construct democracy. A perspective that resembles mine, 
is the one taken by Ezrahi, who outlines the imagination and construction of meaning of 
democracy (Ezrahi 2012)30. Movements combine for example the framing of ensuring 
liberties like the freedom of speech with their framing of democracy in Tunisia and promote 
                                                     
30 However, Ezrahi remains on a very abstract, philosophical level and mainly discusses the theoretical 
importance for democracy. 
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these aspects. Consequentially, they build a shared understanding of the world that is 
expressed by activists and leaders. 
 
Movements “construct an alternative view of social reality” (Klandermans 1992:90). To give 
a practical example: a group-mobilizing people for a cause does promote a set of worldviews 
and framings on what should be changed. In the Tunisian case, a group like the UGTT does 
not only promote workers’ rights, but also aspects of democracy like liberties, support for 
alternation in power, fighting corruption and so on. These aspects become thus part of the 
organization’s framing. 
 
From a method-oriented perspective Robson adds, that a constructivist perspective means 
that “the task of the researcher is to understand the multiple constructions of meaning and 
knowledge” (Robson 2005:27). For this research it becomes important to account for the 
perceived reality of actors, thus who is seen as ally, enemy or important actor of the political 
system. It includes how actors construct democracy from their point of view and what they 
emphasize or neglect. This has also methodological consequences as it requires methods 
that can account for the subjective construction of democracy and networks (like   
interviews31). 
2.6.2 Framing and its diffusion through networks 
Movements construct/combine and use frames in interaction with each other, but also with 
other actors of the political system (2.3). The focus of the thesis is on collective democratic 
framing. This said, combinations of individual frames are used to indicate differences and 
similarities in the use of the concept of democracy. The framing of democracy is integrated 
into “normal” movement frames like issue specific claims on more women rights and the 
like. Framing is seen as social construction and combination of topics, issues or ideas. It is 
about the connection of aspects and whether it is seen as a problem, a solution or a 
mobilizing factor. A frame is seen as interpretation of a perceived situation from a specific 
angle. Framing occurs when elements like workers’ rights are connected with other issues to 
construct an interpretation of a situation. As part of framing, problems get identified, 
solutions proposed and actions prepared (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing). 
                                                     
31 This also means that data from interviews is seen as better in comparison to media data as it stands for a 
subjective interpretation by actors. 
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While speeches not necessarily include all three framing elements, they do at least include 
one of them and link it to an issue of occupation for the organization (for example 
environmental pollution and the demand for the state to take action because it is bad for 
health, for animals or so on). Within organizations several framings can exist, however 
organizations normally agree on common aspects. 
 
Wide reaching frames within a society can be referred to as master frames that resonate 
with the perspectives of many people (and collectives). One can imagine that “democracy” 
or “we are democrats” take a broad, abstract master frame that can be found across 
organizations. Master frames are inclusive, flexible and broad in terms of interpretative 
scope and have already been identified for the framing of rights, culturally pluralist frames 
and others (Benford and Snow 2000; Martin, G. 2015). Frames are useful to analyze how 
democracy is justified and supported. As a consequence, autocratic actions are evaluated as 
bad and dangerous to democracy. Frame resonance in public can be retraced and 
consequentially a picture of frame influence is drawn. 
 
Tunisian movements operate in a political system that is still changing. The question 
emerges, how movements perceive democracy and whether they can influence the state. 
How do they establish a tie towards the state and does the state take over the organizations’ 
framing? What is their perception about democracy and how is it incorporated into their 
collective action frames? This includes the development of a “democratic framing”. The 
organizations position themselves towards the concept of democracy and evaluate certain 
aspects negative and others positive. This provides an explication of what is desirable in 
terms of democracy and what is seen as core of a democratic framing. While intra-
organizational democratic framings express this ideal, public framings may be more radical,   
claiming more than the ideal in order to achieve the ideal. A frequent focus on a problem in 
public can indicate points that have to be changed from the perspective of the organizations.  
 
From the literature on networks (2.2), the argument on coalitions, but also on the division of 
tasks within coalitions and perceived influence are taken over. It can be expected that every 
organization has a specific role and does not cover all topics. The literature states that 
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frames resemble within coalitions. Thus, the framing on specific topics is expected to be 
different, but similar when it comes to a possible master frame on democracy.  
 
What happens with commonly supported law proposals? Do organizations adopt a common 
framing in line with their democratic framing similar to the one proposed by the expert 
movement or do they focus on their own field of expertise and combine frames? These 
questions orient chapter seven as there are still empty spots in literature. Framing 
democracy and framing in general as well as interaction are not well researched. Whether 
democracy frames resonate in countries that democratize is also not well researched. When 
it comes to movement coalitions, roles and framing it is not clear to what degree framing is 
similar or different. 
 
Network connections and their quality can tell much on who interacts with whom and who 
takes which role. Networks are seen as particularly important for socialization and meaning 
construction. Passy explains for the individual level that “social networks contribute to the 
socialization of individuals, or to increase awareness on a political conflict […], but also to the 
construction of specific identities that allow them to identify themselves with a conflict and 
give meaning to their actions” (own translation, Passy 1998:109). In my perspective meaning 
is constructed among compound actors, so between organizations and the state (as well as 
between organizations and other organizations). Perceptions enable certain networks or 
support the transmission of ideas, while networks create the mechanisms for their diffusion. 
To analyze the selected movements, organization centered networks are used, as a 
complete network picture is difficult in a political system where not all actors are easily 
identifiable. Thus, the ties between organizations and other actors are analyzed. The actor-
centered network perspective is equally applied to ministries, but with a focus on 
cooperation with civil society organizations and movements to verify whether ministries 
ascribe importance to organizations. The framings analyzed are centered on the concept of 
democracy. While framing in interviews is directly accessible, the approach for analyzing the 
media (indirect and joint effect model) is focused on framing integrated in claims, as these 
are easier to be identified. 
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Frame resonance in public – using claims 
Analyzing frames is not easy, as discourse analysis of frames may leave reasons for 
interpretation implicit (Johnston 1995). One approach attributes “close attention to 
language, the analyst can reconstruct a schema that systematically shows the relationships 
between concepts and experience represented in speech” (Johnston 1995:220). The 
approach used for analyzing framing as part of this thesis is close to what Woodly calls a 
principal component analysis, where especially the combination of frames is analyzed 
(Woodly 2015). While this is relatively easy for interviews oriented on a specific topic, it is 
much more difficult for media articles where not only movement ideas but also other 
elements are presented. The concept of claims is used to distinguish movement positions 
from simple reporting in relation to the organization and thus to identify frame resonance in 
public. A claim is defined as “purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to 
action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the 
interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans et al. 
2005:24, italics in original). 
 
Claim analysis is often connected to analyzing frames. Koopmans et al. used a model with 
newspaper covering the protest including claim making, thus the “publicly visible part of 
claims making” (Koopmans et al. 2005:25). Political claim analysis uses for example protest 
event analysis but also speeches and public discourses and sees the public action as process 
of meaning giving with a focus on collective action frames (Koopmans et al. 2005). 
Koopmans et al. differentiate between locations of claims, the claimants, and forms of 
claims, the addressee, the content, the object actor and the justification of a claim, which 
should be identifiable (Koopmans et al. 2005). As part of the thesis, the claim itself, the 
claimants as well as the addressee are identified. Claims are seen as representing prognostic 
framing as it represents a demand for a situation to be changed. It can also be related to 
diagnostic framing where organizations for example criticize torture in prisons and demand 
it to be stopped. Whether framing is effective also depends on the resonance of frames in 
public. 
Retracing diffusion through mechanisms 
The literature on diffusion and outcomes by movements underscores the importance of 
mechanism of diffusion (Crossley 2016). As shown earlier effects can be direct and indirect 
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and consequentially mechanisms integrate both channels. Mechanisms for the diffusion of 
ideas focus on a normative perspective on diffusion and on pressure on the state to adopt a 
certain framing. On the other hand, mechanisms are not seen uncritical as it is often used as 
all-encompassing term (Chalcraft 2016). In my research mechanisms are interactions within 
networks that enable the transmission of ideas and show influence of movements.  
 
Having an impact in terms of this thesis is primarily influencing framings on democracy hold 
by civil servants in leader positions in ministries. In a second step this impact should 
translate in policy impact, so the realization or blocking of legislation in the desired – as 
framed – way. State actors sharing the same framings of democracy are more receptive for 
other claims. For the realization of a democratic framing, social movements engage in claim 
making and incorporate democratic elements into their paroles. These claims are shared on 
a state level via relays, for example movement members that enter government, or 
connections to official state representatives. Diffusion is achieved through regular exchange 
that reinforces shared framings. Incorporations of movement actors in state institutions 
allow to spread the perspective on democracy as well as to promote ideas of democracy 
indirectly via public opinion or public claims. As outlined by literature expertise equally plays 
a role. 
 
A first aspect is to identify different channels for diffusion, thus interactions that are able to 
shape framings in the Tunisian case. From there mechanisms of diffusion are derived. These 
can be organizational and individual relays or indirect ways via the media. The channels of 
diffusion also interact with different levels of influence: Based on the distinctions by Burstein 
and Hirsh that are shared by Amenta, Giugni and Andrews, the ways of influencing can be 
distinguished in five different categories (Burstein and Hirsh 2007): 
 Access responsiveness 
 Agenda responsiveness 
 Policy responsiveness 
 Output responsiveness 
 Impact responsiveness 
These types of responsiveness of the state system show different entry points for framing of 
democracy and their degrees. Access responsiveness is for example important for improved 
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interaction. Being able to set an agenda also stands for master frames, policy responsiveness 
can show that democratic framing are integrated into policies. Output responsiveness can 
show that policies including democratic framing are implemented and impact 
responsiveness is related to the output dimension of democracy. What is taken over from 
the literature review is that influence can be easier achieved in the early policy formulation 
process as outlined by Amenta and that Kriesi et al. distinguish between reactive and 
proactive impact by (Amenta et al. 2010; Amenta 2005; Kriesi et al. 1995). 
 
The role of public opinion but also of direct influence is important. I recall the model on 
direct, indirect and joint influence by movements. Indirect ways use allies or media to 
achieve an outcome, direct ways influence the target without relying on other actors. It is 
probable that direct and indirect ways are used at the same time (joint effect), so that 
influence is not only achieved through direct interactions, but also through public opinion. 
The role of former members that enter the political system as well as the integration of 
movements in policy making process shall be kept in mind. I now turn to an in-depth 
elaboration on the research questions. 
2.6.3 Research questions 
While the main research question was already stated in chapter 1.2, this subsection 
formulates a number of additional questions that guide the thesis as well as the respective 
chapters. Movements in Tunisia operate in a context that changed with a new constitution 
as well as a new political system and this poses several questions. Researchers assign that 
the Tunisian case is a success story, but is this due to the movements’ positive influence? Do 
organizations have a framing towards democracy? Are they impactful because of their pro-
democratic framing? And how do they realize that their pro-democratic claims are realized 
in state administration? As there is limited knowledge on the topic, in particular on the 
relation towards the state, these questions are addressed as part of the research question. 
The study takes a social-constructivist approach and starts at a meso-level to analyze 
collective movement framing with a specific focus on democracy as well as how framings 
resonate on a state level. The thesis does not only contribute to the analysis of democratic 
framing, but also to the analysis of state-civil society interactions. 
 
 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
84 
 
  
 The research question that guides this thesis is: 
How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia? 
 
Diffusion is not taken for granted. With the help of additional questions, it is verified 
whether democratic framing is transmitted before mechanisms are outlined. 
This includes the following additional questions: 
 
 How are movements connected to each other and to which degree do they 
interact? 
The first question refers to the inter-actor relations as literature showed that movements 
take roles and that coalitions exist. The question of possible coalitions allows to determine 
whether they advocate common or different framings of democracy. In addition, it helps to 
evaluate whether organizations try to influence the state individually or in cooperation. The 
network structure and the types of organizations included indicate roles in a coalition. 
 
 Which ties exist between movements and the state and what quality do these 
have? 
The second question asks what types of connections exist between the state and the 
movements. By analyzing the connections as being allies or partners I can determine 
whether movements and ministries have close or loose connections. This question becomes 
important to identify possible mechanisms of influence as the relative importance of for 
example committees or media work is highlighted. 
 
 Do the analyzed movements, the UGTT, the LTDH, the ATFD, and the FTDES have 
a collective democratic framing and which elements of a democratic framing are 
highlighted individually? 
The third question asks whether the analyzed organizations have common and/or different 
framings of democracy. Based on the first question, a possible movement coalition is 
expected to have a somewhat similar framing with certain differences. The answer to this 
question allows the comparison to the ministerial perspective that is covered by question 
four. It allows to evaluate organizational and coalitional frames. 
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 Do the same framings exist from the state perspective (did movements diffuse 
their democratic framing)? 
The fourth question looks at the democratic framing of civil servants. Their democratic 
framing is compared to the one held by movements and similarities and difficulties are 
identified. Similar visions indicate effective mechanisms, so whether the connections 
between actors allow a certain framing to be adopted. These mechanisms are qualified with 
the help of interviews in order to determine the causal direction. 
 
 What are the mechanisms used by movements and how effective are these? 
The fifth question relates to the mechanisms of influence for a democratic framing. It 
combines the questions of networks and their quality with the diffusion of ideas. The 
combination of similar/different framing when comparing organizations and ministries and 
the quality of networks allows to identify mechanisms of influence. These mechanisms are 
outlined and illustrated by three examples on law projects that allow to connect the 
influence in terms of democratic framing to policy influence. 
 
Movements framing and its influence are a focus of research. The analysis is divided into an 
explorative and an explanatory part. During the explorative phase, ties between movements 
as well as a democratic framing are identified, while the second phase verifies the realization 
of a democratic framing on a state level as well as the underlying connecting mechanisms for 
diffusion. The questions structure the thesis as follows: 
Table 2.4 Chapters and research questions 
Chapter Topic Question 
Five Networks One, two 
Six Democratic framings by movements Three  
Seven Democratic framings by ministries Four 
Eight Diffusion mechanisms and influence Five 
2.6.4 What is expected and what is controlled for 
While the approach remains inductive on a number of aspects, some ideas guide the 
research. For transparency, the initial ideas that oriented the research are outlined briefly. In 
addition, I identify alternative explanations apart of the main theoretical model that should 
be kept in mind and be used as control for other explanations. 
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As outlined earlier, democratic framings are transmitted via direct networks towards the 
state, indirectly via coalitions and partners as well as via media between movements and the 
state (joint effect). The stronger a coalition and the more resonance in public opinion, the 
more do the framings hold by the movements and the Tunisian administration resemble. It 
should be kept in mind that a number of ideas that orient the research base on exploratory 
research and remain vague. The exploratory nature is also the reason why I do not formulate 
concrete hypotheses. In addition, theory (for example on outcomes) is difficult to interpret 
in terms of projected outcomes. Missing knowledge on the functioning of the Tunisian 
political system cause additional problems for the analysis of diffusion towards the state. 
 
When starting the research, the following ideas oriented the research: First of all, it was 
assumed, that old coalitions persist, which means that UGTT, LTDH and ATFD - who were all 
more or less restricted in their work under Ben Ali, but who held contacts before - have close 
networks. Those three were expected to build a coalition. The FTDES has fewer ties to the 
old civil society. Interaction is regular for the coalition and limited to the FTDES. When it 
comes to ministries, literature indicates that expertise on topics plays a role, so movements 
have closer contacts towards specific ministries in areas where they are experts.  
 
Regarding a democratic framing it was expected that, depending on issues covered and 
positions, specific elements are highlighted. In a similar sense, the three dimensions control, 
equality and freedom take a different weight according to organizations, but are in general 
comparable. Organizations such as the ATFD insist more on equality, while the LTDH focuses 
on freedoms and human rights. Each organization has some unique combinations of framing, 
including for example the call for more government stability connected with more 
participation. As Tunisia is a young democracy, it is possible that democratic framing is not 
totally clear and can go into different directions for example demanding a stronger state and 
at the same time more checks and balances. From the state perspective, in case of much 
interaction between organizations and ministries, ministries and organizations were 
expected to have similar framings of democracy. 
 
When it comes to how mechanisms are used, movements were expected to rely on the joint 
effect approach, meaning that they use direct contacts and the public opinion/media/allies 
at the same time. For example, movements use (former) members that entered the state 
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apparatus to position their ideas. In addition, they have institutionalized contacts with 
ministries in order to influence them (relays). For the analysis I look at whether movements 
have former members in ministries, whether there are institutionalized committees 
including state actors and civil society, whether movements participate in hearings in 
parliament or whether open consultations are relevant. Indirect mechanisms are analyzed 
using the basic distinction between protest activities and media work, both are however 
seen as linked. When it comes to the media, it was expected that some of the movement 
frames resonate. The resonating frames do not have to be the same as articulated as 
important by organizations themselves.  When it comes to overall mechanism, we have seen 
that different stages of the policy process exist. It was expected that the channels and 
mechanisms used to influence framings differ from one stage to another. As concluded by 
theory, it was assumed that it is easier to influence early stages. 
 
The actual “state” of democracy has often been analyzed, but the underlying social 
processes of acceptance or non-acceptance of democracy or types of democracy have not 
been a focus of research. In addition, a number of elements are tested in a more exploratory 
way as literature does not give clear indication. Among those are for example whether large 
or narrow coalitions are more successful and the degree to which framings are shared 
among actors. 
What the literature review could not clarify… 
Given the limitations in the literature, some points are difficult to clarify. Some aspects like 
coalitions are also influenced by choices. While I look at the ideational dimension of 
coalitions, the rational incentives for coalitions are equally discussed in the literature. 
Coalitions might thus be purely instrumental and not based on common framings. While this 
is to be kept in mind, I argue that coalitions based on shared framings are more influential as 
they do not only rely on instrumental aims that can easily change. While a number of 
concurrent explications exist, I insist on the elaborated combination of theories on framing, 
networks and outcomes as this allows to explain more aspects and to draw an extensive 
picture of perceptions of democracy across movements and the state. 
 
Framing is not without criticism. Contamin identifies a number of limits of the framing 
approach, namely the difficulty of a circular reasoning where a certain outcome is associated 
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with a successful framing as well as the danger of analyzing a frame only at a certain time 
and not the framing processes themselves (Contamin 2009). Contamin also criticizes that a 
number of studies focus on elite framing and not on the interaction of several frames within 
a movement, in the media or with respect to opponents (ibid). While the first criticism can 
only be partially addressed, the second criticism is regarded as interviews might reveal 
different perspectives. Future research should have a detailed look at the internal frame 
interactions within each movement to verify the results. 
 
The literature on diffusion showed the major limitation as it is often the international 
diffusion that is regarded; these political systems under scrutiny are already well researched 
and do not lack scholarly information as in the Tunisian case. Scholars assign that it is 
transferable to national political configurations - and some scholars do. Mostly emulation 
and the normative perspective are seen as useful for the diffusion of democratic framing and 
movement influence. 
Reflections, problems and alternatives 
While I do not criticize my own approach, I want to discuss some alternative approaches that 
were prominent in the literature review and that should be discussed again at the end. 
Alternative perspectives include institutional or rational choice approaches as well as for 
example political opportunity structures. Especially the latter orient until today a lot of the 
literature on outcomes and stand for a number of empirical results making it difficult to 
sideline it. Here, I outline why some theoretical approaches were seen as less useful than the 
applied one.  
 
The social movement literature on outcomes is strongly influenced by scholars working on 
political opportunity structures. While this is not a problem as such, it becomes a small 
problem for this thesis as current findings on impact and outcomes highlight opportunity 
structures as foreseen by theory. Consequentially, movement influence is currently regarded 
from a different perspective as mine. The explanations of outcomes focus on opportunity 
structures, certainly not because other ways of influence are unimportant, but because it 
was a focus of analysis. 
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Amenta, in his political mediation model, argues that challenger’s proposals are “mediated 
by political circumstances”, where he especially underlines the openness of the political 
system towards challenger’s arguments, but also other actors (Amenta 2006:8; Amenta et al. 
2005). While I take the results especially from Amenta or Kriesi into account, I propose a 
different reading of influence related to framings and networks. While I do not contend that 
the context and the design of the political system may play a role, I refer to a rather 
rhetorical reframing of political opportunity structures. In fact, I argue that political 
opportunity structures are nothing fixed, but that the interpretation depends on the actual 
actor’s framing. The Tunisian state may be described as democratic, but what that means is 
actually realized through interactions between the state and other actors (movements, 
political parties and so on). When the dominant framing describes the democratic state as a 
direct-democratic state, this could be a dominant framing that shapes the perceived political 
opportunities for actors. Other actors may oppose different framings of democracy within a 
state. Depending on the possibility to reframe, to spread a frame or to constitute or 
challenge a frame, dominant perceptions of a system may change. It thus depends on the 
stance others take and on counter framing. So, even in autocratic states, perceived 
opportunities may emerge even if those are in reality – not yet - there, which also explains 
why it is possible to topple a stable autocratic system. 
 
It needs to be kept in mind, that each theoretical perspective has its weaknesses while it 
remains important to know which (Kriesi 2009). As mentioned earlier, the focus is on the 
social construction through interaction and exchange. Thus, the political system is not seen 
as static, but as continuously negotiated. The political system itself did not create the 
organizations that emerged in Tunisia – although it speeded up the creation of new civil 
society organizations – but civil society organizations and other actors shape the 
configuration of the state. It is more about perceived opportunities than about real ones, 
and again, when (closed) political opportunity structures failed to explain the initial 
uprisings, why should they be better suited to explain ongoing democratization? Beinin 
correctly summarizes that Tunisia did neither show an expansion of civil society nor of new 
opportunity structures before the uprisings (Beinin 2016). It is the main reason why a focus 
on social interpretation is used, because democratization is about a constant renegotiation 
of political structures and policies.  
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Resource mobilization approaches are not seen as crucial as resources were limited before 
and during the revolution. The analyzed organizations were coopted or had limited 
resources available. However, the organizations existed before and were more or less 
restricted by the state. All organizations had no or limited protest experience with the UGTT 
having some experience from smaller protest events. Comparing the organizations in terms 
of size and in terms of resources can control for those resources. The UGTT has most 
members and resources, while the ATFD has only few members and limited resources. The 
LTDH has limited resources as well as a limited number of members (but more than the 
ATFD). For the FTDES no exact numbers on members exist, but it seems that the FTDES has 
some resources, given the number of employees of the organization. All organizations can 
attract international donors like Oxfam to finance projects. If resource mobilization theory is 
true, the UGTT would have most influence, followed by LTDH and FTDES. The ATFD would 
have least influence. 
 
Finally, other actors are important as well. Similar to Tilly’s perspective, social movements 
are not the only important actor of contentious politics (see for example Tarrow 2008). This 
means that social movements are only one actor among others including political parties. 
Scholars underline the role of parties as intermediary between civil society and state actors 
for successful democratization (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005). While the focus of 
research is not on political parties, due to a fast-changing party system and unclear 
positions, their influence on democratization processes can be an “interference” in the 
transmission of ideas from movements towards the state32. Thus, an alternative explication 
for the diffusion of ideas is the analysis of the role of political parties for the democratization 
process. While this is left to other researcher, it is taken into account for the final analysis. It 
is however kept in mind that political parties in Tunisia are of younger origin without clear 
positions, reason why movements have been analyzed. Thus, literature on interest groups or 
political parties is complementary, but is not within the scope of this thesis.  
                                                     
32 While the first elections already took place at the beginning of this research, the positioning of parties was 
not yet clear. As showed later, only few political parties (namely Nida Tounes and Ennahdha) rest relatively 
stable on a high level of vote share, while many other parties like the Congress for the Republic have 
fluctuating support by the population. 
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2.7 Conclusion to chapter two 
The literature review addressed three key aspects, namely networks, framing and diffusion. 
The theory of the thesis bases on social movement theory with some insights from theories 
on democracy and policy processes. When combining different theoretical approaches, one 
needs to ask whether those can be combined or not (see for example della Porta 2014). As 
discussed earlier, literature on diffusion takes networks as well as framing into account. All 
three approaches are compatible as networks allow to answer the question how framings 
travel, while framing helps to assess the content of the framings, in my case with a special 
focus on democracy. Theories on influence and diffusion highlight the effectiveness of 
certain mechanisms. While the compatibility is given, it needs to be recalled that a number 
of aspects remain few discussed in theory and various empty spots exist. As a consequence, 
a final evaluation of the complementarity is not entirely possible as knowledge might be too 
limited to identify contradictions. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis are high. 
Framings of movements in terms of democracy are not well researched yet. Findings do not 
only contribute to the debate on movements’ theory, but also on democratization. Especially 
for democratization or transition the literature lacks clear models that are supported by 
empirical evidence (Almeida 2008; on mobilization and revolutions see also Banegas 1993). 
Not only is the influence of movements following a revolution not well researched, but also 
the context. Furthermore, how movements realize their claims in Tunisia is not well 
researched yet. Very few studies are looking at the meso-level in non-democratic contexts or 
countries in transition. One of the few exemptions is the book by Almeida on 
democratization in El Salvador (Almeida 2008; and of cause Charles Tilly). The analysis of 
movements in changing contexts is worth more research to explain processes of 
democratization from a meso perspective. Movements are a key actor to realize democracy 
as they fight for rights, use freedom of association and freedom of speech actively. They are 
thus a vital part of an effective democracy.  
 
Another issue is the use of “Western” concepts that is not only true for democracy, but also 
for social movement theory that has been rarely applied to the Arab world. Regarding the 
transferability of “Western” concepts, Gerges states that repertoires and forms of 
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contentious action are the same, but the context for actors differs (Gerges 2015). Alimi 
acknowledges differences between contention in authoritarian regimes and contention in 
other systems, but also between regional or local configurations at the same time and not to 
exclude Western theories as such (Alimi 2016). Other scholars like Markham warn that 
scholars should “desist from imposing interpretative or normative frameworks” on the Arab 
world (Markham 2014:99). I apply those concepts to a new context keeping in mind that 
they might neither have a perfect fit, nor that the same concepts will be regarded as 
desirable, something that is evaluated in the end. 
 
I now turn to the points for networks, framing and diffusion that are used for the analysis as 
shown in Figure 2.5. Networks should allow to retrace contacts towards the state and thus 
enable the identification of mechanisms of diffusion that can be used in a Tunisian context. 
In addition, literature discusses expertise and roles as part of movement coalitions as well as 
the ideal size (even though without clear recommendation on the ideal size for a coalition). 
 
The theoretical perspective on framing outlined different important points. Frames are 
constructed within social context. Collectively shared frames are not just the aggregate of 
individual frames, but interact with those and build a collective meaning. The change of 
framing happens through networks. Interaction in society, where views and attitudes linked 
to a movement framing are challenged and defended, plays a role. 
 
To realize influence, explanations by theory differ and do not provide clear ways on how 
movements can influence, but outline several channels and mechanisms. Different stages of 
the policy process matter for policy influence; it is equally important whether there is 
openness towards movements by the state and whether for example external expertise is 
needed. In addition, the direct and indirect model (via public opinion and allies) as well as 
the joint model (both) of taking influence is discussed in the literature (Figure 2.5). Proactive 
and reactive influence as well as the influence for different elements of the policy making 
process are outlined. As recommended by scholars the focus is on mechanisms of diffusion 
as final influence are mediated by a number of (different) actors in the political system. 
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Figure 2.5 Important elements of the theoretical framework 
 
When it comes to framing democracy, the approach used for the Democracy Barometer with 
three main dimensions and nine elements (three each) is used. Regarding the final influence, 
several combinations in relation to framings on democracy and networks are possible as 
Table 2.6 shows: I expect that one and four are in line with my arguments on diffusion, while 
configurations two and three go against my expectations. Configuration one is seen as 
influence, while configuration three might lead to desired outcomes for movements, but not 
due to movements influence. While I am only looking at the transmission towards the state, 
it cannot be excluded that interactions shape perceptions in both directions, so that not only 
the perceptions by state representatives are shaped by their interactions with civil society 
but vice-versa. By verification through interviews the causal direction can be accounted for. 
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Table 2.6 Configurations 
Configuration Framing Movement-State Networks 
One Same framing of democracy Frequent exchanges and 
discussions 
Two Different framing of democracy Frequent exchanges and 
discussions 
Three Same framing of democracy No exchanges and 
discussion 
Four Different framing of democracy No exchanges and 
discussion 
The thesis consists of four empirical chapters focusing on different elements of social 
movement theory. Table 2.7 summarizes what theory elements become relevant in which 
chapter. Having outlined the theoretical framework that provides ideas on how to answer 
the question why movements are impacting the promotion of democracy in Tunisia, I now 
elaborate on methods suitable for the approach focused on networks, framing and 
diffusion/influence. 
 
Table 2.7 Chapters and Theory 
Chapter Topic Theory 
Four Networks Networks 
Five Democratic framings by movements Framing 
Six Democratic framings by ministries Framing 
Seven Diffusion and mechanisms Networks, framing, 
influence 
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Chapter Three 
Method 
 
 
 
 
3 How to compare movements and the state on democratic 
framing 
The method chapter introduces the methods used in order to answer the research question 
on frame diffusion. Chapter one already explained, why Tunisia is a good case to analyze the 
perceptions on democracy. The second chapter described the three parts of literature that 
are important, networks, framing and outcomes. The study compares the ideational (and 
policy) impact of different organizations with the state administration. 
 
The method chapter takes up four elements. First, it outlines the case selection criteria. 
Second it describes the data collected and its utility for the analysis. Third, and basing on the 
theory chapter, it outlines the operationalization of concepts. A last step discusses the 
resulting biases. Strategies to reduce biases like the referral to several sources to reduce 
selection biases or biases of social desirability are explained. 
 
The chapter starts with an overview on the design and research objects. Here, the four 
already presented organizations from chapter one as well as the ministries selected are 
discussed. The section also outlines the differences and similarities across actors that are 
later used for the comparison of outcomes. Why leaders of organizations are interviewed is 
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described. The section also gives a short overview on the time of analysis. Having outlined 
the research objects, the chapter continues with describing the ways for analyzing the 
research content. The second section describes the data that has been collected for this 
research. It discusses why interviews and media, as well as documents have been used and 
details how those have been collected. The third section discussed the operationalization of 
networks, framing and outcomes. The indicators for each of the concepts that have been 
used for the analysis of interviews and media as well as documents are outlined. The last 
section before the conclusion then takes up the problems encountered and discusses the 
limits and biases of research.  
3.1 Design and Terrain, research objects, level of analysis and timing 
3.1.1 Organizations  
While the organizations that are analyzed are already outlined in chapter one, this section 
explains how organizations have been selected. Leaders of organizations and a labor union 
are selected and their framing is compared with civil servants in leading positions33. The 
Tunisian political system builds the context in that organizations operate. The comparison 
centers on mechanisms used and the ideational and policy influence of organizations. The 
access towards the Tunisian state is expected to vary among organizations, as does the 
possibility for influencing framing and policies. Each organization will use several 
mechanisms of transmission; the influence is expected to be different across organizations. 
However, it needs to be noted that the selection of cases is limited to at least partly 
influential movements, as irrelevant movements are not visible and no media data exists. 
 
While individuals are interviewed, it is the group level that is important as discussed under 
3.3; where a collective framing in terms of democracy is analyzed. It should be kept in mind 
that there is an on-going exchange between levels. Group perceptions are constructed 
through social interaction of individuals; a backwards-oriented influence can therefore not 
be excluded. Individual perceptions and their aggregation on a movement and organizational 
level (so intra-movement or intra-ministry dynamics) may be a point for further research. 
The collective perspective is expected to be found particularly among leaders, as those are 
used to speak on behalf of its constituency in public. The same goes for higher positions in 
ministries. 
                                                     
33 A definition of leaders is provided later in this chapter 
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How organizations were selected 
I compare cases to analyze single-movement but also collective influence. A case is 
described as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or 
over some period of time” (Gerring 2007:19f.). The units under analysis are not 
representative for all organizations, but the case study has advantages for an exploratory 
research design that appears particularly suited to uncover the democratic framings. The 
research design uses a cross-case study as described by Gerring (2007). Four organizations of 
the Tunisian civil society were selected for analysis. Similar to Antonakis-Nashif’s model, civil 
society organizations in different sectors have been identified (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). For 
her research she identified gender justice, socio-economic justice and transitional justice as 
three fields of occupation that are analyzed. While I do not stick to the same fields, I use four 
different fields to show similarities and differences in democratic framing across different 
fields of activities. 
 
The selection is based on an initial research for civil society organizations from different 
thematic sectors. The selection was inspired by the first empirical studies that followed the 
Uprisings and that mentioned active organizations. In addition, the participant list of the 
World Social Forum 2013 with organizations from Tunisia was screened. Organizations that 
then appeared several times during those search processes were estimated as active and 
potential targets of the research. The organizations were then contacted on the basis of 
thematic fields of activity, leading to the analyzed and some additional organizations. That 
organizations formally exist and that they are active are important for this research. It was 
seen as more probable that established organizations have already developed a relatively 
clear framing that is identifiable and that active organizations are easier to contact. Chapter 
one already described the four case organizations so that I recall some elements and 
explains the selection here. 
 
Especially the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) served as organization for 
activism and laboratory during the revolution (Mizouri 2012; Yousfi 2013b). The ATFD 
(Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates) on the other hand ensured that women 
were represented in protests during the transition and was also quite developed before the 
transition (Schraeder and Redissi 2011). Although prominent environmental movements are 
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difficult to identify, the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux) has 
been selected as example; it also covers migration and socio-economic rights. However, the 
FTDES covers similarly other aspects closer to UGTT topics. Despite being a rather young 
organization, a large number of publications exist on the FTDES facilitating access. While the 
human rights movement includes international actors like Amnesty International or Oxfam 
that qualify as NGOs due to missing mobilization on the ground and also have an 
international scope, one of the best-known actors in the field are the LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne 
pour la Défense des droits de l’Homme) and the ONAT (Ordre national des avocats tunisiens) 
that mobilize more on justice.  It needs to be acknowledged that information on UGTT and 
ATFD is more widespread than on FTDES and LTDH. Especially for empirical studies, much 
more studies exist on the former than on the latter, allowing much more comparisons. It 
should be kept in mind that the UGTT as a labor union has a different status as negotiator of 
salaries, but equally mobilizes on social, political and economic problems. The UGTT is thus 
expected to hold more extensive contacts towards the state and enterprises as part of the 
tripartite configuration. 
 
The organizations are compared on their democratic framing as well as with the democratic 
framing of the state. The aim is to verify on possible transmission of democratic framing 
from movements to the state. All selected organizations are expected to be at least partly 
successful with different degrees, as will be shown during the analysis. McAdam and 
Schaffer Boudet warn on selecting on the dependent variable and analyzing only successful 
movements (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012). As elaborated previously, the selected 
movements are successful to a certain degree in terms of mobilization, but not necessarily in 
promoting democracy. Considering influence on policy members, it remains unclear which 
organization has more and which less access. It can only be expected that the UGTT with its 
tripartite configuration has a different access and other channels of transmission available. 
Due to a lack of data and the Tunisian history, when all movements had none up to very 
limited influence under the Ben Ali regime, there is no pre-existent successful movement in 
terms of impact. The long-lasting existence can thus not be taken as a criterion for potential 
impact as the political system changed. In addition, organizations were not selected on the 
basis of the Nobel Peace Prize, which was just announced after the first wave of interviews, 
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but which honored two of the selected movements (interviews with a third honored 
organization were used for comparison). 
 
Another layer for comparison is the thematic orientation of organizations. Why are thematic 
orientations important? As every organization focuses on another topic, they are expected 
to have different framings of democracy linked to their field of occupation. The main issues 
covered are outlined in Table 3.1. The choice of organizations is important, as the chosen 
organizations are expected to hold different framings on democracy. The UGTT should 
combine workers’ rights and social aspects with democracy. The women movement is 
expected to focus on women rights and equality, while the LTDH should focus on human 
rights, freedom of association or freedom of speech. The FTDES is expected to promote 
environmental aspects, but also to address questions of poverty and social inequality. Those 
thematic orientations should be logically linked to certain dimensions of democracy and it 
makes less sense to connect for example women rights with a strong state. 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes some of the major differences across organizations that have been 
presented before. Organizations vary considerably in size, a point to consider at the end. The 
last column establishes the distinction between the FTDES and the others as the FTDES was 
not officially registered under Ben Ali. It can be expected, that its structures and framing 
may be less developed than the others due to its newer origin. As framing might be limited, 
it can have negative consequences on their possible influence on the state. The FTDES is 
expected to show different characteristics in terms of framing or reputation due to its 
younger origin. From my theoretical perspective, the size or resources should not have an 
influence on the organizational framing or outcomes and are used for controlling for other 
factors. 
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Table 3.1 Differences across organizations 
Organization Main topics Size34 Existed officially before 
uprisings 
UGTT Wage negotiations, social and 
economic problems, general policies 
Seven hundred to seven hundred fifty 
thousand members 
Yes, partly repressed 
LTDH Human rights, torture, security Four thousand five hundred members Yes, repressed 
FTDES Environmental rights, migrant rights, 
general socio-economic rights 
Unknown, around ten fixed 
employees guessed35, fluent borders 
to unorganized movements 
No 
ATFD Women rights (equality, own body, 
sexual rights, workers’ rights and so 
on) 
Around one hundred fifty to two 
hundred active militants 
Yes, repressed 
                                                     
34 See chapter one on sources. 
35 The number bases on own observation during the visit of their localities in Tunis. 
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The focus lies on organizations that stand for a wider movement due to practical reasons as 
it is easier to identify organizational leaders than unofficial movement leaders. The 
organizations that were selected have an elaborated member base and it is expected that 
members know what the organizations stand for. With newer organizations it would 
probably be more difficult to identify a group framing as this might still be much discussed. 
Multiple memberships occur among leaders showing also the connections on an individual 
level (on multiple membership see Diani 2015; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Knoke and Wisely 
1990; Cornwell and Harrison 2004). 
 
It was planned to include further organizations that work on additional subjects. Ennahdha 
as an Islamic actor was initially planned to be included (party with origins in a movement 
that still has a movement section36). It would have been interesting as divergent views exist 
between Ennahdha and the UGTT (Yousfi 2013b). It would have allowed to test whether a 
different perspective on democracy gets resonance in public and/or among civil servants. 
Access to interview partners showed particularly difficult and it was finally excluded. 
 
In addition, the target of three interviews per organization has not been reached for 
organizations working on justice, but also human rights (ONAT), on capacity building (PASC 
as well as Jamaity), on social issues (OTDS) and on youth and democracy (TUN’Act). While 
interviews have been conducted with the organizations with less than three interviews, 
interviews were not analyzed systematically and serve as comparison especially as all except 
the ONAT represent organizations founded after the end of the Ben Ali regime. This layer of 
comparison of organizations founded after the revolution and those before is 
consequentially restricted to the comparison between the FTDES and others. The selection is 
not exhaustive and does not represent the entire Tunisian civil society. 
 
Why are at least three leaders necessary for organizations to be included? To reduce 
individual perspective biases, the target of at least three interviews per organization has 
been identified because those allow comparing across individuals on similarities and 
differences. It also allows to decide when two interviews show the same and a third 
                                                     
36 The movement section is an organizational part of Ennahdha, the organizational structure distinguishes 
between a party section and a movement section, the latter used for mobilization. As Ennahdha was initially 
not a political party, the second section still persists.  
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something different. At least three interviews were achieved for the UGTT, the ATFD, the 
LTDH, and the FTDES. 
 
The selection of interviewees was based on the national level; regional leaders have not 
been included in line with the research focus on the national level37. As Tunisia is a very 
centralized country where main organizations need a representation in the capital, the study 
focusses solely on Tunis (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). 
What is a leader? 
Leaders of all selected organizations have been interviewed. A leader is a person involved in 
the management of the organization. The leader takes over responsibility for the discourse 
and/or action dimension (Giugni and Passy 1998). In my case, members of the national 
executive committee or presidents as well as their deputies have been contacted. The 
interviews are thus expected to represent the organizational perspective. 
 
The selection of leaders of organizations is important as those frequently speak on behalf of 
the organizations and are consequentially capable to express organizational perspectives 
and not individual ones. This basic statement is important for the quality of the research. If 
leaders would have expressed personal perspectives, I could not speak about the 
organizational perspective. As a consequence, careful attention to the insistence on the 
collective perspective is given during interviews. In addition, interviews are verified 
afterwards, whereas the number of at least three interviews per organization is important. 
3.1.2 State 
Ministries have been chosen as they are highly involved in policy formulation. The choice of 
ministries was based on the initial responses by movement leaders. Keeping in mind that 
relevant ministries should be analyzed; the ministries have been contacted after movement 
leaders indicated that they interact with the respective ministries. The ministry selection 
bases on the question on which ministries they cooperate with. After a first evaluation of 
this question, ministries have been identified. Due to the different fields of activity, many 
different ministries were contacted as those were indicated by organizations38. Especially 
                                                     
37 The exact selection procedure is detailed under 3.3.1. 
38 A list of all interviews and the respective ministries is found in the Annex, included ministries are the Ministry 
of Women and Family, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Youth and Sports, the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Habitation, the 
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the FTDES and the UGTT leaders mentioned many different ministries with only few (for 
example the one on Religious Affairs) that were not discussed. Some ministries like the ones 
on Social Affairs, Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions as well as the Ministry of 
the Interior have been frequently evoked. As for organizations, ministries do not represent 
the entire Tunisian state that would also include regional as well as state-sponsored 
organizations. The research is consequentially limited to specific ministries. Two relevant 
ministries could not be included in the analysis as they did not reply to frequent requests, 
namely the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the Ministry of Justice (the latter being crucial 
for the LTDH). Consequences will be discussed later when discussing biases.  
 
Civil servants interviewed in ministries represent higher levels (at least head of section) as 
those should be capable to speak on behalf of the ministry. Preference was given to include 
many ministries to see whether there is a common state perspective. The analysis is focused 
on the general state perspective and not on the individual ministries as the aim is to identify 
mechanism for frame transmission that are valid across ministries. Again, only collective 
perspectives are analyzed, leaving individual perspectives aside. On both side compound 
players are regarded. 
Comparing the impact on ministries across organizations 
For this thesis four civil society organizations and their democratic framings are analyzed and 
compared. After assessing the democratic framings, these framings are compared with what 
can be found on the site of the state as well as in public opinion. The comparison indicates 
which movement has more influence and which frames are repeated most. The idea is to 
account for the direct and indirect effects (as well as joint) as outlined in the theory chapter. 
 
As Amenta et al. underline in relation to outcomes and social movements, comparative 
designs analyzing several movements can reveal the influence of these (Amenta et al. 2010). 
They argue to compare across issues and beyond the agenda setting stage (ibid). By using 
the cross-organizational comparison in my case, it becomes possible to relate the differences 
in ideational impact to networks and democratic framing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the Presidency of the Government. 
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The research design focuses only on the differences between movements and not on the 
differences across space (different regions) or time (before and after the revolution for 
example). Although the other two dimensions are equally important, this research focusses 
on the differences between movements due to limited data and because very few research 
exists on the actual situation. The data generated is seen as rich in validity for the actual 
situation, but is not very reliable as any research during other moments or other locations 
will generate different results. A comparison across space in Tunisia makes less sense in my 
case, as Tunis as Tunisian capital and level for discussions between groups and ministries is 
the focus of research. 
3.1.3 Timing 
I shortly introduce the time frame to situate the analysis in the context of the 
democratization process in Tunisia. As we see from Figure 3.2 the analysis was conducted 
when democratization processes are ongoing. The initial uprisings were already over as a 
new constitution has been accepted and first elections took place. The time horizon of the 
analyses ranges from January 2015 to December 2016. The research design is not 
longitudinal and the period is not determined by any important event. The study uses one 
point in time of the transformation to analyze the framings on democracy and the influence 
on state institutions. This point in time could have been any point, as the influence of 
movements should be measurable at different points, although with different degrees. The 
data collection period is influenced by practical reasons as the data collection plan was ready 
at the beginning of 2015. Interviews started mid-2015 and ended in 2016, the timing for 
media data was set so that it also covers few months before and few months after the 
interviews to gain a broader picture. It is expected that perceptions of democracy become 
more stable sometime after the uprisings and thus starting around four years after the 
uprisings appears as a good starting point. 
 
As outlined in chapter one, the period includes one change of the prime minister, a reshuffle 
of the government as well as a change of the strongest bloc in parliament due to changed 
membership of parliamentarians. The change of the prime minister can be considered as 
important event. Terrorism was another important issue during the time of analysis as 2015 
occurred an attack in Sousse and end of 2016 in Tunis. 
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A longitudinal design would have enabled retracing the changed importance of social 
movement actors for the state and their changed perspectives of framing; however, that is 
not an aim of this research. It is the purpose to give a detailed explanation of the situation at 
the point of analysis in order to build a basis for future research. 
 
It cannot be excluded that the situation as found in 2015/2016 already changed by the time 
of writing, however the political system is more stable than in the first years after the initial 
uprisings leading up to the new constitution and first free elections. The next section looks at 
the data that has been collected for this thesis. 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Three sources of data 
As existing data does not focus on democratic framing, mechanisms and networks, own data 
collection was crucial from the beginning. The thesis uses three sources of data, namely 
interviews with movement leaders and civil servants, newspaper articles (from the 
newspaper website), as well as documents from the organizations. As Tunisia is a non-
Western context and concepts may be realized differently, qualitative data collection is 
important to identify key elements before engaging in further research. The limited 
knowledge on the functioning of the political system in Tunisia, but also on movements 
emphasized primary data collection. The decision for written and spoken words goes back to 
Benford and Snow, who state that frames emerge through discursive – including talk, 
Figure 3.2 Focus of analysis 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
106 
 
  
speeches or written documents which serve as frame articulation and punctuation - framing 
to achieve defined goals and contest processes (Benford and Snow 2000). 
 
Similar to those authors, the most original framing is seen to be found in discussions, 
speeches and organizational documents. As seen earlier in chapter two, priority is given to 
perceived interactions and interpretations of democracy as part of a democratic framing. 
The method used acknowledges this orientation towards ideational influence and looks at 
those interpretations. As we have also seen in chapter two, effects can be direct, indirect or 
joint which necessities not only to regard the direct effects between actors (analyzed 
through interviews), but also to account for the indirect effects (analyzed through media 
analysis). 
 
I collected data in several steps as Table 3.3 shows, starting with interviews with 
organizational leaders and organizational documents to identify important actors and 
framing elements. Interviews with ministries followed, to search and probe for details. In 
addition, ministries that were named in the first step were contacted. In a third stage 
newspaper articles were analyzed for the influence on public opinion. This was done after 
having a first idea on actors and topics (thus after the first interviews with organizations) and 
started at the same time as interviews with state representatives (and closed a bit later). 
Part one preceded the others because it identified targeted ministries and highlighted and 
verified important framing elements that where then used for the newspaper analysis. 
Articles allow to verify the ties of movements when they published for example common 
claims. In cases where coalitions demanded change, those were equally coded for analysis. 
 
In function of the respective chapter and research question, these different sources serve 
different purposes as Table 3.4 summarizes. For the chapter on networks, interviews are the 
primary data, as they allow to qualify networks and to identify “friends and foes”; articles 
are used to verify those connections – although to a limited extent - as well as to control, 
whether those ties are equally perceived by media. 
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Table 3.3 Parts of data collection 
Part Data collection Reach 
Part One 
(Organizations) 
Qualitative data collection through 
interviews with movement leaders and 
document analysis 
 
At least three leaders of each 
organization are interviewed on 
the organizational framing and 
networks/ acceptance, targeted 
ministries are identified 
Part Two 
(State) 
Qualitative data collection through 
interviews with civil servants 
 
State representatives 
interviewed on the framing and 
the relations towards the 
analyzed organizations 
Part Three 
(Public 
Opinion) 
Analysis of secondary data derived 
from the two newspapers 
Newspaper articles analyzed on 
the frame resonance in public 
and whether ties/coalitions are 
mediatized 
 
The chapter on framings by movements is based on interviews. Articles are used in order to 
account for the indirect diffusion of frames via the media and are searched for frame 
resonance, so whether specific frames by movements are overtaken in articles. While 
interviews allow authentic descriptions of democratic framings, the articles enable to control 
whether those framings are transmitted to a wider audience. In addition, it helps to identify 
frames that “perform well” or that resonate in the public sphere. Given the theoretical 
framework of direct and indirect effects (chapter two), it appears crucial to account for both 
ways adequately. Having an original and mediated form of democratic framing for each 
organization allows to evaluate whether both resemble and if not, whether one of both is 
similar to the perspective hold by state actors. 
 
For the chapter on framings in ministries, only interviews with civil servants build the data to 
identify frames that resonate with civil servants. It is not complemented by media data, as 
the data collection for articles focused on organizations and a separate search for ministries 
would have produced a huge amount of additional data that would not have been possible 
to analyze in the same time frame. It appeared unclear whether ministries engage also in 
“claim-making” in a wider sense and whether this is mediatized. Initial searches raised 
doubts. 
 
The chapter on diffusion and mechanisms relies on interviews and media analysis. In the 
following I outline the data types and data collection strategies. 
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Table 3.4 Sources of data and chapters 
Chapter Topic Type of data 
Four Networks Interviews, (media analysis) 
Five Democratic framings by movements Interviews, media analysis, 
documents 
Six Democratic framings by ministries Interviews 
Seven Diffusion and mechanisms Interviews, media analysis 
3.2.2 Interviews – analyzing the perceptions of interviewees 
Qualitative methods are used to evaluate frames into categories, as they are seen as 
particularly useful in analyzing meaning construction in a context where little is known and 
where aspects shall be clarified (see Blee and Taylor 2002 on little researched phenomena or 
Lilleker 2003 on clarification). Therefore, interviews are preferred for the first verification of 
the most important elements of a democratic framing. 
Structure and form of interviews 
The qualitative data consists of in-depth interviews with movement leaders and state 
representatives (compare on in-depth interviews: McGivern 2006; Legard et al. 2003; 
Robson 2005). The interviews are similar to those described by Garraud or Kvale and 
Brinkmann using an interview guide – tested during the first interviews – which is not 
followed completely depending on the discussion (Garraud 1999; Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009; 11.1 Interview Guides and materials). The interview guide developed with an 
increasing number of interviews, however only minor changes were made39.The interviews 
were semi-structured using a general outline and allowed for probing where necessary 
(Johnston 2014; Blee and Taylor 2002.). The interview guide was not openly visible to 
interviewees; however, it was clear that I followed the guide in order to increase seriousness 
and perceived competencies (Beaud 1996). 
 
During the interviews, it was necessary to keep the interviewees focused on the researched 
topic, a problem already encountered by other researchers (Blee and Taylor 2002). 
Therefore, it was prompted for details and questions were re-introduced during interviews. 
The interviews used ground mapping, dimension mapping, probing questions and 
perspective-widening questions (Legard et al. 2003; Savarese 2002; Axinn and Pearce 2006). 
The interviews followed Cohen’s recommendation to pose questions to precise elements 
                                                     
39 The interview guides can be found in the Annex under 11.1.  
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and to verify the interpretation (“if I got it right then your position…”) or to oppose positions 
by contradicting arguments (for example “you said freedom of speech is important, but is 
this also true for radical actors who might call for violent action?”; Cohen 1999a). Equally, 
positions were affirmed or questioned by the referral to media articles and the like to push 
interviewees for further elaboration (Lilleker 2003). In the beginning open questions were 
asked to let the interviewee develop some ideas for later referral (Beaud 1996).  
 
Blee and Taylor acknowledge the importance of interviews to assess the construction of 
meaning and perceptions (Blee and Taylor 2002). However, as interviews were contextual, 
Blee and Taylor recommend to use other data collection techniques in combination with 
interviews (Blee and Taylor 2002). This recommendation is realized by adding internal text 
documents, as well as information that circulate in the media to not only rely on interviews. 
Number of interviews and conditions 
The initially envisaged number of interviews with organizations was higher than the realized 
twenty-five interviews due to problems with Ennahdha and other practical limitations; thirty 
interviews were planned in order to include several organizations with several leaders. A 
minimum of three interviews per organization was envisaged to reduce individual 
perception biases. 
 
Table 3.5 shows interviews by organization. A number of additional interviews with other 
organizations were conducted to ensure comparability towards the larger civil society. All 
interviews were transcribed and imported in NVivo for comparison, but only the interviews 
of the four selected organizations were analyzed in detail. Some of the transcriptions were 
made by externals and were consequentially verified afterwards40. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40 Externals had to sign a letter of confidentiality to secure anonymity as transcribers heard the voice as well as 
later anonymized elements. Own transcriptions were also checked again. 
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Table 3.5 Number of interviews by organization 
Organization Number of Interviews 
UGTT 7 
ATFD 5 
LTDH 4 
ONAT 2 
FTDES 3 
TUN’Act 1 
OTDS 1 
PASC 1 
Jamaity 1 
Total 25 
For the state representatives, ten interviews were envisaged; thirteen have been realized as 
Table 3.6 shows. The problem of individual perspectives was the same and the interviewer 
insisted on the collective framing of the state. Contrary to the interviews with movements, 
where the focus laid on at least three interviews, the interviews with ministries aimed for a 
large number of ministries to identify possible divergences of the state perspective. Relevant 
ministries were identified during the interviews with organizations to exclude those that 
hold no ties to the mentioned movements. Interviews were conducted with the following 
ministries: 
Table 3.6 Number of Interviews by ministry 
Organization Number of Interviews 
Ministry of Women and Family 2 
Ministry of Industry 1 
Ministry of Tourism 1 
Ministry of Youth and Sport 1 
Ministry of Education 1 
Ministry of Finance 1 
Ministry of the Interior 1 
Ministry of Habitation 1 
Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society and the Institutions 
1 
Ministry of Regional Development 1 
Ministry of Agriculture 1 
Presidency of the Government 1 
Total 13 
 
Two interviews were conducted with the Ministry of Women and Family (hereafter Ministry 
of Women). The second one was accepted to verify the first one. A very short interview with 
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the Ministry of Agriculture does not qualify as a complete interview and was used to 
supplement the other interview with a civil servant from this ministry. 
 
Interviews took between twenty minutes and two hours with an average duration of sixty-six 
minutes and were conducted in French (not the mother tongue of interviewees, but due to 
the wide acceptance of French in Tunisia a minor problem as will be discussed later). The 
time was indicated with one to one and a half hour, while few interviewees were available 
for only twenty minutes. 
 
With confirmation of the interviewees the interviews were recorded which was in all cases 
except four no problem. The interviewees who rejected did this by principle or by fear that 
their position could be revealed (ministries) as they explained. In those cases, notes were 
taken simultaneously and transcribed afterwards. The transcriptions of the interviews that 
were not recorded were made out of memory approximately one hour after the interview. 
This follows Lilleker’s guidelines not to rely on own memory for longer than a few hours 
following the interview (Lilleker 2003). Although the memory was still recent, the wording is 
not completely equal to other interviews. The interviews were consequentially treated with 
caution and used for additional information mainly. 
 
Interviewees were informed on the use of the anonymized data in written form to ensure 
transparency towards interviewees as part of the research ethics (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009). All interviewees received a letter on the utilization of the information (especially the 
anonymous use of their answers) and on the subject of study including contact information 
of the researcher (Annex 11.1 provides an example of a contact letter as well as the letter on 
data use and anonymity). Third persons that appeared on recordings are marked as third 
person speaking or interruption while their speech was not transcribed. Anonymity of 
answers is guaranteed to build a higher confidence level, especially given the autocratic 
history of the country. In addition, the anonymity allowed for a freer speech, at the same 
time increasing the danger of personal perspectives that were expressed during interviews. 
 
Slight modifications are made when transferring oral speech to a written text as the logic of 
both types of expression is different (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). The spoken words for 
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example often included repetitions of words that are neither useful for analysis nor easy to 
read. However, no content has been changed and hesitations that are important for 
understanding are left in the citations.  
 
Most of the interviews were face-to-face; only one interview with a leader from the ONAT 
was made by phone due to incapability to travel to Tunis on short notice. Not all interviews 
took place in offices of the interviewees; especially leaders of organizations were sometimes 
interviewed in cafés. It does not seem that they restricted their speech in public places when 
comparing interviews. For the quality of recordings this did not play a great role as most of 
the records were understandable notwithstanding some noise in the background. 
 
All interviewees learned that it is a study on the role of movements and civil society for 
democratization in Tunisia. During the interviews no problems with unpleasant questions 
occurred, but some questions remained unanswered. At the beginning of the interview, it 
was made sure, that interviewees understood that I am a researcher. Occasionally, some 
interviewees tested whether I would be a journalist similar to what Savarese describes and 
some reservations were overcome (Savarese 2002). 
 
The interviews include three waves, namely: September 2015, November 2015 and 
November 2016. The last wave focused on interviews with ministries. The time frame for 
conducting interviews was rather short and fits what Lieberman describes as prepared visits 
with a clear schedule for meetings and a clear focus on the content with the disadvantage of 
missing integration in communities (Lieberman 2004b). The stays allow to identify context 
specific aspects as visits can be compared. Time specific answers can thus be better 
identified. 
How leaders got selected 
Interviewees were selected by a non-random selection process and an additional snowball 
system. Purposive sampling as outlined by Weisberg, Krosnick and Bowen was performed 
respecting the careful selection process of leaders but creating problems in terms of 
generalization (Weisberg et al. 1996). As leaders are expected to “know” their organization 
best, a non-random selection process appears appropriate. A random selection of leaders 
would have been difficult, as there are only few and the research relies on the availability of 
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movements leaders and state representatives. Cohen underlines the difficulties in 
interviewing leaders which are occupied and not always open towards interviews as those 
give insights about their specialized knowledge (Cohen 1999b). A bias as outlined by Garraud 
exists as probably the interviewees most interested and most favorable towards the 
research participated (Garraud 1999). 
 
Leaders were contacted using different approaches. First of all, the best-positioned leaders 
were contacted. These steer the respective organizations and should consequentially be able 
to take the organization’s position. Thereafter, a snowball method was used, asking 
committee members whether they know other influential persons. A similar method 
(snowball and leaders) has been used by Carroll and Ratner (Carroll and Ratner 1996). The 
selection method bases on a combination of positional selection and reputational selection 
where the second is based on a snowball method. The snowball method was not the 
principal method in order to avoid interviewing a group of people that already cooperates 
closely. 
 
Ideally, potential interviewees reacted on the first contact, normally by email. It was 
expected, that field visits enable to build a wider network of potential interviewees and 
points of contact for further interviews. This showed true as the main contact in the 
following was by telephone. This procedure also depends on what Ostrander describes as 
approaching the “right” person (in the right order), which remains difficult to verify in the 
end (Ostrander 1993). 
Potential problems 
Cautious about the role of leaders, Krinsky and Crossley noted that “those people designated 
as leaders in a community are not necessarily the real leaders” (italics in original, Krinsky and 
Crossley 2013:2). This kept in mind; the combination of reputational and positional selection 
should have reduced the bias. However, the availability of top-leaders was restricted by time 
and language constraints. 
 
Another emerging bias includes the language. Interviewees were contacted in French 
excluding those who only speak Arabic. One may argue that the most “Westernized” leaders 
have been interviewed which consequentially causes biases. This bias is only partly reduced 
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by the documents as those are again probably translated by the most Westernized who 
speak and write French. As a conclusion, the perspective on democracy is probably too 
Westernized. 
 
Beside the issues of availability and language skills, as well as the interest in the research, 
another aspect appeared during the interviews: Polletta et al. noted that “people usually 
end up conforming to the stories that are expected from them” and interviewees were 
telling several stories about their organization (Polletta et al. 2011:116). Thus, one may 
argue that apart from social desirability probably saying something positive about Tunisian 
democracy to a Western researcher played a role and influences their narrative towards 
what is expected of them. This includes the advantage that those leaders tend to speak for 
the organization as this is expected of them and can put own positions aside. It has been 
emphasized in every interview that the conversation is about organizational and not 
personal perspectives. The data has been compared afterwards with other sources. 
 
The profile of the interviewees is diverse but bound to age groups between thirty and sixty-
five years (with notably one exception from the leadership of the youth section of the 
UGTT). In addition, at least for the ATFD, the FTDES and the LTDH, leaders had a higher 
educational status as they finished university. This is to a lower degree true for UGTT 
leaders; student union activism was important for the first engagement of a number of 
leaders. A specific referral to academia was mentioned during interviews with FTDES, ATFD 
and LTDH leaders. However, no detailed questions on personal backgrounds were posed as 
the focus lies on collective levels (the interview guide including some questions is found in 
Annex A). 
How state representatives got selected 
The sampling strategy for state representatives relies on the cooperation of the ministry. 
While the respective ministry as a whole is contacted separately, individual contacts are 
established as well. Ideally, movement leaders mentioned some contact persons in 
ministries, which could have been contacted for confirmation or rejection of the 
movement’s access point. Unfortunately, movement leaders were cautious in revealing 
contact persons in ministries (or there was no concrete person which appears rather 
improbable). As most ministries in Tunisia have a responsible for relations with civil society, 
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this person was contacted first as it was expected that the person can confirm or deny 
regular contacts between a specific organization and the ministry. The availability of 
interviewees in ministries was however not always given and depended also on the 
openness of ministries. It can be expected that ministries, who perceive their contacts as too 
limited or too broad, may not want to discuss those in an interview. 
 
Interview partners were searched to be in leader positions in a ministry. In ministerial terms 
that means the person interviewed needed to be at least Head of Section. Beneath the 
official channels and snowball methods when interviewing civil servants, online research was 
used to identify the responsible for relations with civil society as well as additional people in 
leading positions. The choice was not on the highest level of the ministerial hierarchy as 
those were expected to have limited time resources (minister or members of the highest 
hierarchical level). In addition, Cohen as well as McAdam and Schaffer Boudet describe that 
the second rank is an important and useful source of information as those are easier 
available and hold similar knowledge to the first rank (Cohen 1999a; McAdam and Schaffer 
Boudet 2012).  
 
Consequentially, directors or deputy-directors have been approached, as well as special 
advisors on relations with the civil society. The interviewees thus represent a medium level 
of the ministerial hierarchies. If no responsible for relations with the civil society could be 
identified, leaders from the Head of Section level upwards have been contacted leading to a 
number of directors as final interviewees. Higher levels have more freedom to respond to 
requests by researchers than the lowest level; be it to train themselves in communication or 
to get additional information about civil society or to get external views. 
Interview topics of movement leader interviews 
Figure 3.7 shows the general topics of leader interviews. I started with a presentation before 
coming to an organizational framing. The interview topics include the three dimensions of 
democracy as identified by the Democracy Barometer. Their relative importance and the 
evaluation of the dimensions were included. Notwithstanding the democratic framing of the 
organization, other explanations for a movement’s access to the state were analyzed (such 
as resources). This included questions on whether interviewees think they are successful in 
their activities or whether they can name failures. In addition, ties towards other civil society 
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actors were asked, so whether specific actors are categorized as allies, partners or 
opponents. The detailed interview guide can be found in the Annex under 11.1. 
Figure 3.7 Interview topics of movement leader interviews 
 
Interview topics of state representative interviews 
Figure 3.8 shows the topics covered in interviews with civil servants. The interview topics of 
the state representative interviews resemble those of the leader interviews (with the 
exception of questions on success/failure). The state’s position on democracy is demanded 
and the possible relations towards organizations are compared. However, as the internal 
organization and the resources of the state are not important to determine whether 
movements have success or not, those are not included. The detailed interview guide for 
these interviews is also available in the annex under 11.1. 
 
One of the interviews (with a representative of the Ministry of Education) needs to be 
handled with care as the person answered many questions affirmative. In comparison to the 
other interviews (where interviewees posed questions or opposed views), it might be that 
the person tended to say what the person thought was desired. This becomes more evident 
when the person answers very superficial when prompting for details. The interview is 
treated carefully and only few sentences that seem to represent the interviewees’ 
experiences in the ministry are taken over. This is not to say that the same did not happen 
with other interviews, a bias that is difficult to account for; but in comparison to the other 
interviews it was clearer that there is a problem with this specific interview. It might also 
Networks towards other organizations/ ministries (frequency/quality)
Success/failure of activities
Concrete frames on democracy 
General organizational framing
Introduction and background questions
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show that the person did not have the experience be it with the language or in talking to 
researchers. 
Figure 3.8 Topics Interviews ministries 
 
Having outlined the way interview data was collected, I now turn to the media data. 
3.2.3 Accounting for the public, analyzing the media 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, it is possible to have direct and indirect (as well as joint) 
effects (section 2.2). The aim of this section is to explain how the indirect effects have been 
accounted for. As indirect effects use for example public opinion or the media, newspaper 
articles on the organizations are analyzed in order to identify what frames resonate in public. 
Therefore, claims of movements have been analyzed on their framing and are at the end 
compared to the ministerial framing. This procedure is accompanied by questions on the 
media use to civil servants, where it is revealed whether they regard the media and its 
content or only regard content that is transmitted through direct interaction. Those 
questions were linked to the questions on democracy and freedom of speech and where 
thus integrated in the section on frames on democracy (3.3). 
How articles were selected 
The second part of the content analysis consists of a detailed media analysis of selected key 
media in Tunisia. The focus lies on public claims that can be identified in articles. Networks 
are not the principal focus when analyzing media due to missing information on allies and 
cooperation, however, articles can indicate relations between actors. The media analysis 
Networks towards organizations (frequency/quality)
Concrete frames on democracy 
General organizational framing
Introduction and background questions
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reveals the attention organizations get in terms of coverage, but are also used for 
triangulation, to confirm information from interviews (Lilleker 2003). 
 
The two main French speaking newspapers La Presse and Le Temps are analyzed. Although 
little data on printed numbers is available, La Presse is the most important newspaper in 
French, Le Temps with estimated six-thousand to seven-thousand printed newspapers daily 
the second largest (Revello 2018). Both newspapers were selected after a first research that 
identified them as the most important daily newspapers. They have both the advantage of 
having an extensive online catalogue that covers their articles and that has a search function. 
 
The time span of articles is similar to the interviews and includes the period from January 
2015 to December 2016. Due to the search function, the whole period can be exactly 
covered. The two newspapers belong to different editorial houses (Le Temps to Dar Assabah 
part of Al Karama holding (Revello 2018), La Presse as former coopted media under Ben Ali 
became independent after the revolution, similar for Dar Assabah which did not report for 
all protest events during the Ben Ali period; Hmed 2015; DeGeorges 2013). Dar Assabah also 
publishes in Arab. 
 
Johnston recalls that speech can be prepared for different audience which is effectively the 
difference towards the interviews (Johnston 1995). While interviews are discussions (with a 
researcher), media articles are announcements covered by the media (ibid). The media 
equally reports about declarations that are directly addressed towards government. When 
comparing interview and media data, the second is clearly public, while the first one is of 
private nature (ibid). 
 
The media analysis is bound to the analyzed organizations. The search for media articles is 
actor centered and starts with the claimant. A comparable model with search for 
organization names was used by Andrews and Caren (Andrews and Caren 2010). A separate 
search for each organization in the online data catalogue of each newspaper was done; 
Table 3.9 shows the number of articles by each organization. The search was based on the 
abbreviations of each organization as these are frequently used in Tunisia and are easier to 
identify than the complete name which may be slightly different or abbreviated in some 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
119 
 
  
cases. Thus, the search for abbreviations appears to give more valid results. Table 3.9 shows 
that reporting was by far strongest for the UGTT followed by FTDES and LTDH. Le Temps 
reports less on all organizations, for LTDH and FTDES much less (a list of all article including 
titles and subtitles can be found in the annex). The table also shows that the analysis of the 
ATFD bases on much less articles than for the other organizations, potentially creating a bias 
as the resonance may be influenced by few articles. 
Table 3.9 Number of articles for each organization 
Search word Le Temps La Presse Total 
ATFD 16 22 38 
FTDES 24 113 137 
LTDH 27 109 136 
UGTT 489 502 991 
As separate searches are conducted, the same article can appear several times in this 
overview. For analysis, articles naming several organizations are kept separate as the 
analysis is focused on each organization. I also verified whether the other organizations have 
been mentioned in articles on the respective organization. There was effectively more 
overlap for La Presse in comparison to Le Temps, meaning that there were more articles 
mentioning more than one of the analyzed organizations. This overlap touches especially the 
articles on the FTDES as well as those of the LTDH in La Presse where the UGTT was named. 
Especially the articles on the LTDH showed many mentions of the UGTT. The articles are 
consequentially studied with more attention and coding is verified to really include claims of 
the LTDH41. 
 
As researchers note, the extent and content of media coverage indicate a movement’s 
strength (Kolb 2007; Andrews and Caren 2010). Media coverage is by far wider for the UGTT 
than for the other organizations representing also the different sizes of the organizations (as 
already indicated in chapter one). Organizations appear as more or less newsworthy 
depending on how they position themselves on a topic, but larger organizations are also 
covered more often due to higher (perceived) social significance (Andrews and Caren 2010). 
Coverage of the ATFD is limited; something already found by other researchers. Khalil and 
                                                     
41  An article can include an UGTT claim and being coded under LTDH, but may include no LTDH claim. It then 
would only be coded as UGTT claim. 
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the ATFD itself underline that media reports rarely on the ATFD or women issues (Khalil 
2014; ATFD 2011b). 
 
Andrews and Caren argue that organizations with contact to the government will receive 
more attention than organizations that target the media or hold demonstrations in 
comparison to organizations that use outsider tactics (Andrews and Caren 2010). This 
indicates that the UGTT might be closer to the government, something discussed later in the 
analysis. 
Potential problems 
There are nevertheless some problems with the use of newspapers for data generation. It 
needs to be kept in mind that newspapers are not the only source of information, but that 
television and internet platforms like Facebook and Twitter also play an important role 
(Woodly 2015; Kahlaoui 2013). Thus, it catches a more formalized debate where editors 
serve as filters of messages issued by organizations. It does not show the complete picture of 
contestation, creating limits in reach for the thesis. A sample selection bias can occur related 
to the internal organization of media outlets in terms of deadlines, characteristics of events, 
reporting on major or minor events and journalistic norms of the political perspectives that 
are driven forward by a newspaper (Trevizo 2006; Earl et al. 2004; Woodly 2015). 
Investigative journalism is not seen as frequent in Tunisia (ATFD 2011b). In addition, the 
newspaper only catches a part of the discussion in Tunisia as Arabic newspapers are 
excluded due to resource restrictions. While it is assumed that the media outlets “simply” 
translate their Arab articles to French, it is not clear whether all articles are available in both 
languages or whether modifications occur. In this sense, the debate in Arabic might be 
slightly different from the public debate in French, creating an additional limitation. 
 
Given the problems, it is important to use more than one newspaper. The use of at least two 
newspapers already accounted for more unique events in the case of event analysis and 
augmented data for analysis (Earl et al. 2004). This should be similar for democratic framing 
that will be covered differently across newspapers. It should also be kept in mind that 
different newspapers report differently on the same organization (Andrews and Caren 
2010). The ATFD criticizes that La Presse and also Le Temps often do not publish neutral 
information, Le Temps even ignoring the code of conduct among journalists (putting sources 
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for opinion polls and so on; ATFD 2011b). This lack of professionalism also of the Tunisian 
Press Agency (TAP) is criticized by scholars like Klaus or Dakhli (Klaus 2017; Dakhli 2013). 
However, while media has been criticized of repeating paroles of political actor, it allows 
assessing a more original argumentation by organizations, less filtered by journalists. 
How media got analyzed 
After the initial search for organizations, the articles are regarded one by one and claims are 
identified. Those claims are then coded under the dimensions of democracy, targets 
mentioned as well as other aspects that emerged. La Presse and Le Temps are analyzed on 
whether movements succeeded in positioning their framings on democracy in the public 
sphere (as well as whether they build networks). The media analysis allows to retrace the 
combinations of framing that resonate in public as well as interactions of organizations.  
 
The frames are analyzed under three characteristics: all content of frames, the combinations 
of frames and whether frames get repeated. While the repetition itself does not say 
anything about the importance for the organizations, it nevertheless reflects the resonance 
in public, so whether media outlets evaluate the frames as important. Combinations 
illustrate what dimensions of democracy get combined. Each article has been regarded and 
coded according to the same approach as for interviews. The content of frames in terms of 
democracy has been coded for each article individually. Search word-based coding was used 
in addition. Every article thus went through a double process of manual verification, as well 
as search word-based coding for the most important topics like democracy42. For some 
chapters specific searches have been conducted. For the second part of the chapter seven 
for example, a text search in NVivo for exactly three key words/word combinations 
(terrorisme, reconciliation and harcèlement sexuel43) has been done. 
 
The links towards other organizations, the abbreviation, the official name or modified 
versions are coded (for example: Ordre des Avocats or ONAT, Ministère de la Formation 
professionnelle et de l’emploi, Ministère de l’emploi, Ministère du travail). The majority of 
organizations were already known through interviews, other organizations came up during 
the media analysis. 
                                                     
42 “double codings” are excluded as Nvivo automatically summarizes the same nodes at the same place. 
43 for the FTDES harcèlement sexuel produced no results, so sexual violence was used as a proxy. 
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It should be noted, that during the time of interviews and media analysis, the composition of 
government changed and some ministries disappeared. Nevertheless, media analysis for the 
organizations is performed on the basis of both compositions of government, thus including 
the Essid and the Chahed government. Data from interviews and media is supplemented by 
organizational documents. 
3.2.4 Reports by organizations on democracy 
Frames and discourses are not only part of speeches, but also of documents (Johnston 
2002). A third part of the data are documents of and on the four organizations, explaining 
their framing. Those documents were for example found on the organizational website or 
were provided by the leaders. In addition, a number of scientific articles as well as reports 
supplement the perspective, especially on the UGTT. 
How documents got selected and analyzed 
The key documents of the organizations are normally found on their website, Facebook page 
or are distributed by the leaders during interviews. In addition, scientific and journalistic 
documents on the organization are searched separately. Documents have been filtered on 
whether they include general framings and/or the concrete perspective on democracy. It is 
to recall that the documents are used to verify elements of the organizational framing. In the 
case of organizational publications, those represent internal, pure and unfiltered arguments 
nevertheless prepared for a public audience. It is to emphasize that the internal and external 
documents by/on movements differ in their content and are thus regarded under different 
perspectives. Internal documents present the movement perspective in a written form and 
summarize consensual points articulated by the organizations. They thus allow to identify 
the individual perspective of interviewees that may have created biases for the 
organizational perspective. The documents external to the organizations are regarded from 
a different angle as those have already been filtered by another actor. Even movement 
publications can differ in the content that may be prepared for the public or only for internal 
purposes. 
 
The documents have been sampled to get the most information possible. It is possible that 
the selected documents are not the most important ones for the organizations themselves. 
Unfortunately, no minutes from meetings and thus purely internal documents could be 
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obtained (despite asking). However, careful research allows to select the documents where 
elements of democracy are included. Purely technical reports for example are excluded. As 
the documents were selected on whether elements of democracy are discussed, the 
following analysis was less systematic compared to interviews. A detailed coding was thus 
not performed. Consequentially, the data analysis for documents differs from those for 
interviews and articles.  
 
Documents have the advantage that they are “discursively rich” in comparison to newspaper 
reports (Koopmans and Statham 1999:221). Especially for the selected materials, 
perspectives on democracy are condensed into the – written - organizational perspective 
and different elements were highlighted. However, the availability of materials in French 
differed from one organization to another as did the amount of scientific literature (more on 
UGTT and ATFD, less on LTDH and FTDES). 
3.2.5 Some words on interpreting data 
The thesis uses an interpretative approach that summarizes words or sentences in 
categories like different frames as described by Janning et al. (Janning et al. 2009). Following 
the interviews, the arguments are transcribed and expressions are counted as suggested by 
Axinn and Pearce and analyzed through thematic analysis (Axinn and Pearce 2006). The 
approach used for analysis is a mixture of discourse and content analysis. While discourse 
analysis is especially suited for analyzing the intersubjective construction of reality as well as 
the linguistic interpretation of words and phrases, content analysis relies on word counts 
and quantitative analysis of messages (Herrera and Braunmoeller 2004; Hardy et al. 2004; 
Neuendorf 2004). However, as it is neither the aim to discuss the linguistic quality nor to 
interpret every phrase - which would be equally difficult given that no interview was 
conducted in the person’s mother tongue -, and a pure content analysis appears as too static 
leaving no space for context or for analyzing the importance of some parts of the interview 
or media data, a mixture of both approaches is preferred (Hardy et al. 2004; Hopf 2004). 
 
Content analysis relies on pre-determined categories, while discourse analysis leaves more 
space to interpretation following the interviews (Herrera and Braunmoeller 2004). While 
content analysis assumes a system within the text and allows to code and count, more 
qualitative versions of content analysis do not only look at the number of words used, but 
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also at the context and the sensitivity (Hardy et al. 2004). According to this version in 
between content analysis and discourse analysis, meaning is constructed in contexts, 
categories emerge from data, and based on that, counting is possible (Hardy et al. 2004). As 
a consequence, the preferred strategy to analyze interviews is a mix of content analysis and 
discourse analysis. Similar to Hardy et al., the text is seen as dependent on the context 
(Hardy et al. 2004). The analysis is thus not as strict as content analysis, as coding schemes 
are finalized after the data collection, but also not as open as discourse analysis and 
especially the linguistic dimension is not analyzed in detail. The intersubjective construction 
plays a role; however, there are also systematic elements that enter into play when key 
frames are repeated. This concept is applied to articles in a slightly modified version where 
content analysis is more important due to the larger amount of data available. While it is 
expected that key frames are repeated over time, a more frequent discussion of concepts 
and frames does not necessarily mean more importance. 
 
Mainly two criteria are used to analyze frames: Which frames appear, thus which aspects of 
democracy are framed, and secondly what frames get connected. The connection tells much 
about the key arguments and which concepts get linked. It allows identifying the nuances 
that are attributed to elements of democracy. One example is that equality of participation 
can be regarded in line with economic aspects and linked to corruption, or it can be argued 
from a perspective on discrimination of women or other groups. Accounting for those details 
appears important for distinguishing between different orientations on democracy.  
 
The longer interviews give more material for analysis. This does not mean that shorter 
interviews are less important, but they are more used to verify the statements derived from 
the longer ones. As it was sometimes impossible to conduct longer interviews due to limited 
availability, this problem is acknowledged but cannot be solved. Having outlined the types of 
data, I will no turn to the operalizationalization that is closely linked to how data is analyzed. 
3.3 Operationalization of concepts 
3.3.1 How networks get operationalized 
I recall that the approach is a mixture of deductive and inductive reasoning. The approach is 
deductive, applying a theoretical framework (networks, democratic framing and ideational 
influence) on a case. As the theoretical framework on democracy raised doubts on its 
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applicability in Arab contexts (see literature review), the reasoning is also inductive as it is 
open to not-mentioned elements that are mentioned often and play an important role. As 
little is known about the Tunisian context, new elements were threatened in an inductive 
way. In addition, it is explorative and explanatory as – even though theory gives few 
suggestions – current knowledge on individual perceptions in movements in transforming 
contexts is limited. 
 
As noted by scholars, it is difficult to establish clear causal chains between movement 
actions and change in society as multiple actors try to influence the state and as movements 
may have unintended effects (Martin 2008; Giugni 1998b). The framing of the state 
(ministries) and organizations (UGTT, LTDH, FTDES, ATFD) are compared. By identifying the 
possible influence on the state, the effectiveness of frame diffusion can be shown. 
Movements are expected to directly influence the visions of the state or indirectly through 
public opinion. While framings on democracy are expected to be comparable, some 
elements of democracy will vary according to expertise; an organization working on women 
rights is not expected to promote competition of political parties as primary aim. 
 
Mechanisms are seen as interactions that allow the transmission of ideas. They are not the 
same as networks, but networks can indicate mechanism. According to McAdam et al. a 
mechanism is defined as “delimited changes that alter relations among specific sets of 
elements of identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam et al. 
2008:308). Indicators for mechanisms are consultation, negotiations, formal recognition or 
inclusion by/with the government and the organization. The direct influence as well as 
indirect influence depends on different mechanisms mobilized. Influence can be direct from 
movements to the state or mediated via public opinion. A framing of democracy can 
consequentially be transmitted in direct interaction with state actors as well as via the media 
that is used for representing public opinion and thus in a mediated way. 
 
The degree of ties however is different from one organization to another. The coding of 
networks is described in the following. 
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Measuring networks and their quality 
Not only democracy but also networks are measured through questions similar to the one 
that Schneider and Leifeld posed, namely with what organization they cooperate and 
whether there are organizations that are allies or adversaries (Schneider and Leifeld 2009). 
The approach by Schneider and Leifeld bases much on the important work by Knoke on 
networks (Knoke 1990). Diani uses a similar approach to measure positions of movements 
asking whether other organizations are recognized as influential (Diani 2015). By this 
operationalization, state perspectives and organizational perspectives can be compared and 
confirmed or infirmed similar to how Schneider and Leifeld proceeded in the case of 
diffusion networks (Schneider and Leifeld 2009; compare also Schneider 2009).  
 
The quality of ties was more difficult to assess. The notion of partners or allies was used for 
interviews. When other actors are seen as partners those ties are of higher quality than 
actors that are only described as connected actors. The frequent mention of organizations as 
ally across organizations was used as indicator for a movement coalition. For articles, the 
frequency of mentions in articles was used as a proxy (co-occurrences). These may not 
necessarily be the same allies or partners as outlined in interviews. The frequency of 
interactions was also introduced into Gephi, a network analysis tool, so that network maps 
were elaborated (those can be found in the Annex). 
 
Diani emphasizes the choice for relying on objective or subjective perceptions of ties (Diani 
2015). In my case, the subjective ties are analyzed and thus it is about perceived allies and 
accepted actors. The analysis focusses on organizations and not on individuals although 
individuals serve as informants of organizational relations. Table 3.10 shows the different 
degree of interaction that is assessed by questions. The interactions of the state and 
organizations -in between and towards the state- are regarded and how they perceive each 
other. Other actors can thus be identified as “allies” or “adversaries” as well as “accepted” 
(Gamson) actors of the political system. When talking about networks, organizations were 
encouraged to name their main partners. As the study focuses on four organizations, 
questions on those specific organizations followed the questions on networks. Whenever an 
organization was mentioned in interviews (but equally in articles) this organization was 
coded. The organizations were then categorized in clusters for analysis. Based on those 
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cluster, movement coalitions as seen in 2.3 are identified and the possibility of a coalitional 
influence is assessed. 
 
For the interviews with state representatives, the same questions on regular interactions, 
the quality of those ties and on partners or accepted actors of the political system were 
posed. As interviews with civil servants were also used to verify the connections mentioned 
by movements, civil servants were asked whether they know the four organizations and 
were asked on their respective status. The four organizations were not well known in all 
ministries, and in some cases other organizations were more important as will be shown 
later. When including the media perspective, the question on the role of the media is 
already included in the assessment of democratic framing (see 3.2.2) and thus allowed to 
prompt for how media are perceived and whether those are used to inform others 
(organizations) or stay informed (ministries). This is important as media would only have a 
reduced role if no actor sees it as relevant. 
 
The networks retraced are no complete network between all civil society organizations and 
the state, but follow the perspective of movements as for example proposed by Crossley 
(Crossley 2016). A complete network structure is not analyzed as the collection of complete 
network structures are very resource intensive (Knoke 1990). The networks thus focus on 
organizations and not the whole political system in Tunisia.  
 
When networks are combined with framing, the underlying idea is that leaders of 
organizations and civil servants in leading positions in ministries have similar framings on 
democracy in case of intense interaction. Shared framings go hand-in-hand with interaction 
between the state and organizations that allow framings of democracy to be transmitted 
from movements to the state. The mechanisms by which democratic framings get diffused 
are discussed in chapter seven. 
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Table 3.10 Operationalization of networks 
Main Dimension Sub-element Coded 
Actor named Type of actor The actors named were coded and categorized 
at the time of coding. As categories emerged 
organizations, enterprises or government 
among others. Every organization and ministry 
named is coded with its name. 
Link to other Acceptance Other actor is accepted in the political system. 
Acceptance is for example coded when 
interviewees justify why certain actors are part 
of the networks. 
Adversaries Adversaries are coded only if the question on 
adversaries is answered, as well as when 
explicitly named as adversary. 
Allies Allies are coded when the question on allies is 
answered as well when actors are named as 
partners or allies. 
Direct link Direct link is coded every time when direct 
interactions are explained. 
Motivations for links Motivations include the reasons for interactions 
when mentioned. 
Networks Networks are coded when the interviewee 
talked about networks of the organization. 
Personal/impersonal 
link 
The personal/impersonal link element is coded 
when the interviewees explained on personal or 
organizational contacts. 
Quality of links The quality of links element is coded whenever a 
positive or negative connotation for the links is 
given. 
Note: Own figure, inspired by Sciarini 1994, Schneider and Leifeld 2009; Schneider 2009, Diani 2015 
Analyzing networks serves a double purpose: First networks and ties towards the state 
indicate mechanism of influence as they identify possible ways ideas can travel. Second, 
networks allow to identify the structure of civil society, thus who cooperates with whom and 
introduces the possibility of a movement coalition (see 2.3). Thus, if there is no direct link to 
the ministry, certain mechanisms are not possible as there is no direct influence. However, 
still influence via a coalition might be possible or via the media (alone or together). In the 
following, the way democratic framing is coded is described. 
3.3.2 Operationalizing democratic framing 
Indicators for perceptions and democratic framings are built on the basis of key factors for 
democracy outlined in chapter two (2.4) and will be explained in the following section. The 
concept of a democratic framing is used as deductive element derived from the theory on 
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democratic quality and the Democracy Barometer as explained in chapter two. The 
dimensions of the Democracy Barometer are in line with those of other qualitative measures 
of democracy (for example Lauth 2011). The deductive approach is supplemented by an 
inductive element: While being focused on the aspects of democracy as outlined by theory, 
the approach remains open towards other dimensions mentioned during interviews. This 
means also that elements specific to the Tunisian context are added. The categories used in 
the Democracy Barometer are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in one or the 
other way. They measure the type and orientation of democracy, but are equally useful to 
assess the degree or quality of democracy.  
 
As has been underlined by other scholars, the fine differences between democracies and the 
quality of democracy become measurable using an index like the Democracy Barometer as 
orientation (see 2.4). The Barometer is normally used for quantitative analysis. Its wide 
orientation makes different forms of democracy measurable. Bühlmann et al. identify nine 
elements for democracy that are part of three main dimensions (Bühlmann et al. 2014, see 
2.4): 
 Competition of political actors (showing the perception of political struggles) 
 Governance capacity (showing the perception of capacity for implementing policies) 
 Division of power (showing the perception of balance of political power) 
 Participation (showing the perception on modes of political participation) 
 Representation (showing the perception of modes of representation) 
 Transparency (showing the perception on political corruption) 
 Individual liberties (showing the perception on individual liberties and rights) 
 Public and exchange of opinions (showing the perception on freedom of association 
and freedom of speech) 
 Rule of law (showing the perception of juridical powers) 
 
These nine main elements are categorized into three dimensions: control (one to three), 
equality (four to six) and freedom (seven to nine; Jäckle et al. 2012). Especially freedom and 
equality are also found at other scholars, while control is occasionally circumscribed by 
responsiveness (Quaranta 2016). 
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As mentioned earlier, I will not focus on necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy, 
but use an operationalization of democracy that is compatible with different forms of 
democracies. A family resemblance model on the indicator level is used from a 
methodological perspective (Goertz 2006). A family resemblance model sees none of the 
indicators as a necessary condition, but a high sum of indicators is best in terms of 
democracy (ibid). In this sense, not every organization nor state actor has to evaluate for 
example elections as important for democracy. If a movement’s framing includes freedom of 
association but not alternation of power the movement is not automatically described as 
antidemocratic. Similarly, Glenn argues that it does not make sense to see democracy as 
dichotomous, but as continuous (Glenn 2001). For the Democracy Barometer, it is to note 
that it is impossible to support all dimensions at the same time due to tensions between 
dimensions (Bühlmann et al. 2014; Merkel et al. 2013). Some dimensions like the call for a 
strong state and at the same time a call for more control institutions appears as improbable 
and contradicting. At the same time interactions of different dimensions are observable 
which makes the identification of combinations of elements and dimensions particularly 
important. 
 
No dimension of democracy is seen as more important than another. Bühlmann et al. argue 
for an equal weighting of factors of democracy and see an interaction between the three 
core concepts freedom, equality and control which result in a case specific equilibrium 
(Bühlmann et al. 2014; Jäckle et al. 2013). While the approach of the Democracy Barometer 
is originally quantitative44, it is useful as point of orientation for qualitative analysis as it is 
detailed and wide-reaching. Its three dimensions and nine elements summarize a very wide 
array of factors of democracy that allows identifying a specific framing of democracy. Below, 
the dimensions and their components are explained in more detail: 
First dimension of democratic framing: Control 
Table 3.11 gives an overview on the elements coded as part of the control dimension. These 
include horizontal and vertical constraints to power, but also whether elections result in a 
concentration of seats (Merkel et al. 2013). The competition component covers vulnerability 
and anti-dominant actor components, meaning also that the outcome of elections is not 
                                                     
44 Unfortunately, Tunisia has not yet been included. 
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predetermined as well as the possibility for nearly each actor to contest policies (including 
low barriers, Bühlmann et al. 2014). 
 
The capacity of the democratic government bases on ideas of representative democracy 
where the government has resources to govern and also the possibility for efficient 
implementation (ibid). The division of power in democracy emphasizes differences between 
executive and legislative based on the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu with a distinction 
between horizontal and vertical power constraints (ibid). 
 
An example is criticism of the party system being dominated by few actors. When a 
movement or a labor union claims that the party system should be less dominated, this is 
coded under competition as part of the control dimension. Similarly, a demand for a stable 
government falls under resources as part of the government capacity. A demand for 
decentralization asks for vertical checks and balances under the mutual constraints 
dimension. 
Table 3.11 Control Dimension, sub and third level elements 
Control Dimension 
Sub element Third level 
element 
Coded 
Competition Vulnerability Accurate electoral outcomes, rules for 
competition, concentration of seats (parliament 
and other elected bodies) 
 Contestability Hurdles for entry, effective contestation, access 
to resources 
Government 
capacity 
Resources Government stability, public support for 
government, legislative period, time frame, 
cabinet changes 
 Conditions and 
implementation 
Anti-government actions, inference military, 
inference religion, independence administration 
political inference, administrative capacities, 
bureaucracies, role central bank 
Mutual 
constraints 
Horizontal 
checks and 
balances 
Executive and legislative, checks, balances, 
juridical review 
 Vertical checks 
and balances 
Federalism, financial autonomy 
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Note: Own Figure, based on Bühlmann et al. 2014 
Second dimension of democratic framing: Equality 
The second dimension of the Democracy Barometer includes equal access to rights through 
equal representation and participation guaranteed through the freedom of information and 
thus transparency and which is presented in Table 3.12 (Merkel et al. 2013). The 
participation component includes effectiveness and equality of participation (Bühlmann et 
al. 2014). It is expected that the participation dimension is supported by movements as they 
rely on protest activities that fall under the participation label. 
 
Representation encompasses aspects such as representation of all groups within the 
population as well as representation of preferences in the outcome (ibid). Transparency 
covers transparent political processes and limited secrecy as it may support corruption (ibid). 
While Lauth criticizes the inclusion of transparency under the equality dimension, it makes 
sense given the perspective to ensure equality (Lauth 2011). Merkel et al. argue that secrecy 
hinders equality as it promotes specific interests (Merkel et al. 2013). One can equally ask 
whether rule of law and equal treatment of citizens before courts should also be part of this 
dimension. The inclusion of transparency under equality is the most important criticism on 
the Democracy Barometer. I nevertheless keep the initial framework and propose 
modifications at the end. It can also be discussed whether economic factors should be part 
of the equality dimension, as poverty may hinder participation (for example no time for 
voting, missing competencies and so on; Quaranta 2016). 
 
The criticism of low participation in elections is coded under equality of participation as part 
of the participation dimension. A demand for the inclusion of minorities is coded as 
descriptive representation under the representation dimension. Criticism of corruption is 
coded as no secrecy under the transparency dimension. 
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Table 3.12 Equality Dimension, sub and third level elements 
Equality Dimension 
Sub element Third level 
element 
Coded 
Participation Equality of 
Participation 
Universal suffrage, representative turnout 
elections, representative non-electoral activities 
 Effective 
Participation 
Rules facilitating participation, institutionalized 
participation (regulations for elections, 
referendum and so on), petitions, strikes, protest 
events 
Representation Substantive Voting district distribution, direct democracy, left-
right disequilibrium 
 Descriptive Inclusion of minorities, representation of women, 
access to power for minorities 
Transparency No secrecy Disclosure party financing, disclosure public 
finance, corruption 
 Transparent 
political process 
Freedom of information, informational openness, 
willingness for transparent communication 
Note: Own Figure, based on Bühlmann et al. 2014 
Third dimension of democratic framing: Freedom 
Table 3.13 shows the elements coded under the freedom dimension. The freedom 
dimension is justified as protection and guarantee of individual and civic rights which are 
connected to the legal basis, so the rule of law (Merkel et al. 2013). Given the current state 
of research it is clear that freedom is one main dimension and it is distinguished between 
individual and collective guaranteed rights for the expression of opinions or the personal 
integrity. The formal, effective guarantee in the form of the rule of law is inevitably 
connected. Individual liberties summarize aspects of freedom, the rights on physical 
integrity, right on self-determination and realization of life (Bühlmann et al. 2014). 
 
The public exchange element is one of the most important ones for movements. It encloses 
the freedom to associate and the freedom of speech (ibid). The rule of law component of 
democracy protects freedom and political rights, where the necessity of rule of law is 
emphasized (ibid). 
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Examples include the criticism of inequality before the law that is coded under equality 
before the law as part of the rule of law dimension. Other examples include the criticism of 
torture that is coded as physical integrity under individual liberties or a demand for the 
respect of freedom of associations that is coded under the public sphere dimension. 
 
Table 3.13 Freedom Dimension, sub and third level elements 
Freedom Dimension 
Sub element Third level 
element 
Coded 
Rule of Law Equality before 
the law 
Effective independence other actors, 
constitutional provisions, effective impartiality 
 Quality of the 
legal system 
Juridical professionalism, confidence in the 
system, confidence in the police 
Individual liberties Physical 
integrity 
Constitutional physical integrity provisions, 
ratification of ban against torture, state torture, 
inhumane, or degrading treatments, mutual 
acceptance of those rights, homicides, riots 
 Free conduct of 
life 
Constitutional guarantees individual liberties, 
freedom of religion, freedom of movement, 
property rights 
Public Sphere Freedom to 
associate 
Guarantees for freedom of association, degree of 
association, membership 
 Freedom of 
opinion 
Freedom of speech, media offer, political 
neutrality 
Note: Own Figure, based on Bühlmann et al. 2014  
The elements are coded with or without an explicit referral to democracy. As Beinin for 
example mentions, movements seldom claim democracy or a regime change as their aim, 
but rather particular topics (Beinin 2014). By using this distinction, elements of democracy 
can be retraced as part of the framing, as the discourse using the term democracy is limited.  
 
It is however difficult to estimate the perceptions hold by organizations in Tunisia as there is 
simply up to no information on civil society’s perception of democracy. It is expected that 
leaders refer to democracy in connection to the uprisings and that the participation 
dimension is emphasized as it is key to social movement activities. 
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Applicability and criticism 
As the lower levels below the nine elements have been criticized in terms of validity and 
conceptual stretching and overloaded in terms of number of indicators, lower level 
indicators are only regarded as inspiration for coding as those are used as quantifiable 
indicators in the Barometer (Jäckle et al. 2012; Jäckle et al. 2013). In addition, the coding list 
is not completed beforehand which is in line with the unknown interpretation of the 
Tunisian democracy. Possible additional elements have been coded at the time of analysis; 
especially one element emerged as will be described later. 
 
The approach by the Democracy Barometer is not without criticism. Lauth criticizes the 
Democracy Barometer for including transparency under equality as mentioned above. In 
addition, Lauth states that some functions not only represent one dimension, but several 
ones, thus jeopardizing the threefold division made by the Barometer (Lauth 2010). 
However, in a recent paper he and Schlenkrich distinguish between freedom, equality and 
control as main dimensions (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). Other criticism was formulated on 
the reduced role of output as well as the already mentioned economic issues (see chapter 
two). While the criticism shall be kept in mind for the analysis, the Barometer is used as 
orientation on how to measure democracy. The Barometer served for coding, but coding 
remains equally open towards dimensions not named in the Democracy Barometer. I now 
turn to how framing in public was coded. 
3.3.3 Democratic framing and public opinion 
When operationalizing a democratic framing in public discourse, media articles are used to 
account for the public debate. While interviews are more authentic and express the 
organizational perspective, this is not necessarily the case for articles that mention the 
organizations. Therefore, an additional layer has been introduced for the coding of 
dimensions of democracy in the public debate. Figure 3.14 explains what indicators in 
sentences have been used to code claims. As claims are defined as political demands (see 
2.6.2), all demands towards the state got coded. The additional coded element “claim” was 
then used in combination with the dimensions of democracy already outlined before. This 
translated in requests on matrix coding in NVivo for every organization. 
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An article on freedom of speech that mentions somewhere the UGTT is for example only 
regarded in the analysis if a claim by the UGTT is included, so when the UGTT criticizes the 
restriction of freedom of speech. This is done as not every article that includes the 
respective organizations necessarily includes a claim by this organization. 
Figure 3.14 Coded claims in articles 
Element Coded 
Claim A claim has been coded when a political demand towards the 
state has been expressed. It normally follows formulations like 
the UGTT calls/demands for [claim].  
Addressee of Claim In addition to the claim, the addressee of claims is coded as 
sometimes additional addressees were mentioned together 
with the state.  
 
When it comes to the coding of actors, the organizations already identified in interviews 
have been searched for in articles and were coded respectively. Every article was then 
screened for additional names of organizations. As mentioned earlier, the articles were used 
as additional indicator whether organizations have links as it is expected that regular 
interactions will also be visible in the media through reporting on meetings. The measure 
used is co-occurrences which are however only a proxy for relations as no detailed data on 
the quality of networks can be derived from articles. 
3.4 No research without shortcomings: biases of the approach 
3.4.1 What data allows to account for and what not  
The thesis has a number of limitations and addresses several biases that could disturb the 
research. This section underlines what can be shown by the data and similarly highlights 
limitations of the research in terms of causal direction, limitations as well as problems 
encountered. 
Retracing processes and causal direction 
It is difficult to establish a causal chain for influencing framing as well as policy processes. As 
Janning et al. underline, policy processes are influenced by a number of different actors 
including interest groups, parliament or government (Janning et al. 2009). As Sandoval 
explains “regime transformation, government reform, and even policy changes are the result 
of the complex interaction between multiple political forces including powerholders, polity 
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elites, challengers, and their elite allies” which makes searching for causal relations a difficult 
task (Sandoval 1998:169; on democratic outcomes in complex societies Melucci and Lyyra 
1998). Similar to what Saunders describes for a small sample, cause-effect relations are 
difficult to establish, but the exploratory research gives a starting point (Saunders 2013). By 
verifying the state perspective, the mechanisms that are available to movements can be 
identified and their effectivity be assessed. 
 
There are still numerous actors that are not regarded. Parliament for example is not 
analyzed in detail; only interactions by organizations with parliament are retraced.  
However, not all actors mentioned to influence framing and policies are analyzed in detail, 
but only civil society organizations and state representatives. This choice is taken due to 
resources and accessibility. A number of other explanations of movement influence and the 
role for democratization are possible. Their possible influence on the results is re-discussed 
at the end.  
Limitations and consequences 
The most important point to be aware of is that the data used for analysis is not reliable as 
any repetition across time would generate slightly different results when the context 
changes. The basis on interviews leads on the other hand to valid data, directly related to 
the perceptions within organizations. 
 
Another important limitation lies in the non-availability of two relevant ministries albeit 
mentioned in interviews. The Ministry of Social Affairs having ties especially with the UGTT 
and the FTDES, but also the ATFD, was contacted officially and several leaders have been 
contacted separately. As no response was given one can only speculate whether internal 
policies exist that prevent external contacts45. Equally, no interview with the Ministry of 
Justice was conducted, a ministry central for the LTDH. The interactions between the 
organizations and those ministries are thus not included in the state perspective, albeit 
potentially intense contacts exist. Especially the missing Ministry of Social Affairs represents 
a major shortcoming. 
                                                     
45 One indicator was given by a person approached who demanded an official authorization for conducting 
research (mainly an agreement with the Ministry for Higher Education). After several consultations with the 
ministry and embassies, it showed that this authorization was necessary under Ben Ali, but no longer needed. 
However, the respective person could not be convinced that this was no longer the case and finally no 
interview was possible in this case. 
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Another important point directs towards the number of interviews with ministries. While it 
was initially planned to have different ministries included to see similarities in framing, the 
state perspective shows few coherence. A point that will be discussed at the end is whether 
not more interviews per ministry would have ensured a more detailed regard on the 
perspective on each ministry. My research design gives priority to many ministries included, 
while a more detailed regard might have been necessary. 
 
Whether the group level is detailed in all interviews is another question to pose. I underline 
that the study operates on a collective level and analyzes group framings. While a more 
general perspective on individual perceptions would generate some (different) value, the 
organizational level is the main level of analysis and consequentially individual framings are 
disregarded. As individual and collective framings are difficult to distinguish, the thesis takes 
not just individual interviews, but several for each organization. This is important for validity, 
as individual biases would limit the strength of this research that lies in valid descriptions of 
the situation. The interviewer insisted on the collective perspective and framings are 
checked with the help of documents and media. I did the best to ensure that it was clear at 
any moment, that the organizational and ministerial perspective is important and not the 
individual one. Several measures at the moment of data collection, data comparison and 
data analysis ensure that the collective and not the individual level are regarded. 
Limited knowledge restricts research choices 
I underline the limited knowledge on organizations and influence in Tunisia that made 
research decisions difficult. This made also opt for qualitative research. Results give a first 
overview in a field where little is known. While qualitative research is well suited for causal 
process observations and to analyze relationships between variables, generalization is not 
possible (Lieberman 2004a). The number of four movements is not representative for all 
social movements in Tunisia; the results remain limited to the four organizations. There are 
still other actors that are taken into account but that were not a focus of research as 
outlined above (political parties and so on). 
 
Other biases that emerge are difficult to avoid. Given the limited knowledge on social 
movements in Tunisia, interviews with leaders appear as most cost-effective way to assess 
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the collective framing of organizations. Focus groups would have been possible as well but 
would be more difficult to steer which made me opt for individual interviews. This includes 
the risk of leaders explaining what is asked for instead of focusing on important issues. From 
my perspective, interviews are ideal in assessing the democratic framing as they also allow 
for prompting and flexible reactions. 
The problems with leaders 
Leader interviews have another problem: The elite perspective on framing has been 
criticized by scholars as it makes sense to regard the framing within an organization and to 
include all actors (Benford 1997, compare also chapter two). Critical researchers note that 
elites will not represent the whole diversity within an organization and will only express a 
part of the organizational perspective. Due to feasibility problems and due to the research 
design including also the public, the elite perspective is nevertheless adequate for this 
research. It would have been very difficult to target a representative sample within every 
organization and would have needed more resources. In addition, not every member may be 
equally able to summarize the organizational perspective. Newcomers in movements are for 
example not (yet) able to describe contacts towards others or even to concretize the aims of 
the organization. 
 
Another problem with interviews for data collection is similar to what Trumpy stated for 
focus groups, namely activists portraying the movement as more coherent as it is (Trumpy 
2016). While this is less problematic for individual evaluation as interviewees do not know 
what others said, there is a strong social desirability to show homogeneity of the 
organization and to play down conflicts to not destroy a potential good reputation. The 
inclusion of documents does not solve this problem, only a high number of different 
courants within movements would acknowledge for internal differences. However, this goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Where possible, different perspectives within one 
organization are acknowledged. Social desirability can also play a role when positive 
personal or collective consequences of participation are expected. 
The problems with media and a Western perspective 
For the media analysis different other problems arise. As mentioned before media outlets 
are not completely neutral. One needs to be aware that although the media has recently 
been classified as free, some scholars cast doubt that the media sector was reformed. The 
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law still allows prosecution because of offenses against the state and similar delicts (Aliriza 
2014). The question arises whether media reporting is not biased, a question that will be 
retaken at the end. As little information existed at the beginning of the research, media 
reporting was regarded as having similar functions as stated in theory – mainly for Western 
contexts. 
 
The Western context of many theories and methods is another question that will be re-
evaluated at the end. In addition, language constraints and interviews in French have 
probably caused a bias towards a more Western perspective. Interviewees were probably 
more open towards Western researchers, meaning that a Western perspective is very 
probably overrepresented in this research. Due to limited resources it is up to future 
research to solve this issue and consequentially this study gives a first endeavor to the 
situation in Tunisia. 
The not regarded regional level 
I underline that the thesis focuses on the national level. The reliance on Tunis includes the 
risk that national politics may be over evaluated. Regional differences are not assessed; 
however, it is left to other studies to show them. Cities have specific political, but also social 
and economic dynamics as Stadnicki or Bayat as well as others highlight (Stadnicki 2015; 
Allegra et al. 2013; Bayat 2017; Knoke 1990). The focus on Tunis means also that the results 
cannot be transferred to other cities as configurations are different as Merone and De Facci 
showed for Sfax for example (Merone and De Facci 2015). On the other hand, access to 
ministries would not be comparable in other cities.  
 
Another question is whether movements approach national or regional levels, as local 
governments tend to be more receptive (Meyer 2005). While the first chapter suggested 
that the analyzed organizations are equally active on the regional level (and what appeared 
also during interviews), the analysis is limited to the national level, and the influence 
towards ministries. The most important aims of movements may thus not be covered when 
formulated on a regional level. 
No generalization, but first insights 
Many of those biases lead to the conclusion that no generalization is possible. Only first 
insights can be generated as the analysis focusses on qualitative data. Qualitative data is 
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used for explorative data generation as the organizational framings towards democracy are 
not clear. Qualitative data is also used to assess the possibility of organizations to influence 
policies. Given the low number of real leaders in a movement, a quantitative approach 
appears unrealistic or would have needed a cross-organizational focus were extensive 
contacts to any organizations would have been needed. The reliability is augmented through 
triangulation to reduce individual perspectives (McAdam et al. 2008). 
 
For the state representatives, individual interviews appear as most appropriate as a large-
scale survey would require access to a number of ministry employees which is difficult to 
ensure; especially given the autocratic history of the country with a strict hierarchy. Again, 
the qualitative approach allows to identify previously unimagined access channels of 
organizations. 
 
Media allow to verify for a public perspective. The data from articles helps to reduce the 
problem of few interviews; however, they measure mainly another form of mechanism and 
have a different quality. As two newspapers are used, results are still not generalizable 
towards the whole media landscape, but limited to the two analyzed ones. As the larger 
picture is regarded, media articles appear to be more representative for overall newspaper 
coverage then interviews for all civil society organizations. 
3.4.2 Initial problems for feasibility 
As for other research, questions of feasibility arose before starting the fieldwork. Among 
those was available funding, which was provided several institutions. Nevertheless, the 
limited funding restrained longer field visits which could have enabled more interviews, 
something especially important for ministries as well as for a more diverse perspective on 
organizations in Tunisia. 
 
Another problem was the language. As the researcher has limited Arab language skills, 
extensive interaction in the native language of most Tunisians was difficult. As French is a 
language of commerce in Tunisia the limitations in terms of feasibility were not crucial (CIA 
2014). As interviews were conducted with leaders in higher ranked positions where a higher 
level of education is expected, the possible biases were limited. Nevertheless, it was neither 
the mother tongue of the researcher nor of interviewees (on language and mother tongue 
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Axinn and Pearce 2006).  In few cases possible interviewees could not be contacted due to 
language restrictions. The already discussed bias of having interviewed those with a higher 
education and wider language skills – or the most international – should be kept in mind. 
3.4.3 Isn’t it about…controlling for other factors. 
One may ask whether interaction in networks does not go in both directions and indeed I do 
not reject this. As literature principally states that civil society influences the Tunisian state, I 
consider this argument worth being tested. The data available allows suggestions on 
whether the state influenced movements in their perspective if for example leaders of 
organizations discuss elements that are not part of their written documents and no other 
explanation emerges. By asking civil servants directly on the interactions with civil society 
and how they are influenced by those actors asks however on a causal direction from 
organizations towards the state. The focus on this causal direction is kept throughout the 
interviews in order to be able to assess it in detail. 
 
When it comes to (ideational) influence, control becomes important. As mentioned earlier, 
relative resources or capacities are regarded in order to control for alternative explanations 
of influence (for example resource mobilization theory). As we have seen in the literature 
review, political opportunities can equally play a role – as it influenced many empirical 
results on outcomes - and are consequentially discussed in the end. As the focus lies on the 
responsiveness of the state, one alternative way via parliamentarians is also asked for. The 
question of other factors that may have produced a certain outcome is a crucial one that will 
be re-discussed at the end in line with the causal direction. 
 
The control for other events that influence the political discussion like terrorist attacks have 
been identified in the media analysis. The attacks in 2015 and 2016 were widely discussed in 
the media. While this also oriented discussion in interviews, it is something that can be 
explained and can have led to an overrepresentation of fighting terrorism as a topic. On the 
other hand, terrorism is a topic that was important before and after the time of analysis. 
 
Even though interviews are standardized to a certain point, the aspects influencing for 
example the mood of the interviewee cannot be controlled. Thus, the interviews are 
particularly contextual and would individually not be enough to retrace the framing of each 
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movement. Therefore, interviews are conducted with different leaders for each 
organization, and are compared with the official documents to ensure that the collective 
framing is correctly identified. Even though the context is explained, no final control is 
possible and it remains one of the main limits of this research that could for example be 
overcome by a longitudinal study. The analysis remains thus limited to a specific point in 
time and cannot be generalized across time. 
 
Another remaining criticism I want to express is the individual level data collection for 
assessing a collective perspective. Regarding personal background of interviewees, it would 
be interesting to have a complete biographical background, but due to anonymity of data as 
well as a very streamlined interview guide that was focused on framing and networks, 
questions on the personal background were limited. In this sense, the interesting question 
on whether the personal background is important for a certain framing cannot be assessed. 
3.5 Conclusion to chapter three 
The data collection to answer the question how framing is diffused towards the state is 
based on different data types and a mixture of deductive and inductive approaches. In order 
to identify the influence of an organization, an approach with leader interviews which can 
express the framings and organizational networks is taken. Interviews with civil servants in 
ministries on the same aspects allow to retrace networks and compare the framing. They 
allow also retracing the direction of causal paths. Those interviews are checked with articles 
on what frames resonate as well as interactions between actors. Both data - from interviews 
and media – are seen as complementary and are used in relation to theory on direct, indirect 
and joint effects. 
 
The framing of democracy is operationalized with the help of the Democracy Barometer, 
where three main dimensions (control, equality and freedom) have several sub dimensions 
(three each). The perspective on democracy is relatively open with several possible framings 
on democracy. The approach is not only deductive when it comes to elements of democracy, 
but also inductive as the final evaluation of democratic framing bases on the findings in the 
field. In addition, questions as well as media analysis allow to track networks towards other 
actors and to identify regular interactions or allies and adversaries.  
 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
144 
 
  
One point in time is regarded and thus the research cannot account for the full period of 
democratization. In addition, only a limited number of organizations are analyzed and results 
are not generalizable. Among the discussed biases are the problems of causal direction, of 
problems with some ministries, of individual perspectives in interviews or the limitation 
imposed by language. The results are probably more westernized than in reality as the most 
international and educated probably participated in interviews. Other factors like the 
influence of resources are discussed in order to account other explanations. 
 
Having outlined the methodological approaches that guide the research, the first empirical 
chapter looks at the networks among and between organizations as well as towards 
ministries. 
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Chapter Four 
The networks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Coalitions, specialization and very specific ties 
The fourth chapter focuses on the analysis of network configurations among movements 
and the identification of possible mechanisms, ties between organizations and towards the 
state. Recalling the research question, “How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors 
in Tunisia?”a first insight on ways ideas can travel is given by outlining networks. If there is 
the possibility of direct or indirect effects, the respective networks towards state actors as 
well as towards the media should exist. Thus, in order to verify whether transmissions of 
ideas between the analyzed organizations and the state are possible, the interactions 
between actors are shown first. 
 
The aim of the chapter is to answer the question: How are movements connected to each 
other and to which degree do they interact? Literature suggested that networks and 
especially coalitions are path-dependent (see 2.2), but does this mean that those who 
already worked together under Ben Ali, still work together and partly exclude newer 
organizations from their interaction? I recall that the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du 
Travail), the LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l’Homme) and the ATFD 
(Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates) were registered but repressed under Ben 
Ali, while the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux) did not 
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officially exist. It is thus question, whether the FTDES has a different status among those 
organizations and whether it is part of a possible coalition. 
 
The network approach allows to identify partners, allies and adversaries. Consequentially, 
the possibility of a movement coalition or of other ways of influencing is identified. It is 
argued that not only single influence by one organization, but also coalitional influence is 
possible if the organizations are part of a coalition. This enhances the overall capacity to 
influence policies. Organizational and coalitional influence is complementary. In case of a 
coalition, movements do not necessarily rely on their own networks, but reach out via other 
organizations in case of close cooperation. 
 
Another point is the question of roles in coalitions (2.2). If there is a coalition, the network 
structure and its orientation towards specific actors helps already outlining possible 
specializations of organizations. A human rights group should for example have extensive 
networks towards other human rights organizations, while an organization defending 
environmental aspects does not necessarily need those ties. In relation to the following 
chapters on democratic framing, the chapter sets the framework to identify the thematic 
specialization of movements. 
 
The chapter prepares the later analysis on framing. It identifies possible ways that 
ideas/frames could take when travelling. The chapter elaborates on three main aspects: first 
partners and coalitions, second expertise and roles and third networks towards the state. In 
this chapter organizational ties as well as specialization and coalitions are discussed, before 
in a second part connections towards the state get verified from a state perspective. 
 
The second part of the chapter poses an additional question: Which ties do exist between 
movements and the state and what qualities do those have? The question aims to provide 
insights into the possibility of especially direct effects (see 2.5) and to a limited degree 
indirect effects via media. Direct effects need an interaction between actors. While 
organizations can state that networks exist, their verification from a state perspective is 
important in order to identify the intensity and quality of interaction. The evaluation of 
those aspects then allows determining whether a mechanism of direct influence is effective 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
147 
 
  
for every organization. If there are no interactions, mechanisms of direct effects cannot 
exist, leaving only the possibility of indirect effects, thus through other organizations or the 
media or public opinion. 
 
One limitation needs to be kept in mind: According to Saunders’ study on movement 
networks, social movement organizations do not claim that they have negative relations 
with the state (Saunders 2013). This finding that also appears in the study might make 
movements show that they have good relations and can influence the state. It is thus crucial 
not only to regard the movement, but also the state side. Evaluating the state perspective on 
networks allows a qualification of the expressed ties towards the state and allows identifying 
where movements exaggerate on their ties towards the state. 
 
The chapter bases on twenty-five leader interviews with civil society actors (nineteen with 
the analyzed organizations), as well as thirteen interviews with civil servants46. In addition, 
media reporting takes a minor role and is used to verify whether actors are also perceived as 
acting in coalitions by the public. Those networks are national level and Tunis based 
networks, which has consequences for the actors named (primarily national level) and 
concerns a limitation outlined earlier (see chapter three). 
 
From a methodological perspective, leaders in organizations as well as ministries have been 
asked on their interaction with the respective other side. The interviewees made statements 
about with whom they hold directed links (ties), as well as with what actors they only work 
distantly. By asking questions on the quality of those links to other actors (allies, adversaries, 
accepted actors, see ch. 3.3), those ties can be evaluated from both perspectives. Allies are 
seen as particularly intense interactions as they probably require common framings, while 
interactions with accepted actors might just be accepted due to their legacy. 
 
The analysis prepares the later analysis of mechanisms as mechanisms are particularly useful 
when possibilities for the transmission of ideas – and thus interactions – are seen as 
                                                     
46 A list can be found in the Annex. Nineteen interviews were conducted with leaders from the analyzed 
organizations, additional six interviews include interviews with other civil society actors that are used for 
comparison of the networks. It also helps to assess the network structure, as some mentioned similarities as 
well as differences towards the analyzed organizational networks (for example actors like the OTDS have 
administration centered networks and no links to the analyzed organizations). 
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important by both sides. The use of NVivo for data analysis facilitated to see which actor 
mentions what organization or ministry how many times and with what quality. I equally 
recall that a manual coding that distinguishes between different degrees of interaction as 
outlined in section 3.3 was used. 
 
One of the limits is the subjective evaluation of links by leaders. When an organization is 
seen as an ally by a ministry it does not yet tell much about the frequency of exchanges. The 
subjective interpretation has however the advantage that it includes Gamson’s acceptance. 
As Gamson underlined only accepted actors can be influential ones (2.5). In addition, as the 
indicated links might be just links between one ministry and one organization and not 
between the state and organizations, careful attention is given to outline those dyadic 
relations. 
 
The chapter uses a similar structure for each organization and the ministries. First, it “zooms-
in” to analyze each organization’s ties towards civil society and towards the state in order to 
identify possible ways of influencing. Interviews qualify those links. Due to better readability, 
the network analysis is divided into two parts, one on civil society and international actors to 
show the possible coalitions and specialization and a second that evaluates the links towards 
the state (or civil society for the state) in order to evaluate the possibility of direct effects. At 
the end I “zoom-out” to look at the question of whether not only the individual 
organizations, but also a movement coalition may influence framing and policymaking. 
4.1 Organizational networks 
Like for the following chapters I start with the UGTT as the UGTT is seen as the oldest and 
most established organization of the four analyzed ones. I then continue with the LTDH, the 
ATFD and the FTDES. As outlined above, I start with the ties towards civil society as well as 
towards international actors, continuing with ties to the state and political parties before 
qualifying those. The international level is included as it shows the international integration 
of organizations and allows to identify similarities and differences. Political parties are 
integrated in the second part as most (though not all) parties are active in parliament and 
were named together with parliament. 
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4.1.1 UGTT: a limited civil society framework 
Civil society interaction and international links 
Figure 4.1 shows the ties of the UGTT towards other organizations as well as international 
actors that I summarized in five clusters. As outlined earlier the UGTT consists of sectors and 
regions that may have different ties, but only the national level is regarded in this research. 
 
The first cluster includes the Tunisian civil society. The ATFD, the LTDH and the ONAT (Order 
of Advocates) have been named as principal partners. The own youth organization, the UGET 
was not mentioned often, probably as it is not considered a separate actor by UGTT leaders. 
The Association of Magistrats as well as the FTDES are only marginally relevant for the UGTT 
and were not consistently named across interviews. In addition, relatively few organizations 
were mentioned as closely tied to the UGTT. The links in this cluster go in the direction of a 
coalition of the old civil society, with the FTDES – while being mentioned – of minor 
importance. 
 
The UTICA was mentioned as an important partner, but is subsumed in a separate cluster as 
it is representing the enterprises. It is part of the tripartite configuration and included in 
negotiations for salaries and working conditions. As part of the configuration, interviewees 
emphasized its role as a partner. 
 
Media contacts are not focused on specific media outlets but directed towards all 
journalists. The UGTT has its own publication, reaching all of its members. In addition, 
contacts towards the Tunisian media agency (TAP) are outlined allowing a facilitated access 
to place press releases. At least for the persons interviewed, media contacts do not play an 
important role. 
 
On the international level, the UGTT works with international labor unions, and European, 
Latin American and Arab labor unions. The International Trade Union has been mentioned as 
cooperation partner in interviews. Also, other foreign national labor unions have been 
identified as holding close relations with the UGTT. As an UGTT leader highlights, the 
relations with the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) are important, as are 
those with the Belgian Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC) or those with the 
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Brazilian labor union. The UGTT even has official agreements with other unions like the CGT 
and different parts of the organization cooperate with further labor unions (Businessnews 
2014). Sofien, an UGTT leader, highlights the need for a state-independent organization of 
Arab worker Unions (UGTT, Sofien). He particularly insists that independence from the state 
is important for cooperation with other unions. Sofien clarifies that relations with European 
labor unions increased over the last years as those supported Tunisia. 
 
Other relations exist with the IMF and the World Bank and Ahmed, another UGTT leader, 
expressed proudly “The delegations of the World Bank that visited since 2011 have all visited 
the UGTT” (UGTT, Ahmed). This cluster includes international organizations and are contacts 
that are not normal for civil society actors as especially IMF and World Bank work with states 
and not with civil society. 
 
To summarize and compare to the other organizations that are presented later, ties to other 
actors are limited to few actors. This is in line with the important position of the UGTT and 
its integration in the political system as shown below, that makes few other organizations 
necessary to achieve their goals. The UGTT is less dependent on coalitions as the other 
organizations as shown in the section on state actors. On the national level, ties with the old 
civil society that existed already under Ben Ali are crucial. The UGTT has no other contacts in 
the field of working conditions apart the own youth organization UGET. Not only concrete 
organizations, but also abstract categories (worker, women and youth) have been 
mentioned that were not shown in the clusters and that subsume tranches of the 
population. 
 
While no referral to organizations active on workers’ rights was found on a national level, 
the networks clearly show a labor union orientation when it comes to international ties. On 
the international level, contacts towards the World Bank and IMF show the exceptional 
position of the UGTT. 
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Figure 4.1 UGTT ties towards civil society and international actors  
 
Connection towards the state and political parties 
Figure 4.2 shows the ties of the UGTT towards the state and political parties. These ties of 
the UGTT are strong and compared to the ties to civil society there is a nearly equal number 
of ties. As member of the quartet who received the Nobel Peace Prize, the organization 
ascribes itself an important role for Tunisian history with a lot of heritage. Interviewees 
regularly outlined the historic role and reputation of the UGTT similar to how described by 
Yousfi (Yousfi 2015). This includes very close ties to ministries and the national government. 
 
The cluster on Ministries includes many ministries in comparison to the other organizations. 
UGTT networks towards the state are particularly oriented towards the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, but also to many others. During the analyzed period (2015-2016), especially contacts 
towards the Ministry of Education were prominent mainly related to the negotiations of 
working conditions for teachers. UGTT leaders mentioned that the organization has contacts 
to all ministries. The contacts towards the Presidency of the Government are also described 
as intense by interviewees. 
 
The contacts towards ministries and the state are influenced by another structure that is 
seen as mediating institution between the UGTT and several ministries. It does not exist for 
other organizations. Dependent on its composition, the institution is called four plus 
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four/five plus five arrangement, where four/five ministers meet four/five counterparts of 
the UGTT. It is an institutionalized exchange on a regular basis (see also Dermech who 
mentions the same observation: Dermech 2015). Those Ministries are a Secretary General 
from the Presidency of the Government as well as the Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, 
of Social Affairs and of the Economy. 
 
State administration is also partially important and exchanges occur. Contacts with the 
police are very limited and only occasional, for example when applying for authorization of 
protest. This is similar for the military where only one contact in relation to a protest 
organization was mentioned. 
 
The cluster on parliament is of less importance. Parliament ties are not very strong and 
mostly limited to deputies that are former UGTT functionaries, but also open towards all 
political parties (while the Popular Front is politically closer). While we see several parties in 
Figure 4.2, Ennahdha is still perceived as an enemy and UGTT leaders expressed preferences 
for the Popular Front, but nevertheless contacts exist. Given that the Tunisian democratic 
system relies on a parliament to vote on laws, the limited importance appears as surprising 
as it should be more important when the UGTT wants to influence legislation. 
 
Another actor is regional governments. As the UGTT has several sub-divisions, the regional 
sectors are more focusing on governors as those are more important for their work. 
Occasionally, governors are important to the national level if regional questions gain 
importance. 
 
Due to their close state relations via their regular consultations, the UGTT should have much 
influence on ministries, something to keep in mind when analyzing the networks from a 
state perspective. Especially the national executive committee holds close contacts with 
ministries. These connections are not one-directional but go in both directions, so ministers 
call for example their UGTT contact and vice-versa. Those contacts are in addition used in 
combination with for example protest events. The dialogue gets priority, but if it fails, 
pressure may take to the streets. The UGTT shows interactions like the four plus four format 
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that are not available for other organizations. Those are already important findings that are 
later reused in chapter seven. 
Figure 4.2 UGTT ties towards state actors and parties 
 
Qualifying those links 
I currently described the ties that exist from a UGTT perspective. The ties will be qualified 
and detailed in this section. When qualifying the ties, I rely on questions on the respective 
allies of each organization that have been asked during the interviews. Figure 4.3 
summarizes the main allies of the UGTT. Higher numbers show that many leaders mentioned 
another actor, meaning that those actors are more accepted as ally across the UGTT. The 
more leaders mentioned an organization, the closer the (perceived) partnership. 
 
Especially the LTDH, but also the ONAT and other (international) labor unions are main 
partners and have been mentioned by nearly all leaders (out of seven). The civil society in 
general is also an ally. UTICA, ATFD and the Ordre des Magistrats have been mentioned by 
three UGTT leaders. Left wing parties, the FTDES and the national government were 
mentioned by two leaders. Different other actors include the Presidency of the Government, 
the IMF or the FIDH just to mention a few. Ennahdha and Nida Tounes are not partners as 
such but were mentioned in line with other political parties. 
 
It is important to note, that relatively few other actors are named as key partners by many 
UGTT leaders. Those actors include organizations that existed before the revolution like the 
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LTDH or the ONAT, but also the ATFD. Consequentially, two of the other analyzed 
organizations are identified as main partners of the UGTT, the FTDES a bit less. On the other 
hand, the UGTT leaders expressed the most diverse number of partners in comparison to 
other organizations, but many allies were only mentioned by one leader. 
 
It is to note, that ministries and notably the national government are mentioned as allies by 
some UGTT leaders. Among the list of partners are more ministries than for the other 
organizations, showing that UGTT leaders see the organization as relatively close to the 
government. 
 
One aspect that is common for allies is the human rights and/or labor union orientation. The 
UGTT also defends human rights together with other organizations: 
"But the civil society had to have several associations; […] it is to enrich the 
political life in Tunisia [...]. But at the same time the UGTT is also interested in 
human rights so [...] it is the league that defends them, but the UGTT defends 
them similarly. So, both work well together.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
Figure 4.3 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders  
 
Note: Out of 7 interviews with UGTT leaders 
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When it comes to adversaries, UGTT leaders expressed opposition towards the political 
right. The relation of the UGTT towards Ennahdha is rather ambivalent but developed 
towards acceptance of the status quo following several disputes in the last years. However, a 
clear adversary is the UTT (Union des Travailleurs Tunisiens), another labor union, as they 
suspect it not to represent the workers (UGTT, Moncef). 
Media data on the UGTT 
While interviews were the main data used for determining ties and allies, the media data 
was used to supplement this perspective. However, and this is to keep in mind, media data 
does not include any qualification on relationships or unclear information about 
partnerships. It can only provide co-occurrences that can show whether actors are often 
mentioned together, indicating that there are links between those actors. 
 
A search for co-occurrences in the articles on the four organizations has been performed and 
the results can be found in the Annex (Table 10.1). This analysis revealed that the 
government was mentioned by far most often in articles on the UGTT, followed by the UTICA 
and the President of the Republic. Nida Tounes, the parliament, the TAP or the military (in 
relation to fighting terrorism) are among the most frequent co-occurrences. Ministries like 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and the one on Primary Education equally play a role. 
 
The first non-governmental organization among the top-co-occurrences is the ONAT, 
followed by the LTDH. It is to note, that media has reported more on the government and 
political parties, while ties to other organizations are underestimated or were not prominent 
at all. It is especially the tripartite configuration including the government and the UTICA 
that makes media report a lot on salary negotiations as well as conflicts on work related 
issues. In this sense, the position of the UGTT is clearly related to its role as labor union while 
civil society alliances are less important in media reports than the relations towards UTICA 
and government. 
Summary on the UGTT’s networks 
The UGTT networks are clearly oriented towards the state, some state actors are even 
perceived as allies by some UGTT leaders. In line with its own narrative as important actor 
for the Tunisian political system, the UGTT approaches quasi all ministries, while some like 
the Ministry of Social Affairs are more important to the organization. The Ministry of Social 
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Affairs plays a particularly important role in line with the tripartite configuration that is not 
only very present in interviews, but also very present when it comes to media articles. Both 
types of data show, that the UGTT has intense contacts towards the state. 
 
Beneath state relations, the ties towards what is called the old civil society (LTDH, ONAT, 
ATFD) and to a minor and more limited degree the FTDES are very important. When it comes 
to civil society, the UGTT has very few, but important ties to other organizations. It illustrates 
well the position of the UGTT as there is no need to have a large reach towards other actor 
as the organization itself has enough contacts. The UGTT has on the one hand fewer 
possibilities for coalitional ways of influencing, but also less need. Other actors like 
parliament or the administration are of lower importance to the organization. 
 
4.1.2 LTDH: a human rights network 
Civil society interaction and international links 
The ties of the LTDH include more clusters than for the UGTT. Especially human rights 
clusters are more important. 
 
On the national level, ties include the ATFD, AFTURD, the Journalists Association, the Centre 
against torture, the UTICA, the FTDES, the Association des Magistrats and the UGTT as 
shown by Figure 4.4. The quartet plays a role and we find the same names as for the UGTT, 
but with slightly different orientation towards the women movement and on torture. This is 
explained by the orientation of the LTDH; the LTDH stands for cultural and civil rights while 
the UGTT stands for social and economic rights (LTDH, Medhi). The UTICA is mentioned as 
important but is not summarized under civil society organizations due to its task of 
promoting the interests of enterprises. Like for the UGTT, many organizations that are part 
of the old civil society active under Ben Ali are mentioned as ties. 
 
On the international level, a number of cooperation has been highlighted. As a human rights 
group, the LTDH has contacts with the World Organization against torture and several other 
international organizations. The EUROMED network and the International Human Rights 
Federation are important. 
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Another human rights related cluster includes the African and Arab human rights networks. 
Several ties exist towards for example the Arab Human Rights Association as well as 
Mahgrebin organizations. 
 
Other institutions act as financers. According to interviewees contacts with the EU exist. A 
similar cluster of financers is built by the German FES as well as Dignity Denmark and Oxfam. 
 
The LTDH is well integrated into international human rights networks. During interviews, the 
French axis as well as the Arab axis for cooperation has been mentioned, while the Arab axis 
was evaluated as not that important. It shows that many contacts are of international nature 
and Tunisian contacts are relatively limited in numbers. 
Figure 4.4 LTDH ties towards civil society and international actors 
 
Connection towards the state and political parties 
Figure 4.5 shows the ties of the LTDH towards the state and political parties. Those are very 
limited especially in comparison to the UGTT. The cluster on Ministries includes only three 
ministries, the Presidency of the Government can be added as ministerial actor. The LTDH 
has relations with the Ministries for Social Affairs, Justice and the Interior. Due to their focus 
on prisoners and torture, the importance of the Ministry of the Interior as well as the one on 
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Justice is self-explaining. In comparison to the UGTT, the LTDH is much more focused on the 
issues of occupation when it comes to ties towards the state. 
 
Another cluster is built by administration and police. The LTDH enters in contact with the 
state administration through for example written complaints. Those are mainly case-related. 
While the LTDH has contacts with the police on various issues (prisons, security forces and so 
on), no contacts with the military have been mentioned. 
 
Like for the UGTT, the LTDH has few contacts with parliamentarians even though those are 
important decision makers in a representative democracy. Cooperation with regional 
governments is still in its development as interviewees explained. 
 
Compared to the UGTT the state relations are very limited towards few ministries. This is in 
line with specialization and the role the LTDH takes on human rights issues and especially 
torture and prisoners. 
Figure 4.5 LTDH ties towards state actors and parties 
 
Qualifying those links 
Figure 4.6 summarizes main allies as mentioned in interviews. Especially AFTURD and the 
ATFD – and thus the women movement -, but also the UGTT, the Association of Journalists 
and the Center against Torture are important. 
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Among their allies mentioned by one interviewee are three ministries (Social Affairs, Interior 
and Justice) and the national government. The FTDES was not mentioned explicitly as ally. 
On the other hand, some international human rights actors, but also the ONAT or abstract 
categories such as workers, the youth or media are mentioned as ally by one interviewee. 
 
The close links of the LTDH show an orientation towards the women and human rights 
movement. In addition, we find the “usual suspects” (ATFD, UGTT, ONAT, Association of 
Journalists) as part of a network that can be described as coalition. None of the interviewed 
leaders mentioned an adversary. 
Figure 4.6 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders 
 
Note: Out of four interviews with LTDH leaders 
Media Data on the LTDH 
When it comes to co-occurrences in articles on the LTDH (Table 10.2, Annex), the 
government is by far the most mentioned actor like for the UGTT. The UGTT figures on the 
second place. Shortly after follow the Quartet and the UTICA, as well as the President of the 
Republic and the ONAT. 
 
Parties are less prominent, but organizations like the FTDES, the SNJT, the ATFD or the 
Organization against Torture are placed more prominently. The clear tie towards the women 
movement, easily identifiable in interviews, is not represented in media reporting. The 
media reports are more focused on the role of the LTDH as part of the quartet and the 
interaction with the government. However, the coalition of civil society actors is better 
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identifiable than for the UGTT whose reporting is simply dominated by co-occurrences with 
state actors. 
Summary on the LTDH’s networks 
The LTDH has a more extensive network when it comes to non-state actors, but a much 
more limited one when it comes to state actors. As part of its ties, especially the inclusion 
into the old civil society is to underline; the FTDES is consequentially not mentioned as an 
ally although ties exist. The Women movement has a more important status than other 
organizations like the UGTT, although those ties are not found in media reporting due to few 
reporting on the women movement as shown later. 
 
Links towards the state are emphasized in media reports as especially the quartet is often 
mentioned. This is however less related to common projects or real interactions, but 
because of the Nobel Peace Prize. The media analysis is partly misleading here, something 
that is remarked when looking at articles in detail. 
 
The international dimension plays a less important role in terms of allies, but networks are 
wide and include Arab, Maghrebin and international ties towards human rights 
organizations. The focus on human rights organizations is clearly visible in LTDH networks. 
 
We have seen that the LTDH is well integrated in the women movement at least for 
interviews; I now turn to the women movement, represented through the ATFD. 
4.1.3 ATFD: women and the national coalition 
Civil society interaction and international links 
Figure 4.7 shows the ties of the ATFD. Compared to the networks of UGTT and LTDH, ties are 
much more extensive. There are six major clusters that are identified. Other researchers 
already highlighted a lot of those ties towards other organizations of the women movement. 
 
The ATFD holds strong ties to the AFTURD; some scholars even do not distinguish between 
the two’s networks (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016; Moghadam 2018). As Arfaoui and 
Moghadam describe, the ATFD has networks towards the government sponsored CREDIF, 
but also towards the UGTT, the LTDH and the Office National de la Famille et la Population 
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(ONFP; ibid). It makes sense to open a separate cluster for women rights organization as part 
of the ATFD’s network, because there are many organizations such as Beity or Doustourna 
that are working on women rights. Those networks are also summarized by other 
researchers and partly overlap with another cluster, the (mainly old) Tunisian civil society. 
The ATFD is not only well connected to the old women movement, but also towards newer 
organizations like Beity or Doustourna47. 
 
Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh emphasize the Hrayer Tounès network (Free Women of Tunisia) 
as the biggest network of the women movement in Tunisia, regrouping ATFD, AFTURD, the 
women commissions of UGTT and LTDH, but also including newer groups like Doustourna or 
the Collective for women of Tunisia (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). Those ties are equally 
visible in my research in Figure 4.7. 
 
The cluster on the Tunisian civil society also shows that the already mentioned coalition of 
actors holds true for the ATFD. Other scholars summarize the close ties of the ATFD with the 
LTDH, the ONAT and the UGTT (Antonakis-Nashif 2016; Yousfi 2015). Similarly, the ATFD co-
organized workshops with the UGTT, the LTDH, the FIDH, the FTDES and several other 
organizations at the World Social Forum (ATFD 2015c). Although the FTDES is mentioned 
when interviewees were asked on ties, the organization is mostly considered when 
prompting for other ties towards further actors, while the other ones are named when the 
first question on links to other actors is posed (thus, the quality of partnership is different). 
 
Several clusters show that the ATFD has ties with other human rights groups on the 
international level. Several ATFD leaders like Nour explained that they are among others in 
contact with the regional Amnesty section, but also highlighted their ties with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the FIDH and the Euromed network. Other 
leaders underlined the contacts with Oxfam, which implements also the program AMAL, an 
empowerment program for rural women in Tunisia. Those clusters can be summarized into 
one Arab and Maghrebin women and human rights cluster, an international human rights 
cluster, a cluster on Foundations as well as an UN cluster. 
 
                                                     
47 As some interviewees noted those organizations have been founded by ATFD militants who saw the need to 
create new associations. 
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UN Women and Oxfam are financers of ATFD programs; the UNDP financed another 
program. A lot of cooperation with the UN in a wider sense is highlighted. 
 
The Arab and Maghrebin cooperation is mainly composed of the Forum of Arab Women 
AÏSHA, the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), and the Salma network against 
women violence, the Institute for Arab Human Rights and the Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité 
as well as the Forum Soil Maghrébin for Maghreb (ATFD 2016). 
 
Hiba, another ATFD leader, explained that they work also with the Association for Women’s 
rights in development (AWID), as well as German, French and Canadian Foundations in 
terms of financing and cooperation (ATFD, Hiba). Foundations and institutions of 
international development cooperation are not just financers but also partners. The ATFD 
selects partners carefully based on whether the other side holds shared visions. Thus, not 
every demand for cooperation is accepted (ATFD, Myriam). 
 
In addition, there is another element that emerged throughout the interviews: The 
background in education of a number of leaders and the centrality of ties towards 
universities seems to be of additional importance. While this tie has not explicitly named, it 
seems important, as it becomes a contact point with student activists (so recruitment among 
others). 
 
The ATFD is first and foremost part of the women movement, including international actors 
defending women rights. It is equally part of the human rights network, quite similar to the 
LTDH. However, the specialization of the ATFD on women issues is as visible as the 
specialization of the LTDH on prisoners and torture. The ATFD holds together with the FTDES 
the greatest variety of ties towards different organizations in comparison to the other 
organizations. 
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Figure 4.7 ATFD ties towards civil society and international actors 
 
Connection towards the state and political parties 
Compared to UGTT and LTDH, the ATFD has ties to the state and political parties that 
resemble a lot those of the LTDH as shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
Quite important appear relations towards the Ministry of Social Affairs, but equally the 
Ministry of Women as well as the Ministry of the Interior. When comparing networks 
towards ministries with the UGTT, those are however much more formal towards most 
other ministries, except the Ministry of Women. 
 
Former militants enter the ministries and provide a point of entry. In addition, the relations 
towards the Ministry of Women have been confirmed by the other side, as a former women 
movement leader became responsible for the coordination with civil society (Ministry of 
Women, Soulayma); a case I return to in chapter seven. The relations towards the Ministry 
of Women appear best as they share a number of visions as interviewees expressed. 
 
In interviews meetings with the national government, be it the President of the Republic or 
the Presidency of the Government, are reported as well. When comparing with the UGTT for 
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example, the ATFD cannot that easily approach ministers, apart from the Minister of 
Women. 
 
Contacts with the administration are held on a case-by-case basis, so if there is an issue, 
relations are used. The regional government is approached when there is an issue related to 
the regions. Contacts towards the police are rather ambivalent and seen with skepticism and 
mistrust, while sensitization campaigns are open towards the police. No contacts with the 
military exist. 
 
Contacts with parliamentarians are on a personal basis. While some interviewees mentioned 
few contacts, others insisted on several contacts. The ATFD is open towards most parties 
except Ennahdha. However, relations to political parties are neither well developed nor a 
priority of the ATFD. It is more by hazard that two militants have been elected for Nida 
Tounes and thus represent ties that are used occasionally. 
 
The specialization of the ATFD on Women issues is obvious when it comes to relations with 
the state, as the Ministry of Women is the main target. 
Figure 4.8 ATFD ties towards state actors and parties 
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Qualifying those links 
The ATFD’s network is quite elaborated towards human rights groups and women 
organizations and as noticed earlier is the largest network towards civil society. On the 
human rights level it resembles a lot the network of the LTDH. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the allies as mentioned by ATFD leaders. As shown, the LTDH, AFTURD, 
Amnesty International and the UGTT have been mentioned as allies by all five leaders. The 
Association of Journalists follows close, as well as the general category NGOs. Three out of 
five leaders mentioned general categories like women or civil society, but also the FIDH and 
the UGET. The FTDES or the ONAT were only mentioned by two leaders. There are more 
actors named as allies than for LTDH and FTDES, but less than for the UGTT. Given the wide 
network of the ATFD this is not surprising. It is to note, that the Ministry of Women was 
mentioned by one leader as being an ally, but no other state actor is included in their list of 
allies. The UTICA does also not play a role. 
 
The allies mentioned resemble the ones for LTDH and UGTT although the ONAT plays less a 
role. As for the other two organizations, the FTDES plays a reduced role. What dominates is 
the old civil society as well as ties towards Amnesty International, an actor that is evaluated 
as important for the ATFD but that played no role for the other organizations. 
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Figure 4.9 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders 
 
Note: out of five interviews in with ATFD leaders 
Adversaries of the ATFD are Ennahdha or Zionist organizations, but there is also a general 
distrust towards Islamic actors like in the case of Qatari finance related towards the different 
perception of women’s role. Kilani explains that a number of Tunisians became “allergic” 
faced with Qatar and are suspicious of their intentions (Kilani 2014). This is similar for the 
ATFD. The ATFD is skeptical towards all types of Islamist actors, conservatives as well as 
towards the old regime, or how it is also called by the ATFD: “integrists”, or “destourians”48 
(ATFD, Myriam). 
Media data on the ATFD 
When it comes to co-occurrences in articles, like for the other two organizations, the 
government is placed most prominently, directly followed by articles including Ennahdha 
(Table 10.3, Annex). 
 
Other actors named in articles on the ATFD are the media, parliament, the Ministry of 
Women and Nida Tounes. Other organizations mentioned include the AFTURD, the Euromed 
                                                     
48 The notion of destourian refers to the movement for independence and the time of Bourguiba and 
summarizes the constitutional and cultural heritage of that time. 
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Human Rights Networks, the Foundation “Femmes et mémoire”, the LTDH, the UGTT, the 
FTDES and the SNJT. 
 
The media analysis confirms the reporting on governmental affairs in line with organizations. 
It underlines the antagonistic role of Ennahdha and the ATFD that is shown by the high co-
occurrence with Ennahdha. 
 
The media analysis shows the same links that are mentioned in the interviews, however with 
different weight. The link towards the Ministry of Women is visible as is the coalition of 
actors that is repeated throughout the interviews. 
Summary on the ATFD’s networks 
In relation to the networks that exist, the ATFD focuses on human rights and women rights 
networks on an UN level, but also shows high levels of cooperation with European actors 
especially as financers of common projects. The role of the ATFD is clearly an expert on 
women and human rights. It’s cooperation on a national level are shaped by its integration 
in the women movement, but also into the old civil society. 
 
With regard to networks towards the state, the ATFD is much focused on the Ministry of 
Women. Networks towards the state are as limited as for the LTDH. 
 
While UGTT, LTDH and ATFD are key actors of the old civil society coalition, the FTDES is 
named, but normally of less importance. I now analyze how the FTDES evaluates their ties 
towards other actors. 
4.1.4 FTDES: migration, justice and so much more 
Civil society interaction and international links 
Figure 4.10 shows the ties of the FTDES towards other civil society and international actors. 
Again at least five important clusters are identified. After the ATFD, it is the second largest 
network among the four organizations. The OST is to mention at it is an institution founded 
by and dependent on the FTDES. 
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On the national level, the FTDES works with strategic partners, namely the UGTT, the ATFD 
and others (FTDES, Sami). Those have recognized values as stated during interviews. 
Similarly, another leader called it the “hard core” (FTDES, Nejib). These include also the 
LTDH, the ONAT, the UGET and the Tunisian Journalist Association. The FTDES works with 
the CREDIF, another actor within the women movement. As we have seen before, other 
organizations hesitated to count the FTDES among the hard core; FTDES leaders 
nevertheless see themselves as part of it (or at least they try to suggest it). The same 
organizations as for the others are mainly identified for the civil society cluster. On the other 
hand, the FTDES emphasizes its regional ties with the UGTT for example on pollution or 
health, for the latter subject also with the LTDH and the UTICA (FTDES 2016a). For the 
FTDES, abstract groups like civil society in general, the youth and citizens were mentioned as 
well, but are not shown in this overview on clusters. 
 
On the international level, the FTDES works with human rights groups like the FIDH or the 
Euromed network. They get engaged with the European and the Maghrébin axes as part of 
international cooperation; including Moroccan organizations or even wider when it comes to 
ties towards the Egyptian ECESR. Regarding the European axes, they are in contact with the 
EU, similar to the LTDH. Apart from those, the FTDES has also contacts towards Brazilian 
organizations. 
 
Foundations and international organizations play a role, namely Oxfam, the Open Society 
Foundation, the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation and the FES have been identified. The latter 
are probably more important for financing projects. UN institutions play no role contrary to 
ATFD and LTDH. 
 
The FTDES organized the World Social Forum twice. They are in contact with the Tunisian 
diaspora something not explicitly mentioned by the other organizations. 
 
Special for the FTDES are on the one hand its networks on migration (boats4People and so 
on) as well as the ties towards organizations working on social responsibility or tax justice. It 
needs to be remarked that the ties on migration are of international nature (organizations in 
the lower right of Figure 4.10 are no Tunisian organizations). In this sense and similar to the 
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UGTT for labor issues, the organization seems to hesitate working with organizations that 
operate on the same issue on a national level. 
 
However, no organization working on environmental issues was identified, something that is 
surprising given their focus on environmental problems (see chapter one). From the network 
it looks more like a human rights organization with focus on migration and some social 
aspects, something that is nevertheless in line with their mission. 
 
When it comes to the media, the FTDES did not mention any outlets in particular. The FTDES 
holds regular press conferences and is in contact with several media outlets, however no 
selection is made. 
Figure 4.10 FTDES ties towards civil society and international actors 
 
Connection towards the state and political parties 
Figure 4.11 shows the ties of the FTDES towards the state as well as political parties. The 
FTDES approaches the second highest number of ministries after the UGTT. This shows the 
diversity of topics covered; in some cases, it shows very specific ties. The ties towards the 
Ministry of Transport for example have been established to organize the transport at the 
World Social Forum (FTDES, Sami). Other ties towards ministries include the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, of Relations with Civil Society, of Foreign Affairs (for example on migration as 
well as on trade with the EU), the Ministry of the Interior as well as of Higher Education. The 
Minister of Relations with Civil Society is considered a friend by FTDES leaders. The ties of 
the FTDES towards ministries show the diversity of issues. They also show that 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
170 
 
  
environmental issues are not a priority as the Ministry of Environment is not among the 
mentioned ties. At the same time, it is difficult to identify a clear specialization of the FTDES 
by looking at its networks towards the state. 
 
Due to their personal background, university contacts are equally important as illustrated by 
the CERES (a research institute) and the Ministry of Higher Education. Especially for their 
reports, the organization relies on academic experts. 
 
Personal contacts exist also with deputies. Sami for example speaks of a group of deputies 
who have the same background (syndicalist and people they know) that is “nourished” with 
reports (FTDES, Sami). On the other hand, only remote contact is hold with political parties. 
 
Contacts do exist with the police in relation to the organization of events. The FTDES has 
very broad contacts with the military as the World Social Forum was too big to be handled 
by police only. These contacts are not regular and event related. They are in contact with the 
administration depending on cases. For the regional government it depends on cases as 
contacts are not regular. 
Figure 4.11 FTDES ties towards state actors and parties  
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Qualifying those links 
Figure 4.12 shows the allies as mentioned in interviews. All interviewees mentioned the 
UGTT and the ATFD as allies. In addition, and different from the other organizations, 
deputies in parliament have been mentioned as allies by all three leaders. 
 
Media is mentioned by two leaders as an ally. This is related to the extensive media work 
that the FTDES does. In this sense, the relations to media are very different, not to say 
completely different especially in comparison to the ATFD. In addition, the civil society as 
well as women and the LTDH are identified by two leaders. 
 
Only one leader mentions the youth, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Minister for 
Relations with Civil Society, the Observatoire de la jeunesse or the CERES. Similarly, ONAT, 
Euromed Human Rights as well as foundations were only mentioned once. 
 
Compared to the other organizations, the old civil society is again well represented among 
allies. Notwithstanding the other organizations, parliament and media are mentioned as 
allies. For parliament, this does however not mean that it is the whole parliament, but a 
selection of deputies as became clear in interviews. 
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Figure 4.12 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders 
 
Note: Out of three interviews with FTDES leaders 
Although being asked on adversaries, FTDES leaders did not explicitly mention any. This was 
consistent across leaders, even though it became clear between the lines that Ennahdha and 
Islamists are not appreciated a lot. 
Media data on the FTDES 
Related to co-occurrences in articles (Table 10.4, Annex), the government is again most 
prominently placed, followed by the European Union. The co-occurrences in articles 
including the FTDES show a slightly different orientation as for the other organizations. The 
IVD (Truth Commission) for example is more prominently placed, as is the World Social 
Forum. The UGTT figures as the best placed other organization, followed by the Tunisian 
Social Observatory, an organization belonging to the FTDES. The LTDH, Euromed Human 
Rights and Avocats sans frontiers are often mentioned. Among the Ministries are the 
Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the one for Vocational Training (the latter did not appear 
in interviews). 
 
A balance exists between the co-occurrences of other countries as well as the UN, 
something different from other organizations. Especially the role of the EU can be explained 
by the extensive demand of the FTDES to be included in the ALECA negotiations (trade 
partnership). In addition, a number of questions on migration are related to the EU, but also 
other countries. The presence of the IVD, that is responsible for covering cases of political 
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disadvantages and prosecution under Ben Ali, shows that issues of justice get covered a lot 
in relation to the FTDES. 
 
The media analysis shows a different picture than the interviews. Media co-occurrences do 
not help to identify the role of the FTDES as the additional topic of transitional justice 
prominently emerges. 
Summary on the FTDES’s networks 
It can be concluded that the FTDES is visibly an organization active on many fronts and 
without one or two clear specializations. In addition, environmental issues play no role, 
raising the question why the issue is named prominently in interviews, documents and their 
website. No contact towards other environmental organizations exists neither on a national 
nor an international level. While the FTDES has been selected for its environmental 
engagement (which is certainly existent), it does not translate in their network structure; 
one surprising finding. Possible explanations range from missing other national level 
organizations (something already noted when searching for organizations mobilizing on 
environmental issues, but not explaining missing international links towards for example 
WWF or Greenpeace), towards environment as a regional issue that is not covered on a 
national level. It becomes clear that the role of the FTDES cannot be well determined. 
 
Similar to the first finding, the FTDES approaches a number of different ministries and not 
necessarily the same as the other organizations. Although it is also focused on the Ministry 
of Social Affairs other ministries like the one on External Relations – not mentioned for other 
organizations – play a role. 
 
On a national level, contacts are oriented towards the old civil society that also figures as 
allies. The FTDES much stronger names the other analyzed organization as partners than the 
others name the FTDS. This puzzle will be discussed in the following where I discuss whether 
coalitional influence is possible for what organizations. 
4.1.5 A coalition, but how close 
I now turn to the quality of the networks in terms of a coalition and start by outlining the ties 
towards each other. Table 10.6 and Table 10.7 in the Annex show how often the other 
organizations have been mentioned in the case category that includes all interviews/articles 
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on the respective organization49. We have already seen in the previous sections that 
organizations mentioned the same allies while the ATFD and LTDH appear as particularly 
close. While the FTDES is slightly apart, the UGTT is clearly connected to the other 
organizations. 
 
What becomes evident through the network analysis are the arguments for a strong 
movement coalition, but also some missing or not developed ties towards media, the public 
as well as parliament. While actors are not very positive towards media outlets, they 
nevertheless underline the role of public opinion. The traditional media may not be equally 
important for opinion building as in a Western context, having consequences for theory. 
 
Table 10.6 reads as follows: In all interviews with ATFD leaders, the FTDES was mentioned 
two times, while LTDH and UGTT were mentioned much more often. When qualifying those 
interview statements, the LTDH and UGTT were often mentioned as allies and core 
cooperation, strengthening the arguments for a close coalition of those actors. 
 
For the FTDES fewer other organizations have been coded; here, no clear differences 
between the three other organizations emerge, while the UGTT is most often mentioned. 
From the FTDES perspective, the organizations are of equal importance, with the UGTT being 
slightly more important. 
 
Taking the LTDH, overall few other organizations have been mentioned, something already 
found in their network towards other organizations. However, the differences between 
ATFD and UGTT on the one hand and FTDES on the other are striking as the FTDES was only 
coded once in the leader interviews compared to six respective seven times for the other 
two organizations. 
 
A different picture emerges for the UGTT were ATFD and FTDES are on a similar level, while 
the LTDH is most often coded showing that the LTDH is a more important partner than the 
other two organizations. 
                                                     
49 Every interview with a representative of an organization has been coded as a case. The case encloses all 
interviews with that organization. Other organizations that were mentioned within each interview were coded 
under the organizational name. 
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To summarize, it shows that the FTDES, although considering itself as part of this network 
and seeing the other movements as partners, is somehow distant from the “inner circle” for 
some of the organizations as it has been mentioned much less than others. In addition, 
although being relatively often mentioned in interviews with UGTT leaders, the most often 
heard allies across all organizations were UGTT, ATFD, LTDH as well as the Association of 
Journalists, the ONAT and the UGET. The interviewees stressed the quality of those allies and 
consequentially one can conclude that a close coalition of these actors exists. 
 
This means, that from the perspective of interviews, the first three organizations can use a 
coalitional mode easily for approaching for example ministries, while the FTDES will not be 
capable to the same degree to reunite the others for example on protest. Indirect effects are 
seen as less effective for the FTDES when it comes to a coalitional mode, reason why the 
FTDES focuses much on media when it comes to indirect effects. 
Is the coalition present in the media reporting? 
Table 10.7 tested the co-occurrences for articles in order to see whether the organizations 
were mentioned more often in relation to other organizations. 
 
In articles on the ATFD, the other organizations were mentioned to a similar degree. For 
articles on the FTDES, the ATFD played a minor role, while the UGTT was coded twice as 
much than the LTDH. It becomes clear that ATFD and FTDES are rarely mentioned in articles 
compared to the UGTT and LTDH. In media reports (Table 10.7), the ATFD has fewer links to 
other organizations; something that is related to few media reporting on the ATFD, a 
problem that has been outlined before and that continues to be an issue. 
 
When it comes to articles, the exclusion of the FTDES from the inner circle is not that 
present. In this sense, the FTDES is more successful portraying itself as part of the inner 
circle of civil society in the media than when it comes to evaluations by leaders. The FTDES 
uses the media and portrays a different image to compensate for the missing perceived 
integration in the inner circle. It is not automatically mentioned as a core partner in 
interviews as it appeared after the revolution but is threatened on a same level in articles, 
even though not being part of the old civil society. 
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On the other hand, the tie between the UGTT and the LTDH gets underlined in the media 
also as part of the national dialogue and is mentioned frequently in articles. The old civil 
society is a social construction of the organizations included. Diani would probably assign 
that the old civil society is an identity used to identify partners and cooperation. 
 
The four organizations work together on some issues and are part of a wider movement 
coalition (including for example equally the ONAT and the Association of Journalists or what 
is mainly seen as old civil society; compare also Volpi et al. 2016). What we see is a close 
coalition between the organizations analyzed with some reserves when it comes to the 
FTDES. Not all organizations perceive others to a similar degree as allies. 
 
Diani underlines that organizations search for alliances across levels of prestige and 
influence across a civil society sector, so that cooperation is not necessarily horizontal (Diani 
2015). Indeed, although of different size, the ATFD and the UGTT cooperate. In addition, the 
organizations have unique specializations that only overlap when it comes to human rights. 
 
I also developed network maps showing the shared ties based on articles in order to see 
what contacts are similar/distinct from one organization to another (to be found in the 
annex, Table 10.5). This is important from a coalition perspective, as it shows which actors 
can be approached by every organization or only by specific organizations. 
 
Main shared contacts are contacts towards the president, political parties, parliament, some 
ministries and the quartet. Apart from that, the military or some contacts towards actors 
from other countries like Sweden were mentioned. Due to the media coverage, especially 
the UGTT’s ties get emphasized and are much more covered than those of the other 
organizations. When looking at the media data, the UGTT is the most central actor with a 
number of very dense contacts; however, the reach towards different specific organizations 
is wider especially for the LTDH that is mentioned together with the highest amount of other 
organizations. This is surprising and contradicts the findings from interviews were ties 
towards other organizations, but also towards government remain limited. However, I have 
more confidence to the interviewees as they are closer to the organizations. Media articles 
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do not necessarily represent reality as they for example over report on the quartet. The 
quartet is then linked to other actors. It might however be, that links exposed in public are 
seen as wider as in interviews and that the LTDH succeeds in giving the impression of having 
a large network due to many not very close cooperation that were not mentioned in 
interviews. However, several other problems exist with over reporting on the government 
that I faced earlier. Another example is Oxfam. It appears that ties towards Oxfam, 
mentioned by three out of four organizations in interviews are underreported in articles 
perhaps due to the finance they provide for organizations, an issue that is less reported on. 
Old networks and closed circles 
Media as well as articles show that the analyzed movements hold a relatively dense network 
(with some reserves for the FTDES); especially other organizations and younger 
organizations cannot easily enter this network of organizations and thus have difficulties to 
get the same level of representation. This is well explained by the reluctance of some UGTT 
leaders to work with younger organizations. In addition, this perceptive was confirmed by 
leaders from younger civil society organizations that have been interviewed for comparison 
and that feel excluded (Tun’Act, Wassim; Jamaity, Farah). Thus, a divide in the Tunisian civil 
society exists, dividing organizations with a long history and reputation and those with fewer 
experience and resources. 
 
Hadden argues that larger networks get less connected when many new organizations get 
integrated in networks and from this perspective integration has also its limits (Hadden 
2015). If the network grows too big, coordination among all members becomes too difficult. 
Thus, it is understandable that organizations are reluctant to reach out to newer actors. On 
the other hand, notably the FTDES tries to include younger movements that are not yet 
organized to scale demands. 
 
Another aspect is the growing competition that can increase network divisions as 
emphasized by Hadden for climate change networks (Hadden 2015). As noted earlier, 
especially the smallest organization (ATFD) as well as the youngest (FTDES) have a wide 
network towards other civil society actors including younger organizations. LTDH and UGTT 
are reluctant when it comes to extending their existent network that remains relatively 
limited or selective in comparison to the other two organizations. ATFD and FTDES need a 
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larger network because they are not regarded by media attention (ATFD) or still searching 
for their position (FTDES). 
 
In addition, contacts towards allies are not only organizational, but also personal. What 
became clear through interviews is multi-engagement. A number of interviewees are not 
only in one organization but in several of the same movement network. Even on an 
organizational level, FTDES and LTDH are for example closely tied, with members being on 
both executive boards. Labidi shows a similar example: Bochra Belhaj Hmida was president 
of the ATFD from 1995 to 2001, member of the LTDH, local human-rights activist and one of 
the founders of Amnesty International in Tunisia (Labidi 2015; this explains also the frequent 
mentions of Amnesty as a partner by ATFD leaders). 
 
There are several examples like this, also in line with the role of the UGTT under Ben Ali 
where the organization to a certain degree educated activists. Interviewees referred to 
militants they know from common actions under Ben Ali that re-enforce the double 
(personal and organizational) links. In this sense, personal contacts and experience re-
enforce the old network structures on an organizational level. 
Roles in a network 
We have already seen above, that different parts of the network are shared across 
organizations. One of those shared elements is for example a tie towards the international 
human rights network (FIDH as well as Euromed; not present to a similar degree for the 
UGTT though). 
 
Beneath some shared elements, different specializations are visible throughout the network. 
The ATFD for example works with organizations on women and human rights, while the 
UGTT focuses on worker and social rights and has ties towards labor unions in other 
countries. The LTDH uses human rights networks as well as works with organizations on 
prisoners’ rights and torture. A special case is the FTDES where the specialization is less 
visible through networks with human rights elements, migration, social justice and trade 
included. The specialization allows identifying experts on topics, something that becomes 
more difficult for the FTDES. This might also be the reason why the FTDES is not clearly 
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mentioned as important ally by all leaders as it is not clear for what it stands and how it can 
integrate the coalition. 
 
The UGTT is an important actor in terms of network structure. When the UGTT is included, 
more political weight can be assigned due to the reputation and size of the UGTT. Thus, it is 
not surprising that the UGTT networks on a national level appear rather limited compared to 
other organizations. All other organizations (the FTDES a bit less) can serve as gatekeepers 
for the UGTT that has itself ties towards fewer organizations. The UGTT can also serve as 
access point towards more ministries, especially towards informal structures. However, 
officially, access to ministries is equally possible for all actors in the system; a point I return 
to in chapter seven. 
 
One of the biggest mobilizing structures, the UDC (representing the unemployed), is not 
explicitly mentioned by interviewees and is also not a main partner according to the media 
analysis. This is explained by the missing representation of the UDC on the national level. 
The UDC cooperates probably (few data exist) on a local level with the UGTT. The absence of 
the UDC at a national level recalls however the criticism by Hibou that the poorest actors 
with the unemployed were not organized, so that more organized social categories got 
heard (Hibou 2011a). Given the development of the UDC in recent years, it appears 
surprising that the organization is not integrated on a national level. The missing 
professionalization and some general skepticism towards the UDC are expressed between 
the lines by UGTT leaders. 
 
A number of interviewees underlined that they act in network to augment the chances of 
success (ATFD, Myriam; FTDES, Mehdi; LTDH, Bechir; LTDH, Rim; UGTT, Nada and UGTT, 
Aziz). For mobilization, all organizations refrain to a larger network in order to achieve 
outcomes beneath the efforts by each organization. 
 
The specific roles make specific ministries important for each organization, while efforts to 
change for example ideas about democracy or legislation can be single or joint actions. 
Keeping the double option of single and joint effect in mind, this point is detailed in chapter 
seven and equally accompanies the analysis of framing in order to identify common and 
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single framing. Now I turn to the ministerial networks in order to verify the direct 
interactions. 
4.2 Ministerial network 
The ministerial networks are analyzed on the basis of what ministries were mentioned as 
important before. The UGTT has ties towards quasi-all ministries but more explicitly the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (unfortunately not included in the analysis) as well as the 
institutionalized four plus four/five plus five arrangements. 
 
The LTDH holds closer ties towards the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice as well 
as the Ministry of Social Affairs. The ATFD approaches mainly the Ministry of Women and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. The FTDES approaches more ministries than the LTDH or the 
ATFD as it covers more issues and includes for example the Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society and the Institutions (in the following Ministry of Relations with Civil Society) as well 
as the Ministry of Social Affairs. In comparison, the UGTT holds the most extensive ties 
towards ministries followed by the FTDES. LTDH and ATFD have more specific ties. A number 
of different ministries have been approached to verify whether those connections exist and 
what quality they have. In the following I outline the ties expressed by civil servants before 
integrating the state-oriented relations hold by ministries. 
4.2.1 Towards civil society – it’s specific to every ministry and diverse 
Figure 4.13 shows the general ties of the Ministries. They are regrouped in seven clusters. As 
all ministries are regarded together some clusters are very large like the one on the Tunisian 
civil society. 
 
One of those clusters is international links that get divided into three different clusters. One 
is related to the Human Rights network including Euromed or UN institutions, one related to 
good governance including for example EITI (relevant for the Ministry of Industry), and the 
largest one focuses on international cooperation that can have different thematic 
orientations. International cooperation includes countries, as well as international 
institutions or foundations. 
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On the lower right are some organizations that are state sponsored or that represent 
employers. Those groups are defined more as NGOs, professional organizations or lobby 
groups. Under this category falls the UTICA, but also several federations of enterprises or 
national companies like the STEG. Some ministries mentioned associations that are linked to 
a specific ministry and that are found in the cluster on the lower right. 
 
The lower left shows the ties towards the overall civil society. Not all of those organizations 
represent movements, and again some are quite specific for ministries like the Ordre des 
Experts Comptable (working on finance). Given that the schema represents a high number of 
different ministries, the number of civil society organizations is still rather limited. We find 
not only organizations that qualify as old civil society like ATFD, UGTT, ONAT or LTDH, but 
also younger ones like I Watch, Al Bawsala, PASC or Beity. However, some of the ties have 
been mentioned only once and represent only the tie of one specific ministry (like the Amitié 
for the Ministry of Habitation). As part of this overview, even single mentions are shown in 
Figure 4.13. 
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Figure 4.13 Ministerial ties towards civil society and international actors 
 
As there are many organizations in the overview, the question emerges which organizations 
have been mentioned most by several civil servants across ministries. Table 4.14 shows the 
most mentioned organizations and in how many interviews the referral occurred. 
 
The ties to civil society towards the UGTT, the ATFD, I Watch, as well as towards FTDES, 
LTDH and the EU were mentioned. The analyzed organizations are probably overrepresented 
because specific questions on them have been posed which augmented the number of 
mentions50. As no specific questions on I Watch or I Bawsala (not in Table 4.14 as less than 
five coding) have been posed, these appear as important organizations apart from the four 
analyzed ones because they were mentioned without questioning. From these details, we 
                                                     
50 When civil servants answered to have no contact to for example the UGTT , those are not included in the 
numbers of course. Questions were systematically posed to all civil servants, however not all confirmed those 
links. 
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already see that many organizations from Figure 4.13 are not relevant for all ministries and 
that there are many organizations only mentioned by one ministry. 
Table 4.14 Mentioned direct ties to other actors 
 Mentioned in interviews Number of different interviews 
UGTT 10 6 
ATFD 7 3 
I Watch 7 3 
FTDES 6 2 
LTDH 6 2 
EU 6 4 
Note: including civil society and international actors (five or more mentions in interviews), civil society as abstract 
category was often mentions, equally women and citizens have been evoked. Those categories are not shown as they 
subsume unspecific groups. 
Looking at the number of interviewees that refer to other organizations and actors, it is 
shown that the ties towards many other civil society actors are rather an exception. 
 
It becomes clear that ties towards the LTDH or FTDES are limited to few ministries (especially 
the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society). It also shows that the UGTT is the best-
connected organization of the four analyzed ones as it was coded in six out of thirteen 
interviews. On the other hand, it already shows that ties by ministries towards organizations 
are rather the exception, something that will be discussed when talking about allies later on. 
I equally recall that especially the UGTT stated to have ties to many different ministries as 
the FTDES did. In comparison, not all civil servants did confirm those ties and especially not 
for the FTDES. It is not to exclude that organizations were not named because they are 
subsumed under civil society in general, however this tells much about the quality of those 
links. 
 
To complete the picture, I also shortly elaborate on the inter-ministerial networks as well as 
towards political parties as it shows how organizations perform in relation to political 
parties. Afterwards the links will be qualified in terms of perceived allies. 
4.2.2 Ties towards other state actors and political parties – a lack of coordination? 
When it comes to other ministries as shown in Figure 4.15, most civil servants mentioned 
other ministries very broadly and only few mentioned concrete contacts. While there are no 
specific ministries that appear as cooperating regularly, there is some coordination. On the 
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other hand, some civil servants claimed a lack of communication and coordination across 
ministries. 
 
Another cluster includes state owned institutions like the ENA or the HAICA that were stated 
on a similar level as the administration. Specific contacts of individual ministries exist, like 
police and military that are not linked to all other ministries, but to the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
 
When it comes to political parties, concretely mentioned were only WATAD (Popular Front) 
and Ennahdha, while anyone explicitly referred to Nida Tounes. This may be artificial as most 
civil servants referred to the abstract category of “political parties” instead of concrete 
parties, something that can be well explained by political neutrality. Parliament and political 
parties are prominently named. The Presidency of the Government and the Ministry of 
Finance play a role that is highlighted in chapter seven. The ties towards other state actors 
enable to verify the ways law proposals take, something that is shown later. 
Figure 4.15 Ministerial ties towards the state and parties 
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4.2.3 Qualifying those links – how close are the state and civil society? 
Civil servants were also asked on allies. The most frequently mentioned category is very 
general with the civil society. 
 
When being asked for concrete organizations the most frequently named organization was 
the UGTT, followed by the ONAT as Figure 4.16 shows. Other organizations like the LTDH, 
the ATFD, the UTICA or the PASC have only been mentioned once as ally. Compared to the 
organizations, civil servants were more reluctant to speak about allies and particularly allies 
in civil society. The perception of allies often depends on only one or very few ministries. On 
the other hand, the civil society in general is defined as an ally by half of the ministries. This 
may be due to the perceived importance of civil society in Tunisia. However, it is difficult to 
identify concrete partners with such a wide category and it is unclear whether this category 
serves as category for describing coalitions of actors. From these findings, only the UGTT is 
more or less accepted as ally. 
Figure 4.16 Allies 
 
Note: as mentioned by number of ministries (out of 12 ministries in total) 
Another question on acceptance of movements and civil society was asked. For this question 
(not shown), it was the UGTT that was mentioned most prominently; other organizations 
that are well accepted include I Watch and the LTDH, to a lesser degree UTICA, Al Bawsala, 
as well as the ATFD. It is to recall that equally civil society organizations only spoke less 
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frequently about ministries as allies so that the state and civil society perspective fit well 
together. 
 
While this makes it already difficult to talk about intense exchanges if few organizations are 
mentioned as allies or as accepted, a more detailed analysis shows that some ministries are 
responsible for several connotations as allies, while others do not name any partners. To 
illustrate the differences between ministries I briefly compare the allies mentioned by a civil 
servant from the Ministry of Regional Development with the ones mentioned by a civil 
servant from the Ministry of Industry. 
 
While the one from the Ministry of Regional Development mentioned the UGTT, civil society, 
other ministries, UTAP, UTICA and international foundations, the one from the Ministry of 
Industry only stated other ministries as ally. This shows the differences between ministries, 
as not all civil servants will speak about allies to the same degree. Some civil servants like 
Kamel from the Ministry of Habitation did even not speak about allies, but about accepted 
organizations instead. 
 
The type of actors differs from one ministry to another. While the Ministry of Women and 
the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society mostly mentioned civil society organizations as 
partner, the Presidency of the Government focused on different ministries. These 
differences in perceptions are discussed later in detail as they influence the way framings 
diffuse (and especially limit the diffusion). I recall also that no media analysis is performed 
for ministries and the relations towards other actors in the media, as data was organization 
centered and not collected for ministries. 
Summary on the ministerial networks 
What became evident from the ministerial networks that not every ministry has the same 
contacts towards civil society. Some have very limited ones, others like the Ministry for 
Relations with Civil Society and the Institution very large ones. While all organizations are 
mentioned by at least one ministry, the intensity of interactions differs. Few ministries speak 
about organizations as allies, especially the UGTT is here to highlight as being mentioned by 
some ministries as ally. Other organizations such as the FTDES are not mentioned at all as 
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ally by any ministry. This does however not mean that no ties exist, but it means that those 
interactions are not very intense. 
 
There are several dyads that emerge from a detailed look at the data. One of those is the 
Ministry of Women and the ATFD. Another is the Presidency of the Government and the 
UGTT, as well as the Ministry for Relations with Civil Society and the LTDH and FTDES. 
4.3 Conclusion to chapter four 
4.3.1 Answer to the first question - How are movements connected to each other and to 
which degree to they interact? 
There is a core of organizations that is not just built among the analyzed organizations, but 
also the ONAT, the Association of Journalists, the UGET and others. Those build what I call 
the old civil society that is effectively a coalition. The FTDES is only partly integrated. ATFD 
and FTDES are more open towards younger organizations. Coalitional modes of functioning 
are thus possible for UGTT, LTDH and ATFD among each other and only partly for the FTDES. 
 
The old civil society has strong networks among each other with each organization holding 
some unique ties and the UGTT holding few unique ties (compare Figure 10.8 in Annex). The 
divide between young and existent elites is present; between those who existed before the 
end of the Ben Ali regime and those who mobilized afterwards. The division in new and old 
civil society has severe consequences. While newer social movements can influence their 
reputation, it is difficult to enter into structural circles of influence making. New 
organizations therefore have the disadvantage that their influence is restricted through the 
existent organizations. As members of the existent networks expressed, newer organizations 
often miss the experience and reputation (and in their view the professionalism). Although it 
was not the aim to regard the consequences and outcomes of those younger networks, 
interviews with leaders of younger organizations confirmed the differences in access. While 
newer organizations struggle with approaching at least one ministry, established 
organizations have at least contacts, in some cases even former militants in ministries. 
Consequentially only the old organizations may be able to influence policymaking, 
something to keep in mind for chapter seven when it comes to mechanisms of influence. 
One possible entry point for newer organizations already used by Al Bawsala or I Watch is 
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hearings of ministries which enable to build lasting contacts. This point is taken up again in 
chapter seven. 
 
While organizations normally hold contacts to older organizations, one small exemption is 
the ATFD which named Doustourna and where one leader expressed “we gained eventually 
two to three associations maximum” (ATFD, Nour). This said, the ATFD is aware that they 
work with the same organizations as before and only added those two to three 
organizations. Similarly, the leaders of younger organizations did not mention contacts 
towards the old civil society organizations, but to the same foundations and international 
actors as mentioned by the old organizations. In addition, those revealed that the role is 
different and problems in terms of funding and the like greater (perhaps except for the EU 
financed PASC). Certain contacts have a strategic financing intention like those towards a 
number of foundations, others provide international support where needed (Euromed or 
FIDH) and the national ones are of strategic nature when it comes to putting pressure on 
state officials. 
 
The analyzed organizations show a clear integration into international human rights 
networks. From the international dimension three out of four organizations mentioned 
explicitly the Euromed Human Rights Network as well as the FIDH and Oxfam as important 
partners. 
 
When comparing the findings with the media reports, it becomes evident that, while 
contacts towards political parties and the government are shared among the analyzed 
organizations, all organizations hold unique ties towards organizations and ministries that 
work in their area of expertise. These specialized ties are more intense. This is re-discussed 
when answering the second question that oriented this paper. 
Multidimensional networks and a coalition 
Networks should not be seen as unitary. Different types of networks, be it personal, 
organizational, institutionalized or informal contacts, exist and mechanisms depend on the 
type of networks and aim of interaction as is discussed later. 
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The analyzed movements can clearly be described as a social movement coalition, with the 
FTDES in a slightly reduced role. This means that not only individual influence of each 
organization is possible, but also combined influence by a movement coalition. The structure 
appears like a circle or dense web where most of the organizations are connected with each 
other. It is in line with what van Dyke and McCammon found for a different context, who 
describe a coalition of several movements that works on common tasks (van Dyke and 
McCammon 2010). While there is no umbrella organization, the UGTT is the most decisive 
organization and can decide on whether for example protest gets a national scope or 
whether it remains local based. The UGTT is thus the most central actor in this network, also 
because it ensures the ties towards the state. The FTDES is a bit aside, probably because of 
its newer origin or because of its diverse topics. However, the FTDES tries (and in media 
succeeds) to be part of this inner circle. Among those who are seen as part of the movement 
coalition are those that have been repressed under Ben Ali (with the exception of the Islamic 
movement which is not – longer – seen as part of this coalition). 
 
The FIDH or Euromed can scale problems to the international level or act as support. 
International actors are described less as allies and are more seen as support or resources. 
 
Interviewees showed optimism that the united coalition is able to mobilize against 
authoritarianism. This potential for mobilization is not just found in instrumental goals, but is 
based on shared visions and values. This is similar to what Diani found; that commonality in 
basic values is the most important factor to establish and maintain networks (Diani 2015). It 
is not surprising to find the named organizations as part of a coalition, given the history of 
opposition in Tunisia that included either jihadist groups or professional associations or 
advocacy NGOs in coalitions (Ayari 2016). In this case, the civil society that fought together 
against Ben Ali gets united in its demand for several different issues. 
 
Personal contacts are the glue of the social movement coalition, similar to what van Dyke 
and McCammon found (van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Effectively, many of the 
interviewees claimed that it is not just about organizational ties, but about personal ones. 
Both should be seen as complementary. Many activists passed through an education on 
activism that was influenced by the UGTT and syndicalist activities. 
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Interviews revealed that the role of organizations differs and problems vary. A number of 
organizations underlined the importance of having complementary roles when working with 
their allies, something similar to Diani’s findings (Diani 2015). The differences between 
movements are important for the composition of protest. While the UGTT ensures the reach 
towards workers and the national spread, the LTDH is expert for human rights and the ATFD 
for women rights. The Journalist association can serve as expert for media questions, the 
ONAT as expert for the rule of law and the FTDES as expert for migration or environment. 
The boundaries are clearer for the organizations themselves than they appear from outside. 
It can be expected, that human rights and democracy dominate when looking at the framing 
of democracy hold by the analyzed organizations because they are the most common 
denominator in terms of networks. It can also be expected from the network structure, that 
different organizations set different thematic foci when it comes to framing democracy. 
 
From the first question it is to keep in mind that both direct contacts as well as indirect 
contacts either via other organizations or via media are possible. Interaction with the latter 
is not very frequent apart from the FTDES. 
4.3.2 Answer to the second question - Which ties between movements and the state do 
exist and what qualities do those have? 
While all analyzed organizations mentioned contacts towards the national government, 
ministries, the state administration as well as the governor, three of four organizations 
especially mentioned the Ministry of Social Affairs as being important (which unfortunately 
was not available for interviews although several attempts). All organizations mentioned 
contacts towards the media, parliament and political parties, while the degree differed. 
Nevertheless, the most unattended element is rather weak ties towards parties and 
parliament. Direct ties to major political parties were not that prominent; one could easily 
imagine that for example the UGTT would cooperate more with the Popular Front like 
Amenta et al. outlined for the US context between labor and civil rights movement and the 
Democratic Party (Amenta et al. 2010). This is however not the case and contacts towards 
parties are limited to keep a reputation of independence. This is surprising given that the 
new democratic system relies on parliament; a point that is to keep in mind for later. The 
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outreach towards parliament may become more important in the future. At the moment it is 
more occasionally and not very intense. 
 
All organizations hold ties towards specific ministries in their area of expertise. In some 
cases, ministries do not always acknowledge those ties (especially for the FTDES). On the 
other hand, the Ministry of Women indicates strong ties towards organizations. The UGTT is 
mentioned by a number of ministries and holds not only specific ties, but overarching ones 
that are not bound to thematic orientations. 
 
In comparison to other organizations, the state relation of the UGTT is much more explicit as 
they intensively cooperate with ministers and policy makers on an institutionalized level. 
Recalling Tilly’s distinction between insider and challenger, the UGTT appears as closest to 
an insider position (Tilly 2000). It is not a one-way street as the UGTT gets solicited by 
ministries in some cases. The UGTT is involved in policy making especially via the four plus 
four/ five plus five format and thus can find itself in a privileged position. It becomes insider, 
while it still plays the challenger when mobilizing against the state. The other organizations 
have less and more specific ties. 
 
To answer the second question of this chapter: Yes, the four organizations have regular 
contacts towards ministries that were partly confirmed by ministries and of different 
intensity. The extent is wider for the UGTT and appears limited for the other three 
organizations. There are ministries with more ties towards political organizations like the 
ATFD, the LTDH or the FTDES, while others hold more contacts towards less political 
organizations. The UGTT was mentioned several times by ministries. While the ATFD and 
LTDH were mentioned as partners of the Ministry of Women, the FTDES was not mentioned 
as partner by any ministry. 
 
On the other hand, as part of a close coalition, not all organizations need close contact to all 
ministries as other organizations in the coalition can cover those in in a more efficient way 
(like the UGTT). In addition, some other organizations play a role: Some ministries did 
mention organizations working on transparency like I Watch or Al Bawsala. Both 
organizations have a very good reputation across ministries. Those special cases build 
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another point for discussion for chapter seven as I Watch and Al Bawsala use a different way 
for spreading their ideas than the four analyzed organizations. 
 
Relations between civil society and the state are far from being important for all included 
ministries, raising doubts on the transmission of frames through interaction for all ministries. 
In addition, it is questionable whether movements and civil society can realize many goals on 
a national level if they do not have the wide support across ministries. The consequences are 
discussed in chapter seven in detail. 
 
A short remark on tribes and clans as the topic is regularly discussed in relation to states in 
the MENA region: At least for Greater Tunis I doubt that, what other researchers described 
as informal and clientelistic networks based on family or clans, really shape the political 
landscape (Diani and Moffatt 2016). My findings contradict generalizations on political 
networks in the MENA region, while I nevertheless acknowledge informal networks. A clan 
was not used as a referral and only evoked by two interviewees who at the same time 
acknowledged that it does not play an important role or only becomes important in the 
South of the country (UGTT, Moncef; UGTT, Aziz). 
Consequences for a similar framing 
However, it is not surprising that different ministries mention different organizations 
according to the field of specialization. As a consequence, it is more a link between a specific 
organization and a specific ministry than a link between civil society overall and civil servants 
across ministries. When it comes to framing, it can be expected that ministries with specific 
ties towards organizations have a similar framing, while ministries without clear ties towards 
civil society have a more divergent framing of democracy. In addition, given the extensive 
ties of the UGTT, it is expected that especially the framing of the UGTT can be found among 
ministries, while the LTDH for example is capable of influencing the framing of the Ministry 
of the Interior or the Ministry on Justice. 
 
Before turning to the question of mechanisms, the framings by movements and ministries 
are outlined. Networks and framing get combined in chapter seven. From chapter four it 
should be kept in mind, that it may be difficult to identify the same framing across ministries 
as networks are very specific towards concrete ministries and not towards the state. 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
193 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
The organizational framing 
 
 
 
 
 
5 An organizational democratic framing 
Chapter five answers the question: Do the analyzed organizations, the UGTT (Union 
Générale Tunisienne du Travail), the ATFD (Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates), 
the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux) and the LTDH (Ligue 
Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l’Homme) have one or several collective 
democratic framing(s) and which elements of a democratic framing are highlighted (see 2.4). 
I also recall the research question: “How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in 
Tunisia?” 
 
It is not taken for granted that social movements are said to promote democracy, but this 
chapter highlights perspectives on democracy. It is neither clear what types of democracy 
are promoted by organizations. As Tunisia had an electoral system with quasi-
predetermined outcomes for a long time, it is possible that the focus on elections as part of 
democracy persists today. While researchers often assigned the role of movements for 
democratization (2.4), little is known about whether and what type of democracy is 
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promoted in Tunisia. As will be shown, organizations set different foci of their framing. This 
also means that dependent on the field of activity, different elements are highlighted. 
 
Figure 5.1 recalls the three main dimensions as well as the elements that fall under the three 
dimensions. The main division is between the three dimensions of control, equality and 
freedom. As outlined in chapter two, three elements exist for each of the three dimensions. 
Figure 5.1 Dimensions of democracy 
 
Note: own Figure based on Bühlmann et al. 2014, see also 2.5 
As we have seen in chapter four, the Tunisian civil society is highly interconnected. But does 
this mean that Tunisian movements share the same perspective on democracy? The chapter 
identifies frames they have in common as well as unique frames. The combination of frames 
is used to determine the orientation of democratic framings and how frames are connected 
to make ideas travel. Some of the movements like the ATFD not only promote women rights 
and thus the perspective on liberty and equality, but also other aspects that are similar to 
other movements. This mixture of unique and shared framing is in line with the coalitions as 
well as the roles within it. An organization like the ATFD thus relies on shared frames like the 
protection of human rights, but combines it with unique elements for example on rural 
women. 
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The chapter takes up three key arguments. First, the democratic framing focuses on specific 
dimensions of democracy. Organizations emphasize one of the three dimensions and not 
necessarily the same. Second there are overarching similar elements that are present across 
organizations. Consequentially, there is a division between unique and shared framings 
across organizations. Third, when it comes to frame resonance, framing that is important in 
public discussions should be identifiable in media reporting. It is an open question whether 
unique organizational framing or common framings by a coalition get more resonance in 
public. The last point is important to determine the possibility of ideational influence via the 
media. 
 
The chapter describes the framing of the organizations in order to be able to compare with 
the perspective of state representatives. The chapter starts outlining the profile of 
democratic framing for each organization by referral to the dimensions and elements of 
democracy. The Democracy Barometer, as well as other literature, outlined three 
dimensions (freedom, equality, control), as well as several elements (Bühlmann et al. 2014; 
Lauth 2010; Lauth 2013; Lauth 2011; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). The Democracy 
Barometer is used as it is – although not being perfect – wide and allows accounting for 
different types of democracy without being pre-determined. It is a useful point of 
orientation also for qualitative studies. Concretely, the chapter regards how for example 
frames on women rights are combined with other aspects of democracy like the rule of law 
and the constitution. 
 
For interviews all frame content and combinations are regarded, repetitions are of less 
importance for the analysis of interviews but build the basis to determine the resonance in 
public. Frames that resonate a lot in public should be more often repeated in newspapers. 
 
In this chapter, every section outlines the data from interviews and documents as those are 
seen as more original and not filtered. The chapter bases on interviews with eighteen of the 
twenty-five civil society leaders51. In a second step, the findings from media articles are 
compared. Both types of data account for different types of mechanisms. While the framing 
                                                     
51 A list can be found in the Annex under 11.2, the eighteen interviews include those with the selected 
organizations. Additional interviews with other civil society actors are used for comparison. UGTT: Seven 
interviews, ATFD: five interviews, LTDH: four interviews, FTDES: three interviews 
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in speech and document is seen as unfiltered and as the content that can be transmitted 
through direct mechanism, the content of the media is seen as filtered and describes the 
indirect mechanisms via public opinion. It is to keep in mind that media content does not 
necessarily represent the original framing by organizations but can be rephrased by 
journalists. Reporting is furthermore influenced by issue salience, making some topics 
resonate more than others. 
 
When numbers of mentions are indicated, it is principally to show that frames get used 
across actors and less to show repetitions as those can also be influenced by the individual 
interviews. It is indicated whether the dimension was mentioned by all interviewees to show 
whether the dimension is evoked across interviews as well as in order to identify potential 
individual biases. The perspective may not be shared across the organization if only few 
interviewees evoke it. 
 
While the analysis bases on numbers of mentions and content elements derived from NVivo, 
the aim is not to make a quantitative, detailed analysis of all statistics that would still not 
allow generalization due to the limited number of interviews. The statistics are used to 
account for the distribution across interviews as well intensity of frames. This is in line with 
the misted approach in between discourse analysis and content analysis. Every time when 
using statistics for this qualitative analysis, two aspects are taken into account: Are those 
mentions on democracy that are reported distributed across interviews and if not, does the 
uneven distribution cause a bias that would raise doubts on those numbers. Those numbers 
thus serve as basic orientation and are ever qualified when looking in the detailed 
interviews. For every aspect it is controlled whether those mentions play a role for all 
interviewees and if not what are the reasons. In some cases it is noted, that the element of 
democracy was only evoked prominently by one interviewee, raising doubts on its validity 
for the organization. This is indicated in a transparent matter. As interviews were on civil 
society, especially the importance of participation as a dimension shall be threatened with 
caution as it may be over reported. 
 
As for the networks, I start with the UGTT and LTDH, followed by ATFD and FTDES. I begin 
with an overview on what category has been coded how, before entering into the details of 
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each framing. After outlining each dimension of democracy, I regard frame combinations in 
interviews before turning to a media analysis. Frame combinations are used to for assessing 
the unique framing as for example government capacity can be seen from a critical 
perspective as hindering protest or a positive perspective on fighting terrorism (and thus 
combining different dimensions of democracy). They are seen as complementary to the 
referral to only one dimension and can detail on dimensions. The media analysis then takes 
up the dimensions and looks which frames resonate in public. Every organizational section is 
followed by a short summary. 
5.1 UGTT: the state, representation and collective rights 
In interviews, as shown in Figure 5.2, the control dimension has been found more often than 
the freedom or equality dimension, the latter being the less evoked. Government capacity 
and competition are the most often evoked elements followed by representation, individual 
liberties, and rule of law, public sphere and participation. Mutual constraints and 
transparency play a minor role. The distribution between the three dimensions is relatively 
equal, except more mentions on control. From the overview, the UGTT is more control-
oriented and as we will see later it is the most control-oriented organization of the four. 
 
After the overview on dimensions, I turn to each dimension in detail for every organization. 
For the UGTT, I recall the elements that are included under each dimension; for the other 
organizations those will not be repeated again. I equally outline whether one interview was 
dominant for the framing of elements of democracy. 
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Figure 5.2 Mentioned dimensions and elements in interviews 
 
Note: number of mentions, 326 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 44, Government Capacity: 66, 
Mutual Constraints: 20, Participation: 27, Representation: 40, Transparency: 20, Freedom and liberties: 39, public sphere: 
32, rule of law: 38). 
5.1.1 Control dimension: government capacity as important element 
Competition: A lot of different elements 
The competition dimension covers competition of political parties including different 
programs and electoral competition, but also whether elections represent reality. The 
competition dimension is one of the more prominent dimensions in interviews, however, 
appears much less in the public debate (see below). Competition was mentioned in all seven 
interviews with the UGTT, but has been particularly emphasized by Moncef. There were 
many different aspects that emerged in interviews. 
 
What did the UGTT state on party programs? UGTT leaders were divided on whether 
programs of different parties are clear or not, as well as whether elections only focus on 
persons instead of political programs. When it comes to party programs, UGTT leaders 
disagree on the extent of domination of the system by few parties, something especially 
criticized by Ahmed: 
"I am skeptical about this alliance between the first two forces. From the point of 
view of my education [...], I look around me at what has been happening for 
centuries in relation to modern democracy. We cannot do democracy without 
alternation. The alternation is between the most important forces. If the biggest 
forces rule together, [...] they can run the country like that for a hundred years or 
so. And like that, step by step, they will find that it is easier to arrange between 
them than to arrange with the people. [...] There must be an alternation 
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between two major representative parties. […] So, I think we must break this 
alliance to save democracy” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
The perspective on parties shifts between skepticism on alternation of power and the 
demand for a higher representation of the left, which is closer to the UGTT. 
"The mistakes we made as UGTT with parties that sympathize with the UGTT 
where we thought we were going to win the elections. But it's not true; it's the 
right that won. [...] But we have the Popular Front [...] it's a set of small parts, [...] 
they do not have a great reputation but they have a reputation among young 
people.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
The citation by Moncef also shows that the UGTT had preferences before the elections and 
expected the left to win. It also shows the preferences for the Popular Front. 
 
As we have seen above, political parties and especially the two large ones are criticized for 
having a dominant position. Ennahdha gets criticized not for the influence of religion (that 
would have been coded under government capacity), but its dominant influence on parts of 
the political system that is outlined: 
"[...] most officials in the administration are part of Ennahdha. It is Ennahdha 
who governs. They do not have ministers but they have the administration. All 
key positions.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
"Well, Ennahdha [...] they have their supporters, unfortunately. There are people 
who believe in Ennahdha. […] But when Ennahdha had the power, it behaved 
exactly like Ben Ali so it renewed the same practices of Ben Ali [...] it is the 
extreme right, who defends its interests and on the contrary it is worse than Ben 
Ali.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
This criticism is in line with the skepticism faced with Ennahdha that was already presented 
in chapter four on networks. On the other hand, the UGTT is officially independent from 
political parties (for example UGTT, Aziz) and underlines this independence: 
"Now we are free. But it is still difficult. Because there are one hundred sixty 
parties, who want to be at the UGTT. We are defending our independence. 
Everyone wants the UGTT to always go forward for political causes. We say no, 
we do not do politics. We are here [...] we do social policy. We defend the 
interests of Tunisia first, then the workers afterwards. It is us who makes the 
balance, who lead the national dialogue, who exercised our strength to arrive 
with a parliament, to have a government, to have elections, to always play a role 
of balance between people.” (UGTT, Mohamed) 
 
The citation by Mohamed also shows that the UGTT gets a lot solicited by parties, but that 
they want to show independence, so reject working with parties. It also is an example of a 
leader who defends the social role to the detriment of a more political role. In addition, 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
200 
 
  
there is a clear referral to the national dialogue. This guarantee for the national dialogue and 
for a balance is a framing that re-emerges across interviews. 
 
While the framing of dominant parties as well as criticism of Ennahdha was shared across 
several interviews, other aspects like electoral outcome where more controversial. Electoral 
outcome is connected with different aspects of democracy including representation or 
corruption. UGTT leaders were more consistent and showed skepticism on whether electoral 
outcome represents reality: 
"[...] but what is reality? What reality are we talking about? They represent the 
reality, but it is a treated reality. That is a reality that is created under the 
influence of money and the media. The orientation of the media and the political 
money, not to mention the dirty money, that, it must remain to verify, played a 
very important role for the orientation of the population.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
"The elections were also attended by international observers and proceeded 
transparently. And that reflects badly [...] well it's a new phenomenon for us, 
elections and democratic elections that's why sometimes there are choices, I 
mean [...] a little weird. (laugher)” (UGTT, Amine) 
 
The two citations show two elements: First elections are seen as influenced by money and 
thus represent a modified reality and second electoral choices are not ever understood. 
Especially in relation to understanding vote choices, Amine highlights the novelty of 
democracy.  
 
Similar to the evaluation of elections, the regional elections were highlighted and build a link 
towards vertical checks and balances (UGTT, Moncef and UGTT, Aziz). The perspective of the 
UGTT is very diverse itself, perhaps more diverse than for the other organizations. This is less 
surprising given that the UGTT reunites many more actors of the Tunisian political landscape. 
Government capacity: The old regime and fighting terrorism 
The UGTT connects government capacity with the old regime as well as with fighting 
terrorism. The government capacity dimension includes the possible interference on 
government by specific actors, but also the resources and capacities (control of the state, 
security forces and so on) that lie in the hands of the government as well as its stability. The 
government capacity dimension appears in all interviews with UGTT leaders, but is more 
prominent in interviews with Moncef and Sofien. The dimension is the most important single 
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category in interviews and was often mentioned in articles on UGTT claims (see below), 
showing the importance of government capacity to the UGTT. 
 
The mix of businessmen and the old regime is seen as negative and as influencing politics: 
"I also want to point out that already Essebsi, the current president, or the Nida 
party, is a party that has [...] two and a half years. But in a way the majority, or a 
large part of Nida's adherents, are [...] of the former regime. And of course, they 
want to install themselves now, the former regime it wants to install itself 
gradually […]. So currently Nida defends the interests of the commons, the 
interests of businessmen, the interests of men, corrupt people at the time of Ben 
Ali, he exculpates them.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
"There are more resources and there are more resources to feed the media too. 
To spend 80% of their time on a candidate, for example, very specific, or lists, or 
the creation of a party [...] there were all sorts of concessions.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
The criticism of businessmen as influencing politics is often repeated and is one of the core 
framings of the UGTT. A connected aspect is the persistence of autocratic perspectives that 
influence especially the administration. While Mohamed mentions the “old habits”, Moncef 
insists more on the administration to be neutral, transparent and democratic: 
"We have lived fifty years of dictatorship, a dictatorship regime. And now we 
have for three years a changed system. It takes time. Because the people, they 
do not have the experience and the habit in democracy [...] One cannot change 
after fifty years with administrative persons, political and anything [...] to change 
after three years [...] We cannot hide that the old regime is still there. There are 
people who still want to participate in politics; they have not stopped mingling 
with politics. There are many rich people who give a lot of money to the parties 
and still want to command to safeguard their interests.” (UGTT, Mohamed) 
 
"For me it's unacceptable. I see that the administration must be a neutral, 
transparent, democratic administration and not a mix with the political parties in 
power. And I think that Tunisia has been able without leaving the revolution, it is 
the administration that has turned the political life of Tunisians during the 
transition.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
The referral to money is also found in the citation by Mohamed, but Mohamed tries to 
explain the persistence of influence taking by that people are used to it and that it will time. 
Moncef has a harsher critique especially targeted on the administration that has to be 
neutral. As interviews show, influence on the government is principally related to 
businessmen or the influence of dominant parties. 
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A second important element in the UGTT’s argumentation is government resources and 
security as well as fighting terrorism. The UGTT is relatively close to the government and 
support for more government resources is given. Especially the argument of government 
stability plays a role, but not at any price: A bad functioning government has to be replaced. 
"The fact, that since the revolution we have had seven governments. There was a 
transitional government that lasted ten days or [...] half. Changing is in itself bad 
because it creates certain instability [...] and it disrupts work. But what do you 
want; we are in a situation of democratic gestation. If a government does not 
work as it should, it will leave. It does not matter; it's not because of stability that 
you have to keep a government that does not work. [...] Well, we have dismissed 
this or that government because there have been problems […]. Anti-democratic 
problems, problems of assassination of political leaders, incapacity problems. 
[...]” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
Especially Sofien and Ahmed state that while the government appears as stable, it has to be 
seen as particularly fragile and that “a disagreement between Nida and Ennahdha could let it 
explode” (UGTT, Sofien). 
 
Another factor connected to the stability is the fight against terrorism. This fight is strongly 
supported by UGTT leaders. 
"There is a very important factor that has come into play, it is also terrorism. 
Terrorism was not taken into account. Because practically the majority of efforts 
has been diverted to the fight against terrorism.” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
"But to have stability, there are conditions that must be met first. To have 
stability, we had to fight terrorism first. As long as there is terrorism, there is no 
stability.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
"We cannot talk about democracy without establishing stability. We cannot say a 
democracy in an environment [...] that is not stable. So, first we have to achieve 
security, economic stability and I do not know what [...]” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
Democracy itself gets connected to stability by Moncef. He also sets priorities as security is 
the first most important element and then comes economic stability. This perspective on 
security, that fighting terrorism is a precondition for democracy can also be found in Sofien’s 
citation as well as those of others. However, the fight against terrorism goes not for any 
price and especially individual liberties remain important. In addition, the border towards 
Libya is mentioned as a threat to the stability of the political system (UGTT, Moncef). 
Government resources get connected with terrorism and security, but also with economic 
problems. The resources of the government get also connected to taxation and parallel 
economies; an argument quite important for the UGTT. 
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Mutual Constraints, institutions and limited support for decentralization 
The dimension on mutual constraints includes horizontal as well as vertical checks and 
balances. The perspective on mutual constraints is less important when it comes to framing 
in interviews. In interviews it is not mentioned by Amine. While it is not an important 
dimension, I present some arguments that are highlighted by UGTT leaders. 
 
As part of the horizontal checks and balances, it is especially the constitutional court (that 
does not yet exist) that plays a role in arguments on mutual constraints (for example UGTT, 
Amine). The Economic and Social Council as well as the Council for Sustainable Development 
are mentioned to be introduced rapidly (UGTT, Aziz). On the other hand, Amine connects the 
missing institutions with lobbyism and influence of particular interests, an argument heard 
earlier on government interference: 
"Yes, because the state was weakened after the revolution. Well, there was a 
corporatist state [...]. We are in the process of transitioning, to establish the 
instances. So, the state is weak now and it has an influence [...] we have lobbies, 
lobbies of doctors, lobbies of lawyers, lobbies of businessmen. Because of the 
situation of transition, we are not yet in a political system that is stable and we 
have not yet established our instances.” (UGTT, Amine) 
 
Separation of powers is another point that is underscored for example by Aziz. 
 
Decentralization and vertical checks and balances are more often named for the other 
organizations. The framing on decentralization of the UGTT is limited to few elements as 
expressed by Nada or Sofien: 
"But there will be elections soon, municipal and regional elections; there will be 
local governance. And that's important. Where each governorate will have its 
autonomy. First, you have to pass by financial autonomy, to have a different 
autonomy. When one is financially dependent on the system, one cannot be 
independent.” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
"And one of the goals of our revolution is to have regional and local democracy. 
[…]. Why up to now is the governor, […] why he must be appointed by the 
president, by the prime minister? Why don’t we have a local election and the 
people, the citizens there, elect their governor. There are small projects that can 
be set up, that may be set up, you have to have a budget for each region, certain 
autonomy, say economic and financial […] people have to have a regional 
council. It is the one who decides on projects all that. [...] We are in favor of that 
there must be a part that is centralized, but we must not centralize everything.” 
(UGTT, Sofien) 
 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
204 
 
  
While especially Sofien's argumentation sounds like a support for decentralization, he 
equally describes decentralization as difficult without a tradition; something that can be 
taken as exemplary for the UGTT’s perspective on decentralization. The demand for 
decentralization includes arguments on justice for regions in the interior, participation of the 
people, but also financial independence and skepticism. An important element highlighted 
by Moncef and Aziz are the local and municipal elections that can serve as link from the 
bottom towards political (local) decision making. 
5.1.2 Equality dimension: Representation and its internal dimension 
Participation, electoral participation and protest 
The participation dimension summarizes effective participation and protest, as well as the 
equality of participation. The equality dimension is the least important dimension; 
representation and participation and to a minor amount transparency is included in the 
framing of problems. Participation appears in all interviews with UGTT leaders and slightly 
more in the interview with Ahmed. 
 
As for the other organizations, participation of the people and encouraging electoral 
participation plays a role in their argumentation: 
"We first make a campaign to mobilize people to vote. Direct them a little bit [...] 
because you cannot direct them directly to one party or another, but you can 
direct them to a program. So, a program that is adopted by the social democratic 
parties. […] And we are mobilizing for women to run for office so that they are 
present in local governance, because that is very important. [...]” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
While the role of guiding the electorate is shared among several leaders, the support for 
women is somehow ambiguous. On the other hand, participation gets connected to groups 
of the population that may have difficulties. Participation of youth as well as disadvantaged 
is seen problematic: 
"Participation can be calculated by electoral participation. Since young people do 
not participate in elections, that means we have a problem. That's for sure. In 
addition, as long as young people do not participate so much, it is automatically 
that the future of the political country has a problem. Who will take over 
tomorrow? With a 90-year-old president you cannot go far. So that's it. The 
second amalgam that we can get rid of the rich. [...] According to the statistics 
we have had, 70 of the richest of the world can be counted in Tunisia. With 
fortunes that are outside the country. In addition, there are the difficulties of 
corruption [...]” (UGTT, Moncef) 
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"Young people worked mostly for what I told you, after the revolution we saw a 
lot of young people who took positions of responsibility within the unions. [...]” 
(UGTT, Amine) 
 
"Theoretically, that is to say on the legislative level and everything, there is [...] 
universal suffrage guaranteed for everyone. But, on a practical level, that is to 
say a man or a woman who is poor does not find today, does not find it 
interesting to participate. She does not believe that the name of the one who will 
be elected can influence her economic and social situation. And the facts show 
that the person is right.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
While the inclusion of the youth or the poor is a framing that is used across leaders, some 
like Nada include also the participation of women and the persisting problems: 
"There are too many men; there are too many charges for women. So, the 
charges are not shared equally in the couple [...] what makes that the woman, to 
participate in politics, she must be a superwoman. [Laughs] So she has to 
reconcile between her home, housework and all that, her job, to support the 
man in fact. So, if she still has a bit of time, she's making politics. So, you have to 
be really perseverant to do politics.” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
This perspective on charges of women is neither shared across UGTT leaders (all other 
interviewed UGTT leaders are men), and even not resembles the one of the ATFD that would 
include key terms like equality. It nevertheless highlights a number of private and economic 
problems women can face. 
But participation is not only connected to participation in elections but also to protest, 
another important element of the UGTT’s framing. While strikes are evoked several times 
especially as a tactical tool, protest was especially underlined by Ahmed: 
"People are protesting. Today people go on Facebook, go to the media, they talk. 
When someone […] before when you are opposed to the power and opponent of 
the UGTT, the regime, if for example the general secretary of the UGTT wants to 
exclude someone, the power also excludes him. The media are closed; of course, 
they do not find where to talk. Now we cannot do that. Now people are talking. 
And that's good. [...] Afterwards, step by step people were doing politics on the 
street. The second phase is that we occupied the street. That is, it was Kasbah 1, 
Kasbah 2 and all that that imposed things. Afterwards, step by step, people were 
doing sit-ins, and this was invaded, the movement was invaded by sectoral and 
social demands. That is to say, many requests, salary increase, tenure, social 
benefits, all that, all that stuff. And that, step by step, let the movement grow. 
[...]” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
The citation by Ahmed underlines Facebook, but also traditional media and touch the 
question of the links between UGTT and the media. He also evokes that due to the closeness 
of the UGTT to the Ben Ali regime, media did not criticize the UGTT, something that starts 
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slowly now. On the other hand, he connects protest to the revolution and that people claim 
social and economic benefits. 
 
From an organizational perspective Nada and Ahmed evoked that participation through the 
UGTT plays a role. The organization emphasizes its role as mediator of social and political 
demands. Inserting its own role for participation, UGTT leaders connect participation and 
protest with the revolution. In addition, participation is not seen as equal, as economic 
status, gender and age influence whether a person participates. This is directly connected 
with the equality of participation. As will be shown later, economic elements enter 
frequently in arguments on participation. 
Representation, internal representation and the question of whether there are any 
minorities 
Representation from an UGTT perspective is often referred to internal problems in 
representation. The UGTT is divided on whether there are any minorities in Tunisia. The 
dimension on representation includes direct democracy as well as the representation of 
minorities and women. While women are no minority their representation in political 
processes is often minoritarian and equal representation of men and women is important to 
democracy. The dimension was mentioned in all interviews, but less by Amine and 
Mohamed. 
 
Direct democracy is not important to the UGTT and it was not often mentioned. It is more a 
participatory democracy that is seen as useful: 
"I think what will bring us a little closer to participatory democracy is when we 
vote. The principle is there at the beginning of the constitution […] Second, the 
constitution foresees local democracy. We will elect local and regional 
representatives. […] or there will be no democracy in Tunisia, which is likely, or 
there will be a democracy that resembles a lot participatory democracy.” (UGTT, 
Ahmed) 
 
The connection that Ahmed establishes between participatory democracy passes in this case 
by the vote and not by organizations. The citation also underlines that participatory 
democracy is the most likely outcome of Tunisian democratization processes.  
 
When it comes to the representation of minorities, opinions differ. While Moncef argues 
that minorities guard their rights within a democracy or Ahmed argues that minority rights 
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are not yet realized, others like Aziz underline that there are no minority problems, but that 
there might be some tribal issues. 
"In fact, we [...] speak of certain minorities but that's not it. So, we are not in the 
Iraqi or Syrian context or all that. [...] in some areas of the south, of the center, 
some tribes […] Tunisian democracy consists of a number of tribes. But 
sometimes there is a certain tension between the different tribes. And no, there 
are no minority issues. [...]” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
Both arguments, that there are no minorities or that rights are not yet effective, are often 
found in interviews, not just with the UGTT, but especially with representatives in ministries 
as will be shown later. The UGTT is very distant when it comes to rights of homosexuals and 
sexual orientations: 
"They are not very representative in Tunisia so [...] there are not really 
minorities. No. There are some associations that defend a bit the rights for 
example of black people, the rights of homosexuals, but it is limited to some 
associations. [...] And as it is a little delicate for example for homosexuals. You 
understand: a Muslim country. But we talk about it anyway, we talk about it.” 
(UGTT, Nada) 
 
In this sense, while some interviewees acknowledge problems with minority rights, there is a 
tendency to deny that there are any minorities in the country. While this is well in line with 
the narrative of Tunisia as homogeneous country, it contradicts the reality as in every 
country minorities do exist. UGTT leaders are not very aware of those minorities. 
The representation of women and internal representation 
As we will see for the other organizations, the role of women has been discussed. How does 
the UGTT evaluate the participation of women? When asked on the representation of 
women, own organizational problems with the equal representation of women are 
acknowledged, as if they would need to clarify a well-known problem: 
"The female representation is minimal. Even for us. For example, at the central 
union, there is no female representation at the headquarter. We have 
representation as a federation for example. Even for regional unions it's minimal. 
One cannot exceed the number of fingers of the hand. So, it's because it's related 
to the mind. We have women who are members or they want to participate. But 
at the level of taking responsibility, you have to responsible them. Political 
parties must be responsible.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
“Yes, it is a patriarchal organization, it must be admitted. Well, that said, there is 
always these efforts to be in line with what is happening in the world and to be, 
now you may know that there is an official request from the ITUC to impose 
somewhere to the directorates of the union centers that there are women. And 
there the UGTT will find a solution [...]” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
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The UGTT, having problems of internal representation of women, is also criticized by the 
women movement for example. On the other hand, it is logic that UGTT leaders do not 
criticize other actors for missing representation of women if their own organization does not 
perform better. It can also be an externally exposed frame that automatically links 
representation of women with internal problems. One can easily imagine that the women 
movement or even the own commission on women openly criticize the internal 
organization. 
 
The UGTT discusses internal representation between different regions, were some regions 
are seen as more influential due to their reputation or more activities (like Kairouan, 
Jendouba or Gafsa; UGTT, Moncef). However, Ahmed underlines that the UGTT reunites the 
whole Tunisian political spectrum when it comes to representation: 
"It's diversity too, you find all the political tendencies, from the far left to the far 
right, to the liberals. Generally, it is a minority the liberals in Tunisia in the union. 
But generally, we find all the political conceptions, all the small groups are 
represented and you find all sorts of ideologies and perceptions of the trade 
union work. [...]” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
The dimension on equal representation includes the representation of excluded regions, 
poor people as well as unemployment. The economic dimension in the framing of equality of 
representation is thus important as will be elaborated in detail later on. In addition, the 
UGTT discusses internal representation, however without providing solutions to the ongoing 
underrepresentation of women. 
Transparency: it’s all about corruption, businessmen and the old regime 
The framing of the UGTT focuses a lot on corruption, businessmen as well as the old regime. 
The transparency dimension includes freedom of information, publishing finances as well as 
corruption. The transparency dimension was not mentioned by Nada, but by all other UGTT 
leaders. It is however among the least evoked categories. 
 
The focus of UGTT leaders is on transparency and publishing finances in relation to political 
parties as the citation of Ahmed exemplifies: 
"Yes. But we could not, that is to say stop at the time of the elections, to stop the 
financing actions which seemed a little shady and all that. Now the report has 
been published, and a copy has been sent to the judiciary. But that will not 
influence the election results.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
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This referral to the use of money during elections is one of the few found across 
organizations. It is however pessimistic as elections are over and the published report on 
abuses will not change election results. 
 
On the other hand, the question of corruption is equally discussed. Positive developments as 
well as negative evaluations get highlighted. Corruption is the most important element when 
it comes to framing transparency, although some leaders are more optimistic than others. 
"There are always deviations in every country […]. But sincerely after the 
revolution things are much more objective. There are always people who have 
the opportunity through corruption and everything from having positions of 
influence […]. But it is less than before especially that there is no political 
interference.” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
"So, after four years of revolution, we must put an end to these practices, to 
these Mafiosi practices. For the moment, the 4 successive governments, none 
of the governments have worked to put an end to corruption on the types that 
exist in Tunisia. Be it regulatory corruption by law, and second corruption as 
abuse of power. Because before it was said that it was the family of Ben Ali and 
now the family is no longer so who does the corruption? That's it; there are 
others who do the same thing. [...]” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
The first citation by Aziz nearly accepts corruption as something that is normal, while the 
second criticizes in a more harsh way the incompetency of the government in terms of 
corruption. Others like Sofien link corruption to the old regime, Nida Tounes and the RCD. 
Similarly, Ahmed connects the question of corruption and violence to the old regime and the 
police state. Corruption gets connected to the electoral system and government 
responsibility. This framing, that several governments did not touch the question is a 
repeated framing that is frequently evoked. 
5.1.3 Freedom dimension: worker and collective rights 
Individual liberties, human rights and collective rights 
The dimension on individual liberties includes liberties, free conduct of life, but also physical 
integrity. The dimension appears in all interviews on a relatively equal level. The individual 
liberties dimension plays a role in interviews, but does not resonate in public as will be 
shown later. 
 
However, as for the LTDH, the role of human rights is underlined. Often, this referral to 
human rights goes hand in hand with a referral to worker rights. 
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"As I told you, the UGTT upholds the principles of human rights, collective and 
individual rights, including decent work for all workers. Decent work, respect for 
humanity, as an individual.” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
While Nada here speaks about both, collective and individual rights, Ahmed underlines that 
the UGTT defends practically more collective rights: 
"Of course, the UGTT has always defended individual and collective freedoms 
and everything. But in the day-to-day work of the headquarter and even sections 
and regions, there is always collective freedom rather than individual freedom. 
That's the nature of the organization, which is an organization dedicated to 
collective action. But on the statutes, on the values, the individual freedom is 
something very important.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
This human rights orientation and its connection towards workers and decent work are 
regularly discussed and are linked to the economic dimension that will be introduced later. 
Nada connects several elements in her argumentation on human rights. She does not only 
connect it to equality, but also to the constitution. By connecting equality, human rights and 
constitution, she adopts a framing that is particularly close to the one by the women 
movement as will be shown later. 
"So, we can say that we have a constitution that meets our expectations, where 
there is equality between men and women, where there is respect for human 
rights, so all freedoms are guaranteed in the constitution, but I tell you that the 
constitution [...] it is not enough to write a constitution. We must monitor the 
application, the application of these laws, and take radical measures against 
excesses […].” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
The position by Nada is less representative for the overall UGTT framing, where human 
rights get more frequently connected with worker rights and with economic elements. 
However, the distinction between legal texts and application is similar; something 
emphasized by Moncef. With the referral to workers’ rights, the UGTT goes farer (or in 
another direction) than the other organizations. 
 
As most of the other organizations, the UGTT discusses physical integrity. Physical integrity 
gets connected with the defense of movements from violence. 
"For example, this morning there is a press release from the UGTT. It says that 
social movements should not be treated by security police actions. You have to 
talk to people. Following the events of Ben Guerdane52 there was brutality, as 
we have said. You have to talk to people. It is necessary to understand the 
origins of these causes of these social movements, poverty, exclusion and 
                                                     
52 He refers probably to the protest following a closure of the Tuniso-Lybian border in September 2016, 
Middleeasteye 2016 
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precariousness, and to attack the roots of these movements rather than say to 
treat it in securitarian way [...]. You have to listen, analyze the problem and try 
to find solutions in partnership with people. But not shoot people […] or stop 
people.” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
"It’s a question of power. If people come by thousands, if they come in large 
numbers, the minister of the interior has only five-thousand [security forces] 
[...] good if it finds a few hundred, of course it can hit, it can have gas bombs 
and all that but [...] it's a question of power.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
The focus on collective rights becomes evident with the question on physical integrity. While 
other organizations emphasized individual physical integrity, the UGTT takes a collective 
perspective and speaks about the physical integrity of protesters as a group. While both 
perspectives fall under the same dimension, the framing is different and shows a somewhat 
divergent perspective in comparison to the other organizations. The framing as protector of 
movements is only comparable to the FTDES. The question of physical integrity gets 
connected to the next dimension, the public sphere, where freedom of speech is limited by 
violence. 
Public Sphere, freedom of speech as achievement of the revolution 
The public sphere dimension, including freedom of speech and freedom to associate, 
accounts for a number of demands exposed during interviews. It was not mentioned by 
Amine, but by all other leaders of the UGTT and slightly more by Sofien. 
 
Freedom of expression is essential for democracy: 
"I would say that freedom of expression is a crucial time for democratization. So, 
we need freedom of expression if not how to establish a democracy if there is no 
freedom of expression? [...] I am for total freedom of expression. Without 
restriction. Everyone has the right to express themselves freely.” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
"It's an open exchange. We are now [...] fortunately we are in a democratic 
climate. And we allow ourselves to criticize when there is reason to criticize. We 
do not criticize for criticism. But when we feel that there is a deviation that 
things do not work, it must be rectified; we criticize the government's approach.” 
(UGTT, Aziz) 
 
Freedom of speech not just breaks with the old traditions; Moncef for example highlights 
that freedom of speech shifts the old categories of clan belonging as everyone has the right 
to express themselves freely (UGTT, Moncef). In a similar vein, freedom of speech is often 
compared with the pre-uprisings period and is portrayed as main achievement of the 
uprisings. 
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"Before the revolution the Tunisian is afraid, does not want to discuss politics. 
Now you see all the people arguing wrongly or differently. People talk, people 
denounce, people protest, people claim. And so, there is a dynamic, there is a 
dynamic within the street at different stages even illiterate poor […], they claim.” 
(UGTT, Aziz) 
 
"If there is one gain after the revolution, it is freedom of expression in the media. 
Because we are not used to it. So, before we spoke in newspapers that are 
censored [...] there was a single sound of a bell, it is the bell of the government, 
the party in power. Because there was only one party in power. Now there are a 
hundred parties, so everyone expresses himself freely. Even the extremists, they 
express themselves [...].” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
In the perspective of the UGTT, freedom of speech is the most important achievement of the 
revolution. Similarly, when it comes to criticizing the government, the criticism by the UGTT 
becomes evident in relation to freedom of expression. The same framing with a referral to 
the old system is used to criticize limitations of the freedom of expression today. 
"Right now, so in the last few times, it feels like the government wants step by 
step to silence people. The proof of it is, I said, the attack on the protesters in a 
civil way. And there, the police forces attacked fiercely. Which was not the case 
for example last year. [...] One feels, in the last weeks, a lot of [...] media that 
somehow more or less is dominated by the government. It is not as it used to be. 
There is the dosage of criticizing the government that has decreased a bit. We 
feel that there is a collaboration between the former regime and a lot of 
television stations or radio, with the government and all that. We feel that things 
are getting arranged on the government side and the regime side.” (UGTT, 
Sofien) 
 
The limits of freedom of speech are the demand for violence and are quite similar to the 
framing of the other organizations. 
"No, but of course there are limits to everything. When you say freedom of 
expression I agree, but there are red areas not to exceed. It is not in the name of 
the freedom of expression one comes here for example to make a publication 
[...] to encourage the young people to go to Syria to a camp [...] for the jihad in 
Syria. That is, on the contrary, it is a provocation for terrorism and it is not a 
freedom of expression, it is a deterioration of the civil society.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
Freedom of expression is linked to the question of democracy and the opposition to the old 
regimes as well as the will of the people. The government is criticized for restricting freedom 
of speech. 
 
While freedom of speech was named relatively often, freedom to associate plays a limited 
role and gets connected to repression and terrorism as especially Sofien expressed (UGTT, 
Sofien). While freedom of association has not been mentioned often in detail, it is more or 
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less taken for granted and subsumed under freedom of expression as public contestation by 
the UGTT evidently plays out by the street and mobilization (or the threat of mobilization as 
strikes are a major tool of the UGTT). 
Rule of law, independence and the question of corruption 
The rule of law dimension includes the equality before the law, the quality of the legal 
system and the constitution. It was only mentioned by five out of seven UGTT leaders and a 
bit more by Aziz in comparison to the others. It is a dimension that was part of the framing 
of the UGTT, although of less importance. 
 
The equality before the law plays less a role than the quality of the legal system. When it 
comes to the quality of the legal system, one framing that reoccurs is a demand for 
independence. 
"The judicial system should be based on independence, autonomy and 
objectivity, the actual application of the law.” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
"Equality, theoretically yes, but practically no. There is a big problem at the 
judicial and security level in Tunisia, it is corruption.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
"There is still the influence of the people in power, the influence of the rich, the 
influence of all that on the judges. Until now, we do not have an honest and 
transparent justice system […].” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
Corruption and the fight against terrorism are transcending elements of the framing that get 
connected with the quality of the legal system. The call for reforms in the security as well as 
juridical sector includes the demand for a constitutional court. The independence of the 
juridical sector and thus a connection towards horizontal checks and balances is established. 
Another aspect that was often mentioned is the referral to transitional justice, an element 
still to be realized. 
5.1.4 Summary on the UGTT’s framing 
What do we retain from the UGTT’s framing on democracy? The UGTT’s framing on 
democracy is much about the support for the government in the fight against terrorism, but 
with respect to freedom of association. The UGTT is the only organization that highlights 
that a change of the fiscal regime should be used to finance the fight against terrorism. 
 
The framing underlines also participation. This triangle between government capacity, 
strikes and freedom of speech covers many arguments. Another influencing element is the 
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role of businessmen that are framed as corrupt and influencing the government. This 
element of corrupt businessmen named in line with the old regime equally influences 
framing on rule of law as businessmen are seen as influencing jurisdiction. 
 
The criticism of the two dominant parties is something much more pronounced for the UGTT 
than for the other parties. The UGTT appears also less sensitive when it comes to minority 
rights as there are no minorities from their point of view. Regarding freedoms it is to note 
that the UGTT underlines worker rights in line with human rights and emphasizes a collective 
perspective. Much in line with workers’ rights is the focus on economic aspects that is much 
more important than democracy itself as we will see in the following. 
5.1.5 Frame combinations: Dimensions of democracy but first and foremost economic 
issues 
Having outlined the democratic framing of the UGTT and the major preoccupations, I now 
turn to frame combinations. Those connections are important to describe the unique and 
shared elements of a democratic framing. It helps in the search for common elements, as if 
for example participation and public freedom get combined by all organizations, it can be an 
element that gets promoted together. Difference are highlighted because dimensions have 
not the same meaning when getting combined with different other dimensions. 
Combinations are an additional element of analysis because organizations can have single or 
combined referral to dimensions.  
 
Frame combinations include for example the connection of corruption with inference on 
government and the role of businessmen as part of the argumentation. Equally, the electoral 
outcome is connected with the dominance of the two most important parties. 
 
There are three elements of democracy that often get connected with other elements of 
democracy; concretely government capacity, individual liberties and rule of law (Table 10.12 
in Annex). The combination of government capacity and competition is mentioned most in 
terms of quantity and is important when regarding the framing in detail from a qualitative 
perspective. The role of political parties and especially of Ennahdha and Nida Tounes, that 
build the government, are a point of discussion. There is a criticism of their dominant 
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position as well as the general weakness of political parties that influences government 
capacity. 
 
Mutual constraints and rule of law get equally often connected. It is however to recall, that 
rule of law was only mentioned by five out of seven interviewees. Those five nevertheless 
consistently connected rule of law with the constitutional court and an independent justice 
in the sense of horizontal checks and balances. 
 
Individual liberties showed important and get often connected with other elements although 
we have seen earlier that it is mainly about collective rights. Representation and individual 
liberties get often evoked together, however the argument here is not necessarily positive as 
it also connects homosexuality and representation of minorities that is not seen as 
important. Another combination, individual liberties and government capacity, for example 
stands for the discussions on the fight against terrorism. It connects state capacity with 
restriction of freedom of speech at the same time. Another element that is connected to 
democracy are economic factors; a factor that is regarded in more detail in the following 
section. 
Democracy and the Economy 
 
"The UGTT is a national militant organization that defends democracy, social 
justice, the economic and social rights of workers and […] who adopts as a basis 
for discussion the social dialogue [...]” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
The framing of the UGTT on democracy is not only a demand for democracy, but also 
strongly related to the economy as the citation shows. One example is protest (part of the 
participation dimension), mainly strikes, that is connected to the demand for higher salaries. 
A number of economic factors, including development or unemployment, are found in 
central positions. This also includes political parties: Moncef for example criticizes political 
parties as being liberal in an economic perspective (UGTT, Moncef). Nearly every dimension 
on democracy is framed from an economic perspective as is the question of stability: 
"But to have stability, there are conditions that must be met first. To have 
stability, we have to fight against terrorism first. So as long as there is terrorism, 
there is no stability. The problem of unemployment, of the unemployed, would 
to be solved enormously and deeply, so we have more than three hundred fifty 
thousand graduated, who are graduated and unemployed. So, we would have to 
solve, as I said earlier, the problem of the interior regions. It is necessary to be 
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actively interested, it would be necessary to make a small economic 
development in these interior regions. And of course, it would be necessary to 
solve the social problems of the various workers in Tunisia. So, at that moment, 
we can talk about stability.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
Socio-economic factors are not only related to stability, but socio-economic factors are 
framed as hindering participation. Especially the question of (rural) women, a topic much 
covered also by the ATFD, has a prominent position: 
"It is not a question of rich and poor for political participation. It's a question of 
commitment. One is engaged in the political process, or one is not engaged. But I 
can tell you that effectively all Tunisian women are engaged in the political 
process, especially after the revolution. Because we had a whiplash or a slap 
after the revolution, because we saw our achievements that were starting to 
reverse. So, we were obliged, all Tunisian women, we were obliged to participate 
at least in community life, in demonstrations to defend our rights. Because we 
were threatened. Not threatened, we began to nibble some of our 
achievements, which had been acquired for at least fifty years, sixty years. So, 
that’s why women have been forced to defend their rights.” (UGTT, Nada) 
 
"Unemployed. Women also have problems of equality of insertion, especially 
rural women, integration into economic and social activity. So, we try a little 
through our dialogue with the different structures to help support and express 
our point of view on the modalities of a better professional integration of young 
people and women for a social stability of better social cohesion because there is 
no cohesion and stability the proliferation of social movements. It's a 
destabilizing factor.” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
The rural women frame is a frame particularly compatible for several organizations as we 
will see later. Economic exclusion plays a role in the framing of the UGTT, often accompanied 
by a demand for inclusion of the poor. 
“We are with the people, with public opinion, and with the poor, with the 
poorest regions, we are defending the middle class, the poor class, the 
unemployed and even equality between people. Between regions, between 
people. It is not necessary that five or ten or eleven or thousand can have all the 
goods of Tunisia.” (UGTT, Mohamed) 
 
Economic aspects are more prominently placed in the framing than is democracy. When it 
comes to the poor, also redistribution of income is an option, especially in order to 
overcome regional exclusion: 
"Of course, the UGTT also defends a democratic, civil society [...] it is for a free 
Tunisia, it is necessary to have a social balance between the regions. It also 
defends a legal distribution of wealth in Tunisia. And also, [...] it was necessary to 
have a new policy especially for taxes and debts and so on, because you know 
that in the Ben Ali regime, practically bourgeois and businessmen [...] it is only 
the workers and the wage earners who pay the taxes. The majority [...] of 
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businessmen are practically [...] doing what they want. We judge in the UGTT 
that, say the tax policy, is an unfair policy and in which it was necessary to 
initiate, it was necessary that the businessmen, the people who have money they 
must participate in a fair way, like the others.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
"It's the interior. They are called the regions where unemployment is 
accentuated, especially unemployment of graduates. That's our first axis. Our 
second axis that we wanted to work with the government was [...] the tax 
reform. Because at home in Tunisia you know that eighty-two percent of income 
is [...] the employees and employers. It's a little crazy […]. So, it's […] the third 
axis is the caisses53[…]. As long as unemployment increases, as long as there is no 
recruitment, the pension funds are empty. So, we have to find other ways to 
feed them, such as [...] the taxes on fortune. […] the fourth is to find solutions 
[...] to [make] the unemployed survive […]". (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
The economic dimension is not to underestimate for the UGTT. When regarding the 
combinations, it appears that democracy is actually a side product of arguments and gets 
connected with a number of economic problems. As part of the tripartite configuration, the 
demand for higher salaries is very important. It is however also the aspect that gets most 
mediatized as shown in the following. 
5.1.6 Frame resonance in public: Economy and a bit more 
This section shows which frame elements resonate in public. This becomes important in 
order to determine whether framings are eventually more convincing when mediated than 
through the direct channel or whether both can be used at the same time. 
 
First of all, it is to recall that the UGTT is by far bigger than the other organizations as this is 
represented in the number of articles and coded elements. When it comes to the framing of 
the UGTT, especially economic aspects and the demand for salaries are crucial. A number of 
claims presented in articles do not relate to democracy. The extent of this can be found in 
articles where economic issues like salaries dominate the media coverage as shown in Figure 
5.3 (a more detailed list can be found in the annex, Figure 10.11). Those findings qualify the 
overall relevance of democracy as part of the framing of the UGTT and set it more as a by-
product of claims. 
 
                                                     
53 Social security funds. 
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Many other elements like reconciliation, education and martyrs are other frame elements 
that appear often (coded under other as they were not part of the coding scheme on 
democracy). 
 
It is especially the perspective on government capacity or the fight against terrorism that are 
evoked in media. The state-oriented perspective is related to the UGTT’s central position in 
the political system. As they are closer to the state, the UGTT supports the state in its 
mediatized framing. While Kilani underlines that UGTT members had to rectify their own 
image following the revolution and instead took an offensive position against the old regime, 
the positive perspective towards the state at the national level persists (Kilani 2014). 
Figure 5.3 Topics of claims in articles 
 
Note: absolute occurrences of main dimensions, UGTT, total number of claims in articles: 826 
Resonance of democratic framing in public 
When it comes to the distribution across dimensions of democracies, eight hundred twenty-
six democracy-related claims appear in articles. As indicated earlier, I only look at clear 
organizational demands (claims) in articles and whether those include elements of 
democracy as part of their framing. The UGTT has a much higher media resonance than all 
other organizations taken together. However, as already seen, a huge number of claims are 
not directly related to democracy. 
 
Claims on democracy in articles are shown in Figure 5.4. Compared to interviews, the picture 
gets a bit less equally distributed and the focus shifts towards the equality dimension. This is 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
219 
 
  
mainly due to the reporting on the threat as well as actual protest. The UGTT connects the 
demand for higher salaries and better working conditions often to this threat. 
 
Beneath the reporting on strikes or its threat, two other elements of democracy resonate a 
lot in media reporting: Government capacity and much less freedom and liberties. While 
mutual constraints are not part of claims that resonate well in the media, government 
capacity alone accounts for two hundred eighteen of the claims. Adding the seventeen for 
competition and eleven for mutual constraints, the control dimension arrives at two 
hundred forty-six claims in relation to democracy. 
 
From the equality dimension it is especially participation and more concretely strikes and 
protest that play a role as well as to a minor degree transparency and participation. The 
equality dimension comes on three hundred thirty-seven democracy-related claims and thus 
more than the control dimension. 
 
The freedom dimension gets integrated in few public claims; while individual liberties are 
most represented and present an important element, rule of law and the public sphere are 
less relevant as shown in Figure 5.4. In articles, two dimensions with participation and 
government capacity gain more prominence than in interviews. 
 
Those findings are detailed in the following. The UGTT puts the revolution in the center of 
the debate as can be seen from articles (see Figure 10.11 in Annex). Corruption is a relatively 
central concept and gets connected to different other elements. Not only government 
stability, legislation and government inference, but also repression or justice are found in 
central positions and often connected with other elements. 
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Figure 5.4 Coded dimensions in claims in articles 
 
Note: number of coded claims, 826 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 17, Government Capacity: 
218, Mutual Constraints: 11, Participation: 264, Representation: 46, Transparency: 48, Freedom and liberties: 74, public 
sphere: 27, rule of law: 47). 
While rule of law, individual liberties and government capacity were important in interviews, 
government capacity and individual liberties have more or less equal importance in articles. 
This is also due to issue salience of the fight against terrorism at the time of analysis. 
However, the notion of individual freedoms can irritate as it is mainly human rights and 
collective rights that are defended by the UGTT. 
 
The government capacity is outstanding in the sense that it is much more combined in 
articles than other dimensions. This is linked to the already mentioned close position of the 
UGTT with the state and to the media coverage that is state-oriented. In this sense, the 
reporting on government stability can be overestimated as UGTT leaders were frequently 
asked on their position on governmental questions. From a different perspective and given 
the importance of government capacity in interviews, the importance of this dimension for 
the UGTT’s framing is there. Even if it is over reported in articles, the UGTT integrates 
government questions in their framing. Whether they do this to get more attention or 
whether they are asked to do this by the media is not clear. Commenting on the government 
could become a habit that gets integrated in organizational framing, not because the 
organization wants to do it, but because they are solicited. 
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The main three dimensions that get combined are rule of law, individual freedoms and 
government capacity for interviews. Participation, individual freedoms and government 
capacity are important combinations for articles. In this sense the internal framing of 
democracy can be found in the media, however to a slightly different degree. For the UGTT it 
can consequentially be argued that they are relatively successful in placing their claims in the 
media, although the relative importance of dimensions changes. 
 
The link towards the state shows also the possible compatibility of framing of the UGTT with 
the state that will be discussed again later. The UGTT criticizes the state, but at the same 
time refers to old governments or the old regime and less to the actual government. While 
especially the restriction of collective rights leads to claims towards the state, a lot of 
criticism is directed towards businessmen and corruption. The old regime is blamed for 
unequal distribution and so on instead of the actual one. 
 
Especially in relation to the public image that was expressed in articles, the UGTT appears as 
particularly close to the state. In line with the network structure presented in chapter four, 
the UGTT approaches a number of state actors and interacts more than other organizations 
with the state. It can thus be expected, that state representatives who interact a lot with the 
UGTT adopt a similar perspective, thus focused on government capacity, collective rights as 
well as rule of law. If they follow the mediatized perspective, they will emphasize 
participation instead of rule of law. 
5.1.7 Summary on the framing of the UGTT in interviews and media 
In comparison to the other organizations it becomes clear that the UGTT is first of all a labor 
union, defending workers’ rights and demanding higher salaries, at least when press 
reporting is concerned. The demand for higher salaries and better working conditions are 
aspects that resonate well in the public sphere. In addition, the UGTT highlights the 
government capacity and underlines elements like the fight against terrorism. 
 
Articles exist on the historic role of the UGTT that do not exist in a similar way for the other 
organizations. However, the UGTT is also more often subject to criticism. Especially its role 
as influencer of the government is criticized as going too far in articles published in Le 
Temps. The UGTT is portrayed as negative element able to influence the government and 
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thus as anti-democratic element in a number of journalist comments. Yousfi finds similar 
arguments in her analysis stating that the UGTT is accused of supporting anarchy through 
mobilization or described as uncivil actor (Yousfi 2015; Yousfi 2017). 
 
The perspective of the UGTT as consensus seekers is equally influenced by their position in 
the political system. The UGTT connects the framing on democracy with a narrative of the 
UGTT as national protector of democracy and guarantee for national dialogue on the basis of 
historic achievements. This framing fits well with what Meyer describes as a narrative of 
movement influence as part of the framing, or even a myth with historical scope (Meyer 
2006). Thus, the question on democracy is not just on democracy itself, but is connected to 
the image of the UGTT. Some interviewees used storytelling to illustrate points – and 
especially the historic role - through the use of examples (on storytelling see Polletta et al. 
2011). This was more frequent than for the other organizations. Explaining why storytelling 
is more frequent among UGTT leaders is difficult. Perhaps it is the wide reach of the 
organization, including very different tranches of the population that leads to a simplification 
in the sense that more examples become used as those might be easier understandable 
across different perspectives and positions. 
 
It shall be kept in mind that while interviews showed a relatively equal distribution with a 
slight focus on government capacity and thus the control dimension of democracy, the 
distribution in articles is different with a strong support for the government capacity 
dimension, but also for elements of equality. The UGTT is close to the state and defends 
more resources for the state. This argument is accentuated in the sense that for example the 
fiscal regime should be adapted so that workers and poor people get support. The framing of 
the UGTT is internally sometimes less consistent than for other organizations as the 
examples on parties and electoral outcome show. 
 
In chapter six it will be analyzed whether UGTT leaders have a similar framing of democracy 
compared to state representatives. Given the extensive networks, it is expected that this is 
the case. Following this argumentation, government capacity, collective rights and rule of 
law or participation should be prominent across civil servants. 
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5.2 LTDH: human rights and rule of law 
The LTDH is focused on the freedom dimension of democracy. The dimension is mentioned 
twice as much as each of the other two dimensions as can be seen in Figure 5.5. The control 
dimension as well as the equality dimension was mentioned less than the freedom 
dimension for interviews. However, different sub dimensions are of uneven importance. 
 
The unequal distribution causes a less detailed analysis as some dimensions are simply 
included in too few framings of democracy. It is less a problem of the number of interviews, 
but more the fact, that the LTDH is much more freedom-oriented and does not talk much 
about other elements, especially not separately. As a consequence, only few interviews 
concretely cited the control and the equality dimension. 
 
The focus lies clearly on the element of individual liberties as well as rule of law as Figure 5.5 
shows. Even public sphere is among the most important elements although it is much less 
important than rule of law and individual liberties. I discuss every dimension, although not 
every category will be discussed extensively due to the limitations mentioned above. 
Figure 5.5 Coded dimensions and sub dimensions in interviews 
 
Note: number of coded mentions, 112 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 6, Government 
Capacity: 8, Mutual Constraints: 9, Participation: 3, Representation: 11, Transparency: 8, Freedom and liberties: 41, 
public sphere: 9, rule of law: 17). 
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5.2.1 Control dimension: a dimension of reduced importance 
Competition of political actors: elections 
Competition of political actors is not often mentioned in interviews as shown in the 
overview and it is especially the electoral outcome that is coded. Nevertheless, it was 
mentioned by three out of four interviewees, however not by Bechir and more by Ali. The 
perspective on competition should be handled with caution; a bias through the more 
prominent mentions by Ali is possible. In addition, the framing in the interview of Ali is often 
connected to other dimensions such as the rule of law. 
 
One element that can be retained from interviews is the question of electoral observation 
that is evaluated as relevant by Rim: 
"So, there are a lot of networks that exist. The networks exist to organize the 
elections together for example, and a huge network has been set up to organize 
the observation of the elections together.” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
There is not much of the competition dimension included in the LTDH framing; it is not a 
very relevant dimension. The caution that the perspective on competition as a dimension of 
democracy may be biased becomes nearly obsolete as there is very few to analyze. 
In relation to theory and operationalization it needs to be said, that it was partly difficult to 
code elements of democracy as there was little to analyze. 
Government capacity: criticizing the security forces and the influence of the old regime 
Similar to control, government capacity is a category which received limited attention as part 
of a wider framing. The element was mentioned by Bechir and Rim, but not by the other two 
leaders. 
 
The influence of especially the old regime is criticized as augmenting: "Yes, the influence is 
still there, but it amplifies visibly.” (LTDH, Bechir). On the other hand, government stability 
and security forces are evoked, the latter in connection with liberties. 
"That the government is unstable during this period of metamorphosis is normal 
and also conflict. But the stability of the country interests us. And the 
cooperation of all actors for stability. It is the social and political stability that is 
important [...] even during difficult times we have never given up but after the 
dissolution of the secret police. But we always put liberties as a red line. Even if, 
in the name of national security and rights, it is difficult to combine all.” (LTDH, 
Bechir) 
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Especially in comparison to the UGTT, the differences become evident. While the UGTT is 
much more oriented towards state stability and government resources, the LTDH sees it as 
relevant, but other elements like freedom are more important; a point that is discussed 
when it comes to the freedom dimension. 
Mutual constraints: civil society as a watchdog 
Like all categories of the control dimension, mutual constraints did not receive a lot of 
attention. The framing was not mentioned by Medhi and is much influenced by the 
arguments presented by Bechir. The perspective on mutual constraints is to be handled with 
caution; a bias through the more prominent mentions by Bechir is possible. 
 
When I state that all categories of the control dimension face the same problem, it does not 
mean that discussions with leaders did not cover those topics. However, LTDH leaders used 
very clearly a different framing, oriented on the freedom dimension, to answer questions on 
the respective elements. One element that is mentioned in relation to mutual constraints is 
the role of civil society. 
"Civil society controls the government, especially after the Nobel Prize. Nothing 
will be changed without the mediation of civil society [...] Good governance is 
also important. The Nobel Prize was not only for the guarantors of democracy 
but for the Tunisian exception. [...] To be realistic. The first actor is the people 
through elections and civil society. Civil society has the power to control the 
government. It is a partnership between government and civil society. What we 
think to succeed and will also succeed in the other countries of the Arab Spring. 
Tunisia is a model.” (LTDH, Bechir) 
 
This perspective describes civil society as controller as well as partner of the government 
and as separate control institution. As mentioned earlier, this element is to be handled with 
caution and shall not be generalized to the whole LTDH. 
5.2.2 Equality dimension: socioeconomic factors and equality 
Participation: it’s the civil society that participates 
The participation dimension was rarely named in interviews, but more in articles as we will 
see later. It was only mentioned by Rim and Bechir and may consequentially represent only 
partly the framing of the LTDH. 
 
Participation is not seen independently, but gets connected to rights and the constitution 
(LTDH, Rim). Even more explicit on the role that civil society can play in policy formulation, 
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Rim connects the participation of civil society with the state, but also the resources of civil 
society and its possible implication: 
"So here too the revolution has […] allowed the climate of freedoms a lot, helped 
much to decongest the freeze that existed, the ice, the wall of ice that separated 
civil society from public institutions. It is true that there were [...] attempts of 
coordination between civil society, this two-part dialogue which is absolutely 
necessary. [...] There are departments that are more open to listen to civil 
society, more adapted than others. But doing so is the battle, is never fully won. 
It is essential to ensure that civil society is not only consulted systematically in 
politics, in the implementation of policies, but it must be respected that its 
choices are adopted and that it really weighs. This poses an enormous question 
of the responsibility of civil society, which must absolutely increase its capacities 
to become a real force of proposition.” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
This citation first of all highlights that connections between the state and civil society are 
already getting better, but that it depends much on departments whether civil society is 
consulted. Rim also remarks that inclusion in policy-making is not systematic. At the end she 
highlights the responsibilities of civil society to ameliorate in order to become a force of 
proposition. 
 
Participation is based on rights but also on practices vis-a-vis the state (and representation). 
The proposal and framing of the LTDH goes in the direction of an institutionalized access of 
civil society to political decisions and thus effective participation of civil society. However, 
only half of the interviewees mentioned the element and thus information remains limited 
and is to be verified by future research. 
Representation: socioeconomic factors and equality 
Representation was named several times as part of the framing. It was mentioned by all 
leaders, slightly more by Ali. However, it is not often presented as essential by interviewees. 
It is more the connection towards other elements of democracy that are important elements 
of representation. 
 
LTDH leaders for example argue that the socioeconomic exclusion in the interior of the 
country also hinders representation due to limited resources, a framing we have already 
seen for the UGTT. In addition, women rights and equality are underlined, again with a focus 
on rights. 
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"We are for total equality. That's the general principle. How to adapt to a 
discourse, […] it is according to the specificities of the region. But the basic 
principle is the same. Rights do not change” (LTDH, Ali) 
 
"It's in the constitution and we aspire total equality.” (LTDH, Bechir) 
 
Representation of minorities was not mentioned by interviewees. What already emerged for 
other dimensions is the strong referral to freedoms and rights which is regarded in detail for 
the freedom dimension. 
Transparency: it is all about corruption 
Transparency was evoked in interviews only to a limited degree. It was mentioned by Rim, 
Bechir and Medhi, but not by Ali. 
 
Especially corruption is discussed by the LTDH: 
"(Laughter) the systematic corruption that lasted thirty-five years is not to be 
solved within four to five years. The fight should be institutionalized.” (LTDH, 
Bechir) 
 
"[If] the people who continue to corrupt [...] and be corrupt know they will not 
be able to do it with impunity anymore. We will begin to hope for a cleaning of 
the economic world and social life in a general way.” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
The first citation calls for a more institutionalized fight against corruption, while the second 
asks for more persecution of corruption in order to show that corruption is nothing 
accepted. This sensitivity on corruption goes also for the own financing, not only due to the 
danger of money laundering, but also because of other perceptions: 
"We refused money. [...] Above all, there are funders where there is an 
exclamation mark. There may be funders who are laundering money. There are 
funders who are Zionists and we do not deal with Zionists. We do not have any 
problem with the Jews. We have problems with the Zionists. In addition, our 
accounting is very clear; we have an accountant who will divulge in the 
newspapers.” (LTDH, Medhi) 
 
The combination of the fight against corruption with other topics is less clear, apart from 
internal finance and the economic system. The equality dimension like the control 
dimension was few evoked in interviews, contrary to the freedom dimension. 
5.2.3 Freedom dimension: a human rights orientation 
Before introducing the elements of the freedom dimension, it is worth to recall that this 
dimension is by far the most important and thus essential to understand the perspective of 
the LTDH. It becomes that important that other dimensions are of minor importance. The 
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dimension gets more attention in the analysis as it is important to analyze this dimension 
carefully. In comparison to the other organizations it is remarkable that the distinction in the 
framing of the LTDH in favor of the freedom dimension is clearly pronounced. 
Individual liberties: human rights at the heart of the LTDH’s framing 
Individual liberties are by far the most important element when it comes to democracy. It 
was mentioned by all interviewees and a great part of all answers turned out to be on 
human rights even if questions referred to different aspects. 
 
It is this referral to human rights that is very prominent in the framing by the LTDH and this 
human rights framing encompasses several links towards other concepts like freedom, 
equality, democracy or torture. 
"The principles of the league are based on the principles of human rights and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter. [...] It is fundamental 
rights and freedoms that are important to us. We also paid the bill symbolically. 
We are the first association for the defense of human rights in Tunisia, the Arab 
world and Africa. [...] The league as an NGO can only perform these functions in a 
context of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This is not possible in an 
autocracy.” (LTDH, Bechir) 
 
“We touch everything. All about human rights in Tunisia. Political, social, 
economic. And everything that happens especially in prisons, the restriction of 
freedom, complaints, prisons, [...] the constitution of the country as a country on 
the way to freedom. Gender, gender equality. When we say gender, it is 
fifty/fifty. And we have parity too, we are for parity. We [...] fight for the 
constitution too. We do not have a single niche.” (LTDH, Medhi) 
 
Especially the second citation shows that human rights are also connected to prisons and 
prisoners. There is again not only a link to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as in 
the first citation, but also a referral to the constitution. Others like Rim refer to the LTDH as 
an old organization that was essentially founded for the defense of human rights. This goes 
hand in hand with a demand for the state to respect human rights and gets linked to the 
respect for the freedom of association. 
 
In addition, the difference towards the UGTT for example is actually found in the difference 
of rights defended, as Bechir elaborates: "The UGTT defends social and economic rights and 
the LTDH civil rights and culture. Each has its own specificity. These are the generations of 
human rights.” (LTDH, Bechir) Human rights are a transcending element that covers much of 
the framing of the LTDH. 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
229 
 
  
 
Physical integrity and the defense of prisoners and engagement against torture play a role. 
Prisoner rights are one specific aspect that is covered by the LTDH and that was not found 
for the other organizations. Especially, controls of prisons are one of the means of the LTDH: 
"We have several that we work with now; we imposed the unannounced visit of 
places of detention with the Ministry of Justice. And we are negotiating with the 
Ministry of the Interior to visit places of detention” (LTDH, Medhi) 
 
"So, since its creation it has aligned itself with the universal declarations of 
human rights and […] whose mandate is mainly the defense of individual and 
collective liberties, it is the defense of all victims who see violated their rights, of 
political prisoners who have been tortured. It has campaigned for the release of 
political prisoners and has also supported all justified and peaceful social 
movements that do not use violence.” (LTDH, Ali) 
 
The LTDH is the only organization that has the defense of prisoner rights and the protection 
against torture as focus, something already noted when it comes to the networks of the 
LTDH. 
 
It is also the referral to weapons and violence that is seen as “red line” for the LTDH when it 
comes to freedom of speech for example (LTDH, Bechir). 
Public sphere: more freedom of speech 
The public sphere and thus freedom of speech and freedom to associate get less attention. 
The element was not mentioned by Medhi. 
 
Generally, two arguments exist, one focusing on the role of the (social) media to defend 
freedom of speech and another one that sees protest as realization of the freedom of 
speech (as expressed by Ali). 
"Certainly, in a modern sense, Facebook, Twitter, etc., the media have played a 
vital role and still play in defending the freedoms of expression. The media are 
not always independent; some media speak for the parties” (LTDH, Bechir) 
 
The above citation shows also the skepticism towards some media outlets that are criticized 
as promoting particular interests, but that are nevertheless connected to freedom of speech. 
As mentioned before, the public sphere is the least integrated element of the freedom 
dimension and is thus not of great importance for the framing of the LTDH. 
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Rule of law: the legal basis for human rights 
The rule of law dimension is together with individual liberties the most important element 
for the LTDH. The framing can be nearly exclusively be referred to those two dimensions. 
The dimension was mentioned by all interviewed leaders, but less by Medhi. The rule of law 
is described as pre-condition for the activities of the LTDH and for human rights and 
democracy, something that makes the link between both categories even clearer. 
"The league as an NGO can only perform these functions in a context of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law. It's not possible in an autocracy” (LTDH, 
Bechir) 
 
"It is a rule of law that is to say where there is a separation between the three 
powers and where the power is held following democratic elections, that it is a 
process, good schematic but it is a process, all that is simple. It is the power that 
can only change with free and fair elections. So, the three powers must be 
separated. The laws should be in accordance with the constitution. This is 
democracy and respect for individual and collective freedoms, freedom of the 
press and information. That's democracy.” (LTDH, Ali) 
 
While the first citation connects rule of law, democracy and human rights as opposed to 
autocracy, the second links rule of law to the separation of powers. This call for separation of 
powers is seen as important for the quality of the juridical sector as independent actor. The 
constitution serves again as a referral. 
 
However, the quality of the legal system and less equality before the law plays a role. Bechir 
stated that while equality before the law exists on paper, problems persist in reality. The 
reform of the juridical sector is a topic underlined by Bechir: 
"In comparison we are less wary of the legal system, but we have reservations. 
There are still authoritarian structures. The legal system is not independent, it's 
not finished yet.” (LTDH, Bechir) 
 
The persistence of authoritarian structures and its criticism is something found across LTDH 
leaders. 
 
The constitution and the realization of the content of the constitution are central to framing. 
In this sense (and like for the ATFD) the constitution becomes an important referral for the 
guarantee of human rights, but also for the demand of reforms. The human rights 
legislation, be it national or international, is an important point of referral that emerged also 
in publications (LTDH 2011a and b). 
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"So, democracy means participation. It [...] means to concretize [...] all that the 
constitution has brought as a promise, has brought as a principle for the respect 
of the fundamental freedoms, the respect of the fundamentals of the universal 
human rights of the state, of the rights of the achievements in matters of 
women's rights. That's all mentioned in the constitution. The constitution also 
includes aspects of the need to decentralize, to decentralize power and to give 
the regions a kind of self-determination, within the unity of the state, of course, 
but it is something that is quite new. And it is necessary that the laws which are 
promulgated be the most respectful. It is a struggle how to make these principles 
translated into laws in all areas that give concrete substance to the general and 
in the constitution written principles” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
From this argumentation, the constitution is seen as the referral for many demands, be it 
decentralization, human rights, women rights. It is not just about codification, but also about 
application of the constitution. 
 
Two different additional topics emerge. Ali used justice in relation to social justice and the 
disadvantaged regions and Rim connected justice to the question of helping others on 
juridical questions - another topic as the LTDH wants to establish an effective juridical 
counselling. 
5.2.4 Summary on the LTDH’s framing 
Shortly summarized, the framing of the LTDH is relatively simple in the sense that two 
categories of the freedom dimension (human rights and rule of law) get combined in their 
argumentation. There is not much to summarize on the LTDH as it is very much about the 
connection of human rights with its codification, mainly the constitution. Rule of law is seen 
as precondition of democracy which is seen as condition for human rights guarantees. 
 
Human rights are that dominant in the framing that few unique elements exist. Nearly every 
element of democracy gets connected to it. The most evident mentions on other dimensions 
of democracy are related to civil society as a watchdog as well as to the role of freedom of 
speech. 
 
It is quite surprising that leaders of the LTDH did not extensively speak about other elements 
than human rights and rule of law. One could expect that democracy is perceived as more 
than human rights, also by LTDH leaders. The framing is that limited that it is even less in line 
with democracy as democracy is no concept only focused on the freedom dimension. While 
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the LTDH is clearly libertarian in its perspective on democracy, the question should be posed, 
whether a that unidimensional framing is sufficient to influence actors in a democratic 
system without a clear idea on democracy. 
5.2.5 Frame combinations: the freedom dimension’s importance underlined 
Not surprisingly, the most important combination is between individual liberties and rule of 
law. Other important combinations include freedom of speech and individual liberties as 
well as representation and individual liberties. 
 
In addition, the individual liberties dimension and thus human rights get connected to other 
elements like government capacity or electoral competition. Given the low number of 
mentions of government capacity or electoral competition it also means that nearly every 
referral to those two elements gets linked to human rights, something that again 
emphasizes the importance for the LTDH framing. The framing is very limited, but also much 
targeted. The LTDH does not integrate many other elements in their human rights and rule 
of law framing. 
5.2.6 Frame resonance in public: it’s still about human rights 
 
"We had the Nobel prize recently following [...] the quartet. To unlock the 
country. [...] we have never looked for the Nobel. We never, not even thought. 
But we thought about the good of our country and the continuity of [...] 
democracy. Although there are lower phases, there are peaks, [...] and above all 
we are aware that democracy goes hand in hand with the economic side. If the 
economic component does not work, democracy will regress. And unfortunately 
for us, our economic situation is very delicate. And with the delicacy of the 
economic conditions, it is sure that democracy will regress.” (LTDH, Medhi) 
 
The above citation mentions an aspect that resonates in public, that was not yet discussed, 
the Nobel Peace Prize: The Nobel Peace Prize plays a role when it comes to articles and is 
frequently named in relation with the LTDH as can be seen under the category other in 
Figure 5.6 (a more detailed list including more elements can be found in the Annex, Figure 
10.14). 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the predominance of the individual and rule of law dimensions, but equally 
sees government capacity in a prominent position when it comes to articles (partly related 
to the fight against terrorism, a salient topic at the time of analysis). Economic aspects figure 
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prominently, but not as prominent as for the UGTT. Individual liberties, government capacity 
and rule of law are more important than economic or other elements. 
 
The first not democracy related dimension is other, followed by economy. Aspects that fall in 
the category “other” and that resonate much include the revolution and the question of 
martyrs, health related issues and to a minor degree migration, culture or tourism. Terrorism 
and reconciliation are other topics that occupy the LTDH. 
Figure 5.6 Topics of claims in articles, main dimensions 
 
Note: absolute occurrences, LTDH, total number of claims in articles: 92 
Resonance of democratic framing in public, more about freedom, but there is a bit more… 
Ninety-two claims appear in articles, much more in LaPresse than in Le Temps. Figure 5.7 
shows that the dimensions individual liberties, government capacity and rule of law resonate 
a lot in the public sphere probably due to the perceived expertise of the LTDH. 
 
On the other hand, there are three sub dimensions (competition, mutual constraints and 
transparency) that have been only rarely coded in the claims in articles (Figure 5.7). In 
comparison to the interviews, the coding in articles is more balanced. While the freedom 
dimension stays most important, the control as well as equality dimension account 
nevertheless for more coding than in interviews. 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
234 
 
  
Figure 5.7 Coded dimensions in claims in articles 
 
Note: number of coded claims, 92 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 3, Government Capacity: 
37, Mutual Constraints: 4, Participation: 22, Representation: 21, Transparency: 7, Freedom and liberties: 40, public 
sphere: 17, rule of law: 34). 
For articles one can notice that especially human rights, the constitution, but also security or 
the revolution, justice, repression or participation are often connected with other elements. 
Also, the question of prisons can be prominently found in the framing and gets connected 
with rights and repression (an overview on centrality of topics can be found in the Annex, 
Figure 10.15). 
 
When it comes to frame combinations in articles as shown in Table 10.17 in the Annex, four 
dimensions get more connected to other dimensions, namely government capacity, 
individual liberties, public sphere and rule of law. Apart from the government capacity 
dimension that gets more coverage in the media – but only related to security aspects -, 
frame combinations center on the freedom dimension and show a very consistent picture 
for the LTDH. 
 
The most frequent combination is between government capacity and individual liberties. 
Under this category falls the criticism of the fight against terrorism as well as the role of 
prisoners in connection to human rights. The connection between human rights and the 
constitution and legal texts has already been mentioned. It is no surprise that the legal texts 
are equally used to criticize the government in relation to the security apparatus. While the 
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focus on the freedom dimension is also visible in articles, there are more of the other 
dimensions than in interviews that get combined. 
 
Economic issues play a role, but are not as central as for the UGTT. Resources and 
government stability play nearly no role in frame combinations in articles. It is more the 
question of security forces that is most important in terms of government capacity. In 
addition, it is to remark that neither competition, mutual constraints or transparency are 
virtually integrated in the framing. 
 
When it comes to combinations with other elements than democracy, it is to note that the 
questions of lesbian and gay rights emerge for the LTDH in articles. 
 
One of the reasons why the LTDH is more covered on other dimensions in the media are the 
calls for protest together with other organizations covering different topics as well as their 
inclusion in the quartet. In this sense, interviews appear as pure in the sense that they 
present the heart of the LTDH framing. This also shows that the inclusion of the LTDH in 
coalitions causes a much broader perception of its framing in the public sphere. By sidelining 
with other organizations, the LTDH gets mediatized with a much more equalized perspective, 
covering other aspects than freedom. 
5.2.7 Summary on the framing of the LTDH in interviews and media 
The key topics of human rights, security, repression, protest, legislation and justice are 
important frame content of the LTDH. The rights-oriented approach is clearly represented in 
interviews and articles. 
 
Compared to the UGTT, media coverage is different as still a number of state actors are 
included, but the most important dimension is clearly the freedom dimension. When it 
comes to the state, security forces get criticized. The role of the LTDH is less supportive for 
the state in comparison to the UGTT. 
 
While the LTDH clearly argues on the bases of what it was founded for (human rights), one 
can highlight that the LTDH still has a mono-dimensional framing of democracy. One can 
equally criticize that the framing of the LTDH fails to integrate other important dimensions of 
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democracy as democracy is much more than the freedom dimension. While this limited 
framing is certainly easy to identify by all actors of the political system, one can question 
whether it is adequate in a more and more democratic context, where human rights are not 
the only demand. 
 
When it comes to ideational influence it is difficult to say whether the LTDH is able to 
influence the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice. As we have seen from 
chapter four, at least relations with the Ministry of the Interior are frequent but distant. It is 
more to expect that ideational influence on the Ministry for Relations with Civil Society are 
better as those are seen more positive from both sites. 
 
The problem of the limited framing of the LTDH is no artefact, but a much focalized framing. 
The LTDH currently fails to provide a full picture of democracy. The ATFD on the other hand, 
while being focused on human rights as well, integrates other dimensions of democracy. 
5.3 ATFD: interference, representation of women and legal texts 
Figure 5.8 shows a distribution of dimensions that resembles a lot the one of the LTDH for 
articles with a very important freedom dimension. While the control and equality dimension 
are mentioned to an equal degree, the freedom dimension received much more attention. 
However, within those categories some poles are more important than other sub-categories. 
When it comes to the control dimension, it is government capacity in line with terrorism that 
has been coded most. For the equality dimension, especially aspects of representation (of 
women, but not only) and participation were named. For the freedom dimension, the focus 
on individual liberties and human rights as well as rule of law is to emphasize. 
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Figure 5.8 Coded dimensions and element in interviews 
 
Note: number of coded mentions, 415 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 30, Government 
Capacity: 64, Mutual Constraints: 20, Participation: 40, Representation: 57, Transparency: 22, Freedom and liberties: 98, 
public sphere: 31, rule of law: 53). 
5.3.1 Control dimension: religious inference and the role of businessmen 
Competition of political actors: weaknesses of political parties and skepticism 
As we have seen above, competition of political actors is not very important for the ATFD. It 
nevertheless appears in all interviews, while being less mentioned by Myriam. Two aspects 
are to be highlighted. The perceived weakness of political parties and skepticism towards 
those parties. 
 
A referral to party programs is part of the organizational framing, oriented towards priorities 
– and connected to civil society – as well as towards the missing regional reach of political 
parties and their diverse problems. 
"There are divisions already, in most parties. There are contradictions. There are 
also differences in the priorities of each [...] for example if we take the civil 
society, there are so many priority issues, important questions, that we cannot 
all agree on the priorities for which we must fight.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
When it comes to political parties themselves, Myriam for example identifies the opposition, 
Ennahdha and Nida Tounes, as three poles of the system (ATFD, Myriam). On political parties 
Nour added: 
"They are terrible, it's horror. When I see how they work, it's terrible. They are 
small grocers who think about what to win, stuff like that. When we see as the 
Front from the left, stuff like that. [...] We do not really have political parties that 
are up to the situation”. (ATFD, Nour) 
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The citation shows a missing confidence towards political parties that is not just share across 
ATFD leaders, but also with some of the other leaders. The contradictions mentioned are 
also part of a negative perception of political parties, covering different aspects like party 
programs. 
 
One of the few referrals to the competition of parties is found in one of the ATFD 
publications remarking that party competition did not ensure absolute equality (ATFD 
2011b). Interviews did not go in detail on competition of political actors. When prompted 
for, interviewees were divided between some existing competition between parties and the 
perception of missing competition of political programs. There appears to be more 
confidence in civil society than in political parties, thus the missing clear position on political 
parties and party competition appears logic. It can be argued, that those topics get salient 
during electoral campaigns; something similarly valid for the other organizations. 
 
Another aspect is the criticism of “rich” parties in election campaigns as well as the 
predominance of men in leading positions of electoral lists (ATFD 2011b). 
"For example, at present, the majority of the population is the poor or the 
poorest, but economic choices are essentially liberal. So, they do not represent 
the interest of the masses. And in the elections, there was a lot of use of money, 
for election campaigns.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"[…] that’s not really the reality. Because it's also the money that played a role in 
the elections, the last elections.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
Elections are criticized for representing more the fortune of actors than the reality. This 
critique often get links to the exclusion of the poor. In addition, the first elections after the 
Ben Ali era are seen with skepticism: 
"People voted for the first time in 2011, mainly for the Islamic party because 
they thought [...] they made promises, they are honest people who went to jail. 
They have values that are guarantees and everything. And then they realized 
that they are people like the others. They are politicians like the others, who 
have made calculations like the others, who make promises they do not keep, 
like the others. And so, they changed, they made vote-sanctions. So, as you 
know, they punished, they went to the other side. Many women voted for Nida 
as alternative.” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
The criticism of political parties has several names be it that politicians are not honest, that 
they search compromises and do not stick to their vote promises. At the same time, the 
ATFD criticizes a missing professionalization of political parties (ATFD 2011b). The ATFD sees 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
239 
 
  
elections as only one part of democracy, in combination with civil society as interviewees 
expressed (see 5.3.2 on participation): 
"I think that the fact that there are two, three, four parties that are there, I think 
it limits. And I believe that civil society, unions and all that are very vigilant. 
People follow what is happening, ask for accounts. There will be new traditions, I 
think that if we go like that there will be new habits, new traditions.” (ATFD, 
Hiba) 
 
While the electoral outcome is nevertheless accepted, the ATFD criticizes the influence of 
other aspects than political programs and argues for a greater inclusion of civil society, also 
as additional control instance. It is especially this framing of civil society complementary to 
electoral outcome that seeks to strengthen the role of civil society as a whole. 
Government capacity: the role of religion and businessmen 
Government capacity is one of the most important dimensions expressed in all interviews. In 
relation to government capacity and whether specific actors are able to influence the 
government, ATFD leaders expressed their concern for religion as well as businessmen to 
influence the government. 
"So, there is this side, there is the cleavage that is also religious. And who says 
religious, it's very complex here. Because it is religious Islamist, political, because 
there is the political religious and there is the religious all at short. It's not the 
politics, it's the spiritual side, the religious affiliation, and it’s the culture.” (ATFD, 
Nour) 
 
"We know it very well. The central bank mentioned that there is a lot of money 
coming from the so-called associations to build mosques, and so on, but basically 
it is for terrorism.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The skepticism towards religious actors is widespread among ATFD leaders. The influence of 
religion does not only concern the government but also the juridical sector as Yasmine 
argued (ATFD, Yasmine). Different perspectives on whether religion is bad per se and leaders 
arguing for different actors that use religion exist within the ATFD. The skepticism towards 
Ennahdha is shared among many interviewees of the other organizations, but ATFD 
interviewees most clearly linked it to political interference. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is not only the inference of religion, but equally the influence of the 
money or businessmen that is criticized. Myriam for example states that “capitalism reigns in 
Tunisia” (ATFD, Myriam). While this position is at one extreme of the ATFD framing of 
influence with a critique of capitalism, the question of rich people influencing politics is a 
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common perspective. Not all leaders criticize capitalism, but they at least criticize the 
economic system. 
 
Another element of government capacity are terrorism and security. The question of 
government capacity or state authority is seen more skeptical and negative, as the ATFD 
underlines problematic events like police aggression (ATFD 2011b). On the other hand, the 
ATFD condemns the violence committed by Daesh, especially in relation to atrocities against 
women or political assassinations (ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015d; ATFD 2015b). There is support 
for the fight against terrorism, but this clearly within the limits of the respect for human 
rights. 
 
Government stability is supported and a strong state is sometimes emphasized, but with 
limitations. 
"Stability of the government is important, of course it is important. But not at all 
costs. The goal is not the stability of the government. If a government is unable 
to ensure a correct and consistent follow-up, if it is unable to work; in the 
general interest of the people and the nation, we do not want it. But it's still 
good, a stable state, it's always better than an unstable state. But not at any 
condition. It depends what it does.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"We need a strong state. But these ministers and ministries are weak. It is 
because they are infiltrated and there is an imbalance within, or it is a desire to 
keep the position. Personally, they hold to their position and they do not make 
decisions.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
As the first citation shows, stability of the government is bound to an effective government. 
If the government does not work in the interest of the people, the ATFD sees it better to 
change a government. The second citation furthermore highlights the problems with 
ministers as well as personal interests to keep in power positions. Both together advocate 
stability if it is in line with policies in the interest of the country. 
 
ATFD leaders are divided between the demand for a strong state in terms of fighting 
terrorism and the danger for individual liberties that result from a harder fight against 
terrorism. The ATFD appears more skeptical towards government resources and capacities, 
especially in comparison to the UGTT. The framing is more compatible with a LTDH framing. 
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Mutual constraints: decentralization and participatory democracy 
The horizontal and vertical checks and balances were mentioned by all interviewees, but a 
bit more by Sarah. 
The ATFD underlines the demand for independent institutions within the state that are able 
to regulate for example the media (ATFD 2011b). While institutional checks and balances 
would enable civil society actors to enter institutional councils as part of their expertise, the 
demand for controlling institutions was not prominent. The most explicit demand was for 
the constitutional court, as there is still a divide between actual laws and the constitution. 
 
Especially Sarah demands independent institutions as answer to those practices of 
influencing: 
"That is to say, sometimes we do not have a real political will to involve the 
authorities concerned. And one does not want autonomy of these bodies. For 
example, one does not want media autonomy; one does not want autonomy of 
justice. One does not want because currently the people who compose it are not 
all true Democrats, because there are political negotiations. There are the 
Islamist parties, there are the far-right parties, there are the liberals [...] if there 
is autonomy of justice, if there is a constitutional court, if there is autonomy of 
expression, if there are no material issues in the media for example. At least the 
national press [...] should be controlled for their material sources as well.” (ATFD, 
Sarah) 
 
The ATFD criticizes here the missing political will to develop independent institutions, 
because they see the people in institutions as more democratic than politicians. The demand 
for institutions includes the constitutional court, but also independent media and 
independent justice among other. 
 
The second aspect that was discussed a lot was decentralization of the political system. It is 
foreseen by the new constitution but not yet implemented. 
"You know, decentralization does not mean regional autonomy, to say total 
autonomy. […] It's a big debate still, it's a big debate. When we made the 
Tunisian constitution, the new constitution, we had great regional debates about 
stuff like that. How far can we go in terms of decentralization? Does the region 
have to be truly autonomous? Because there is the region, the governorate [...] 
so that's the division even in regions, do we keep the same nomenclatures as 
before, do we change?” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
"So there has to be this participation. Participatory democracy, it should be 
developed, now at least at the level of local power, local governance. I hope so.” 
(ATFD, Hiba) 
 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
242 
 
  
"[...] to establish a participatory democracy, to enable women to be in these 
forms of institutions. For that, I would have to talk mainly about disadvantaged 
regions, regions where there are still difficulties for women to participate” 
(ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The ATFD framing goes in the direction of a limited autonomy and includes many questions 
where ATFD leaders hesitate to give answers. There is a wide support for decentralization, 
but there is no answer to the degree of autonomy. At the same time, the demand for 
redistribution in the sense of federal equilibration from one governorate to another was 
mentioned. Another key word is participatory democracy to give an idea about what kind of 
democracy Tunisia could develop (ATFD, Sarah). In this participatory approach, local 
democracy and civil society play an important role. 
 
While decentralization is an issue, it was not among the most prominent frames as we saw 
from the overview on dimensions. What appears as important for the ATFD is not 
decentralization at any price, but a well-planned one. 
5.3.2 Equality dimension: parity of men and women and participatory democracy 
Participation: participatory democracy and civil society as intermediary 
Participation appears in all interviews, slightly more in the interview with Sarah. 
Participation of women is one of the key elements in ATFD’s argumentation. 
 
Participation also includes the participation of civil society and the link towards the state. 
Especially participatory democracy re-emerges as a term and is a key frame when it comes 
to democracy, being connected to a number of different elements. 
"It must exist. There must be a real desire for participatory democracy. If we want to 
build a democratic state. [...] And where the civil society has a role, where the people 
also has a role, it intervenes in the big choices of the State. It is a participatory state. 
[...] Normally through elections it [the people] participates directly. During the 
elections, it is a participation [...] it can also be represented by the civil society. For 
example, for unions, through associations like ours. It's not contradictory, it's 
complementary. Whenever it has the opportunity, it also participates indirectly 
through the elected to the parliament, through the parties too, for those who are in 
the parties.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
Participatory democracy includes not only citizens, but also civil society. Civil society is here 
seen as a relay for people’s demands. The referral to participatory democracy by women 
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movements around the world is also underlined by scholars like Anne Phillips as it fits well 
when combining feminism and democracy (Phillips 1995). 
 
Another aspect is the equality of participation. Here, the role of women in line with parity 
and representation gets discussed. The framing on representation is presented in the 
following section, but both elements, equality of participation and representation get often 
connected. On the other hand, there are also some doubts on the willingness of people as 
well as civil society to get mobilized. 
"Today, people are exhausted […]. But there are women's associations that 
continue to work.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"Because, well, we fight against it. But it is not up to us to mobilize alone, to 
make the decisions; it is also to the Tunisian people. But the Tunisian people with 
the revolution I feel that it is [...] exhausted. Also, we are very touched by the 
economic crisis; the Tunisians are very much affected by this. They are no longer 
interested in politics more than in their lifestyles, in their salary.” (ATFD, Myriam) 
 
This notion of an exhausted people is a widespread framing and is also found for some other 
organizations. The ATFD places it more prominently than the other organizations. Another 
difference towards other organizations lies in the evaluation of the people’s capacities. The 
people are seen with skepticism questioning the capacities of voters: This position is an 
elitist position that goes against the conception of democracy based on equal participation. 
“[...] I think both. I would say the people, but the people are so manipulatable 
sometimes […] the elections showed that. I think that the people say its word, 
that's for sure. We saw how women in particular voted during the last 
election.” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
This framing of a manipulatable people is something unique to ATFD leaders and was not 
found for other organizations. 
 
Summarizing, the disadvantaged position of women hinders participation of women 
according to the ATFD. This has equally influence on the representation. Effectively, 
participation and representation are closely linked for the ATFD. 
Representation: Parity, and minority rights 
Representation was mentioned by all interviewees and a bit more by Yasmine and Sarah. 
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It is especially the representation of women and minorities that plays a role while neither 
left-right wing representation nor direct democracy are important. Some of the few 
arguments on direct democracy link it to participatory democracy, the key term already 
discussed above. Given the caution towards decentralization and the partly missing 
confidence in the people, the reserves towards direct democracy are consequential. 
 
The representation of especially women is one of the most important pillars in the 
argumentation of the ATFD. The ATFD asks for more women in local and decisive councils 
and for equality in representation (ATFD 2014a; Huffpost Maghreb 2013). 
"[…] when it comes to mass movements, women are very strong there. But when 
it comes to elections and representation at the level [...] of decision posts, both 
in political parties and in government institutions, we don’t find them anymore. 
So, it's not them who do not want to. But it is also the lack of political position 
taking, political decision that allows them to go ahead. [...] First in law, there is 
no protection or promotion of women's political participation. You now see the 
latest appointments of governors, at the regional level; they are all men while 
there is a lot of female competence. Similar in parties, unfortunately, even those 
on the left, there is no promotion of women's political participation. There must 
be positive discriminatory measures, unfortunately.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The ATFD connects representation in the administration; institutions and so on with several 
articles of the constitution (see 5.3.3; ATFD, Sarah and ATFD, Yasmine). The organization 
asks for parity of men and women as part of legislation including electoral laws (ATFD 2012; 
ATFD 2014c). This parity gets divided into horizontal and vertical parity. 
"But that [success] was parity [...] first of all it was written in the constitution, it 
was our battle too. But currently it is not [...] for example article forty-six says 
that the state must take all the measures so that there is parity in the elective 
bodies. It is not parity on the electoral lists. In institutions. And to have parity in 
the institutions, we must give ourselves every opportunity to ensure that women 
are effectively present in the elected bodies. And we must therefore apply 
horizontal and vertical parity. That is to say that in the heads of lists, there must 
be fifty percent of men and women. [...] The parties also have their role to play. 
There are parties that claim to be democratic and have no women at their head 
first. Women are not represented in their leadership [...]. And they did not want 
to vote for horizontal and vertical parity, on the pretext that there are not 
enough women, that there is no competence [...] whereas for us there is a lot of 
female competence in these specific parties, in the unions too.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"Well we have fought for parity, already in the high instance for the democratic 
transition [...] and therefore within this body we have campaigned for an 
electoral law that takes into account parity. Unfortunately, we did not reach 
parity but it was at least known. It continued later in the period when there was 
the electoral code that was to be discussed within the ANC. We campaigned for 
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horizontal and vertical parity but unfortunately it was not accepted. We have 
also campaigned with other associations and we have been active in ensuring 
that the constitution [...] shapes the need for equality, respect for individual and 
collective freedoms, freedoms for men and women. Well, there are some 
achievements. Article twenty-six and article forty-seven.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
This division between representation of women and representation in leading positions was 
not found for the other organizations. The framing on equality is more detailed. In addition, 
there is a strong referral to international treaties and human rights as those are more 
progressive in the fight against discrimination. The ATFD criticizes the unequal 
representation of women, especially in line with elections, as well as their missing presence 
in political functions. Parity or equality are key terms for the ATFD. 
 
Heritage and legislation on heritage play a role for the ATFD connected to an egalitarian 
perspective: 
"At the moment, there are laws that discriminate against women, which are not 
for equality. And according to the constitution, these laws must be modified and 
repealed. They must be repealed to be in harmony with the constitution, 
otherwise they would be unconstitutional. And there is currently no real political 
will to change these laws. [...]. And we want these laws to change. For example, 
equality in the inheritance, if article twenty-one of the constitution says that the 
citizens are equal, then the inequality in the inheritance becomes 
unconstitutional. If the constitution says that the state must take all measures to 
protect women from violence, discriminatory laws [...] that is not a change of law 
because there are laws which are for equality that exist in Tunisia but that are 
not respected.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"Although Tunisian laws are supposedly for equality, discrimination against 
women still persists. In the family. Already in the family, tutoring is for the 
husband. It's the father, the husband who is the head of the family. Hence there 
is a lot of discrimination, both in the important choices of the family, to solve the 
daily problems, [...] it follows of course the inequality in inheritance, which still 
remains [...] the woman half of what the man inherits. And also, choices for 
children” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
This referral to heritage is not directly linked to democracy, but is nevertheless important for 
the claims of the ATFD. It is important for the framing on equality as equality covers many 
different aspects. The demand for equality in heritage with a referral to the constitution and 
the demand to change existent laws is typical for the framing of the ATFD. 
 
A lot of arguments of the ATFD turn around women. The exclusion of the youth and the 
question of minorities still get attention. Minority rights as well as discrimination are named 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
246 
 
  
by ATFD leaders, which was not the case to a similar degree for the other organizations. The 
ATFD even discusses rights of homosexuals in line with discrimination. 
"Minority rights, of course. We are against all discrimination according to sex, 
race, sexual orientation, social origin, country. So, all forms of discrimination. We 
are all equal before the law [...]” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
It is to keep in mind that this framing with a support for sexual orientation as a way of life is 
something very progressive in Tunisia. When it comes to discrimination, the ATFD – like the 
FTDES – includes racism against black people in its argumentation, something not found in a 
similar way for the UGTT or the LTDH. 
"There are problems. You know we worked a lot and during the 2015 Social 
Forum, this year. The dynamics [...] the question of black […] racism. We put it on 
the table. It was not easy. There we saw the difficulty of being accepted. For 
them, it does not exist. That's not true, you raise a false problem. They live 
among us there is no problem. It is not a problem. Just saying that [...] is a total 
ignorance of what these people are going through. [...] They feel excluded. They 
live it as social exclusions.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
In addition, the rural sector as well as exclusion of poor people is covered by the ATFD. This 
is a transversal theme that will be discussed later in detail when it comes to frame 
combinations. The ATFD highlights the representation of women and parity in institutions 
and political parties, discrimination not just against women, but also minorities and the 
exclusion due to economic reasons. 
Transparency: rather abstract demands for transparency 
Transparency appeared in all interviews, while being more present in the one with Sarah. 
While availability of information is named by the ATFD - especially in line with transparency- 
it is to recall that it is not an important topic often used. 
 
The demand for transparency remains abstract when Sarah demands that state institutions 
work on transparency and honesty or where opacity is criticized (ATFD, Sarah). Other 
mentions focus on transparency of electoral campaigns as well as the control by civil society 
to blame the abuse of money. In addition, informal economies are a problem in line with the 
state capacity: 
"Listen, when you have fifty percent of the revenues of the national economy in 
the national economy, it is the parallel market, what do you want? What state 
are we talking about?” (ATFD, Nour) 
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On the other hand, corruption itself is not regularly evoked by the ATFD. While it is criticized, 
there are no concrete demands on how to tangle the problem. 
"In any case, corruption has increased in Tunisia according to international 
statistics. [...] because of the impunity, it is a post-revolutionary period, because 
of the impunity the corruption has increased. [...] Of course. It is contradictory to 
transparency and democracy.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"It's more than before. Because there is a lot of dirty money. A mad money 
laundering. There are bundles of money coming into the country. We do not 
know [...] we know its parallel trade, all that too. [...] the trafficking, the mafia 
that spread with the Salafists here.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
Transparency is not a very important demand of the ATFD and it shows a limited framing of 
the problem. The framing is nevertheless very compatible with other organizational 
perspectives as it rests on a very abstract level. It becomes clear that transparency and 
corruption are no important issues to the ATFD. 
5.3.3 Freedom dimension: sexual rights, women rights, human rights 
Individual liberties: defense of freedoms and physical integrity 
Recalling the statistics on topics named as part of their framing, one can assign that 
individual rights and the free conduct of life, as well as physical integrity especially of women 
are among the most important elements for the ATFD. Individual liberties were mentioned 
by all interviewees on a high level, while being even higher for Sarah. This becomes already 
clear in the objectives of the ATFD: “elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 
[…], the defense of the achieved rights and the evolution of Tunisian legislation towards 
effective equality of sexes […], the transformation of patriarchal mentalities […], the 
recognition by women of their problems and the solidary fight towards anti-discriminatory 
solutions [...], the participation of women in civil and political life […], the recognition 
without exception of their complete citizenship” (ATFD 2015a, own translation). In addition, 
freedom of movement, liberty of religious practice, the “right to difference”, the rights of 
minorities or the equal distribution of values between men and women are part of their 
arguments (ATFD 2012). 
 
In interviews, their framing on rights focusses on human rights. Those human rights are 
together with international treaties a main point of reference. 
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"We are for all individual freedoms. We fight for individual freedom, [...] we are 
against racism, [...] we carry all human rights, this is our reference. Our reference 
is human rights, international conventions.” (ATFD, Myriam) 
 
"Democracy is a state of law, where all individual freedoms are respected [...] we 
fight against all discrimination and where dignity, social concerns and human 
rights are respected.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
The framing of democracy as a state of law and its combination with human rights describes 
well the framing of the ATFD. Human rights are also used to determine cooperation, so they 
actually build the basis for the perceptions of other actors as Sarah expressed: 
"No, not by the word. It's with exercise. For example, we know that the Tunisian 
League for Human Rights has always campaigned for rights [...] I said that 
currently, for example, they have voted for parity for the leadership and for the 
regional leaderships, in addition we have always defended the same rights, they 
are for the rights of expression, individual liberties, freedoms [...] against torture, 
against the death penalty. That is to say, we share these values there. We push 
them [...] they started to take charge of women's rights and they never say no, it 
is not possible in the name of religion or in the name of anything. But we would 
like them to adhere, that their base adheres more massively to these values 
there.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
The citation also shows that human rights and a rights-based approach is not promoted 
alone, but together with the LTDH, which indeed has a very similar framing. However, it is 
not only a referral to human rights, but more concretely to women rights for the ATFD. 
"[...] the basic principles [...] for us it is the defense of women's rights, which are 
an integral part of universal rights. So, from there, our battle is part of this fight, 
too, for the universal. We believe that even if we belong to a country, that there 
is the world, too, that is there, that contributes.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
"What binds us are the rights of women, it is the democracy, it is the freedoms 
and we are plural, that is to say we have copines54 who are in different parties, 
but generally those are parties of [...] modernists, democratic, who are for the 
respect of human rights. We are not, for example, none of us in the Ennahdha 
party or the Islamist parties. So, we are copines, what binds us is respect for 
these rights.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
The framing of the ATFD is nevertheless often more progressive in comparison to the LTDH. 
Sexual rights are part of the human rights and are linked to democracy, something very far 
reaching in comparison to the other organizations (ATFD 2013). The ATFD demands freedom 
in relation to the way of life for example of youth when it comes to alcohol, choice of 
workplace or other aspects (ATFD, Yasmine). Especially the demand of freedom of sexual 
                                                     
54 The term copines is not translated as it is used to connotate members of the ATFD. 
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orientation is not very common in Tunisia. To recall, the ATFD is one of the organizations 
with relations to organizations defending gays and lesbians55. 
"For us, for example, the criminalization of homosexuality, because 
homosexuality is punishable by three years in prison. And the state, and the 
constitution includes provisions for respecting and protecting individual life and 
privacy. That's part of the individual choices. So, we use the constitutional 
arguments to attack those discriminatory laws that already exist. And it's not 
about changing the laws only; it's also about conducting awareness campaigns. 
[...] And currently young people [...] for example, there are many young 
associations working for specificities, for example organizations for the rights on 
sexual orientation, which are not declared totally gay or lesbian but we work 
with them. We have always supported sexual orientation, because it is difficult 
to do in Tunisia. Moreover, the Islamists attacked us during the election 
campaign saying that it is people who are against Islam and against traditions; 
they advocate the marriage of gays and lesbians. For us it's not even a question 
of marriage. For us it is the respect of freedoms. Because we do not care if 
people want to get married, whether they are gay or not gay, or straight, that's 
not our problem. Marriage is a personal choice. But their freedom, respect for 
their freedom is a claim we have always had since the beginning of our activity.” 
(ATFD, Sarah) 
 
This framing on lifestyles shows a very libertarian conception of democracy. The realization 
of the own way of life is deeply embedded in the ATFD’s framing. Much of the framing 
describes the modernity of the Tunisian political system. 
 
In line with modernity, the ATFD is against the headscarf and discusses the freedom of 
religion. 
"We are against the veil and our position is clear, but we receive veiled women in 
our listening center for battered women. We accompany them, we follow them, 
we are in solidarity with them. [...] So we have no problem, we are for the choice 
of clothes, but we have a position, we are against the veil because we think it is 
discriminatory.” (ATFD, Myriam) 
 
"You are for women's rights, or you are against it. If you are for, how? Because 
even for the pros, they say we are for the right of women, even Islamists that's 
what they say. We are for women's rights […] according to the vision of the 
Koran. The Koran, it gives rights, and they must be applicable. So, to tell you that 
it's a real negotiation, it's not [...] It's this cleavage that will make the difference, I 
think. The question of women's rights, are these fundamental rights for you, or 
not? At the social level, at the religious level, are you for the separation of 
religion from politics? […] And that's the big cleavage. [...] everyone has the right 
to choose the religion he wants to practice. That's clear, you see. To practice [...] 
                                                     
55 Fortier summarizes the very difficult situation of activists for LGTB issues and the related problems in Tunisia 
(Fortier 2015). Consequentially, the ATFD takes up a very controversial topic that does not have yet societal 
consensus. 
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but at the same time, we are for that religious people also respect those who 
have no religion, or those who have different religions.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
The question of the headscarf again shows the tension and skepticism towards religious 
actors. The interpretation of women rights and religious rights is a quite important point in 
the framing of the ATFD. Religion is used as main criticism for more traditional ways of life. 
 
The right on physical integrity, on the own body and against violence is often mentioned 
(ATFD 2012; ATFD 2014a; ATFD 2011 a; ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015d). Other researchers already 
found that this framing resonates well. Arfaoui and Moghadam argue: “Framing violence 
against women as a human rights issue resonated with many lawmakers and policymakers, 
especially at a global level” (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016:639). This is found in a similar way 
for the ATFD. The protection against violence is targeted via the Centers of listening for 
victims of violence, where the ATFD helps and tries to sensitize in case of violence (ATFD 
2011a). 
"The minimum of freedom is to dispose of one's body. You cannot talk about 
freedom if you do not even decide on your body. We are against pedophilia; we 
are against violence [...]. But everyone has the freedom to dispose his body 
within the limits of the law, that is to say you cannot dispose your body while 
being, while going out with a child. But it's freedoms as long as it does not touch 
between two consenting people, two consenting adult people; it's not our 
business, nor the business of the state. We must respect the individual choices of 
people.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
The right to dispose on its own body establishes the connection to healthcare. Health related 
questions and access to healthcare by women or the right to abortion are further aspects 
demanded by the ATFD (ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015b; ATFD 2013). The ATFD thus consciously 
breaks the taboo to talk about sexuality and especially the right on abortion to enable 
women to completely dispose their body without influence from the patriarchy (ATFD 2013; 
ATFD 2014b). 
 
The ATFD supplements its perspective on reproductive health with several international 
treaties and conferences like the pact on social, economic and cultural rights, the CEDAW, 
the CIPD, the Conference of Beijing, the Millennium Development Goals, the Protocol on 
Women rights in Africa (2005) or the Maputo Action Plan, but equally bases its 
argumentation on national legislation (ATFD 2013). The main argument, based on human 
rights and international conventions is the right for the own body, where also reproductive 
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rights are included. Empowerment of women is hereby also promoted through health-
related questions. 
 
All this already shows the connection of human rights, individual liberties and physical 
integrity with the rule of law. Individual liberties build the key of the ATFD’s argumentation it 
is clearly a libertarian perspective, even a very Western perspective. 
Public Sphere: freedom of speech and the problems with media 
As seen above, the public sphere plays a role for the ATFD, but not as important as individual 
liberties or participation. It was mentioned by all interviewees and slightly more by Hiba. 
 
Freedom of expression is seen as achievement, be it new or old media and as positive for 
democracy. 
"If we have won something, it is this freedom of expression. So, it's very 
important for us. That's why even the young people are fighting for it [...] But I 
think that to send the critical message [...] because you know after the 
revolution, there has been an almost radical transformation of the expression 
even. At the radio level stuff like that. There are new journalists who have 
returned. But the ancients too, who have changed, depending on the climate [...] 
well, they have qualities.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
"Yes. I think that with the possibilities for information that are spreading, it will 
become popular. And there are many people who cannot speak; they will come 
to the party meetings. They express themselves on the Internet, they send 
messages. No, the virtual space is extraordinary. It freed the speech and it 
brought people together in an incredible way. [...] it is as if we were pressuring 
us already by the media because, already at the level of Facebook, the debates 
were discussed, we were forced a little bit. So, I think it will be democratized.” 
(ATFD, Hiba) 
 
Freedom of expression is evaluated very positive and notably the internet gets emphasized. 
When looking at the framing on media, there exist many reserves on whether particular 
interests hide behind media outlets. The importance of the media and of information also 
for society has been discussed by a report of the ATFD during the initial transition where 
they, in cooperation with other organizations, monitored the media (ATFD 2011b). The 
independence of media from politics is important and some owners of media outlets have 
been criticized for using their enterprise to promote themselves (ATFD 2011b; ATFD, Sarah). 
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The question of freedom of expression gets connected to the fight against terrorism as 
mentioned earlier. 
"So, it is not with this slogan that we must stop the freedom of expression of 
journalists. There was this fear, as we have said, do not touch freedoms in the 
name of the fight against terrorism. The fight against terrorism is known. We 
must first fight criminals now; we must control the people who provide them 
with money, weapons. [...] and above all it is necessary to make society aware of 
the danger of terrorism and to improve the socio-economic conditions because 
these people buy them more easily because they are poor. It's not the minister's 
son who is going to blow himself up. They use, the terrorist movement, their 
leaders use more disadvantaged social groups, young people” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
The criticism, that the fight against terrorism is used to restrict freedom of expression is an 
important element for ATFD leaders. It connects the fight against terrorism and sets limits to 
it, notably where freedom of speech is touched. On the other hand, freedom of expression 
also has its limits, notably in hate speech. 
"The limits are the respect of others. Respect for the rights of others We do not 
have the right to say that such person [...] For example there was at one time the 
Islamists made Facebook sites, sites that were specialized in aggression and 
insults and defamation of Democrats, democratic parties and women essentially, 
feminist activists. That is to say it is pure and simple defamation [...] For us it is 
possible to express, one cannot disagree, but on the condition of respecting 
others and not to preach violence and hate. For the extremist parties it's not a 
freedom of expression, it's a call to hatred, it's a call to violence, and there they 
have no right to do it.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"Well simply, when it is something that is considered a threat, the state takes 
action. Threats of assassination, saying in a mosque such is a [...] how we call it, 
the Takfir” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
Freedom of speech is certainly important for the ATFD. Nevertheless, the ATFD clearly 
evokes limits to freedom of speech in interviews, notably hate speech, and criticizes the 
media for missing professionalism or particularism. Those limits for freedom of speech are 
similar for all organizations that have been analyzed. The argument on missing 
professionalism was more expressed for the ATFD in comparison to the other organizations. 
 
Freedom to associate is not that often referred to and often in combination with freedom of 
speech as seen above. Freedom to associate is either taken for granted or gets only 
attention when security forces repress protest. 
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Rule of law: the basis for many arguments 
Rule of law is a very important dimension for the ATFD and several referrals to national and 
international law can be found. The dimension was discussed with all interviewees, slightly 
more by Hiba and Sarah. 
 
The ATFD refers to the Tunisian constitution and especially article six on religion, article 
twenty-one on equality before the law and article forty-six on the protection of women 
rights (ATFD 2015a; ATFD 2014a; ATFD 2015b). Article thirty-four on women representation 
is equally important (ATFD 2015b). The personal status law and the constitution are main 
points of reference, also for sensitization campaign (ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015b). The CEDAW 
is advanced and especially article thirty-eight (ATFD 2014a; ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2012). On the 
international level, the Convention on Children Rights from 1992 is referred to in line with 
the national code on the protection of children (ATFD 2014b). All those legal references can 
be found in the framing of the ATFD, often used for justification. One example is the 
argumentation by Hiba on equality of men and women. 
"2012, the story of complementarity, we had to talk about that. We cancelled 
article twenty-eight, which said that the woman is complementary to the man. 
And so, we rolled it back. So, the action on the drafting of the constitution was 
important, very important. The CEDAW as well, we lobbied for the state to 
withdraw the CEDAW's reservations for the first time in 2011 and a second time 
in 2014. 2013-2014.” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
As we have seen legal texts play an important role for the framing of the ATFD. If one would 
need to pick a more important text, than it would be the constitution that was often 
mentioned as referral. 
"Of course. To promote the values of equality, equality of opportunity, to defend 
the rights of women, especially in the last constitution. Now we must try to see 
that the laws are in conformity with the constitution.” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
"[...] all that is asked is to harmonize the laws with the constitution. It is not easy. 
We are in our right and we can, if there is a constitutional court, we can file a 
complaint. [...] We are a force of argumentation and a force of proposal, too. 
Because we propose. As we did for the constitution, we proposed a constitution 
on women's rights. We wrote what we wanted to be mentioned in the 
constitution.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"Of course, the basic principles of ATFD are women's rights, which are included 
in human rights in general. It is the struggle for equality, for dignity, for individual 
and collective freedom. And we also fit into […] the international principles of 
human rights, the universal charter of human rights, the CEDAW and all 
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international conventions that are against discrimination against women and 
against all minorities.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The constitution and especially its sections on the equality between men and women are 
highlighted and its missing application is often criticized. With this referral to legal texts 
comes also a criticism on the inequality before the law that remains a problem as leaders 
expressed. 
"You know the rule of law is a daily battle. We see it with judges and lawyers, in 
the field, on women's files. […] It's not systematic; it's not something that goes 
on its own. Especially in a period where impunity covers everything. They all [...] 
are the last governor I do not know, you heard, the governor of Beja, who 
married, who made a second fictitious wedding. He lied more to the second 
telling her he was not married. A governor, who allows himself this kind of 
behavior, thinking to be in complete impunity, must be solved.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
Equality before the law is underscored with the referral to international conventions, which 
is again linked to the quality of the legal system. It is exactly this quality of the legal system 
that accounts for the majority of arguments. 
"There are still [...] the judges themselves they say, they wait for the directives 
often. In their majority. Of course, there are judges who are more independent, 
even at the time of Ben Ali. That is to say, they made their work independent of 
Ben Ali. Well, on political issues they are still dependent, I think.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
"Of course. First, there must be autonomy of justice. Justice must be 
autonomous so that politicians do not try to influence the course of trials, for 
example. So, for there to be the bases of a democratic state, it is autonomy and 
freedom of expression, it is the autonomy of justice and independent 
autonomous structures, like those of elections for example, the constitutional 
[...] administrative court which must review the constitutionality of rights, and 
which can be used in case of problems. That is to say if these instances, these 
high instances are not respected and are not autonomous, there is always an 
interference of the executive” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"There are still problems. First, because there is still no body that controls 
judges, [...] which is not yet there, the high authority for the conformity with the 
constitution of laws. It is not set up yet. That's a big problem. And even if it will 
be put in place, if the way to put it in place is not democratic, we will have an 
instance that will be challenged, too. Also, at the level of the ministry, the 
independence of justice is not yet respected.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The missing independence of the juridical sector is seen as a major problem by ATFD leaders. 
This includes the missing control for judges but also judges that wait for political orders. The 
autonomy of the juridical sector is seen as a precondition for democracy. In line are 
independent institutions mentioned as well as the control of constitutionality of laws. The 
referral to existent law and regulations is connected to a harmonization of existent laws with 
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those regulations. The constitution and international conventions build important references 
of the framing. The independence and functioning of the juridical sector are emphasized. 
5.3.4 Summary on the ATFD’s framing 
The ATFD shows the same libertarian orientation as the LTDH. Their focus on human rights 
and their codification in the constitution and in international treaties are very important 
elements of their framing. But in the case of the ATFD it are first and foremost women rights 
that are part of human rights and it is more than just the freedom dimension of democracy 
that is framed. The ATFD has a framing that is also focused on government capacity and 
representation. 
 
Government capacity is linked to the criticism of religious actors. Government stability is 
relevant, but it goes not at any price as freedom of association and individual liberties are 
important. 
 
Not surprisingly, the representation of women, but also of minorities gets highlighted. The 
ATFD has in contrast to the UGTT a much more individual orientation on rights and is 
accepting homosexuality as part of the freedoms. Equally, sexual rights and health related 
rights of women are important. 
 
Recurrent framing include their advocacy for the law on violence against women, as well as 
questions of discrimination and equality in heritage. For the ATFD, while being strongly 
libertarian, democracy is not a unidimensional concept, but includes equality and to a 
certain degree also government stability because it is the government through its codified 
legislative texts that has to guarantee women and human rights. 
5.3.5 Frame combinations of the ATFD 
The ATFD combines its main frames like the representation of women or individual liberties 
and free conduct of life in interviews. 
 
As we can see, individual liberties and representation are connected in an important 
manner, often with human rights or legal texts. A criticism of the influence of religion 
(government capacity) gets connected with individual liberties. In addition, equality of 
participation is often combined with those frame elements. 
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The quality of the legal system is connected to a number of rights-based claims. The rights-
based approach of the ATFD is thus well represented in frame combinations and builds a key 
component of its framing. This is quite similar to the referral to (however less) legal texts by 
the LTDH. 
 
There is an additional transcending element that appeared during interviews and that is not 
summarized under the democracy dimensions, namely social justice. This transcending 
element is similar to the UGTT’s referral to economic aspects, but with a slightly different 
orientation. 
Social justice 
"Of course. It was a claim of January fourteen. Social justice, social equality, 
freedom, dignity and equality. These are the slogans for which people have 
revolted.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
One transcending dimension can be summarized as social justice. The identified challenges 
are socio-economic problems as well as political-cultural like female poverty, social 
vulnerability of women, domestic or public violence against women, inequality and juridical 
discrimination (ATFD 2009; ATFD n.d.; ATFD 2011c; ATFD 2012; ATFD 2014c). Equality in its 
socio-economic dimension has its foundation in perceived discrimination. In some of the 
publications, unemployment and work are prominently placed as well (ATFD n.d.). In their 
argumentation, equality of participation (for women) gets connected with economic and 
social hindrances: 
"Already their conditions, they work practically [...] women work in the 
agricultural sector on a continuous basis, there is not even a limit of hours. 
Sometimes they work in the family farm, but without being paid.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"I believe that the will to participate is the same. But the means to have one's 
voice heard, the resources, say, to express oneself, it is much easier for rich 
people who have the means, who have the level of education. […] because they 
know how to formulate in meetings and so on. They have the means to move 
around the city, to attend meetings very late, there are people who ensure for 
them the work at home. Women who have the resources can go to meetings. So, 
I believe that there are intellectual and material means that make them more 
likely to participate and express their word” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
Both leaders link participation to the time and resources available for women and rich 
people. Hiba also underlines that only women with resources can go to meetings and 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
257 
 
  
formulate demands. From the last perspective, also the elite role within the women 
movement appears as justified as those who have the resources will also work for the 
others. As part of this framing, the resources influence the degree of participation. Poor 
people are framed as having much more difficulties than richer ones. 
"It's a difference between the poor and the rich. Anyway, even in farming sector, 
in rural areas there are businessmen, big farmers who live better than in cities. 
So, the problem is the most disadvantaged layers” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"Yes. I think that patriarchy, behind all these discriminations, is very strong in 
some areas where taboos are larger, where also the difficulties are greater for 
women to move. For example, if we already start with the little girl, little girls, 
besides the difficulties of going to school when she is far away. Because they are 
subject to aggression. And so sometimes they leave school because they cannot 
travel miles to school.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The citations also show, that it is not only about political participation, but also about school 
attendance or working conditions and that women are in a worse situation than men. 
 
Another issue is the question of rural women, in line with regional, economic and gender 
inequality. The framing on rural women is a very performant framing that was also found for 
other organizations, but that was explained in detail by the ATFD. In 2014 for example, the 
ATFD conducted a large study on rural women and their poverty (ATFD 2014a). As we will 
see later, this study builds the basis for a number of arguments that also enter ministries. 
"Of course. The agricultural sector [...] because we worked on women working in 
the agricultural sector, we did a survey and this survey showed that there is an 
incredible exploitation of these women. Because in the informal sectors, it is 
essentially women who work. These are sectors where mostly women do this 
work. And even if there are men, they do not have the same salary for example. 
Firstly, there is no respect for labor agreements, there is no employment 
contract, there is no social protection, there are no fixed hours and there is 
discrimination in wages.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
The ATFD discusses all questions of rural women like “housing, marriage, juvenile marriage, 
virginity, contraception, the different forms of violence against women, religious extremism, 
school attendance and so on” (ATFD 2014b:7, own translation; see also ATFD 2014a). This is 
an important framing for the ATFD as it encloses not only very modern demands but also a 
referral to the poor in the interior. 
 
In line with their framing on equality, the ATFD calls for an egalitarian and fair society (ATFD 
2014c). This equality also includes equal chances across regions. 
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"Of course, it's social justice. First between regions. We want the state to invest 
because there are regions that have been forgotten for about fifty years. Like the 
south, the north [...]” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
While the state should not only guarantee citizenships to men and women, political 
participation and representation rights, social justice is similarly important (ATFD 2012). The 
ATFD attributes a clear responsibility to the state to secure all these aspects. 
Additional elements 
The ATFD includes unique elements in their framing that are outlined briefly. The ATFD is 
open to all kind of women including various social backgrounds and ideological perspectives 
as Moufida Missaoui, an ATFD member, expressed in its communication with Debuysere 
(Debuysere 2016). In reality, some reserves exist on religious actors as can be observed in 
their publication or against Ennahdha in media articles (ATFD 2013; Huffpost Maghreb 
2013). The ATFD sees their enemies in Islamists, something confirmed by other research 
(Debuysere 2016). This negative perception of religious actors is not surprising, given that 
the ATFD has a modern picture of a Tunisian women, advances sexual freedoms and insists 
on the right on the own body. 
 
Another aspect is a call of support for women suffering from war and armed conflicts as well 
as solidarity with women in Palestine (ATFD 2014c). During the interviews an anti-American 
and especially supportive perspective for the Palestinian cause is promoted. This is in line 
with the general anti-Americanism and support for Palestine in the Arab world (Gelvin 2015; 
Filiu 2011). 
 
In other publications activists like Asma Fanni are hailed for their activism for youth, culture 
and the women movement (ATFD n.d.). By linking cultural activism with democracy, the 
ATFD speaks of “democratic vigilance” in the sense of identifying right violations and of the 
democratization of social justice (ATFD n.d.). In their demands, the ATFD includes freedom 
to cultural creations and publications without restrictions, freedom of thought, protection of 
ideas, as well as academic and scientific freedoms or sport (sic) without discrimination (ATFD 
2012). Numerous cultural activities also supported by Oxfam like showing films with 
discussion or critical shows allow the ATFD to address a wider audience (ATFD 2014b). The 
cultural dimension is more expressed for the ATFD than for the other organizations. 
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5.3.6 Frame resonance in public  
After having presented the framing in articles, I now turn to the public framing. Figure 5.9 
shows the claims in articles. It becomes clear that physical integrity, individual liberties as 
well as representation and equality of women resonate in public. The category other 
consists mainly of children, work and heritage related claims (for a more detailed list of claim 
related coding see Figure 10.18 in the annex). 
 
Another argument is the referral to socio-economic rights and the economic situation of 
women. The socio-economic frame in line with democracy is often recurring. Similarly, 
discrimination is linked. A support for legal measures to reinforce equality in line with the 
constitution can be found. Arguments are rights based and the construction of history uses 
the progressive Tunisian example. It is to note that claim related coding in articles are 
relatively limited in numbers compared to the other organizations. 
Figure 5.9 Topics of claims in articles  
 
Note: absolute occurrences, total number of claims in articles: 57 
Resonance of democratic framing in public 
In total, fifty-seven claims in articles can be identified for the ATFD. The claims in articles 
reveal a stronger focus on rule of law as well as individual liberties, representation of women 
and participation as shown in Figure 5.10. Frame resonance in media does thus not 
represent the complete organizational framing although the most important dimensions 
from interviews are present as well. 
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The limited number of articles has consequences on some dimensions. It is obvious that the 
control dimension rarely mentioned in interviews is nearly not present in media articles and 
transparency was not coded at all. The freedom dimension is represented most (Figure 
5.10). The media analysis shows that nearly all articles on the ATFD include the law project 
against violence on women and often the equality of heritage as well as a referral to national 
or international legislation or conventions. 
 
While there is much fewer reporting on the ATFD, articles are relatively long in comparison 
to the other organizations including several claims. Contrary to the UGTT, the ATFD is not 
close to the government, meaning that reporting on the government capacity dimension is 
limited as well in articles. The control dimension is nearly not existent in articles, meaning 
also that the criticism on the government does not resonate a lot. 
 
Figure 5.10 Coded dimensions in claims in articles 
 
Note: number of coded claims, 57 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 2, Government Capacity: 5, 
Mutual Constraints: 1, Participation: 10, Representation: 24, Transparency: 0, Freedom and liberties: 39, public sphere: 4, 
rule of law: 14). 
The government capacity dimension is seldom coded in articles. Representation and 
individual liberties get connected most; rule of law in combination with individual liberties 
also play a role. Not surprisingly and as already found in interviews, representation and 
participation get often combined. 
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The focus of combinations in articles lies on individual liberties, violence and aggressions 
linked to free conduct of life and human rights. In addition, the equality dimension is 
connected to the economy and social politics as can be seen in Figure 10.19 in the Annex. It 
becomes also clear that some claims are isolated and just bound to one or few other claims, 
while those in the center (Figure 10.19 in the Annex) are better connected. 
5.3.7 Summary on the framing of the ATFD in interviews and media 
The claims in media are the same as those in interviews. The only dimension not covered 
equally in articles is the control dimension. The freedom dimension is more important in the 
public debate. Rule of law, representation and participation are of similar importance. 
 
The ATFD is comparable to the LTDH when it comes to human rights and a legal basis. While 
the LTDH and the ATFD hold a juridical-constitutional and freedom-oriented perception of 
democracy, the UGTT has a more equalized position with more support for a majoritarian 
perspective. The role of rule of law is not the same between ATFD/LTDH and UGTT. It is a 
much more important referral for the first organizations. 
 
The ATFD uses different key frames than the LTDH, namely on parity, women rights, equality 
in heritage and violence against women that are easily identifiable. In this sense the framing 
of the ATFD is more complete than the one of the LTDH and includes also representation and 
participation elements, but also a referral to interference on government. 
 
The ATFD has a clear referral to the state. The rule of law-based approach asks the state to 
fulfill the legislation. The state is responsible for the actual situation and a target for claims. 
 
Given the extensive networks of the ATFD towards the Ministry of Women it is expected that 
ATFD and Ministry of Women are particularly close in terms of framing democracy. Similarly, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs should include frame elements used by the ATFD, but is 
unfortunately not analyzed. Other ministries are of minor importance and thus frame 
influence is limited to few ministries. 
 
I now turn to the FTDES, an organization that equally holds the state responsible, but that 
has a different focus of framing. 
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5.4 FTDES: a bit of everything 
For the FTDES democracy is multi-dimensional and perhaps most balanced in comparison to 
the three other organizations. The three dimensions of democracy are equally distributed in 
interviews with none of the dimensions gaining a higher level of attention. 
 
There is no dimension to highlight in particular as shown in Figure 5.11. The difference 
towards the other organizations is for sure the more pronounced equality dimension. 
Different elements of democracy get more attention for the FTDES. Questions of 
representation of minorities, the quality of the legal system, electoral outcomes or effective 
participation are aspects that have been mentioned more often. 
 
The FTDES has an equilibrated framing of democracy touching all aspects nearly equally with 
no dimension gaining more prominence over other. The analysis of each element will 
consequentially take up the differences within each element and detail more on those. 
Figure 5.11 Coded dimensions and element in interviews 
 
Note: number of coded mentions, 214 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 21, Government 
Capacity: 30, Mutual Constraints: 19, Participation: 21, Representation: 31, Transparency: 18, Freedom and liberties: 29, 
public sphere: 17, rule of law: 28). 
5.4.1 Control dimension: influence by businessmen and instability 
Competition of political actors: programs, alternation and rich parties 
The competition dimension was mentioned by all three interviewees to an equal degree. 
While not being one of the most important dimensions, interviewees expressed skepticism 
towards political programs and competition: 
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"But honestly, the competition is not happening now in terms of programs. I 
think that only six percent of Tunisians make their choice from programs. I think 
rather […] that the model of society before, to say between a rather modern 
model of society and a somewhat retrograde, conservative model of society, and 
now, perhaps more stability, security. [...] that interests people. But also, the 
economic issues of purchasing power, public service, employment for young 
people, all these questions start to interest people.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
"There is competition between political parties that is clear. But you also know 
there is this magical couple between Nida and Ennahdha working together. They 
are two liberal parties […].” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
The criticism of the political party system resembled the UGTT framing with the criticism of 
the dichotomous party configuration. Equally a conservative model of society is criticized. 
 
As we can see from Sami’s quotation, the FTDES uses a different model of economic 
development to evaluate political parties. Democracy and alternation in power are 
connected with socio-economic rights. Another different is the referral to citizenship. The 
FTDES speaks not only about alternation of power, but also about a culture of citizenship. 
"Well, obviously democracy means what it means for everyone. [Laughs] We do 
not have a special conception. Obviously, for us, it must not be limited to 
alternation. For us, it must be rooted in a culture of citizenship that we seek to 
develop. So, for us, it is a cultural phenomenon, it must not be limited to the 
issue of freedoms and elections.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
This notion of culture of citizenship is an important point to the FTDES that will re-emerge 
several times in the following analysis. A mix of skepticism towards electoral outcomes and 
the perception of a system that is still changing exists. As for the ATFD, the dominance of 
rich parties and money is criticized. 
 
To summarize, electoral outcome is connected to dominant parties and the influence of 
money as well as to local elections. However, the time of interviews was not the time of 
elections and thus it might be discussed differently when it becomes more important in the 
public perception. 
Government capacity: hidden influence and an instable government 
Government capacity is more important in interviews as seen in the overview. It was 
discussed by all interviewees, but a bit more by Sami. 
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When it comes to inference on the government, the FTDES criticizes hidden influence as well 
as missing independence: 
"It's not power. I think that if they are influenced it is in an indirect way; it is by 
the lobbies of money [...]. But I do not think there is any direct government 
pressure on the media.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
"Of course, it's a difference. It's always the rich. The rich and the so-called 
privileged. That is to say, what does it mean the privileged, it is historically 
speaking what‘s telling, what led to the revolution, there are two poles in 
Tunisia. There is the favored pole, the coastal regions and there are the 
marginalized, who are the people of the interior. And until now in the same, in 
this rhythm, we have not changed.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
This referral to money and the rich is very prominent across interviews. It is similar to the 
one promoted by the ATFD. In addition, Nejib criticizes the influence of religion, which is 
equally linked to the question of money. 
"Politics too is a little roughened by the confusion between religion and politics. 
That's why it complicates existence. There are people who utilize religion to 
make politics. Recently, things are getting more complicated because confusion 
arises between politics and money. You know in the Chamber of Deputies there 
are thirty-three businessmen. And businessmen believe they can directly use 
politics to expand their wealth. So, this is not yet stable scene, the political 
landscape is full of [...] there are even rogue businessmen, who try to utilize 
politics and politicians. So that's why I'm not hiding from you, I have a lot of 
concerns about this democratic transition. [...] for democracy for me the ideal is 
a secular state. Moreover, those who are most laic are religious minorities.” 
(FTDES, Nejib) 
 
Nejib details his criticisms on Ennahdha also in relation to extremism that is accepted by 
Ennahdha. This criticism is less widespread than for the ATFD, however it is still relevant. 
Government interference is referred to rich people as well as religion. 
 
The framing of the FTDES resembles also the one of other organizations when it comes to 
government stability. Stability of the government is important, but it is not unconditional 
stability that is demanded by the FTDES. 
"Certainly, it's always the stability of the government, everywhere, that is 
important. Even more in the context of the democratic transition. Good, 
unfortunately, we have a government, [...] that is not yet stable. It is composed 
of a heterogeneous mass of parties, four parties between which there is not a 
constant convergence of perspectives, of program, of perception, of appreciation 
of things. And in addition, it is complicated when the first party of the 
government is going through a catastrophic situation; it is likely to break out [...] 
So unfortunately, this phase of democratic transition suffers from these aspects 
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of institutional uncertainty and institutional confusion, and government 
instability, and internal partisan conflicts." (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
The diagnosis of government stability is influenced by the role of institutions as well as 
internal problems of governing parties. This instability is also linked to specific individual 
actors that are posing problems. The responsible persons are criticized for missing visions or 
inappropriate behavior. 
"It's not a question of stable. As I told you, there are people who work, there is 
no, you do not feel that there is a group working. There are individuals, and it 
depends on the individuals. And that's a problem, too. There is not a clear vision 
for this government.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
"No, it's confusion. As it is confusion, we have a president who behaves as if he is 
in a presidential regime. He forgot that the regime is no longer presidential. We 
have a prime minister who is not aware of the power he has. We have a chamber 
of deputies, who has normally most of the power but who lack the means to 
exercise it, and who also lack the culture to know how to exercise it. So, it's still 
[...] not stable. It is a political landscape that is not clear yet. There is a lot of blur 
and confusion." (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
The criticism of persons is something that was not found for other organizations. It is 
however systematic in the framing of the FTDES that not only parties, but also individuals get 
criticized. 
 
Another aspect linked to government stability is the fight against terrorism. This is in line 
with the reforms for the security sector that are demanded. The framing is compatible with 
the framing of the other organizations. 
"It's reformed yes. Now the police is playing a big role in maintaining security, 
the fight against terrorism. A great role also for the life in the city in a general 
way, the borders and all that. So, I think there is some improvement. But we 
consider that the whole body itself also needs profound reforms.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The FTDES also connects the imprisonment and fight against terrorists with human rights 
(FTDES 2014a). 
 
The framing of the FTDES is a mixture of all framings we have seen before when it comes to 
government stability. On the one hand, missing stability and the role of parties are criticized; 
on the other hand, the question of terrorism is equally connected to the socio-economic 
situation. The influence of the rich plays a role. What is unique is the criticism of persons in 
power that was not found for the other organizations. 
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Mutual constraints: participatory citizenship and redistribution 
The mutual constraint dimension was mentioned by all three leaders, slightly more by Sami. 
 
The FTDES highlights the independence of juridical institution as well as the constitutional 
council that should proof whether laws are in line with the constitution (FTDES 2012a). The 
arguments of the FTDES focus much on the constitutional court and division of power: "Yes. I 
consider that it will be the court that will really translate the authority of the constitution on 
the state and society.” (FTDES, Sami). Especially the perspective on a problematic juridical 
sector is part of the framing of horizontal checks and balances and democracy. 
 
Other institutional horizontal control mechanisms are not part of the framing; however, 
decentralization is important also in the publications of the FTDES. The FTDES has 
“participative citizenship” as a democratic ideal, which goes in hand with decentralization 
and good governance as well as efficiency (FTDES 2012a; FTDES 2016a). This participative 
citizenship sound like participatory democracy mentioned by the ATFD, the focus is however 
more on the citizen then on civil society. 
 
Local democracy is another topic of publications describing local democracy as 
reconstruction project (FTDES 2012a). The notion of decentralization is framed as equal to 
participative citizenship. 
"Participatory. Certainly. We are in the middle of a debate about the electoral 
laws for the municipalities. So, it's next year. So, certainly the law itself, it is the 
law that will prepare the elections, but also the specific law of the functioning of 
municipal structures in the regions are supposed to be participative structures, 
that is to say they integrate the citizens of the regions.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The FTDES argues for a new collectives-state relationship which currently suffers from the 
central state (FTDES 2012a). The argument includes exchange between the state and 
representatives of citizens rather than individual persons (ibid). This demand for more 
implications of local groups gets linked to new initiatives, efficacy as well as 
comprehensibility of public policies (ibid). Another argument for decentralization and local 
democracy is the proximity between local discussions and policy implementations that is 
seen as better (ibid). On the other hand, decentralization is seen skeptical in some cases 
although being supported: 
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"Yes, but it must be well studied. Why? Because Tunisians are not ready for some 
form of decentralization. That's one. Two, the question of decentralization leads 
to other problems, there is no difference in the culture of Tunisians, between 
decentralization and separation. That is to say that the Gafsa region, where there 
is a phosphate company that has enormous wealth, if you go through a process 
of decentralization that is not prepared, they will tell you, the phosphate is ours, 
and the wealth is ours. We are not part of Tunisia. So, it must be well studied, it 
must be in its overall vision.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
"We have to go slowly with that, because you see, there is still a community 
culture. There is still a regionalist culture. Who rules to be careful in this 
decentralization. But it necessarily implies the gradual transfer of certain tax-
attributions from the center to the local authorities. Whether local or regional. 
And it also implies the transfer of many human resources so that 
decentralization is not an empty word, but must be accompanied by a 
redistribution of resources as well. In human terms, in financial terms, and in 
terms of prerogatives, initiatives. But in all of this you have to go gradually.” 
(FTDES, Nejib) 
 
The referral to regional fiscal autonomy to a certain degree goes farer than for the other 
organizations. Decentralization appears as key framing for the FTDES while there is some 
skepticism. It is related to the question of municipal elections: 
"Right now, we do not have the law on decentralization, it is not yet voted. But 
this is the essential point, this municipal election. That's why we are currently a 
bit preparing civil society to play its part in setting up these new institutions and 
this new power. Power at the local level. […] We are doing a lot of training for 
civil society so that they can make proposals. So that they are also able to 
interact with others, and so on. Otherwise this local power will be chaos that's 
all. If the people, the actors are not prepared to exercise it, to exercise this local 
power.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
Vertical checks and balances play an important role in framing; especially problems of 
resources as argument for redistribution are included and are part of the socio-economic 
approach of the FTDES. This socio-economic approach combined with a perspective on 
missing experiences with local democracy leads to some skepticism. The approach of the 
FTDES with redistribution goes farer as for other organizations, while the support for local 
inclusion is similar but more detailed. 
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5.4.2 Equality dimension: participatory democracy and representation of vulnerable 
groups 
Participation: participatory democracy and problems in participation 
Participation is discussed by all interviewees, slightly more by Sami. 
 
The FTDES connects the question of effective participation with the question of suicides as 
protest activity. They do not only observe the number of protest activities across the 
country, but they also monitor the number of suicides. The monitoring of suicides and its 
evaluation as protest (or as sign of bad socio-economic conditions) is a unique element of 
the framing. In addition, the FTDES supports participation through capacity building for 
movements and local actors (FTDES 2014a). 
 
As evoked above, participatory democracy is another term that appears in publications and 
interviews of the FTDES, often linked to local or regional topics (FTDES 2014a). 
"Democracy is a participatory democracy that involves the citizen, who 
integrates him into the decision. It is local and global governance at the same 
time that embodies transparency, civic engagement, citizen integration. 
Democracy too is social justice through taxation, through investment in the 
regions, through the role of the state. Democracy too is openness to the world 
through debate and dialogue.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The framing of the FTDES puts – contrary to the ATFD that focuses on civil society – the 
citizen at the heart of the argumentation. The citizen shall be included in decision making to 
enhance the acceptance of outcomes. This conception is not without problems as 
participation is seen as fluctuating: 
"We have the feeling that a good part of the population has fallen back on itself, 
for different reasons, people maybe are tired, people are seeing that the country 
is now stabilized, people are perhaps now [...] no longer trusting politics in itself, 
in the political class in itself so maybe they want to change the rhythm anyway. 
So, it is not with the same density that one sees for the citizen engagement. [...] 
It's not a problem, but when you compare the commitment a few months ago 
and these days, there is a difference. People are no longer mobilized by 
themselves [...] it's not just about us, it's about everybody.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
"At the moment this participation goes through different channels. There is 
participation through the political channels. Unfortunately, politization is not yet 
very big in Tunisia. There are the professional channels, but also this channel is 
not sufficiently developed except at the level of the class of employed labor, the 
working class. But the peasants are poorly organized in professional terms. The 
informal sector does not have an organization. [...] Finally, we, for the moment, 
are aware of this fragility of the circuits, of the channels, which do not encourage 
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and mobilize the population enough that is why we are orienting ourselves a 
little in a direction which consists in developing social knowledge and solidarity 
[...].” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
The FTDES criticizes not only missing participation, but also the channels that are used to 
channel demands. Here, the FTDES is conscious that poor people have less possibility to 
participate in decision making. This question of participations falls back on the local level and 
the framing attempts to encourage more participation. 
 
When it comes to equality of participation, the FTDES proposes little up to no framing. Much 
of the demand for equality is between the rich and the poor. While there is a general 
support for the women movement, this does not result in a combination of equality and 
participation like we saw for the ATFD. 
"We are very much in touch with feminist movements, not just the great 
feminism of the state, that is, feminism driven and encouraged by the state. But 
really the feminist movement rooted in society, within the union movement of 
the UGTT. And we consider that Tunisia has a feminist movement quite 
important in terms of societal weight and in terms of qualitative weight. 
Educated women, women teachers, women executives, women artists, all these 
people can continue to push the situation of the women, also with the women 
worker, the peasant women, the women in the localities.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The citation above is less a call for equality in participation, but an expression of support for 
the women movement. Effective participation is more mentioned than equality of 
participation. On the other hand, the FTDES underlines representation of vulnerable groups. 
Representation: particular business interests and the defense of vulnerable groups 
Representation is discussed by all three leaders to a rather equal degree and only slightly 
less by Nejib. 
 
The elements of direct democracy and left right representation are not regularly evoked by 
the FTDES and appear only occasionally. However, a missing adequate representation of the 
left and an overrepresentation of businessmen are criticized: 
"Good the assembly anyway there is a left opposition group that is active. Who is 
relatively weak, but who tries to raise its voice. There is also civil society that 
continues to be awake. It also has a say.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
"It is clear because we are in the same mechanisms as before. So those who are 
represented are those who have money. And proof that you have an assembly of 
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people's representatives, twelve percent are businessmen. So, we are always in 
this logic. It is not well represented the Tunisian people.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
As we have seen earlier, there is a strong criticism of businessmen and money. Similarly, the 
form of the electoral system that was foreseen for the municipal elections was criticized as a 
winner takes it all system does not ensure representation and supports the bigger parties 
(FTDES, Sami). This perspective goes clearly against a majoritarian conception of democracy 
and emphasizes equality. 
 
Mehdi sees direct democracy as part of the FTDES claims and in line with participatory 
democracy and representation (FTDES, Mehdi). Direct democracy is however not detailed 
and as we have seen earlier under mutual constraints, direct democracy integrates into 
questions of decentralization and citizen participation. 
 
While direct democracy plays no role, the representation of minorities and migrants as well 
as discriminated people is an important pillar of the FTDES framing. 
"Well, there are associations that defend minorities in Tunisia [...] I find that the 
constitution remained a little vague, vague on the issue of minorities and the 
issue of religion. And so, you have article six that says yes and says no at the 
same time, so, in the end it's [...] not clear at all. But for me, it is necessary to 
base, on the question of minorities [...], it is necessary that also those who feel 
like minority pass on the global question. That is to say, to seek complicity more 
than to try to be different. And so, they can base on articles of the constitution 
so, that they guarantee at least the Tunisian citizenship and also guarantee the 
rights. So, the rights of the Tunisian citizen. So, you have to change your didactic 
strategy, given the vagueness of the constitution and laws. [...] Not minorities, 
it's not the [...] as I told you, the vulnerable groups, those who do not have [...] 
that easily [...] in a region far from Tunis, do not find media next to them, who do 
not find the voice to express themselves, so it's our role to help them to know, to 
express themselves.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
"Well, in fact we must recognize that we do not have a real ethnic minority in 
Tunisia. The majority are Muslim Arabs. So, we do not have an ethnic divide [...] 
maybe Libya or Algeria or even Morocco have this question, but all the same, the 
cultural richness of the Tunisian cultural heritage is dear to us. But we consider 
that there is even a return to some actions and some [...] racism, which must be 
tackled from the beginning. With regard even to the Africans who are at us. 
There are still some racist practices that continue to be in Djerba, southern 
Tunisia.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The FTDES is thus the only organization that really discusses the representation of migrants. 
This is in line with its orientation as we have seen from its network structure. Migrants are 
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part of a wider group of vulnerable groups. This group includes also the youth that is not 
well represented. 
"It's deeper. There is this cleavage there but there is also a cleavage identity. 
That is to say that a good part of the youth finds in this withdrawal of identity a 
refuge, an answer to their worries to their disarray, in defiance of the West, to 
poverty. And another part of the population that sees openness, modernity, 
partnership with Europe, that's the salvation. And between the two, I would not 
say choose but it is necessary to hold a frank debate, a direct debate and a 
constructive debate.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
"It is not easy. It's not easy as I told you because political parties are trying to [...] 
young people do not have access to decision-making positions. We are still in the 
same mentality as before and we do not have this facilitation [...] for young 
people to go for political activities.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
Those citations frame the missing inclusion of the youth as a structural problem, something 
not found for the other organizations. The criticism of the FTDES is much more systemic than 
for the other organizations. 
 
In relation to women rights, there is a demand for parity of men and women in 
representation. The FTDES adopts positions very close to the framing of the ATFD. 
"Of course, we see problems; we are not satisfied with the situation of women in 
Tunisia today. [...]. Today we are in 2015. So, our goal is total equality, our goal is 
equal inheritance, our goal is to ratify all the conventions that guarantee 
equality, who fight against violence against women. We are talking about 
violence associated with the economy. So, there are a lot [...] of the steps you 
have to do.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
"The parity at the level of the principles of law, if we compare that with other 
Arab and Muslim countries, we are much ahead but we still hope to improve the 
situation of Tunisian women even more. Even in mentalities, even in people's 
minds, even in everyday life.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The FTDES adopts not only the term parity, but also the question of inheritance as well as 
violence against women. The framing is less detailed as for the ATFD and it appears that the 
FTDES overtakes some of the ATFD’s arguments. 
 
The focus lies on different vulnerable groups and their representation as well as of youth 
and women. As for other organizations, there is the notion of intermediary in form of civil 
society that bridges state and citizens; however, the notion of the citizen is much more 
important. It is to recall that the representation dimensions take a good part of the framing 
of the FTDES. 
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Transparency: corruption and influence of financers 
It is more corruption than freedom of information that plays a role when it comes to 
transparency. It is discussed by all leaders and slightly more by Sami. 
 
When freedom of information emerges, it is in relation to freedom of speech and the media: 
"They are freer. They are free but today it is not a problem of freedom in the 
media. It's a problem of lobbies. So, it's people who finance. And that can 
influence the media. It's not a problem of freedom.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
The influence of money on media has already be found for some of the other organizations. 
As we will see later, the media is however perceived more positively by the FTDES. 
 
In line with transparency is the demand for good governance and fighting corruption. The 
FTDES also covers taxation, as well as the mobilization of national resources which is 
connected with democracy, good governance and the fight against corruption (FTDES 
2014a). This issue of fighting corruption is an important framing of the FTDES. 
"And we consider that the fight against corruption, good governance, allows all 
potentialities, all energies to liberate themselves. That is to say that fighting 
poverty can be led by a certain solidarity and social economy, which gives the 
chance to the peasants [...]."(FTDES, Sami) 
 
"It's always a problem. I consider corruption one of the biggest problems in 
Tunisia. And the number one enemy that threatens this democracy. [...] Yes, 
there is no trust because they see [...] the corruption it starts with even the zero 
level of the relations between the citizen and the administration, the citizen and 
the administration or even the power.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
Corruption gets connected to several aspects like good governance but also to poverty and 
the rich or institutional actors. This link towards socio-economic factors is mentioned as 
solution to corruption with economic incentives getting reduced. Socio-economic factors will 
be discussed later as it is a transcending element of the framing of democracy. 
5.4.3 Freedom dimension: migrant rights, human rights and the public 
Individual liberties 
Individual liberties play a role for the framing of the FTDES. It was discussed by all leaders, 
slightly more by Nejib. 
 
For the FTDES, human rights are connected to economic rights. The framing focuses on 
social and economic rights that are indivisible and universal (FTDES 2012b). The FTDES 
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connects democracy with freedom, equality and dignity, but also critically reflects that no 
democratic tradition exists (FTDES 2012a). As mentioned earlier, the citizen takes an 
important role. 
"Freedom is the starting point of any militant action. So, we focus on freedom, 
we also focus on the organization. It must be organized, because until now in 
Tunisia, freedom is rather chaos, disorganization, indiscipline. For us it is not that 
freedom. Freedom is a right that can only be acquired if people are aware of 
duty too, of their duty. That's why I tell you the concept of citizenship is 
structuring. We are committed to freedom as much as we are concerned with 
organization and discipline.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
The citizen is a concept that includes not only freedom but also duties. It is thus not an 
unlimited freedom, but a freedom that is regulated. What this exactly means was difficult to 
retrace with the help of the interviews and remains an open question. 
 
The FTDES is the only organization to talk about migrant rights and refugees under the 
perspective of free circulation (FTDES 2014a; Boats4People 2014). 
"The Forum is an NGO that is more interested in human rights in general, but it is 
more directly involved, and there is more proximity to economic and social 
rights, rights of the people, employees, unemployed, excluded, women, remote 
areas, illegal immigration, school failure. All that is the problems of the 
environment, of the ecology. And we begin to develop timidly anyway some axes 
that concern cultural rights and activities.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The framing on migration and the notion of free circulation as a right is a unique framing to 
the FTDES. It is however nothing that stands alone and gets connected to rights of other 
vulnerable groups. 
 
Compared to the ATFD or the LTDH, individual liberties are less often underlined by the 
FTDES. The most specific aspect is the strong prominence of migrant rights, not necessarily 
connected to democracy itself, but to human rights as one sub-element of democracy. 
 
The individual and civil rights that are important for democracy get connected with the right 
to work. Given the history of the revolution that demanded jobs, it appears logic to connect 
democracy and work. However, this interpretation goes farer than democracy itself as it 
connects democracy with the economic situation. While a certain income level or a middle 
class is often seen as supporting democracy, the supply of jobs itself is not a precondition of 
democracy. However, the output dimension of democracy should satisfy the voters and thus 
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create jobs. This demand itself could also be satisfied by other political systems than 
democracy. I will return to job creation and economic aspects when discussing the 
transcending socio-economic elements. 
 
Physical integrity is to mention in line with individual liberties. The FTDES works especially 
for the protection of protesters from violence. 
"Good in three years, we filed about twenty complaints. But the biggest was that 
of [...] Siliana. So [...] we filed a complaint because the number of victims, not 
deaths, but victims affected by buckshot, exceeded hundred people. So, we filed 
a complaint against more than thirty people, including the Minister of the 
Interior and the then head of government. And the trial so far is in progress.” 
(FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
"But as I said, the overall goal is to go into negotiations and have results. [...] but 
sometimes also, it is not us who choose the demonstrations. There is triggering 
of the demonstrations, and so you have to support them [...] either by what is 
called protection, that there is no police repression, or by framing it, having clear 
claims. That it will not be an absurd event [...]” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
Violence is mainly framed from a perspective of protection where the FTDES seeks to protect 
mobilization against repression. This is in line with its self-perception as umbrella 
organization for protest movements. 
Public Sphere, the basis for the own existence 
The public sphere dimension is discussed to an equal degree by all interviewees. 
 
In interviews, freedom of speech and freedom to associate are frequently mentioned. They 
take an important position for the internal history of the FTDES as it is seen as basis for all. 
From this point of view, although few evoked, the public sphere and freedom of speech are 
enabling factors for the own organizational existence. 
"I think at the beginning, that is to say the first months after the revolution, 
larger Tunis was really a Greek agora [...] open [...] Avenue Habib Bourguiba 
could see everything […]. Flags of all colors. But I think now, after the real threats 
of terrorism, the hotbeds of terrorism, the dangers that can be considered by 
radical young Salafists, I think there is some restriction that is understandable 
anyway.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
"For the moment, I believe there is no problem of freedom of expression. There 
may be problems with excesses, that is, excesses because this freedom must 
target the problems of substance, not attack people and their private lives.” 
(FTDES, Nejib) 
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FTDES leaders perceive freedom of expression partly in contradiction with individual 
liberties, a tension that in this way was not found for the other organizations. The referral to 
freedom of expression as basis for the own existence is underscored by Nejib and Mehdi. 
"Without this freedom of expression, we would not have existed [...] at least we 
would not have existed in a formal and institutional way. […] The society is taking 
advantage of those achievements, which is new to us. But for the moment this 
achievement is not yet exploited in a productive way. And so, it is used in a 
somewhat chaotic and unproductive way. Unproductive, when you see a lot of 
mess, when you see that there is a relaxation in terms of work, there is a 
relaxation in terms of productivity in all sectors, including even garbage 
collection, cleanliness. So, we will have to move quickly beyond this situation, 
which is not conducive to the maintenance of freedom, and which is not 
conducive to democratic transition. [...] So that's why freedoms are a precious 
good that must be saved. Well, we are concerned about this point of view, 
because it is our condition of existence, but also these conditions are fragile if we 
do not know how to exploit them properly.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
"We started with individual freedoms, but we started with freedom of 
expression as well. We began with freedom to manifest freely in the street, 
despite the state of emergency. But, here, democracy is not only that. 
Democracy is the state of institutions. Democracy is a new constitution. For a 
new constitution, it is necessary to have the mechanisms that guarantee the 
application of these laws. There is [...] democracy, there are thousands and 
thousands of laws that are unconstitutional today. Democracy is a process. 
Democracy also means finding solutions to social, economic and cultural issues.” 
(FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
The freedom of expression is particularly relevant to the FTDES. It is the only organization 
that emphasizes freedom of expression a lot. It is seen as basis for their existence. The 
element is linked to the limits of freedom of expression when actors call for violence, 
something similar to the other organizations. In addition, aggressions are condemned. 
"As long as we are in a peaceful environment, when we are in the context of 
dialogue that comes within the framework of freedom of expression. As soon as 
one is in hatred, in hostility, in revenge, in rejection, and even in the threat, of 
violence, one goes out of the civil framework.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
The combination of freedom of speech and freedom to associate is natural for the FTDES 
and the defense of the public sphere elements clearer than for other organizations. 
Rule of law, independence of the juridical sector and the constitution 
Rule of law is more discussed by Sami than by the others. It is however not relevant in terms 
of a potential bias. 
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Compared to the ATFD and LTDH, the perspective of the FTDES is less rights based as the 
referral to the constitution and legal texts is not that pronounced. Nevertheless, the rule of 
law dimension is often combined with other elements as will be shown later. 
 
Equality before the law for example is seen as problematic in Tunisia, in line with the other 
organizations. 
"There are still problems of equality before the law since we are talking about a 
juridical system that is not sound, that is not reformed. So, this irremediably 
generates problems of inequality before the law. And this inequality will persist 
as long as the necessary reform has not been achieved in the field of the juridical 
system.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
In addition, bureaucracy as well as independence of the juridical sector is highlighted by 
FTDES leaders, similar to what we have seen for the ATFD. 
"There is a problem of bureaucracy, of slowness. It's clear. And there is a real 
problem of independence. I do not take all judges but I think there is a problem 
of real independence. And there is also a problem of proximity, modernization of 
the sector in general. [...] In a concrete way [...] the details and the legal 
treatment of the files it takes a long time therefore the principle of right itself, as 
defended in a political way can be lost in the detail of the laws. So, you can still 
feel a little helpless before the jurisdiction that makes you lost in the details.” 
(FTDES, Sami) 
 
"We are not yet in the independent justice phase, so no. […] Justice is not 
independent and the constitutional court so far, we have passed the deadline, 
and so far, we do not have a constitutional court. And so, we cannot hope too 
much through justice. Sometimes we have the good will of the judge, but not 
justice.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
The FTDES underlines on the one hand like the ATFD the independence of the juridical 
sector, but speaks also about administrative problems. Concretely the organization of the 
juridical sector in terms of proximity, modernization and also speed gets criticized. 
 
The framing on the juridical sector is focused on the constitution and on the inequality based 
on resources among others. The focus on the constitution can also be found when looking at 
the quality of the legal system. 
5.4.4 Summary on the FTDES’s framing 
The FTDES has the most equalized framing of all organizations and mentions all elements of 
democracy to a nearly equal degree. This means also that the FTDES is highlighting the 
equality dimension more than the other organizations. The equality dimension is important 
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from an economic point of view. As came clear through interviews, the FTDES promotes a 
more solidary form of economy that has consequences for several elements of democracy. 
 
One example is the strong support for decentralization. While of course reserves exist due to 
missing experience, it is supported as part of local democracy. Decisions closer to citizens get 
preferred. Participation, and especially protest, including suicides, gets emphasized because 
it shows the deteriorating socio-economic situation. 
 
Another aspect is a strong criticism of money that resembles a lot the one of the UGTT on 
businessmen. Money is seen as influencing elections and the government, but – and this 
time differently to the UGTT – the exclusion of poor people gets criticized. Vulnerable 
groups, including poor people, migrants and so on are a key term for the FTDES and their 
defense part of the mission of the organization. 
 
When it comes to the freedom dimension, the perspective of the FTDES is often closer to 
collective rights and thus much in line with the UGTT, although taking a different 
perspective. The freedom dimension is seen as empowering factor especially in relation to 
the freedom of expression. On the other hand, the FTDES emphasized the rights for all types 
of vulnerable groups be it migrants, women or minorities. 
5.4.5 Frame combinations 
Some of the frame combinations like suicides and participation, as well as economic 
problems as part of democratic rights are transcending elements of their framing. Among 
the most important connected dimensions are participation and representation, individual 
liberties and rule of law as well as rule of law and mutual constraints. Participation and 
representation are often combined by the FTDES, something similar to the ATFD. It is 
interesting to note, that the rule of law on legal aspects gets combined with the mutual 
constraints element showing the demand for a constitutional court. This combination was 
effectively a combination that was also prominent for the UGTT, but not for the other 
organizations. 
 
There are some combinations and elements that are similar to the other organizations, 
others differ. This is also the reason why I explained earlier that the FTDES represents a 
mixture of the other framings. 
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Like for the UGTT, it is to note, that socio-economic factors are of huge importance to the 
FTDES, not surprising as it is already in their name. The transcending framings should be 
regarded in the following. 
Socio-economic rights: part of its name, part of its perceptions 
"It must be understood in depth, in its cultural dimension, which requires the 
development of a culture of citizenship, and in its social dimension. That is why 
our forum is called the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. So, we are 
campaigning for the economy to be not only dominated by market logic, but also 
dominated by ethics and respect for values. So, this is for us democracy, it is to 
be rooted and irreversible, so we must develop a culture of citizenship and 
develop the sense of law. And of course, when you say rights, also of duties. And 
that is the citizenship; it is this balance between rights and duty, and this 
awareness and this appropriation of this balance." (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
Socio-economic rights are already in the name of the FTDES and Nejib summarizes some of 
its main dimensions. Another example for the transcendence of socio-economic rights is the 
referral to government stability that is described as dependent on the social economic 
situation. As we have seen above, regional distribution and local finances are a key demand 
of the FTDES. From their perspective, it is a question of equality to connect rich and poor 
regions; something that is deeply inscribed in their socio-economic framing (FTDES, Sami). 
 
While the FTDES also remarked that information on socio-economic aspects is missing, they 
founded the OST (Observatoire Social Tunisien). The OST collects data on protest, so on who 
protests where. Protest serves here as an indicator of socio-economic problems. 
"That's what guides us. Obviously, we wanted to organize this task. [...] that is 
why in the first place we created an observatory. Which is called the Tunisian 
Social Observatory. Who is responsible for conducting ongoing, ongoing work 
that includes observing social movements, identifying key demands, identifying a 
priority, setting a priority, engaging with stakeholders to discuss an agenda for 
action which can take different forms, which usually starts with a thorough study 
of the question that is posed, whether it is women's social movements, in some 
companies, whether it is pollution, whether it is illegal immigration, [...] whether 
it is a matter of dropping out of school, whether it is shale gas [...].” (FTDES, 
Nejib) 
 
The topics covered include development, unemployment and poverty and links to the 
discussion of regional and local development and decentralization (FTDES 2013a). 
Environmental protection and durable economy are advocated in order to create new jobs 
(FTDES 2013a; FTDES 2013b; FTDES 2014a). The government is blamed for the pollution and 
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responsible for environmental problems in order to ameliorate the health situation (FTDES 
2013b). One of the few referrals to environmental problems is thus linked to economic 
questions and health. 
 
The FTDES brings the economic dimension to the front. The economic dimension is framed 
as being part of democracy as they subsume the right to work as part of rights. This 
perspective may be surprising to Western observers, but it gives sense from the perspective 
of the FTDES that criticizes neoliberalism. Thus, underlining the right to work is seen as 
empowerment of citizens enabling participation. 
 
The FTDES framing becomes even clearer in their communications. The FTDES states that the 
socio-economic model that was applied under Ben Ali caused the isolation of the Tunisian 
government at that time (FTDES 2013a). Thus, they argue that the revolution showed the 
limits of the Tunisian economic model and has to be understood as international struggle 
against neoliberalism and social regression (ibid). The proposed solution is the introduction 
of a new, durable and equitable economic system on the basis of reciprocity setting all 
actors on an equal level (ibid). 
 
A number of arguments that could also come from the UGTT, like workers’ rights, working 
conditions or other problems like child work, poverty and salary questions, are covered 
(FTDES 2014c). As Mehdi expresses, it is all about vulnerable groups: 
"In fact, it is the defense, what is called the defense of vulnerable groups, that is 
the victims of social and economic violence, the victims of environmental 
policies, pollution, the victims of social exclusion as well, the victims of 
educational exclusion policies and the victims of the failure of the education 
system in fact. And we are working on what we call the victim regions, that is, 
regions of the interior that have been […] marginalized […]. So, we work on the 
economic, social, cultural, educational and environmental aspects. In fact, we are 
in logic, in the global perspective that [...] what is called as I said at the beginning 
the social origins of the revolutions. We cannot reach the completion of the 
Tunisian revolution, if we do not mention the social and economic question, and 
that of education. So that's clear. Otherwise we will go, we will be in what is 
called the instability that lasts. And we never manage to finalize the revolution.” 
(FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
Those vulnerable groups are impacted by social and economic conditions. Migration and the 
defense of migrant rights also in line with the precarious living situation are important topics 
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for the FTDES (FTDES 2014b). From this perspective, economic problems build the basis for 
clandestine emigration. 
Where is the environment? 
As the selection criteria for the FTDES was originally the environmental protection, this is 
equally a transcending framing although not as important as other elements. 
"Yes, sometimes people are very sensitive to pollution problems, especially 
water, sea. People who live on the coast. People are also sensitive to garbage. 
You see Tunis is very dirty, it is a very dirty city, so people are sensitive to that. 
But to say that people are perhaps sensitive to nuclear energy issues is elitist.” 
(FTDES, Sami) 
 
"But a state must be renewed. That is renewed in terms of relationship with not 
only the economy, but with society [...]. Also, in its relationship with the 
environment, in the sense of respect for the right to a justified, dignified, healthy 
environment. And also, in the sense of good resource management. So, it's all of 
these reforms that we're trying to focus on our alternative development model 
that I mentioned earlier.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
The demand for environmental protection goes hand in hand with a demand for health and 
the change of an economic culture based on exploitation. If one evaluates the 
environmental framing by the FTDES, one needs to state that it is not very important in 
relation to the overall framing. Consequentially, the choice of the FTDES for environmental 
activism is not false as projects exist, but it is far from important. The number of alternatives 
on environmental activism for the case selection was rather limited and one could add that 
environmental issues are not a salient topic in Tunisia leading to the media coverage of 
other FTDES demands. 
5.4.6 Frame resonance in public 
The focus on socio-economic factors is concretely visible in the claim representation in 
articles, where economic problems take a dominant position as can be seen in Figure 5.12 (a 
more detailed list can be found in the annex, Figure 10.22). Under the category other fall 
aspects other than democracy or economy including migration, the interior of the country or 
environmental issues (environmental issues are included in sixteen claims). 
 
Forms of participation as highlighted by articles are important. Generally, socio-economic 
problems as well as participation are emphasized. Suicides and migration are the most often 
coded claims beneath elements of democracy or economic factors. 
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Especially suicides are connected to participation and forms of mobilization and framed as 
legitimate repertoires of contention that are the result, mostly, of socio-economic situations. 
The press conference on mobilization and suicides creates a great number of articles on the 
FTDES. In addition, there is a focus on migrant rights present in a number of publications and 
articles. Education and water are further topics in claims. 
 
Taking a strategic action fields perspective one can argue, that the FTDES tries to generate 
new fields and to put pressure on existent fields in order to consolidate its position (Fligstein 
and McAdam 2011). 
Figure 5.12 Topics of claims in articles 
 
Note: main dimensions, absolute occurrences, FTDES, total number of claims in articles: 207 
Resonance of democratic framing in public 
When it comes to democracy related claims in articles, the attention shifts slightly in 
comparison to interviews. For the FTDES two hundred and seven claims appear in articles, 
much more than for the ATFD or the LTDH, but less than for the UGTT. Comparing for 
example the LTDH and the FTDES, the FTDES is able to place some topics in media, which can 
be related to their regular use of press conferences. 
 
When it comes to the dimensions of democracy (Figure 5.13), the control dimension attains 
only some coverage. Only government capacity plays a role, as neither political competition 
nor mutual constraints have been coded much. The lack of one element is a problem of 
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resonance in public, as especially decentralization was named during interviews, but 
disappears in media coverage. While the FTDES mentions decentralization frequently it is 
either a topic not expressed in press conferences or it does not resonate a lot. 
 
The elements under the equality dimension are equally distributed and account for the 
majority of claims as Figure 5.13 shows. Among those categories, representation and 
participation are a bit more prominent than transparency. Equality is the most important 
dimension in public, showing an egalitarian perspective on democracy. 
 
The freedom dimension is more covered than the control dimension, but less than equality. 
Claims on individual liberties and rule of law are more important than those on the public 
sphere. While more relevant in interviews, the public sphere dimension does not play a large 
role. The equal distribution from interviews is less present for articles. However, dimensions 
like participation, representation, government capacity or individual liberties resonate a lot 
in public. Others like competition, mutual constraints or the public sphere play no or limited 
role in articles. 
Figure 5.13 Coded dimensions in claims in articles 
 
Note: number of coded claims, 207 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 0, Government Capacity: 
44, Mutual Constraints: 6, Participation: 64, Representation: 38, Transparency: 24, Freedom and liberties: 41, public 
sphere: 11, rule of law: 23). 
When it comes to combinations in articles the focus shifts a bit towards participation, 
government capacity as well as individual liberties. Government capacity, participation, 
representation and individual liberties are often combined. 
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Figure 10.23 in the Annex shows the centrality of combinations of some framings. Parts of 
the inner circle are economic and social aspects, as well as corruption, unemployment, 
individual liberties, the equality dimension of democracy, security or terrorism. It is not to 
forget that especially security, terrorism or economic problems resonate well in the public 
sphere. 
5.4.7 Summary on the framing of the FTDES in interviews and media 
The FTDES has a relatively equal distribution of dimensions of democracy in interviews and is 
more focused on equality in articles. The dimensions already relevant in interviews - 
government capacity, participation, representation and rule of law are underlined. Other 
elements like decentralization or freedom of expression do not resonate in public. 
 
In comparison to the other organizations, the framing looks like a mixture of many elements 
of the other organizations’ framing. For example, FTDES leaders use framings of the ATFD in 
relation to women rights and of the UGTT in relation to economic aspects. What 
distinguishes UGTT and FTDES is the demand for a solidary economy that is much stronger 
for the FTDES. The FTDES has a much clearer vision of a different economic system that 
encompasses labor, salaries, profit-making, equal distribution of resources across regions, 
but also environmental aspects. The socio-economic problems are seen as a basic problem 
that gets related to migration or environmental pollution. This conception leads to the 
support of minority rights, but also to the demand for a more redistributive state and a state 
closer to the citizen. This conception of economy influences the framing of democracy and 
leads to a slightly different framing than for the other organizations. 
 
On the methodological level it is to keep in mind that the interview with Sami produced 
more mentions of several dimensions of democracy. While it was only slightly more in most 
cases, it could nevertheless have created a small bias that is countered by not over 
interpreting only Sami´s interpretations. 
 
When analyzing each organization’s democratic framing, I have already outlined some 
similarities across organizations. In the next section I identify possible common frames that 
could serve elements for common actions. 
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5.5 Common frames of democracy 
The section on common frames identifies similarities and differences across frames on 
democracy across organizations. This is made as frames present among all organizations can 
travel easier when promoted collectively and could thus be more present among state 
representatives. If actors have collective influence on framing of ministries, this should be 
possible through the most important collective frames. 
 
While the most frequent framing is the link to human rights, the other framing is different 
and dependent on the orientation of the organizations. Figure 5.14, summarizes the most 
important frame combinations by organizations and underscores the findings as individual 
liberties figure often among the most important frame combinations. 
 
One can put the LTDH and ATFD on the one side with a very strong focus on freedom and 
UGTT and FTDES on the other with more focus on equality and control, although from 
different perspectives. Not surprisingly, the strengthening of the government capacity is not 
a focus of all civil society actors, apart from the support for fighting terrorism. 
 
The other dimensions that are repeated across organizations, although in a different order 
and to a different degree are government capacity, rule of law, representation as well as 
participation. 
 
Economic aspects are among the most mentioned other dimensions, showing its importance 
across organizations. What strikes is also the absence of transparency and competition 
elements among the top combinations. 
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Figure 5.14 Most mentioned frame combinations (fc) of dimensions of democracy 
Organization 1st fc 2nd fc 3rd fc Most imp. 
frame apart 
democracy 
UGTT interv. Gov. capacity/ 
competition 
Rule of law/ 
mutual 
constraints 
indiv. liberties/ 
representation 
Economy 
UGTT art. Gov. capacity/ 
participation 
Gov. capacity/ 
indiv. liberties 
Indiv. liberties/ 
participation 
Economy 
LTDH interv. Indiv. liberties/ rule of 
law 
Indiv. liberties/ representation, 
Indiv. liberties/ public sphere 
Economy 
LTDH art. Indiv. liberties/ gov. 
capacity 
Indiv. liberties/ 
rule of law 
Gov. capacity/ 
rule of law 
Other (pre-
revolution 
phase) 
ATFD interv. Indiv. liberties/ 
representation 
Indiv. liberties/ 
government 
capacity 
Representation/ 
participation 
Legislation 
ATFD art. Indiv. liberties/ 
representation 
Indiv. liberties/ 
rule of law 
Representation/ 
participation 
Economy 
FTDES 
interv. 
Representation/participation, mutual constraints/rule of law, 
individual liberties/ public sphere (all on same level) 
Economy 
FTDES art. Indiv. liberties/ 
participation 
Indiv. liberties/ 
government 
capacity 
representation/ 
participation 
Economy 
Note: based on illustrations for frame combinations for the other sections , see Annex
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It becomes obvious that each organization specializes more or less on one dimension of 
democracy, be it freedom for LTDH and ATFD and slightly equality for the FTDES as well as 
control for UGTT to a limited degree as equality plays also an important role as a comparison 
of the orientations of each organization shows. The most equalized organizations in terms of 
dimensions of democracy are FTDES and UGTT with relatively equal distribution of the 
dimensions at least when it comes to interviews. 
 
It is to keep in mind that not all dimensions resonate equally in public which can have 
resulted in a discrepancy towards reality in terms of media reporting. As before, the 
interviews and documents are taken as basis as those are seen to represent the real 
organizational perspective. The mediatized perspective is nevertheless important for the 
mechanisms via public opinion. Results go in the same direction as those found by Cohen-
Hadria, that civil society discourses are mainly focused on their area of specialization (Cohen-
Hadria 2017). 
 
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 take the mentions of dimensions of democracy for all 
organizations together. The figure summarizes what has been said before; mainly that LTDH 
and ATFD hold a strong freedom-oriented perspective of democracy, while the UGTT focuses 
more on control and equality and the FTDES on equality, especially when it comes to articles. 
 
Lauth and Schlenkrich used a similar distinction as in Figure 5.15 to identify libertarian, 
egalitarian and control-oriented democracy (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). From their 
approach one can argue that the UGTT promotes a slightly control oriented approach, but 
also egalitarian approach, while the LTDH and ATFD have a libertarian approach towards 
democracy. The FTDES has an egalitarian approach to democracy. When applying Lauth and 
Schlenkrich’s model we are thus faced with three different conceptions of democracy for the 
four organizations raising doubts on possible common frames notwithstanding human rights 
and economic elements that could be promoted together. There are effectively few 
elements that could resonate in public and build a widely accepted frame in society, thus a 
master frame. This is even more problematic when human rights that do not resonate a lot 
in media are the most evident common element. 
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What became also clear in the media analysis for each organization is that not all frames 
resonate in public. It is not to forget that media were part of the authoritarian regime as a 
state industry leaving room for limited discussion (Mirgani 2016). Zayani underlines that the 
media in the Arab world developed over the last years and is still in transformation in terms 
of more diversity, more openness and more activity (Zayani 2016). However, it is equally to 
note, that while the FTDES works actively with the media, the LTDH and ATFD do this much 
less also due to missing confidence in reporting. 
 
As discussed in chapter four, the coalitional perspective is important with the FTDES being 
slightly aside. Regarding the framing, the inclusion or exclusion of the FTDES in coalitional 
framing would not make a great difference, as already the other orientations differ quite 
much. The inclusion of the FTDES re-enforces more human rights as a common point, while 
the economic perspective is more similar for the other three organizations. 
Figure 5.15 Comparison of main dimensions (interviews) 
 
Note: number of mentions in interviews by organizations56 
 
                                                     
56 The author produced the figures before knowing that Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018:84 use a nearly similar 
figure for distinguishing between types of democracy. While those figures were not inspired by Lauth and 
Schlenkrich, they show nevertheless the same distinction of dimensions as well as a similar approach towards 
democracy. 
UGTT LTDH ATFD FTDES
Control dimension 130 23 114 70
Equality dimension 87 22 119 70
Freedom dimension 109 67 182 74
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Figure 5.16 Comparison of main dimensions (articles) 
 
Note: number of claims in articles by organizations 
 
When it comes to the aspects that are common as well as different mainly three elements 
can be highlighted. Common elements are a human rights approach (although with different 
additional elements), a framing including a connection between economy and democracy 
and to a limited degree participatory democracy. 
 
In comparison to a European perspective of (liberal) democracy, Tunisian civil society 
includes also work as a right or economic aspect as part of democracy (especially the FTDES 
and the UGTT). While the right to work is not connected to democracy in Western 
democracies, or only as part of effective governance, it appears central in Tunisia which is 
not surprising considering the uprisings as a demand for jobs. The output of democracy is 
seen as more important in the analyzed context. 
 
It is not a purely liberal picture of democracy that appears in the Tunisian context, but a 
picture that seeks civil society as mediator, as watchdog, but also as important element of a 
participatory democracy that reaches from the local to the national level. 
The crux with minorities 
Although Tunisia never had major ethnic divisions (perhaps apart from the Berber question, 
Sadiki 2002), the question of minorities and for example black immigrants is ignored by 
UGTT LTDH ATFD FTDES
Control dimension 246 44 8 50
Equality dimension 337 50 34 126
Freedom dimension 148 91 57 75
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many interviewees. Apart from the FTDES and the ATFD for sexual minorities, the answer on 
minorities was that there are no minorities which is however not completely true. On the 
other hand, it represents exactly the former state perspective. 
 
While the divides for regional disparities have become visible following the end of the 
regime and the narrative accepts those divisions, other rights like those of minorities are not 
often discussed. This is also problematic in line with rights of homosexuals for example 
which is another aspect not often discussed apart from the ATFD in interviews and the LTDH 
in articles. Thus, while some organizations have more open perspectives on minorities, 
especially the UGTT can be said to be in line with public opinion and does not seek a change 
actively. While problems might be accepted by parts of the UGTT, the question would 
probably be referred to the more specialized organizations in that sector, such as the ATFD. 
 
This is similar for women rights. While women rights are discussed within the UGTT, the 
missing internal representation of women in higher positions and missing public support for 
women parity casts doubts on the reality of this commitment (compare also with other 
researchers: Labidi 2015; Bishara 2014). The question of women rights will thus be referred 
to the internal commissions, which then cooperate with other organizations and share the 
same perspective. At the end, the UGTT builds a diverse microcosm of the Tunisian society 
and thus becomes an important profiteer of the division of tasks also in terms of democratic 
framing in Tunisia. As shown earlier, also other organizations use a framing on women rights 
that is similar to the ATFD ones although less elaborated. 
5.6 Conclusion to chapter five 
As we have seen, the highly interconnected organizations (chapter four) do not share the 
same framing on democracy. In response to the research question that guided the chapter, 
three different perspectives, focused on different of the three dimensions are identified. The 
common aspects that can be promoted together are oriented towards human rights, 
economic elements or participatory democracy. The most important frame combinations 
resemble, but different dimensions of democracy get underlined. Economy plays a major 
role for all organizations and is a specific element linked to democracy. 
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I expected more similarities in the framings. While some of the key words are often used in a 
similar way (human rights, representation, equality), the framing is nuanced and thus 
sometimes different, sometimes similar. In any case, apart from the focus on human rights 
or economy in general and thus the output of democracy, as well as the mention of 
participatory democracy, no clear common framing emerges. 
 
This raises the question whether human rights and economic elements are enough to glue 
the coalition together or whether it is “just” the common perception of formerly repressed 
organizations (except the FTDES) and not a common framing in terms of democracy that 
holds the coalition together. In line is the question from the theory chapter whether 
coalitions frame on the basis of their roles or whether some or many elements are shared. 
From my results, only very few elements are shared and I indeed suggest that the perception 
of close allies is sufficient to cooperate without common perspective. This consequentially 
raises doubts on whether a coalition can have a framing clear enough to convince, a 
question that will be discussed again in chapter seven. 
 
As we have seen from chapter four, the human rights focus can be a sign of the 
organizational integrations into the international human rights network. One can also make 
the distinction between organizations that have their origin in workers or collective rights 
(UGTT and partly FTDES) as well as the more individual oriented rights (LTDH and ATFD). It is 
especially the framing of the UGTT with a strong support for the state that remains 
compatible with the political system under Ben Ali, with the notable exception of their 
framing on freedom of speech. There are elements that are not compatible with all forms of 
democracy, especially when it comes to minority rights. The argument that Tunisia is a 
homogeneous country underestimates minorities and goes clearly with a majoritarian form 
of democracy. 
Forms and distinctions of democracy 
What is more important and not foreseen by the theory on democracy is the distinction 
between individual and collective rights, which has been emphasized by some interviewees. 
While the tension is nevertheless indirectly in the framework of the Democracy Barometer, 
it is difficult to retrace in reality. 
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While collective rights are important and act as the safeguard of democracy, mainly 
individual freedoms are emphasized as insufficient by civil society groups. Thus, while they 
relatively easily find support for collective elements, the individual level appears more 
difficult to promote (especially sexual rights and so on). This orientation towards collective 
or individual rights can determine in which direction the Tunisian democracy will turn, 
whether it will be a majoritarian, egalitarian or libertarian system. 
 
A more participatory approach towards democracy is highlighted by leaders. However, I 
remain cautious on further conclusions especially when it comes to what some called 
“participatory democracy”. While there appears to be a wide support for this form, 
especially when civil society represents the people and acts as mediator, the prominence of 
participation is not to overestimate. It is partly caused by the topic of interviews (civil society 
participation), but is equally a mean to achieve more influence for organizations. Similarly, 
can the support for decentralization be interpreted in the sense that it could enable more 
movement influence on local levels. Those dimensions of democracy have also a strategic 
use in framing. 
Common or individual framing 
Regarding coalitions and fields of expertise, neither is the movement coalition completely 
divided according to topics, nor have those organizations totally shared visions. The reality is 
a combination of both. Some topics are framed in a similar way while others topics are 
characterized by different frames. 
 
The combination of human rights and a legal basis for example is found with a nearly similar 
framing for ATFD and LTDH. On the other hand, while UGTT and FTDES discussed similar 
points, their argumentation is partly similar for example on the dominance by political 
parties, while on the question on stability and terrorism the UGTT appears as much closer to 
the state. 
 
The coalition distinguishes experts for certain problems, like the ATFD for women issues, 
based on the reputation and experiences with the organization. Thus, I argue that it is less 
about the “real” mediatized frames that can show similarities or differences, but the 
perceived expertise of each organization that also includes a point of referral in case of 
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questions on the topic. We see similar and different frames across organizations and it is 
difficult to identify the origins of each frame. Again, women issues are a good example. 
While the equality in heritage is a frame that has also been used by FTDES leaders, it is 
probably a frame that originates from the women movement. However, it is not possible to 
prove this with the data available. 
 
It can be argued that coalitions can be more successful if movement specific and collective 
coalition frames coincide. I would thus assume, that proposals including human rights and 
individual liberties are easier to promote by the movement coalition, than would be 
questions of government capacity for example. While we have seen earlier that three of the 
four belong to a movement coalition, while the FTDES partly fits in, the framings on 
democracy appear as quite different at the inside. It appears that the four organizations do 
not hold a clear common perspective, but several ones on democracy, something that 
contradicts the common understanding of movements as safeguard of the Tunisian 
democracy. It is possible that this multitude of perspectives is quite normal in democracies 
and that it influences the Tunisian democracy in its ensemble and diversity. 
 
UGTT, ATFD or LTDH leaders emphasize the historic role of their respective movements and 
their activism that has its origins long before the revolution and highlight the longstanding 
tradition of protest (although critical scholars remark that the UGTT has been coopted on a 
national level). As mentioned earlier, this criterion is actively used to distinguish between 
friends and foes with the notable exception of Ennahdha (which was repressed but is 
perceived as a foe). 
Raising questions on the parliamentary system 
It is to note, that the parliament does not play an important democratic role for the named 
organization in their framing which can be interpreted under the light of either no 
experience with representative democracy or a focus on more participatory forms. A referral 
to parliament was not the case when it comes to networks as seen in chapter four, nor is it 
the case for framing. 
 
While parties are at least mentioned, interviewees hardly ever evoked the parliament as 
important element of the Tunisian democracy. When it comes to parties, interviewees tend 
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to stress the independent or even apolitical character of their organization and criticize 
parties. They could say that they are not associated with parties or independent and they 
partly do, but they often just state being apolitical. Is it linked to the type of organization? Is 
it to protect themselves or something normal? Or does the notion of being apolitical serve as 
a protection to keep themselves out of debates or to avoid a negative picture? All those are 
questions that can be points for further research because they would require further 
interviews on those specific questions that were not covered by this thesis. 
Organizational framing of democracy and consequences for the state framing 
As we have seen, we are faced with three conceptions of democracy. The LTDH and ATFD 
have a very similar framing connecting human rights with rule of law and a freedom-
oriented argumentation. On the other hand, the UGTT promotes collective rights and has a 
perspective that is more supportive to the state. While the equality and control dimensions 
are also important for the FTDES, their perspective is much more critical and they cover 
more minority rights and issues that get limited public attention (environment, racism, 
suicides) than the UGTT. 
 
Taking the networks into consideration with a much-restricted network of the UGTT, 
oriented towards the state, one would imagine that the state perspective is closer to the 
UGTT than to the other organizations. Taking the human rights perspective of all 
organizations into consideration, especially the network role of the FIDH and the Euromed 
network are to underline leading to the conclusion that human rights should be among the 
most prominent framings by civil servants if there is a coalitional movement influence. 
 
It can be expected that the more specific ties towards ministries by for example the ATFD 
(Ministry of Women) or other bilateral configurations (LTDH- Ministry of the Interior, FTDES 
– Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and so on as seen from chapter four) lead to a more 
similar framing when comparing those bilateral configurations. It shall equally be kept in 
mind, that coalitional and individual influence can be complementary. 
 
The following chapter analyzes the Tunisian state and the perspective on democracy hold by 
state representatives. 
 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
294 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
The ministerial framing 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The state perspective on democracy 
Chapter six follows the same structure as chapter five, taking the state perspective. Recalling 
the research question: “How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?”, 
chapter six asks a more concrete question: Which are the democratic framings that are 
present among state representatives? The findings from the perspective of civil servants is 
then related to the one by leaders: Are the same framings existent from the state 
perspective (did the movements realize their democratic framing)? 
 
To recall the movement perspective, the UGTT holds a state capacity-oriented view, while 
the ATFD (women) and the LTDH (human rights) hold a right based approach focused on 
freedom. The orientation of ATFD and LTDH are closer to each other, while the ATFD covers 
more dimensions (also participation and representation). The FTDES (socio-economic rights, 
environment and migration) holds a rather equally distributed view on control, equality and 
freedom with a focus on vulnerable groups and the equality dimension. 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
295 
 
  
 
From chapter five we know that the most common element among organizations is the 
referral to human rights and liberties, which has been prominently mentioned by all 
organizations, often with a right-based background. It is difficult to identify a clear framing of 
democracy that is shared by all members of the movement coalition except human rights, 
participatory elements and economic aspects. The latter are not directly part of the 
dimensions of democracy, but related to the output dimension of democracy. 
 
What does this mean for the state perspective? The referral to human rights should be part 
of the state framing of democracy if organizations can influence the framing of ministries, as 
it is the most important point of referral of all organizations. However, as human rights do 
not resonate in public, it would be a sign of direct influence. In addition, participatory 
democracy as a term plays a role (some caution is necessary as outlined in chapter five). 
Apart from that coalitional influence is limited to very few specific frame elements and 
economic aspects are expected to be part of the ministerial framing. 
 
In addition it was shown that interactions are higher between specific ministries and specific 
organizations. It is possible that a bilateral interaction results in a similar framing. The state 
perspective can thus show the same differences than across organizations. An alternative 
regard would be whether the state developed a consistent perspective on democracy across 
ministries, meaning that most civil servants are easily able to identify what democracy 
means in Tunisia. This refers to what has been questioned in section 2.5, whether the state 
is a unitary or multidimensional actor in Tunisia. Both are actual possibilities as the state was 
very centralized with a clear state perspective under Ben Ali, while the chaotic processes 
after the uprisings and interaction with specific organizations could have let to very 
divergent perspectives on democracy. The middle way with clearly identifiable core 
elements of a Tunisian democracy, as well as some smaller differences could equally be a 
possibility. This leads to a conditional argument. Dependent on the possibility to identify a 
common state framing, another option will be regarded: If there are several framing of 
democracy, do some of those resemble the ones of individual ministries? The argument 
bases on the question of individual organizational influence not on the entire state, but on 
specific ministries dependent on issues. 
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This chapter bases on thirteen interviews with state representatives from ministries that 
have been identified as interacting with civil society organizations. A list of all interviews and 
the respective ministries is found in the Annex. Included ministries are the Ministry of 
Women and Family, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Youth and 
Sports, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Habitation, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions, the 
Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Presidency of the 
Government. 
 
It is to recall that those interviews served a double purpose: To verify relations towards civil 
society and qualify those and to identify the framing(s) of democracy that can be found in 
ministries. While the first purpose was already exposed in chapter four, the second purpose 
is covered in this chapter. 
 
Interviews can only indicate whether there is a certain preference towards elements of 
democracy, but the results are not generalizable on all civil servants. The number of civil 
servants interviewed is with thirteen interviews low. The representatives are sampled on 
their position in higher ranks and are not representative for all civil servants. As for 
organizations, it can be expected that the most open, most interested and probably also 
most Westernized participated when a Western researcher contacted them. As virtually 
nothing is known about perceptions of democracy by civil servants, the research presents a 
first endeavor. 
 
The structure from the analysis of democracy for organizations is taken over to present this 
analysis. The chapter starts with the democratic framing present among ministries referring 
to the three main dimensions and nine elements used earlier. The resonance of ministerial 
framing in public is not a point of analysis57. The chapter describes the framing of the 
ministries to build the basis for comparison with the perspective of organizational leaders. 
                                                     
57 As mentioned in the method chapter, no search for ministries in articles was performed due to several 
arguments: First it was unclear whether ministries will expose claims to the same degree as organizations as 
they do not have to rely on the media for advancing issues towards other ministries. Second, it was not clear 
whether media allows to clearly identify all concerned ministries. It would have needed an additional amoung 
of ressources that was not available. 
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The dimensions and elements of democracy used earlier are also used for this chapter as 
recalled in Figure 6.1. The dimensions are used in a deductive way, but were open towards 
additional aspects of democracy that may not be part of a Western concept as part of 
inductive reasoning. 
 
First, the perspective on democracy is outlined, before a short comparison towards 
organizations describes similarities and differences in framing at the end of each section. The 
last section already gives a short connection towards the interactions between organizations 
and the state to prepare the analysis in chapter seven. The framing of democracy is often 
limited and the overall analysis for state actors is shorter than the description of the four 
organizations.  
Figure 6.1 Dimensions of democracy 
 
Note: own Figure based on Bühlmann et al. 2014, see also chapter five 
6.1 General view on democracy: the participation of civil society 
The perspective on democracy expressed in interviews with state representatives often 
underscores the participation of civil society and movements. However, it is to keep in mind 
that participation of civil society was one of the main topics of interviews and were thus 
mentioned more than other aspects. Consequentially, the participation dimension is 
probably overrepresented. The dimension is regarded with some reserves in the analysis and 
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comparable to a weighting, the other dimensions orient more strongly the analysis in order 
to account for this bias. 
 
When looking at the rough statistics on topics discussed during interviews as shown in Figure 
6.2, the equality dimension and participation take a lot of space when discussing civil society 
and democracy with state representatives. Even if one argues that estimated one third of 
the framing on participation is due to the overrepresentation of this dimension, it would still 
be the most important element and equality the most important dimension. 
 
Not surprisingly, also the government capacity dimension is important. As we will see, a lot 
of its importance is related to practical, work related problems and not to democracy as a 
concept. The freedom dimension does play a minor role when looking at all interviews 
together; casting doubts on whether movements could integrate human rights into the 
framing of state representatives. 
 
It is also to underline that the equality dimension was not equally prominent among 
organizations, showing that the state perspective on democracy might be more egalitarian. 
On the other hand, the framing by state representatives resembles a bit the framing in 
articles as found for the UGTT with the notable exception of mutual constraints and 
transparency being more prominent for civil servants in contrast to individual liberties that 
are less prominent. 
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Figure 6.2 Coded dimensions and elements in interviews 
 
Note: number of coded mentions, 692 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 25, Government 
Capacity: 103, Mutual Constraints: 67, Participation: 240, Representation: 50, Transparency: 83, Freedom and liberties: 
49, public sphere: 26, rule of law: 49). 
6.2 Control dimension: stability is important 
6.2.1 Competition of political actors: party competition and uncertainty about programs 
Recalling Figure 6.2, competition is one of the least discussed dimensions, which will 
nevertheless be discussed in order to rest systematic. Six out of thirteen civil servants did 
not mention this dimension showing its lack of importance. 
 
When it comes to the competition of political actors, civil servants mentioning it and 
underlined the recent introduction of party competition and thus the missing experience. 
"Because our political system, [...] it's a parliamentary system. There are many 
parties in parliament, so there is no absolute majority. Many parties, one cannot 
have an absolute majority. So, you need a coalition to govern. [...] And there is 
this coalition but we hope a lot, we hope very much that we will better handle 
the situation.” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
 
Some civil servants equally discussed political programs, but are – probably depending on 
sectors – more or less sure on political programs. Others like the civil servant from the 
Ministry for Sport and Youth connect missing programs with missing transparency. Political 
programs are evaluated not under the perspective of democracy, but from a work-related 
perspective to know what to expect. 
"It's not clear, there is no program, there is no plan. The parties, as I said, are 
quite young, they are not organized strategically enough. Strategically, there is 
not something to do, something they can deal with strategically, in terms of 
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planning. Unfortunately, when the Minister arrives, we do not really know where 
we are going, we do not know.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid) 
 
On the other hand, the party system is not seen as stable and is influenced by money as the 
civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society expresses. The framing of the 
problem resembles civil society framing. In addition, he underlines, that new parties are still 
in creation and others disappear. He underlines the importance of the 2011 elections and 
the respective political programs and emphasizes the competition, but also the freedom of 
speech in relation to new political actors. The framing by the civil servant from the Ministry 
with Relations with Civil Society is no common perspective hold across ministries, but 
something that should be kept in mind for later. 
 
Competition of political actors appears less relevant to civil servants. What occupies civil 
servants are less surprisingly political programs that are more or less clear in order to 
identify what the respective minister and the government want, as well as questions of 
interaction with political parties. Framing does not correspond a lot to organizational 
framing of any of the four organizations. The only exception is the interviewee from the 
Ministry of Relations with civil society when he mentions the influence of money, but also 
aspects such as freedom of speech. 
6.2.2 Government capacity: stability is good for the own work 
The government capacity dimension came up in all interviews except the one with the 
Ministry of Habitation, indicating the importance of this dimension that is also underscored 
by the second highest number of mentions for elements of democracy. 
 
Civil servants underlined the stability of a government. However, this perspective is of rather 
practical nature criticizing the problems for continuity of problems or competencies. 
Government stability is not basically considered being good for democracy, but being good 
for the own work. 
"It's a problem, yes. And in addition, the ministers who come, they are not 
technicians. So, we have to redo everything. Explain everything again and redo 
everything. Well, there are those who understand faster than others [...] And 
there is, as everyone has a political color” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
"We are at the seventh government [...]. Every time there is a new minister there 
is a restart stop, one hundred thirty km / h. You have to stop for five minutes 
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afterwards we must restart to get back to your km / h, like at a toll station. We 
must stop and afterwards restart.” (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen) 
 
The civil servant from the Presidency of the Government underlines that new ministers are 
not necessarily familiar with the general visions of the ministry or arrive without 
preparation. 
 
In addition, each government has a particular priority. According to the civil servant each 
minister implicates some changes regarding positions causing interruptions for the 
administration. The interviewee from the Ministry of Industry describes the confusion and 
fluidity that shape the months surrounding the change of a minister. However, the degree of 
continuity differs from one ministry to another. 
"It changes absolutely nothing because the continuity is so sacred in the 
administration; but because the team working on the issues is the same, […] 
ministers, fortunately, they all arrive after the revolution are also convinced of 
the utility” (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa) 
 
The framing of changes of ministers as being bad for the own work is widely shared across 
civil servants and stability is preferred. 
 
There is also strong criticism of politicians, as they are often seen as not having the 
necessary competencies or knowledge. The degree of competencies of ministers as well as 
the administration from the perspective of civil servants differs as well: 
"So, the political parties do not have enough experience, let's say. Sure, they've 
been appointed as ministers, they do not have enough experience [...] to 
understand the administration, to manage public administration and the 
functionaries and all that. So, to have the politician's support for more 
transparency, for more citizens’ contribution or citizen awareness in public life, 
[…] is a bit difficult.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid) 
 
"There are some people who have the competencies. But these people have 
lived elsewhere. I do not know where. They studied in France. They made their 
superior in Cambridge. They think the best of the best. Our problem is another. 
We now want to plant bananas in Russia. We do not arrive. All the theories you 
have learned in Europe are not the reality. It's bad, it's totally different.” 
(Ministry of Tourism, Aymen) 
 
This criticism of personal competencies has only been found under FTDES leaders. The 
question of competencies is enlarged to the approaches taken as well as internal capacities: 
The interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism criticizes the Western theories on problems as 
not adequate for the Tunisian context. Taking a different perspective, the civil servant from 
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the Ministry of Industry underlines the missing expertise within the administration as a lot of 
people left and as recruitment processes were either partisan recruitment or forced by 
protest. Consequentially he sees resources and recruitments as not helpful for the 
administration. 
 
Government capacity is seen as influenced by bad communication. Communication between 
ministries as well as optimizing processes is another topic that concerns civil servants. 
Recalling that the support for stability is widespread, the question of competencies, 
approaches and resources of the government is discussed from several perspectives. 
 
Not surprisingly, but different from other ministries, the interviewee in the Ministry of the 
Interior underlines the capacity of the government and mentions a strong state as 
important. However, the ministry is special as it represents a state within a state, as the 
ministry was used under Ben Ali to control the whole security apparatus and thereby the 
whole population (Hmed 2016; see also Deane 2013 for the relations towards civil society). 
The interviewee from the ministry emphasized the term sovereignty in line with government 
capacity. It goes hand-in-hand with a security focus. It is linked to interaction with civil 
society that is called “manipulation” as well as with democratization. 
"With the sovereign approach of the state, security is a function of the state. It 
can even be a danger. Especially if there is manipulation by civil society. The 
Ministry of the Interior has now […], there is an exchange but with restrictions, 
civil society cannot access all the reforms. There is an opening with this 
democratization. To say civil society is not the Leviathan. There is a double 
helmet. [...] In comparison with many others, we are a country, I can tell you by 
comparing for example with Georgia, […], we are advanced. Thanks to a good 
partnership, thanks to this awareness. We are on the process of success, we have 
no right to fail, it is an obligation of [producing] results.” (Ministry of the Interior, 
Rania) 
 
While the very state capacity focused approach of the Ministry of the Interior differs from 
other ministries, there is nevertheless a general referral to stability in the country. 
 
Good governance is another issue for some of the interviewees, especially from the Ministry 
of Industry; it is however a limited element of framing, as only some ministries referred to it. 
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Some civil servants relate government influence to the UGTT. Too many or too aggressive 
protest activities as well as in some case the UGTT are evaluated as negative for the 
government. According to civil servants, too many protest actions hinder the efficacy of the 
administration. A criticism that is partly shared among civil servants is the perspective on the 
UGTT as having too much influence on the government, influence that can even make the 
juridical sector change opinion. As mentioned in chapter five, this narrative is frequent in the 
media and only includes the UGTT and no other organizations. 
 
Few civil servants discuss influence of religious actors. Especially for the civil servants in the 
Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, but also in the Ministry of Women and the Ministry 
for Tourism mention it. 
"Because Tunisia is now, we cannot deny it, is divided in two: the Islamist clan 
and the progressive clan. And I choose explicitly my words, Islamist and 
progressive, to say that Islamist is reactionary.” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma - 
a) 
 
Interestingly, the representative from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society connects 
the question of religion with fighting terrorism and thus draws a positive picture of its utility 
for fighting terrorism (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled). While the evaluation 
of religion by the civil servant from the Ministry of Women could also be a statement by 
ATFD leaders, the evaluation of religion in line with government interference is not found 
across ministries. 
 
There are still differences towards the four analyzed organizations on how the government 
capacity dimension is framed. First of all, there is the utilitarian criticism of government 
stability that is only partly present among organizational leaders. The perspective of the 
ATFD still comes closest when it comes to criticizing changes in government. In addition, it 
appears that personal influence is seen as critical for the work of the administration, while 
the criticism of businessmen and corruption as influencing policies – prominent among 
movement leaders – is not shared among civil servants. Good governance was only rarely 
mentioned by interviewees. 
 
On the other hand, the combination with fighting terrorism that was present in narratives of 
the UGTT did only come up in the interview with the civil servant from the Ministry of 
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Relations with Civil Society as well as the one from the Ministry of the Interior. There is 
nevertheless little congruence with framing on government capacity by organizations. 
 
I especially underline the comparison between the LTDH and the Ministry of the Interior. The 
strong referral to the government capacity by the Ministry of the Interior is not shared by 
the LTDH that expressed close ties to this Ministry. While the interviewee from the Ministry 
of the Interior acknowledges that the situation is now different towards the time of Ben Ali 
and civil society plays a greater role, the perspective on government capacity is different as 
it is much more positive towards security forces than in the case of the LTDH. The latter did 
not insist on government capacity in the same way. 
6.2.3 Mutual constraints: control institutions and skepticism towards decentralization 
The representatives of ministries did all mention this dimension, except the one from the 
Ministry of Habitation. The four analyzed organizations did not insist on mutual constraints 
but focused on the constitutional court or decentralization. 
"The Constitution of 2014, it dedicated the separation of powers and the 
complementarity of powers. So, we have a democratic transition, unique in the 
world.” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
 
Interviews with civil servants emphasizes the institutional checks and balances as well as the 
challenges of decentralization; the latter quite similar to the organizations (especially the 
FTDES). 
 
The interviewee from the Ministry of Youth and Sports underlines the importance of 
autonomy and freedom of the administration, especially when it comes to the nomination 
procedures for control bodies that are currently steered by the sections that they should 
control. He links this to the control of the executive body and gives the example of the 
National Statistics Institute (INS) that, although delivering much more reliable numbers than 
before, is still not independent in terms of its organizational status creating a risk for 
manipulation. Similar framings exist with respect to other government bodies. 
 
Others highlight the role of the administration as safeguard of respect for laws and as a 
controller of government: 
"It is not always evident that the administration is neutral and even if […] you 
might say that the administration always complies with it, it always resists any 
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diversion, it is the watchdog of the law, of the respect for the law” (Presidency of 
the Government, Mokhtar) 
 
The referral to administration and institutions as control for politicians is something shared 
across civil servants. The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society 
mentions the importance of institutions that are part of a vital democracy. He describes 
especially problems for inter-institutional checks and balances: 
"[...]because democracy is not only elections […], it is also about the institutions, 
so we are contacted of course, on the issues of democracy that, come into play 
[…] with the institutions, because there is a problem. The constitution of 2014 
has created new powers but has not completely defined the relationship 
between its powers, there are shadow areas and it is for this reason that there 
are misunderstandings. Everyone sees the things from his side and does not see 
the relationship with the other and the return. It is complicated to manage a 
country when the constitution is new, democracy is new, the recognition of the 
other is recent and trust is not quite established” (Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society, Khaled) 
 
The interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society also criticizes that many 
institutions have not yet the power assigned by the constitution. 
 
When it comes to relative power across ministries another issue emerged: As one 
interviewee from the Ministry of Women for example outlines, that while being sure that 
the minister tries everything for women rights, one cannot be sure on the influence of the 
minister on the ministerial council (Ministry of Women, Soulayma - a). This leads to 
something discussed in chapter seven, where even a shared position with civil society may 
not be sufficient to convince other ministries. There is effectively competition across 
ministries adding another layer to horizontal checks and balances. 
 
Linked to vertical checks and balances are the municipal elections that shall embed 
democracy on a local level as for example interviewees from the Ministry of Education or the 
Ministry for Regional Development express. Equally, a link between local democracy and civil 
society that will be discussed under participation gets evoked. On the other hand, local 
democracy and decentralization is also seen as a challenge. 
"Anyway, we have no choice. [...] it's decentralization that is done in stages. We 
preview at least 9 years. And therefore, there are attributions that will be 
affected. […] So, we are obliged even if we try to delay a little or [...] we are 
obliged. You have to respect the constitution to do it. [...]. It's something good; it 
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takes a lot of money. It takes a lot, a lot of resources for that. And we must not 
make mistakes in the process” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
"I believe it is a process today that is irreversible; it is written in our constitution 
and there is today a roadmap to prepare this decentralization; there is no 
decentralization today, not yet, but today there is all the architecture [...]. So, we 
should already have […] a common understanding of what decentralization is; 
after the revolution everyone wanted to have decentralization in Tunisia, and I 
assure you no one understood what that meant, because it's complicated [...] 
transfer of decision-making power, transfer of funds, and so on. [...] it takes years 
of work, it takes a lot of thinking, it requires a great maturity, a great 
understanding [...], one day establish this participative approach, concretely said, 
and to be likely effective, it would also need a good associative basis, active and 
mature” (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa) 
 
As those citations show, framing on decentralization is very diverse. Local competencies are 
seen as limited as the interviewee from the Ministry of Finance expresses. Others underline 
that decentralization is a long-term process. Some civil servants propose alternatives: E-
governance is considered a better solution than decentralization of offices towards every 
region by some civil servants. 
 
The perspective on checks and balances is oriented towards regional competencies as well 
as practical consequences of decentralization. In this sense, decentralization is seen as 
positive, but also skeptical and as a long-term process. 
 
While organizations and ministries agree on the general importance of decentralization as 
foreseen by the constitution, organizations stronger insist on regional participation and the 
FTDES especially on more independence. The skepticism towards new arrangements for 
regional and local democracy is shared across ministries and civil society. The demand for 
independent institutions is even stronger among civil servants compared to organizations. 
6.3 Equality dimension: let them participate and transparency 
6.3.1 Participation: participation through organization and criteria of selection 
Civil servants underline the participation of civil society and participatory approaches before 
the equality of participation. It was mentioned in all interviews. 
 
As interviews were on democracy and participation of civil society, all interviewees 
elaborated on the contacts towards civil society. Consequentially, this dimension takes a lot 
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of coverage and could probably be overrepresented. Due to the wide coverage, some sub-
titles orient the section on participation. This section consequentially gets a bit longer as civil 
servants elaborate on the criteria for civil society participation. It appears that some 
organizations have easier access to ministries than others, as some ministries are more open 
than others. 
 
Civil servants drew a positive picture of participation of civil society. 
"Yes, it is in the sense of setting up precisely a participatory approach because 
the Tunisian civil society has shown itself quite mature in its vision, in its way of 
seeing things and in acting. And in any case, it fits into the very framework of the 
definition of democracy because in the framework of democracy civil society is a 
very important component. So, it goes a little bit in the general democratic policy 
that we want for the country.” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b) 
 
"So, we have the civil society in Tunisia, it's an essential element. An essential 
element in the democratic transition and it is an essential element [...] in the 
control of power, be it executive or parliamentary. [...]. There is the civil society 
that is active in parliament. And also participates in this dynamic of transition, of 
economic and social development.” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
 
"For the formulation of priorities. There is a consultation process and an 
implementation. We have partners like the Red Crescent Tunisia [...] and with 
the National Order of the Lawyers [ONAT], or with the Order of the Magistrates 
[...] with the ICRC we also have projects. [...] At the same time we have a local 
security council with the participation of the civil society and the security forces.” 
(Ministry of the Interior, Rania) 
 
One key word in the framing on participation is a participatory approach. This term appears 
throughout interviews with civil servants and plays a major role. The interviewee from the 
Ministry of Regional Development gives a good example on how the participatory approach 
is defined when it comes to its implementation: 
"Participatory approach, it means all actors at the local regional level should be 
able to participate in the decision making that concerns their everyday lives or 
the big decisions that concern their regions directly as investment, like project, 
like regulation etc. and that it is not only in the hands of policy makers and local 
authorities. [...] Before the revolution it was not the case at all. The decision was 
really top down so everything was done centrally and ran at the regional level. 
Now the trend has inversed. It's bottom up” (Ministry of Regional Development, 
Mawa) 
 
Those descriptions and the comparison with the pre-revolution time are frequent. The civil 
servant from the Ministry of Finance describes that organizations did not attempt to 
approach the administration before and ministries did not accept help from experts; a 
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situation that changed. According to the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society the state no longer fears civil society and the role of civil society is strengthened 
through their argumentation and their protest. He concludes that the civil society is more 
active and less aggressive due to increased confidence between state and civil society, but 
that this relation is still in its “embryonal phase” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, 
Khaled). The notion on a participatory approach is shared with some organizations. 
Participation through organizations and consultations 
Participation through organizations rather than individual participation by citizens is 
emphasized. Most interviewees prefer citizens using associations to articulate their 
positions. In this sense the Tunisian approach favors organizations compared to individual 
participation or protest (like writing letters and so on) and consequentially representation. 
"Well the citizen as natural person, even if he is interested, he has a rare chance 
to access the information, to come forward, to see his opinion materialized, so 
that's why citizens generally choose to join their efforts in the framework of an 
association [...] sure, with a single representative it is much easier than to speak 
with each one separately” (Presidency of the Government, Youssef) 
 
Civil servants respond to requests and special units within the ministry explain decisions and 
respond to citizens. The referral to the participative elements of democracy is also found in 
the interviews with civil servants. However, the ministerial perspective resembles more the 
perspective of ATFD or LTDH and less the one of the FTDES that focuses more on the 
individual’s contribution. 
 
Participation gets connected to the principle of consultation as the interviewee from the 
Ministry of Tourism expressed. He explicitly mentioned “shura” as principle to be included: 
"Participation is the whole thing; we have to teach it at school, we have to make 
sure that this generation [...] We even have in our religion. Participation, the 
participation approach is shura, […] it's consulting all the components of civil 
society, but we're not going to consult them […] one by one, we will not consult 
the population one by one, but it is necessary that the population is organized in 
the professional groups represented by associations.” (Ministry of Tourism, 
Aymen) 
 
While the civil servant from the Ministry of Tourism mentioned shura as principle, other civil 
servants advanced other reasons for the participation of civil society. The position by the 
interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism is specific as there is a frequent referral to religion, 
different from other actors. 
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Dialogue is an important element for some civil servants (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine; 
Ministry of Industry, Anis). This referral to dialogue was prominent for the UGTT framing. In 
line, the national dialogue is emphasized by the civil servant from the Ministry of Relations 
with Civil Society and the role of the four organizations for Tunisia is highlighted. 
 
The motivations for civil society participation reach from inspiration, historical reasons and 
common values to more practical motivations like creating acceptance through integrating 
civil society. 
"[…] for better fit of projects, that is when citizens, and when they are well 
organized in an association, that there is really an important network of 
associations that sends its voice to the decision-makers to choose, to decide, the 
project or the decision that will be made, which will be taken at that local or 
regional level, it will be more appropriate to say that people will feel involved in 
the project so they will ensure that it is done in proper form, they will also 
ensure to preserve what has been done and take care of it, so that's all it is a 
philosophy in life too, it's a mentality to change, but it's better, it's much better 
like that and then it's also freedom, it's democracy” (Ministry of Regional 
Development, Mawa) 
 
"But it is of course based on common values […] and of course on what we 
defend together. And besides, what I personally find is extraordinary with my 
head civil society, something that I find extraordinary that we begin to receive a 
civil society that was hostile to all that is institutional and public etc. There we 
begin to receive them and they express their predispositions to work in close 
collaboration with the ministries” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b) 
 
"Personally, when I find an association involved in a competition it gives more 
guarantee for me even as an administration, that once the results are published 
there will be less protest” (Presidency of the Government, Youssef) 
 
Similar to the civil servant from the Presidency of the Government, another from the 
Ministry of Women confirms that there is less protest and fewer demonstrations due to 
those processes. 
 
Another motivation is underlined by the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society who describes the historical role of civil society as deeply embedded in the Tunisian 
society. Some see participation also as an obligation or a task prescribed by law. 
"It's a duty, it's an obligation, now it's an obligation, we cannot work alone. The 
administration, the ministry can no longer work alone [...] So, I find that even 
decisions of the administration now and the decisions of the ministry [...] are 
more [...] I would say seem more credible” (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa) 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
310 
 
  
 
"So, the second reason why civil society is important in Tunisia is because the 
Tunisian constitution of 2014 gave civil society a new life. This new life is led by a 
principle. If you read the constitution we are creating or setting up or developing 
a participatory republican civil country. [...] So participation becomes a 
component of the country's governance.” (Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society, Khaled) 
 
This perspective with referral to a historical role of civil society or to the achievements of the 
revolution in terms of civil society participation is widespread. Occasionally, different, 
singular elements were highlighted. One interviewee from the Ministry of Women explained 
an interesting point as he stated to “use” civil society for own lobbying: 
"From the beginning in all the steps, from the idea to the project until the 
lobbying. In particular, it is a force of proposition. We consider it [civil society] as 
a partner a force of proposal but also a lobbying force.” (Ministry of Women, 
Nizar) 
Increased participation and exclusion via selection criteria 
The diversity of civil society and its recent development is often mentioned by civil servants. 
From this perspective, the freedom to associate gets connected to participation of civil 
society. On the other hand, links to civil society are not necessarily good. 
"No, not always good relationships. We have relationships that can be good. 
Everyone plays his role. When I told you a force of proposition, it is a force of 
proposition. I do not expect civil society to have a position that is the same as 
ours. And we can even go to […] discussions that sometimes are a circle 
discussion. But generally, one can arrive, that shows that there is diversity. Even 
if we do not share the same ideas, we share the same values […]. Certainly, we 
share the same values, […] we do not share the same ideas, we do not share the 
same solutions but we share the same values. And this way we hope to have a 
force of proposition.” (Ministry of Women, Nizar) 
 
While there is still a difference between ministries and civil society, there is a general 
openness. 
 
When it comes to the equality of participation, different degrees of participation exist. 
Participation is not equal and the possibilities to enter into contact are better for larger 
organizations like the UGTT or UTICA. 
"We have two organizations that are very important organizations in Tunisia […]. 
From a quantitative or qualitative point of view […]. So, there are other 
associations but they do not have a very important impact on the decision, on 
the support, […], on its way of participation [...]. As I already said, with the two 
big organizations, UTICA and UGTT” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
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The civil servant from the Ministry of Agriculture argues that they limit participation to the 
organization known best. The one from the Ministry of Tourism adds the federations that 
are seen as key partners and the civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society 
states that they work with four labor unions in terms of representation, but that on other 
topics expertise is the most important criteria of selection. The latter distinguishes between 
those that are known and that often approach the ministry and those who less often come 
up, for example through the media. Across organizations exist many different criteria for 
selection making the possibility of civil society participation different from one ministry to 
another. 
 
Other civil servants do not distinguish between organizations when inviting and chances are 
more equal: 
"That's not exclusion. When one is asked to be present in workshops, etc., one is 
present as far as possible, dependent on the availabilities of the staff, [...]. But 
finally, for example, there are missions where the civil society is involved, in 
quotation marks, obligatory in the administrative work, for example, at the level 
of the OGP [Open Governance Program], you cannot work an action plan by 
yourself or alone, we must involve all associations. Generally, it is done by a call 
to the public, to associations. So, there are associations that present themselves, 
they want to be presented in that, good. Generally, we accept everyone” 
(Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis) 
 
"All organizations are treated in the same way. The proof is that in all [...] in all 
the calls for proposals, in the calls for applications, etc. it's a call for tenders, so 
we get calls, there's a commission that meets on the basis of pre-defined criteria 
[…]. So, everything is done in transparency.” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a) 
 
Notwithstanding those two citations, a number of interviewees acknowledge the exclusion 
of parts of the civil society. In addition, some parts of the civil society are seen as not having 
enough competencies to effectively discuss policies: 
"They do not have the technicality. Public finances are a little complicated. And 
so, they [...] sometimes they have false, totally wrong concepts.” (Ministry of 
Finance, Cyrine) 
 
"The problem is that sometimes, when we do not have enough information on 
the current situation of the administration, we […] badly [...] hear ideas that are 
not […] applicable, unfortunately, or who ask for funding and resources that the 
country or the state does not have […]. So, to give realistic solutions, the 
association or the organization, the citizen must have real information of the 
sector” (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis) 
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In line with this is professionalization of civil society, another aspect frequently mentioned 
and a criterion of selection of civil society. The interviewee from the Ministry of Industry 
highlights an organized well financed civil society, with clear good governance, a stable 
team, a strategy, action plan and partners as important aspects that can make organizations 
privileged partners of the administration. The interviewee from the Ministry of Regional 
Development points in a similar direction: 
"Absolutely and his ability to analyze, and his ability to learn things and to 
anticipate, to propose, that’s also it, not only to be a receiver but to be active to 
be really active in a process of change [...] there is not enough maturity in fact, 
that everyone claims his right to participate, […] why do you not make us 
participate […], at the first meeting everyone is there, at the second meeting no 
one is there, when it comes to taking action, when it comes to assigning 
responsibilities that everyone takes care of something for example, and also 
share the tasks, there we feel that people start to flee, I do not speak of all 
associations, it is really those who cannot have many experiences, which do not 
have a lot of active [members] [...], for an association to participate and that it is 
really an effective participation, it is necessary that at least there is a minimum of 
financial resources, human, office, I do not know, mail account, press releases, 
telephone, thus the basic, unfortunately this is not always the case” (Ministry of 
Regional Development, Mawa) 
 
"What I see is that the new civil society is a civil society that tends towards 
professionalism and the black spots; it lacks commitments, it lacks activism, it 
becomes a job that it is professional” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, 
Khaled) 
 
The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society underlines the expertise as 
well as the comprehensible and pertinent language that is used by organizations like I 
Watch; also used in their reports that shape public debates. He highlights organizations like 
the Euromed Human Rights Network as well Jamaity. In some cases, participation of civil 
society got institutionalized and thus connected with representation of civil society. 
 
Apart from that, the implication in legislative processes is highlighted by some civil servants 
and will be discussed in chapter seven in detail. It is particularly the civil servant from the 
Ministry of Relations with Civil Society58 who underlines the number of consultations in 
relation to the electoral law for the municipal elections as well as other law projects. 
Another example is participation in the five years planning explained by the interview from 
the Ministry of Regional Development. 
                                                     
58 He details the role the civil society takes and will take in the future through over the interview that can be 
found in the annex. 
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The interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society also expressed that they are 
trying to ameliorate the coordination between ministries and civil society, as well as regional 
level relations. From the ministerial perspective however, missing confidence from the civil 
society is another problem: 
"What is curious [...] is that the first consultations people came rather protesting 
[…], they start, one is never consulted, they do not realize that they are actually 
in a consultation, there is also a phenomenon of lack of confidence” (Ministry of 
Civil Relations and Institutions, Khaled) 
 
"According to my explanation, they may not have so much confidence in the 
process. So, they come as spectators. [...] Well, if they want to make proposals to 
insert them there. No reaction. We sent two emails. We [...] we talked about it 
verbally, they did not send anything. [...]. I explain because they do not have so 
much confidence.” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
Another aspect is the criticism of disruptive protest. Protest itself is seen as rather positive, 
but disruptive protest as a problem. 
"Now they cut the road. They no longer write letters, they cut the road. This 
aspect is really nasty” (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen) 
 
"First of all, it must be recognized that after a revolution, and after a 
dictatorship, it is quite normal that there are uprisings, that there are frustrations 
related to the problems of strikes and the problems of [...] a problem of disorder. 
It's something natural, something [...] let's say, logical that it's happening. [...] But 
after two or three years, it becomes much more critical, especially since this kind 
of strike, it will paralyze the economy, economic activity, it will paralyze political 
stability, etc. So, that's where this kind of strike especially wildcat strike […], it's 
not regulatory strikes. The wildcat strikes are beginning to give more concern to 
politicians, administrations, the government.” (Ministry of Industry, Energy and 
Mines, Anis) 
 
This framing of protest as disruptive is similar to the media coverage that exists on the UGTT 
that is seen as motivating wildcat strikes that hinder production. 
Summary on participation 
The interviews gave a very detailed picture on how civil society participates in decision 
making processes. What became obvious is the different degree of participation that is 
promoted by each ministry. While there is general legislation that civil society should 
participate (as well as the constitution that mentions a participatory approach), some 
ministries underline the utility of civil society for recruitment processes for example. 
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The interview at the Ministry for Habitation and Infrastructure is a good example, as the 
interviewees underlined the way they integrated civil society organizations in the 
recruitment process to create legitimacy. Other ministries like the Ministry of Women and 
the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society hold a different perspective as they mentioned 
also common visions and values that make it easier to cooperate with civil society. Other 
civil servants mentioned a perspective in between, where they “tried” participation and are 
still figuring out how it could work effectively. 
 
When it comes to participation of civil society – and it is to underline that it is civil society 
and not individual citizens – participation is not equal as not every movement or 
organization has the same chances. Looser movements that do not operate within the 
context of professionalized organizations will have difficulties to enter the discussion. 
 
In comparison to the organizational framing we have seen some similarities when it comes 
to participation through organizations, but also differences, for example a strong referral to 
legal requirements to make civil society participate by civil servants. The hypothesis that 
participatory democracy as shared element of a movement coalition is found among civil 
servants shows only partly true. 
6.3.2 Representation: Representation of women and no discussion of minorities 
Representation was mentioned in all interviews. In comparison to other dimensions, it is less 
important than for example participation or government capacity. However, it is a dimension 
that is often connected to participation. Representation of women is one of the discussed 
aspects. 
"At the level of the Ministry of Finance, there are more women than men. And 
the female development rate is very important. And at the level of the agents of 
the FISC59, are more women than men. So, it's paradoxical but it exists.” 
(Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
"Tunisia is ahead in terms of equality men-women compared to other Arab 
countries, […]. But in terms of management, in terms of responsibilities, there is 
always an effort to be made. For example, the new government has enough 
women. So, there is a positive change.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid) 
 
                                                     
59 Tax authorities. 
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The two citations by civil servants from different ministries relate representation of women 
to internal representation. Like for the UGTT, they focus less on the role of representation in 
society and political decision making, but in relation to their own organization.  
 
Especially with regard to equality in representation of men and women, the argumentation 
within the Ministry of Women is very close to the one advocated by civil society in line with 
their perspective on women rights: 
"It is a project called Project for the Promotion of Equality between Women and 
Men which consists of three specific objectives, three areas of work […] to 
institutionalize gender on promotion economic empowerment and women's 
policy and the fight against all forms of gender-based violence.” (Ministry of 
Women, Nizar) 
 
The Ministry of Women connects equality of participation with equal rights and women 
rights, but also violence against women. Other interviewees like the one from the Ministry of 
Agriculture relate the problems in the interior with problems for rural women. In this sense, 
arguments on economic aspects similar to those raised among others by ATFD leaders 
emerged during some interviews. 
 
On the other hand, minorities like handicapped people are excluded although some 
institutional mechanisms for representation exist. The interviewees from the Ministry of 
Youth and Sports as well as from the Presidency of the Government mention fixed quotas in 
order to achieve representation. The civil servant from the Ministry of Finance, on the other 
hand, mentions the missing documentation for blind persons relating it to personal 
experiences. 
 
As mentioned earlier, some of the relations between civil society and state got 
institutionalized and representation of the civil society in committees is generally seen as 
useful. The representation dimension is often coded in relation with the participation 
dimension showing that both dimensions are connected. The question of handicapped was 
not touched by organizations. On the other hand, representation of different minorities 
(especially mentioned by the FTDES, ATFD and LTDH) did not play a role in interviews with 
civil servants, as did not left-right representation. What played a more important role is the 
representation of women (in line with arguments of the ATFD), as well as civil society in 
committees. 
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6.3.3 Transparency: it’s about corruption 
Transparency was neither coded in the interviews with the Ministry of Women nor in the 
interview with the Ministry of the Interior. However, it represents a dimension that is quite 
important for the remaining civil servants. Access to information and its legal basis is 
underlined by civil servants. 
"So, we have a very important law that has been voted, [...] the law of access to 
information. It is a very important law and there is a specialized authority in this 
area.” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
 
"I give you an example concerning the law on access to public information. […] 
the law that was proposed by the government for the vote of the parliament, 
this law contains constraints for access to public information. These constraints 
were of public interest but the association "I Watch" has put pressure, great 
pressure on the government to remove this constraint. And the law was passed 
for access to public information without constraint. And it is a great achievement 
for the part of Tunisia. It's thanks to the civil association.” (Ministry of Youth and 
Sports, Walid) 
 
It is especially the demand for transparency that makes civil servants emphasize the 
dimension. The civil servant from the Ministry of Industry remarks that they publish, as part 
of the Open Data platform where all data generated by the ministry are available, in order to 
get feedback from citizens. One interview from the Ministry of Agriculture confirms that 
they have to publish information. For some civil servants transparency goes hand in hand 
with participation of civil society. 
"We get organizations working on transparency involved. Budget transparency. 
We have I Watch with us, […] We have Bawsala, we have Transparency First. We 
have opengov.tn. […] We had, they dropped out, an organization called 
Influenza. And well, ITDD, the Institute of Development” (Ministry of Finance, 
Cyrine) 
 
"It gave transparency. We treated everyone equally. We will also publish the 
competition notices. There is a publication on the website, also on the website of 
the employment agency. We do not exclude anyone.” (Ministry of Habitation, 
Slim) 
 
The perspective of the Ministry of Habitation as “using” civil society to assure legitimacy 
through transparency resembles the utilitarian perspective on elements of democracy that 
was evoked earlier. It is however not a perspective shared across all civil servants. 
 
Corruption plays a role as part of the framing of civil servants. The interviewee from the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports for example underlines the economic consequences of 
corruption that cost two percent of growth. Also, other civil servants like the one from the 
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Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Regional Development acknowledge the problems. 
The interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society connects the question of 
corruption with institutions and that also rural areas need access to the anti-corruption body 
(Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled). 
 
Corruption gets connected to transparency and publishing information to prevent 
corruption. Particularly for those working on finance, open budgets and publishing 
information is important for fighting corruption. Some civil servants assign that cooperation 
with civil society creates transparency and thus less contestation. In comparison to the 
organizations analyzed, the question of transparency is more important, especially in 
relation to solutions. It is to recall that while corruption played only a minor role for 
organizations, it is the third most important dimension for civil servants. 
6.4 Freedom dimension: diverse framing 
6.4.1 Individual liberties: some emphasize human rights, others are more ambivalent 
Individual liberties were not referred to in the interview with the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry for Regional Development. From the 
freedom dimension, individual liberties is the sub dimension discussed most. However, 
especially in comparison to organizations such as the LTDH, freedom and individual liberties 
do not play a big role as part of the framing of democracy. 
 
Individual liberties are seen positive and as important element of the Tunisian revolution. 
"The great achievement in 2011 is freedom. For all Tunisia. [...] Of course, we are 
free and we have a pride and all that in comparison with the other Arab 
countries. We are proud of this event. We are proud of this change that has 
made Tunisia's reputation in the world.” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
 
"Demonizing human rights defenders in the country or abroad has left a mark in 
our thinking. Before, it was something very problematic, more than once, after 
2011 it's different, so we became aware of our rights, the way in which we could 
enjoy our rights, but concretely there was no institution that could guarantee 
that, how can I have my right, if we read the 2014 constitution, chapter two 
devoted to individual and collective law, it is a huge achievement compared to 
articles seven to eleven in the old constitution” (Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society, Khaled) 
 
The acceptance of human rights activists and freedom is only one element of the framing. 
Different perspectives exist. On the other hand, the interviewee from the Ministry of 
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Tourism mentions that the Ben Ali period had the advantage of stability while lacking 
freedom, presenting a position that could live with autocracy. 
"It may have been a more stable period than now, fewer freedoms, but it was 
more stable. We were safer. Now the officials are a bit like fired officials. If one 
does not do a job one is fired.” (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen) 
 
However, this position is not shared among civil servants. On the other extreme, 
Interviewees from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society as well as from the Ministry of 
Women underline the role of human rights, similar to what I found for the analyzed 
organizations as shown in chapter five: 
"This is a guarantee that is enormous [...] now the rights are written in the 
constitution, how I as Tunisian can enjoy my right, [...] in the phase of law which 
comes into force which are not /no more consistent with this constitution and 
that they would have to change, so a lot of work needs to be done to change the 
laws, amend the laws to bring them in line with the constitution and especially to 
set up the institutions that will guarantee the real revival of these rights, we 
speak about a national human rights body we do not have [...]” (Ministry of 
Relations with Civil Society, Khaled) 
 
"So, we were very precise on this point and on the values of human rights. So, to 
say that good the Arab-Muslim specificity etc., but there are also human rights. 
We respect it for those who want it to be their reference, but we must respect 
others as well. [...] Nothing for the Tunisian women is different compared to all 
the women of the world, whether in America or Europe, so we claim, and there I 
do not speak in my name only, but as citizen of the world. [...] So she [the 
Minister] is totally in favor of women's human rights and for total equality and 
with international references, etc. there is no problem at this level. [...] how to 
say, between theory and reality there are always difficulties, because she is still 
in a government, she is still in a political environment that is not always very 
favorable.” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a) 
 
The interviewee from the Ministry of Women for example underlines women rights as 
specific aspect of human rights and sees human rights as “condition sine qua non” for 
interaction with civil society, something that is absolutely in line with the framing of the 
ATFD (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a). 
 
For other ministries there are rather mixed results when it comes to freedom and way of life, 
for example when it comes to homosexuality, that is not seen as acceptable. 
"Individual freedom, for example, there is a problem that [...] well, I do not know, 
for example, homosexuality is not allowed. [...] Maybe because we are a Muslim 
country, maybe […]. Otherwise, all the rest, there is no taboo, there is no 
particular problem” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
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There are some elements that are only named by one interviewee: The interviewee from the 
Ministry of Tourism for example mentions the freedom of religion as element. The one from 
the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society adds transitional justice and rights and violence 
against women have been evoked by the one from the Ministry of Women. The civil servant 
from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society refers to torture as a topic they cover and 
explains that Tunisia has the perspective of acknowledging the existence of torture while not 
accepting it. All those elements have only been mentioned by one civil servant showing the 
diversity of perspectives on individual liberties. 
 
To summarize, freedom is integrated in framing, but different civil servants highlight 
different aspects like human rights, freedom of religion or violence against women. In this 
sense, especially the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society mentions 
with torture a topic that so far was only discussed by the LTDH. The civil servant from the 
Ministry of Women underlines the role of human rights and especially women rights as does 
the ATFD. Those similarities touch especially ministries like the Ministry of Women as well as 
the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. 
 
There are some ministries that use framings more similar to the movements’ perspectives, 
while others clearly do not. It is to recall that some civil servants did not mention human 
rights or individual liberties. Others are more limited than organizational ones. With notably 
two exceptions, ministries have a rather limited perception of human rights and democracy 
especially when compared to LTDH and ATFD. One of the hypotheses that human rights as 
transcending element of a coalitional framing can be found among civil servants does not 
show true for all. 
6.4.2 Public Sphere: few discussed and missing professionalization 
The dimension was not coded in interviews with the Ministry of Women, with the Ministry 
of Tourism, with the Ministry of the Interior as well as with the Presidency of the 
Government. These limitations already show that the public sphere is less important than for 
example participation. The public sphere dimension is one of the least discussed dimensions 
in interviews. 
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When talking about the public sphere, civil servants referred to the role of the media, but 
also acknowledged that media outlets are not impartial. While the interviewee from the 
Ministry of Education for example describes the media landscape in Tunisia as free, the one 
from the Ministry of Youth and Sports criticizes that media outlets are not neutral but closer 
to specific parties. The proximity of media outlets to some parties is also shared by the 
interviewee from the Ministry of Finance. Professionalization of media is another aspect 
discussed: 
"Freedom has given us the right to have an open internet and many among the 
Tunisians have seen the world differently because we thought we were free and 
really we saw how the freedom is elsewhere; it is different and our regime said 
we were democratic, we made the elections, we want democracy; […] 
afterwards it was the 2011 elections that the elections became different [...]” 
(Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled) 
 
"[…]with the media, now, they start to validate or search the information 
informally following various training sessions, etc., they try to validate the 
information and to see with us before [...] they publish anything.[...]it is still to 
emphasize that the social networks or the media, it remains in Tunisia at a very 
low level in terms of professionalism, because generally, there are many 
newspapers or media relaying false information or relay a point of view without 
having the other point of view. So, there is a lack of professionalism. There are 
some media that are funded by political parties or influential people, etc., to try 
to divert public opinion, so the media sector is still in movement […], it is 
necessary to take the function of media with precaution for certain files or 
certain information.” (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis) 
 
Those limitations for the functioning of the media are widespread among civil servants with 
the notable exception of the civil servant from the Ministry of Education. Those illustrate 
also the practical limitations, while other limits for freedom of speech get discussed. 
 
The limit of freedom of speech is seen in radical opinions that incite violence, a position that 
is also shared by movement leaders. The interviewee from the Ministry of Women 
underlines the difficulties for freedom of expression after years of dictatorship: 
"It was not easy at all after [...] decades of dictatorship, to have the opportunity 
today to express oneself, and again, there is a small question mark in relation to 
that, have the opportunity to express oneself, discover one’s own possibilities 
and skills etc. […]” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a) 
 
This framing is however nothing widespread across civil servants and shows again the 
particularity of the Ministry of Women. 
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Civil servants underline the role of the media that are not always impartial and reliable. On 
the other hand, ministries know that problems can be easily mediatized. The public sphere is 
not an essential part of the framing of civil servants. While a lot of elements resemble those 
presented by organizations, it is doubtable whether it stands for all civil servants given that 
many did not mention this dimension. 
6.4.3 Rule of law: the constitution as basis 
The dimension was not included in the interviews with the Ministry of Habitation. All others 
made a referral to the rule of law dimension, while it was not very detailed in most cases. 
 
The Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society clearly refer to the 
constitution as well as international treaties (for the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society 
compare also 6.4.1). 
"[…] the reference is clear. There is the constitution, there are the international 
conventions. So, there is no problem even with a change of ministers. […] and 
the vision is already established. So, we cannot go against that vision and against 
the constitution.” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b) 
 
These are again the same two ministries that are closer to civil society. On the other hand, 
the constitution is also important for other civil servants: 
"In 2015 with an established constitution we have a legitimacy of the institutions. 
Institutions must be constitutional. It must be reflected. Hence the importance of 
exchange, hence the different levels of the political and institutional 
environment.” (Ministry of the Interior, Rania) 
 
The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society connects codified rights 
with human rights, but also warns that existent legislation needs to be conform to the 
constitution. The constitution builds the general guidelines for the realization of democracy 
in Tunisia. State representatives regularly refer to the constitution as a general guideline, 
however this does not concretize in other explanations. The dimension is not of great 
importance to the majority of civil servants and included only limited explanations, often 
with a general referral to the constitution. 
6.5 Several framings of democracy 
It is difficult to identify one clear framing of democracy across ministries, something 
acknowledged by interviewees as well. 
"She [the minister] is in a context of the country [...] where you have to have a 
certain vision of democracy, because democracy in Tunisia is not democracy in 
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Europe, with all the experience accumulated since the French and other 
revolutions in the world. It is not the same thing; it is a new fact so this approach 
towards democracy, it is necessary to have a vision for that and I think that it is 
not always a shared vision, so it is not a program put in place by the government, 
which is a mix of different political tendencies. So, there is not a clear and 
evident vision of democracy” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a) 
 
While the larger setting of a democratic political system is accepted, each ministry has its 
own orientation. However, ministries share a referral to civil society and a participative 
approach. Participation enters in the general definition of democracy. 
"Democracy, you know, it's the citizen who chooses first and foremost. It is the 
one who chooses its leader and its governor. That's the point, that's democracy; 
[...] It's the participation of citizens in public life too.” (Ministry of Youth and 
Sports, Walid) 
 
"You know in Tunisia, democracy [...] is very recent. We are not used to involve 
people in decision-making, and so on. But I think it's a good initiative. Personally, 
I think it's good and we work mainly in collaboration with all the organizations 
and all that with the associations. There are [...] more ideas, there are more 
proposals, there is a trial of a feedback.” (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa) 
 
Summarizing the relative importance of every (sub-) dimension of democracy, it appears 
that framings not only differ from one organization to another, but also from one ministry to 
another. I shortly summarize the main findings from the analysis of the three dimensions 
before turning to a more detailed picture of frame combinations as well as the specifics of 
each ministry. 
 
The competition of political actors does only play a minor role in the framing of democracy 
of the civil servants. Government capacity on the other hand, is an important sub-dimension 
for civil servants. Especially the stability of the government is important, mainly from a 
practical perspective as change disrupts the work of civil servants. This is perfectly in line 
with the framing of the organizations. Competencies of ministers as well as good governance 
are included in the framing of government capacities and were not for civil society leaders 
except the FTDES. 
 
The referral to security and terrorism, often found for example for the UGTT especially in 
articles, is shared only by the Ministry of the Interior. Mutual constraints are particularly 
important to civil servants in the sense that decentralization as well as some control 
institutions are underlined. However, this is done with caution, as it is new to the 
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administration. This framing on democracy, with a cautious perspective on decentralization, 
is comparable to the one expressed by ATFD or UGTT for example. Another aspect, even 
stronger than for movement leaders, is the referral to civil society as a counter power or 
watchdog to the state as well as the important role of institutions. The partly similar framing 
of decentralization as well as government stability is rather an exception and framing 
appears as different in comparison to the organizations. 
 
When it comes to equality, participation is the most important dimension mentioned by civil 
servants. It is thus an essential part of the framing of democracy. The perspective is very 
positive towards the inclusion of civil society as a whole and linked with representation. It 
covers a number of elements like reasons for civil society participation (inspiration, 
legitimacy and so on), professionalization of civil society as well as questions related to 
participation. 
 
The participation of civil society occurs not on an equal basis. Effectively, well-connected and 
old organizations are easier included, professionalization equally plays a role. In this sense, 
equality of participation is limited. When it comes to representation, some organizations are 
better represented than others (and thereby different parts of the population). The partly 
negative referral to too much protest in interviews with civil servants is not found for the 
organizations and appears only in the reporting on the UGTT. 
 
The representation of women is mentioned, while the representation of minorities does not 
play a role, except handicapped people and this more from an administrative perspective. 
This perspective on minorities is more in line with the framing of the UGTT arguing that 
there are no minorities in Tunisia. 
 
When it comes to transparency, open access to legislation and access to information as well 
as the fight against corruption are important. However, when it comes to fighting 
corruption, businessmen for example were only partly named as main influencers, while the 
framing focusses on internal measures against corruption. The framing on transparency 
shows an orientation towards the ministry itself and includes justification or measures that 
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are taken against corruption on the administration level. It misses the general perspective 
for society. There is no systematic similarity with organizational framing. 
 
On freedom, some state representatives highlight the codification of rights, while civil 
society actors emphasize their application. On the other hand, especially the Ministry of 
Women as well as the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society have a more explicit rights-
based approach connected to human rights. Equality before the law as a sub-dimension 
plays no role for civil servants. Contrary to the findings for especially the ATFD and the LTDH, 
the freedom dimension did not play an important role for the ministries. Freedom of speech 
gets underlined to a limited degree. For rule of law, there is a certain referral to the 
constitution but no detailed one. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to identify common elements. When it comes to elements 
of democracy it is the participation of civil society that is most consistently framed. The 
referral to human rights is limited to some ministries and not consistently prominent across 
ministries. 
Democracy across ministries 
When taking all ministries together an overwhelmingly amount of mentions is related to the 
equality dimension as Table 10.28 in the Annex shows. This dimension accounts for over half 
of all mentions which is very much compared to the organizations and is probably caused by 
a bias if civil servants felt that they should talk more about participation. However, not all of 
this coverage can be attributed to the bias and even when focusing on the content it is the 
framing that is most consistently promoted across civil servants. 
 
This finding needs to be qualified even more than for the organizations as perceptions across 
ministries vary strongly. As Table 10.28 shows, participation is for all ministries, except the 
Ministry for Sport and the Ministry of the Interior the most important element. The 
mentions for each dimension vary largely also when relating to the total framing by each civil 
servant. The equality dimension is the most important dimension apart for the Ministry of 
the Interior. Other dimensions like government capacity, but also mutual constraints are 
mentioned to an important degree by some ministries but are irrelevant to others.  
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The diversity of perceptions of democracy across ministries can be shown well with the 
dimension of transparency. This dimension is important in the interviews with the Ministry 
of Youth and Sports as well as the Ministry on Habitation. For other civil servants it only 
plays a minor role and even the interviewees from both ministries have a different 
perception of it. While the civil servant from the Ministry of Youth and Sports underlines 
budget and financial transparency, the civil servants from the Ministry of Habitation 
emphasize the transparency of recruitment processes. For the Ministry of Women or also for 
the Ministry of Tourism as well as the one for the Interior it is not important at all. 
 
Because of the difficulty to identify common elements in the state perspective, it is also 
difficult to relate the influence to organizations. The perspective on the freedom dimension 
illustrates differences and similarities towards organizations. Recalling that the freedom 
dimension plays an important role for ATFD and LTDH, but also for the FTDES, this is not the 
case for most ministries, with the exception of two ministries, the Ministry of Relations with 
Civil Society as well as the Ministry of Women. This means that while it is not possible to 
speak about overarching ideational influence on the state, the influence is limited to some 
ministries. 
 
Recalling its importance for the organizations, it is surprising that human rights did not get 
more coverage. In addition, it contradicts the assumption that organizations have a 
collective influence on the framing of human rights as human rights were not prominent 
across ministries and took different perspectives. Possible explanations include that the 
question of individual liberties concerns only some of the Ministries like the Ministry of the 
Interior and does simply not represent the working reality of other ministries. It refutes the 
central idea that especially human rights can be promoted by civil society towards (all) 
ministries, influence is limited to specific ministries. 
 
It needs to be kept in mind, that none of the interviewees was an official spokesperson, but 
all in leading positions. This might also be the reason why there is no clear framing of 
democracy, but a very diverse one. 
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Frame combinations 
Having outlined that framing is very diverse for the state, I nevertheless highlight some 
important combinations with elements of democracy, but also including other elements. 
 
The most important frame combinations include participation with respectively government 
capacity, mutual constraints and transparency. Table 10.26 in the annex shows that 
participation and government capacity as well as individual liberties and rule of law are 
central for combinations. 
 
With regard to other dimensions not related to democracy (Annex, Figure 10.27) that came 
up during the interviews, social politics are most important, followed by education, the 
revolution and the pre-revolutionary period. The remaining aspects are rather ministry 
specific such as the coding of sport related issues. However, like for the organizations, the 
role of economic aspects, here in the form of development and social politics, is a major 
point of referral that gets integrated in the framing of democracy. 
 
When comparing the most mentioned frame combinations with frame combinations by 
organizations (Figure 5.14), then it is the most important frame combination with the UGTT 
in articles that is similar to the most important one for ministries. When looking at its 
content the mediatized perspective of the UGTT on participation and government capacity 
focuses on strikes and the demand for more resources, while the one for civil servants 
focuses on the role of civil society and influence on government. 
Summary on the framing by state actors 
To summarize, there are several framings of democracy, very limited ones like the one by 
the civil servants from the Ministry of Habitation, a state capacity focused one of the 
Ministry of the Interior – talking even about a Leviathan – as well as several other civil 
servants emphasizing transparency or good governance that can be located between the 
extremes. 
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Some of the perceptions show incomplete pictures of democracy which is problematic when 
elements like equality are used as a basic referral of argumentation60. While I do not speak 
about undemocratic frames per se, there are effectively framings of democracy that are also 
compatible with a more authoritarian political system for example when collective rights are 
emphasized over individual ones or when participation of civil society is not constructed as 
substantial participation, but as factor for avoiding conflict. 
 
Relatively common is the referral to a participatory democracy as written in the constitution 
that translates in an obligation to have civil society participate as intermediary of individual 
citizens. It is an egalitarian conception of democracy that primes for civil servants, with the 
reserves that participation was the principal topic of discussion. On a very practical level, 
chances of participation are not equal as ministries work as a filter for participation as 
outlined above. 
 
The Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society hold framings of 
democracy that are much closer to the organizations, apart from the UGTT. The UGTT 
perspective is particularly compatible with the focus on state capacity that was often 
emphasized by civil servants. The FTDES perspective, although in terms of dimensions 
highlighted resembles a lot the UGTT, appears especially on decentralization close to the 
state perspective, however, on minority and migrant rights not at all. Thus, it becomes a 
complicated puzzle. 
6.6 Coincidence of interactions and framings? 
As we have seen in chapter four (and as will be detailed in chapter seven), especially the 
UGTT holds close reciprocal contacts towards a variety of actors of the political system. From 
this data it can be expected that the UGTT framing of democracy, with a slight focus on 
government control, equality, but also with its connections to economic conditions, is 
prominent among state representatives as there are many interactions. This is however not 
the case. While the state capacity framing is indeed present across civil servants, it is not the 
same perspective that is emphasized. While the UGTT focuses on government stability and 
                                                     
60 Although I do not enter the complete discussion on heuristics, Weible et al.’s article inspires to regard 
democracy as heuristics, something that could be element of further research (Weible et al. 2011). From this 
perspective it becomes insufficient to reduce democracy to one element. 
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fighting terrorism, this framing was less found among civil servants. A practical framing on 
government stability that sees it as more important for the own work gets emphasized. 
 
While the UGTT framing appears as less transmitted to the state there are also examples 
where framings and interactions resemble a lot. As we have also seen, the Ministry of 
Women is important for the ATFD, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice for 
the LTDH. As however not all of those contacts have been evaluated as important by civil 
servants, the framing is more similar for ATFD and Ministry of Women than for the LTDH and 
the Ministry of the Interior for example (keeping in mind results from chapter four). It 
appears that the Ministry of the Interior shares only few framings on democracy with civil 
society, raising doubts on whether civil society has intensive links with that ministry (one 
interviewee from the LTDH assigned that it is difficult with the Ministry of the Interior 
although much better than before). Another explication is that the diffusion of framings on 
democracy by interaction did not work in this case and one might speculate whether it is just 
about the issue covered by the ministry. It could also be that given the central position of the 
Ministry of the Interior at the time of Ben Ali, old habits are still very dominant. 
 
It is also complicated for the FTDES to relate framing and interactions. The FTDES mentioned 
several ministries as being important, but especially the Ministry for Social Affairs like the 
UGTT or the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs is not included, as it was impossible to interview a leader in this 
ministry due to reasons I can only speculate over (internal policies and so on). Given its 
prominent mention for interactions, I do still assume that framings are particularly 
congruent with the ones of the UGTT. Nevertheless, contacts towards the Ministry of 
Relations with Civil Society are intense and when comparing the framing one can see that 
there are several similarities. 
 
Interestingly a framing on rural women, an ATFD topic, has been found for the Ministry of 
Regional Development. This is also true for ministries were no specific links have been 
expressed by the ATFD (notably the Ministry of Regional Development). As also other 
organizations took over the topic it seems that it spread to other organizations. It appears 
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that this could be an example of indirect transmission, something to be verified by future 
research in detail. 
 
When taking the combined perspective of movements, the already mentioned elements 
human rights, participation and economy are prominent. While participatory elements of 
democracy are mentioned by civil servants, human rights have no prominent role with two 
exceptions. The focus on economic elements however is something widespread among civil 
servants. 
6.7 Conclusion to chapter six 
There is not one approach towards democracy, but several, including also a different degree 
of acceptance of civil society. Some civil servants prefer associations close to the public 
sector where people that they already know are included; an aspect facilitated by multi 
membership (ministry and associations). Others are more open towards the broader civil 
society without clear preferences. 
 
In some cases, the discussion on democracy was limited as elements of democracy got 
connected to own projects or to the orientation of the ministry in a utilitarian way. 
Compared to the organizations this means that it is even more limited than the one-
dimensional approach of the LTDH because no dimension of democracy is discussed in detail 
for some ministries. A limited framing of democracy is on the other hand more compatible 
with autocracy and can be interpreted as leftover from the Ben Ali period. As one 
interviewee mentioned, there is no clear common framing of democracy that is shared 
across ministries. 
 
There is a difference between less politicized ministries and more political ministries61. Those 
differences shape the orientation towards civil society as less politicized ministries “must 
talk” to civil society due to legally binding directives; other ministries promote an open, civil 
society oriented and more participative form of democracy. Ministries that are rarely 
targeted by civil society (like the one on Habitation) are rather oriented towards their 
problem fields and less towards democracy. It is a very utilitarian use of the concept of 
                                                     
61 As a less politiciced ministry I qualify ministries that emphasize the technical aspect of their work and argue 
less on the basis of aspects of democracy, parliamentarian decisions etc. Ministries underlying the 
administrative aspects of their work qualify as technical. 
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democracy. For the Ministry for Habitation two elements of democracy are more important, 
namely participation and transparency. This is exactly what civil society organizations are 
used for: to ensure legitimacy by providing transparency of procedures. On the other hand, 
the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society as well as the Ministry of Women are particularly 
close to civil society and some of the analyzed organizations in terms of a democratic 
framing (it is still a more egalitarian perspective). 
 
It is not about absolute congruence of framings, but about the perception of similar 
framings. What I mean here is that – as noted above – frame combinations are not 
completely similar, but actors insisted that they share values and beliefs. Those two evoked 
ministries have intense contacts with civil society. Other ministries are in between; between 
self-oriented concepts and a wider perspective on democracy (like the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports). It is possible that intensive networks augment the willingness to accept divergent 
elements in the framing of partners. However, this needs to be verified by further research. 
 
A participatory approach as written in the constitution is accepted, participation occurs 
through organizations that represent the citizens. However, disruptive protest is partly seen 
as going too far. Some civil servants accept every form of protest if not violent and 
encourage the dialogue. Many civil servants made a comparison to the pre-2011 period and 
how freedom as well as elections were influenced positively due to the referral made by 
organizations. It is not about human rights as common element between organizations and 
ministries, but participatory democracy as a key term that is shared. Equally, the importance 
of civil society is the same when asking civil servants and organizations. Thus, civil society is 
seen as a constitutive element of the Tunisian democracy. 
 
When it comes to the stability of the government, less change in government is preferred, 
similar to what organizations described. It thus becomes easier for both sides when 
governments change less. The economic aspects present in interviews with organizations 
were related to social politics in interviews with civil servants. 
 
Some similarities came up for decentralization. Most civil servants see it as element of the 
constitution that has to be realized and see a number of problems. While problems are also 
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advanced by organizations, the link to the economic development and importance of 
regional decision making is highlighted more explicitly for organizations; perhaps with the 
two exceptions, the Ministry for Regional Development and the Ministry for Relations with 
Civil Society. 
No common framing? 
The idea of a common framing on democracy that can be found for ministries and 
organizations did not show true. Effectively, different framings exist and perspectives are not 
unified. This is less surprising considering that the Tunisian democracy is relatively young and 
also civil servants need to learn and practice democracy. It is also in line with the different 
degree of interaction that was found in chapter four. 
 
Two aspects are nevertheless important. First, the civil servants in the Ministry of Women 
show democratic framings that are highly similar to those found at the ATFD. Especially the 
right-based approach on women rights and the insistence on a common framing based on 
equality and parity are shared. Those close framings are facilitated by the entrance of former 
as well as actual women movement members in the Ministry; something that will be 
discussed in chapter seven. 
 
Second, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society has a framing of democracy that is close 
to the one advanced by civil society with a human rights-based approach. The person 
interviewed has personal connections to the FTDES and the LTDH that might have supported 
the framing. Personal but also impersonal contacts as well as the task of the ministry to 
promote civil society appear favorable to a similar framing. Both ministries are examples for 
an ideational influence facilitated through intense interaction between ministries and 
organizations. 
 
Notwithstanding it is to note, that a number of other ministries hold a more general 
perspective strongly focused on the government capacity that resembles the perspective of 
the UGTT. There is some evidence that the wide networks of the UGTT also shapes framings, 
especially for the Presidency of the Government as will be explained later. Nevertheless, 
evidence for movement and civil society influence on democratic framings is limited. In 
addition, movements and organizations may adapt their perspectives to government 
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narratives. In this sense, it is probable that the control and equality-oriented perspective of 
the UGTT is also shaped by its interactions with the state. 
 
As we have seen in chapter five, especially frames on economic aspects, salaries (for the 
UGTT), as well as questions of terrorism and security resonate a lot in public. While the 
economic frame can be found in interviews with civil servants, none of the other framings is 
relevant to them. Thus, it is questionable whether there is a lot of influence through the 
media. However, civil servants acknowledge some attention but also skepticism towards 
traditional media reporting what will be detailed in chapter seven. 
 
From a normative perspective it is not a problem that state and civil society hold different 
framings of democracy, which is absolutely logic as each emphasizes other dimensions of 
democracy. However, the very different concepts that are present on the state level can lead 
to tensions across state actors and hence political conflicts. In addition, it is surprising that 
some organizations defend even a majoritarian perspective on democracy, while state actors 
use an egalitarian perspective. A stronger focus on equality and the framing of participatory 
democracy vis-à-vis state actors may be more beneficial for connections with other ideas. In 
this sense, especially the LTDH that does not connect equality a lot has difficulties, while the 
ATFD with a focus on participation and representation is in a far better position because 
their arguments naturally overlap with some of the framings of civil servants. 
 
As mentioned earlier, results are not generalizable to all civil servants and it is thus up to 
future research to confirm or falsify the obtained results. The diversity of frames and the 
presence of different framings across ministries pose problems as mainly only one interview 
represents a ministry. More interviews with civil servants of one ministry on their bilateral 
interactions with specific organizations are necessary to put results on a more robust basis. 
As the original idea was to have as many ministries as relevant as part of this research, I 
would nowadays focus on some ministries and have more interviews for those were 
interactions are frequent. However, at the time of writing it appears still as the right choice 
to search a variety of ministries. It was this approach that allowed to account for the 
difference across ministries. 
 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
333 
 
  
Not surprisingly, there appears to be competition among ministries on the realization of 
ideas with the Presidency of the Government as deciding factor in case of conflict. This 
central position and its influence on legislation processes is outlined in the next chapter 
taking a close look on mechanisms of influence that have been identified for the 
movements. While the ideational influence is limited, the ministries shall be situated a bit 
more, but also general ways of influencing are outlined. It is possible that those interactions 
still need time to show results on the state site and thus the identification of mechanisms 
can allow a future comparison. As we know from chapter four, different networks exist that 
movements can use. While the UGTT has a limited, state-oriented network, the others 
spread much more towards other civil society actors. 
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Chapter Seven 
Transmission mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Direct ties and public discourse 
Chapter seven shows the mechanisms by which movements can influence state framing and 
policies. The chapter answers the question: What are the mechanisms used by movements 
and how effective are those? As we have seen earlier, framings do only play a role in specific 
contexts of the Ministry of Women for example. Keeping framings of democracy in mind, 
this chapter connects the question of frame influence with policy influence, so whether 
specific elements of a democratic framing get promoted trough policy proposals or 
opposition. While we saw in chapter six that framings are quite different, movements can 
nevertheless influence legislation and democracy. It is expected that social movements use 
networks to realize their democratic framing directly (direct influence). Movement members 
enter the state apparatus or have close contacts to the administration. In addition, social 
movements use the media to influence the population (indirect influence). However, frame 
resonance in public is rather limited as shown in chapter five, something that will be 
discussed as well.  
 
As we have seen before, it can be expected that ministries with close ties to organizations 
have common framing (compare chapter four on networks, for example Ministry of Women 
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and ATFD). As we have seen degrees of similarities differ between ministries with those with 
more interaction having some similarity. 
 
While chapter six on the ministerial framing has shown that influence in terms of a 
democratic framing is limited, except notably two ministries, the general mechanisms and 
channels to influence the state will be outlined. In addition, the differences between the 
ministries that are closer to civil society and those that are more distant are outlined in 
order to identify effective channels of diffusion. It is to recall, that the perspective is ministry 
oriented, setting aside other actors like political parties. 
 
In line with theory, notably the direct/indirect/joint effect model will be tested, as well as 
different entry points at different policy stages (Giugni and Passy 2003; Giugni 2004; Giugni 
and Yamasaki 2009; Amenta 2006). It shows ways to influence especially ministries as those 
connections are verified through the state representative interviews, but also gives insights 
on how to influence other actors. In addition, interaction does not automatically mean 
influence as is shown in this chapter. 
 
Three arguments guide the chapter. First, at different stages of the policy process, influence 
differs; organizations that place a certain topic and frame it their way, have a higher chance 
to get it realized. This goes back to agenda-setting and setting a topic as important. This 
stage bases on emulation where state actors get convinced about a better policy option, and 
to more limited degree learning. 
 
Second, the direct/indirect/joint effect model has its limits in the Tunisian case because the 
traditional media sector does not work effectively and there is mistrust in information as we 
have seen before. In line is mistrust in information and consequentially some limits for 
learning on the basis of new information. The direct influence model appears as effective. 
Indirect effects can be achieved via media reporting on protest, and consequentially 
coercion. 
 
Third, proactive proposals in early phases have a higher probability of getting integrated into 
policy making and consistent framing of common proposals is important in order to make 
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
336 
 
  
positions clearly identifiable. As we have seen from theory, early processes are easier to 
influence (chapter two). In this phase it is mainly about proactive proposals because it is 
often too early to oppose legislation where the proposal is not yet written. 
 
The chapter bases not only findings from chapter four on networks, but combines those with 
chapters five and six on framing and links it with the findings on influencing as outlined in 
interviews. The question of individual or coalitional influence is discussed in the second part 
of the chapter. 
 
The chapter starts retracing how movements can influence state framing and policy 
decisions. A focus is given to legislation processes and at which stage it becomes possible for 
movements/organizations to influence ministries. The chapter here outlines the possibilities 
and connects it to ideational and policy influence at the end. The second part answers the 
question whether public opinion and the media can influence the policy making process. 
Thereafter, three examples of legislation are used to illustrate degrees of influence. If there 
is some ideational influence, organizations should be capable to influence legislation 
processes in a desired way, even if this is limited to the two ministries where influence was 
shown.  
7.1 Ties of actors and possible entry points 
Figure 7.1 summarizes influence channels that have been identified with the help of the 
network structures outlined in chapter four and what interviewees told. Direct arrows show 
relatively stable and working channel via different relay, while the broken arrows show 
channels that work partially from a movement perspective/ministry perspective. For 
example, while organizations use information and education to influence people as part of 
learning, it is not clear whether this process effectively translates in votes for parties that see 
a topic as important or whether information or education motivate people to protest. 
Especially on the latter more research is needed. On the other hand it is doubtful if ministers 
care a lot about elections if they are technocrats that while being nominated by parties, can 
still survive in their position without party support. Even for elected parliamentarians it is 
questionable whether not every parliamentarian has to fear re-election in a party system 
that still changes a lot. 
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I differentiate between movements and organization as organized movements can get heard 
because ministries prefer clear contact persons and clear resources behind (Figure 7.1). 
From the ministry perspective a difference in treatment between protest and organized 
claims exists. Equally, a slight difference between the ministries and the Presidency of the 
Government - officially a ministry itself - is highlighted as the latter plays a special role in 
legislation processes. Differences in mechanisms are considered in detail later. 
 
I generally identified six relays that can serve as transmission channels and mechanisms for 
the promotion of ideas. Those are Individuals that entered the state, recruitment processes 
with civil society participation, institutionalized hearings, hearings by ministries of by 
parliament, the media as well as the people and thus the general public. When it comes to 
the media, media reporting on organizational demands, but also on protest is possible. 
Protest and coercion is consequentially most effective in its mediatized form.  
 
As became clear through interviews, protest appears as something to be avoided for some 
ministries. It also became clear, that protest is especially regarded when a critical mass in 
terms of media reporting is reach. Protest passes thus by the media – and thus in an indirect 
way - in most cases. The threat of protest is to be seen as part of coercion by civil society on 
state actors. Especially disruptive protest can be perceived as negative (chapter six on 
ministerial framing), thus, it is questionable whether this type of protest can influence 
ministries to the same degree. For all ministries, it is questionable whether the relay media 
can function effectively when media is not perceived as impartial. While civil servants regard 
media reports, they prefer different sources of information (thus learning through media is 
seen as improbable, coercion as possible). On the other hand, movements and especially the 
FTDES use media or press releases in two ways: They try to pose their own information in 
the media and, more indirect, protest is used to create media attention, but also general 
public attention in order to influence the government. Media is not without problems: 
Especially the ATFD leaders have doubts that this works effectively as their positions are not 
correctly taken over. 
 
As reserves on media exist, diffusion of framing does not work effectively. I therefore argue 
that the indirect effect model that uses the public sphere does not work well with the 
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traditional media, as media in Tunisia is not seen as independent. In the Tunisian context, it 
seems more useful to focus on the direct influence model. 
 
For more open ministries a number of entry points exist, multiplying channels for access. As 
civil servants outlined, most ministries have to include civil society in one or the other way, 
while the form of involvement is not unified. While closed ministries focus on consultation 
for example during recruitment processes or public consultations as Figure 7.1 shows, open 
ministries have institutionalized consultation bodies or consult regularly with civil society in 
order to get new ideas or to create transparency. As will be detailed later, recruitment 
processes are seen as less effective when it comes to promoting ideas, while 
institutionalized committees are better suited. The different channels are seen as enabling 
or hindering factors for the diffusion of democratic framing and policies. 
 
Individuals that are part of the civil society can serve as relays for the transmission of ideas. 
This is a way of influencing that works also on an ideational level linked to emulation and 
that is the first channel that is presented. Before looking at this channel m in detail, I shortly 
outline the Tunisian legislation processes to create a better understanding on policy 
processes in Tunisia. 
Figure 7.1 Actor based ways of influencing 
 
Note: own figure based on interviews
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Legislation process 
The legislation process is important to understand when and how movements can influence 
policies through their framing. It is an additional step towards framing influence and outlines 
what interactions can influence policies with and without common framing. The legislation 
process is here described as experienced by the actors involved. While this is similar to the 
stages of the policy process as outlined in chapter two, I explain it from the perspective of 
interviewees. Therefore, terms such as agenda setting phase will not appear in this 
overview. 
 
The initiation of a law proposal normally comes from a ministry, the administration or the 
parliament including political parties as illustrated in Figure 7.2. In some cases -as will be 
illustrated later-, movements can pressure ministries to propose a law. Normally one or few 
ministries are in charge for a law project. 
 
In case of budget implications, the Ministry of Finance needs is included; interviewees also 
mentioned that formally the Presidency of the Government as well as the Administrative 
Court are to be informed. The parliament proposes only few laws itself or sends the ideas for 
elaboration to ministries. According to Youssef from the Presidency of the Government it is 
especially the missing expertise that makes parliamentarians send law ideas to the 
administration: 
"The parliamentarians prepare the laws but sometimes they do not have for 
example the knowledge or something like that. They limit themselves to give 
directives and they trust in the expertise of the administration to help them. 
They also call us to listening sessions to listen to our opinion” (Presidency of the 
Government, Youssef) 
 
When a law proposal is initiated, a consultation phase follows. While some ministries consult 
with other ministries, some have open consultations or consult with the organizations they 
work with regularly. This process is not unified. The legislation process includes a lot of inter-
ministerial coordination: 
"And for other texts, decrees or laws, even decrees, generally […] one must have 
the opinion of the Presidency of the Government, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Administrative Court. Generally, in these three instances, they must be 
notified on the project before being consulted, […] to pass […] by the ministerial 
council.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid) 
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"It goes through all ministries in the case of proposing laws. Once one has 
collected all the opinions, one tries to get closer, to solve the various problems 
one has. Once we have an agreement, we send to parliament” (Ministry of 
Tourism, Aymen) 
 
When the law proposal passed all involved ministries and when potential conflicts are 
decided by the Presidency, the law proposal gets published and is sent to Parliament. 
 
The Parliament can have consultation as part of the involved parliamentary commissions. 
This is another stage where movements and organizations can get involved. As will be shown 
later through the law examples, once a law proposal is published, protest makes more sense 
and can be directed towards parliament and government. It is in the second part of policy 
process when it comes to passage and implementation where protest is seen as effective 
because consultation mechanisms are missing. When the plenary accepted the law, the 
president signs the law and once it is published in the official journal, it enters into force. 
However, the signature by the president, as well as the publication can be delayed; another 
point where protest can emerge. The law proposal becomes only a law when published in 
the official journal JORT. 
Consultation and conflicts 
The processes slightly differ from one ministry to another, especially the moment at which 
organizations get consulted. The Ministry of Finance for example uses a Council, where also 
organizations participate, to get early feedback. In most of the cases, consultations are 
conducted after internal consultation with other ministries: 
"The Ministry, the Directorate of Legislation begins to prepare the law on 
finance. It is sent to all departments, so to all professional organizations to ask if 
they have proposals to make. And the administration, too, is looking at whether 
there are texts that have not worked well, whether there is something that is not 
up to date or something to change, etc. So, we collect all that. [...] And 
afterwards, this Directorate of Legislation drafts the project. […] We have what is 
called the National Council of Taxation. It is a consultative body [...] It is formed 
of professional organizations, other departments, departments other than the 
Ministry of Finance. [...] We expose them it and we ask for their opinion [...] if 
there are relevant remarks, if there are changes to be made, we modify and 
submit it to the Council of Ministers. [...] by times it is approved by the Council of 
Ministers. We're doing some new consultations. The most important 
professional organizations are consulted. UTICA, UGTT, etc. If we can rectify, if it 
is not quite the opposite [...] So not to disrupt everything, therefore, we take into 
account. If not, we refer to Parliament and they can go to Parliament to reclaim 
it.” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
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"There is a draft text that is prepared in consultation with the other ministries. 
After having sent the project to the presidency of the government, we have to 
prepare a modified version, and at this stage, we involve the others. So, in my 
opinion, we cannot get them involved from the beginning […] and you know 
most [of them] are not experts” (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa) 
 
In case of conflict between ministries, ministries first negotiate with each other before 
making civil society participate. The civil servant from the Ministry of Finance underlines that 
there were occasions where civil society organizations did not show up although being 
solicited. 
 
If no consensus on important questions is reached between ministries, it is the Presidency of 
the Government that takes a decision. 
"Generally, within this council, these are minimal problems or issues that do not 
have significant impact at the national level; they are managed through the 
different technical departments within ministries, of two or three ministries. So, 
they are managed at the ministerial level. If the problem is significant, normally 
they are brought back to arbitration before the Prime Minister within the 
framework of the ministerial council or the restricted ministerial council, as that 
the decision finally is taken by the President of the Government” (Ministry of 
Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis) 
 
The Presidency of the Government thus has a decisive position and can influence which laws 
get promoted and which not. Similarly, a law project can “bounce” between the ministerial 
council and ministries (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid). However, conflicts between 
ministries are not the only conflicts. Equally, discussions with parliament can arise. Conflicts 
with parliament get discussed by the Consensus Commission62: 
"As soon as the project is transmitted to parliament, it is published on the site. 
[…] So, at the level of parliament, if there are major discrepancies and 
everything, there is a commission called the […] Consensus Commission. We 
meet the Commission and the ministry to find compromises. […] If there is a 
compromise, that's good. If there is no compromise, the Finance Commission 
reports and transmits it to the plenary. And the vote is in plenary. So, the 
ministry will defend the project and the others will defend their point of view.” 
(Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
The Consensus Commission does however not include civil society. Law proposals can even 
originate from civil society. The movement perspective suggests, that law projects are not 
only elaborated by ministries or the parliament, but equally by the UGTT: 
                                                     
62 The International Crisis Group (2018) recently mentioned this commission as being used extensively for 
legislative decisions by political parties, also sidelining the complete parliamentary assembly. 
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"Well, we have just taken the initiative to propose a law on the social and 
solidary economy because we believe that the development model that is 
currently being followed does not fully meet the needs of the economy for the 
promotion of [...] and insertions of young people and women into working life. 
That's why we have a fight against poverty. We proposed a framework law for 
promotion and solidarity as the third pillar of the economy because the current 
economy is lame, if we think of the private sector and the public sector. [...]. So, 
it is a cross-cutting mission that pushes the major economic issues to big 
reforms.” (UGTT, Aziz) 
 
Of course, the law proposal is not officially proposed by the UGTT, but a ministry that was 
approached by the UGTT. However, this is only true for the UGTT to this degree. For other 
organizations it is more complicated to realize law proposal with the notable exception of 
the women movement as shown later. 
"It depends. But we continue. For example, we spent four years to have a law 
decree with five governments. Because we believe that people change, but the 
state exists. So there, since 2011, we had a fight to have an inquiry committee 
[…] on the issue of missing migrants in Italy, so the government before January 
14, […], the government before October 23, the government after October 23, 
[...], the government of the Democrats, until we arrived at this government. So, 
five governments. We arrived at a result with the fifth. So, there were blockades, 
there were people who did not respond to emails, but we continued” (FTDES, 
Mehdi) 
 
Different ministries work differently as especially civil society is consulted earlier or later in 
the legislation process. Entry points for organizations are diverse and range from protest at 
different stages of the policy process, especially to counter law initiatives and augment 
pressure (coercion) as will be shown later, or participation in open consultations, up to direct 
consultations between the ministry and the organization. In addition, organizations use 
different levels within the hierarchy (department, ministry, and presidency), complicating 
the picture. I now look at the channels in detail and highlight differences and similarities 
recalling the differences between the ministries as well as the Presidency of the Government 
to illustrate where movements can place ideas and their framing. 
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Figure 7.2 Legislation process 
 
Note: own figure based on interviews
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7.2 Direct Channels 
7.2.1 Civil society members in ministries 
The first relay are (former) civil society members that enter the state administration. 
Examples that came up during interviews concern especially the Ministry of Relations with 
Civil Society and the Ministry for Women. Especially the ATFD and the women movement 
have a contact person in the Ministry of Women. The position was funded in relation to the 
EU project PASC at a time when civil society influence in ministries was limited. This 
externally financed project helped the Tunisian women movement to become influential. 
Additionally, interviewees at the Ministry of Industry and at the Presidency of the 
Government mentioned their involvement in associations. 
 
The interviewed state representative at the Ministry of Women confirmed the direct 
contacts between the ATFD and the minister. She is herself member of the women 
movement and holds close ties with diverse women organizations; the entry towards the 
ministry is not very difficult for the Tunisian women movement. Similarly, Anis from the 
Ministry of Industry underlines the links due to positions in ministries and associations. 
"To talk about the link between the ministry and civil society, I am the concrete 
example in front of you because […] I actually came from civil society a very long 
time ago. I joined the ministry because I was asked by the minister, the former 
minister of women as civil society to contribute the most in the ministry in the 
sense that the ministry is a public institution with vision, a history etc. And then 
cooperation with civil society allows to widen a little the horizon and to have a 
differentiated vision on things and in this step that one wants to be really 
democratic we consequentially associate the civil society.” (Ministry of Women, 
Soulayma – b) 
 
"We have a very active civil society in Tunisia. […] A civil society that has a 
characteristic that is very special compared to others […] I think that compared 
to other countries, the majority of the Tunisian civil societies come from the civil 
service, from the higher public function. So, generally, they are friends who know 
each other. The majority of the people who work in these associations are 
colleagues who are working or who were already working in the public sector [...] 
who know the problems and who know the solutions and who have a double hat. 
[...] it is at the limit between the formal and the informal. So, that works” 
(Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis) 
 
"There is already this willingness that is installed. [...] I do not know how it 
happened before, but what I know is that associations like ATFD [...], which are 
on the same side in principle, had virtually no connection with the ministry. With 
the arrival of Minister Samira Merai Friaa [...] But there, sincerely, I saw a request 
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from civil society to cooperate with the ministry. [...] It's reciprocal. And I would 
say that [...] with all the modesty, a representative of the civil society within the 
ministry has given a form of trust; […] there someone who represents us there, is 
someone who will fight for our principles, our ideas, etc. And especially I held 
that at the beginning, now I am obliged to stick to the norms” (Ministry of 
Women, Soulayma – a) 
 
Other researchers confirm the role of the Ministry of Women. Khalil underlines, that during 
the tenure of Labidi as minister, experts have been recruited to the ministry (Khalil 2014; see 
also Norbakk 2016 on the relation between ATFD and Ministry of Women). From the 
perspective of the ATFD, contacts are seen as personal as well as institutionalized: 
"There exist both. But it's not individuals like me who will talk to Ms. X because 
we are friends. It's really institutional. It's institutional relationships, not just 
personal ones. But let's say they are both at the same time.” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
"Besides, we have prepared a proposal that is already with decision makers [...] 
as I told you we are working on the harmonization of laws with the constitution. 
[...] with the constitution who, at least, recognized equality between women and 
men. And through this law, we go, we ask for more.” (ATFD, Myriam) 
 
The Ministry of Women is known across ministries for its good relations to civil society. 
While the ATFD generally reported good contacts, it has been refused at least once by the 
Minister of Women in Mai 2016 and was excluded from participation in the elaboration of a 
law on women violence as reported by the press (Réalités 2016a). 
 
It is not only the link towards organizations, but also coalitions across ministries that are 
equally important for legislation processes as Soulayma from the Ministry of Women 
expressed. 
"So, everyone, every minister is doing his best, among the progressive ministers, 
each one is doing his best to move towards democracy, fighting within the 
ministerial council to pass some things and so on. And I come back to democracy 
in Tunisia, it is not a matter of government, it is essentially civil society that will 
guarantee at least the non-demolition of this nascent democracy” (Ministry of 
Women, Soulayma-a) 
 
Particular in this citation is the mention of non-progressive ministries, notably the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs. This is in line with perceptions of the ATFD. Beneath the networks 
towards other organizations, the ATFD has no contact to religious women rights 
organizations. As Debuysere describes, cross-ideological cooperation is difficult between 
women rights organizations (Debuysere 2016). However, Debuysere also argues that a cross-
Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia     Jan-Erik Refle 
  
346 
 
  
ideological cooperation may improve the effectiveness of Tunisian women rights 
associations (Debuysere 2016). Islamists are defined as outgroup. In the case of the ATFD, 
Islamists and especially Ennahdha are outsider and it is difficult to integrate their 
perspectives as those are too different. As the Ministry of Women and the women 
movement are close, this perspective translates also to the ministerial level. 
 
While not systematically analyzing, Antonakis-Nashif remarked the participation of the ATFD 
in decision-making processes due to the different alliances that exist and due to its specific 
expertise (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). It became clear through the interviews that contacts 
were primarily personal and were institutionalized over time. Another example for personal 
contacts in form of former members is provided by Antonakis-Nashif, naming former ATFD 
leader Bouchra Bel Haj Hamida who became Member of Parliament for Nida Tounes 
providing the ATFD contacts toward parliament (Antonakis-Nashif 2016; see also Moghadam 
2018 for more examples). 
 
The degree of involvement is however different from one ministry to another. Kamel from 
the Ministry of Habitation for example assigns that his ministry does only have links to the 
sports association of the ministry as well as a support association for the ministry (Ministry 
of Habitation, Kamel). These links show the different quality as the associations have no 
political influence. 
 
Beneath the ties towards the Ministry of Women, a tie towards the Ministry of Relations 
with civil society exists. 
"They tell us that they are very aware. We also have relations with Kamel 
Jendoubi63, who is a human rights activist, who was our ally before. That is to say 
that we have no difficulty to see them, but to concretize. They can collaborate at 
some point in certain issues on women, for example. But for the moment [...] the 
minister of women says that we have the same project, she is aware, she will 
introduce the law project. She is aware of equality, women's rights and 
everything.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
                                                     
63 Minister for Relations with Civil Society at the time of interviews 
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It is important to note, that some ministries like the one of Women also restrain cooperation 
with certain organizations as not all are working on women for example. Ministries have an 
interest not to cooperate with “irrelevant” organizations working in other sectors. 
 
The Ministry of Relations with Civil Society has close contacts towards the FTDES and the 
LTDH. 
"We have friends among ministers; we have friends, who facilitate a bit the 
contact. Now we have a minister who is in charge of civil society, is in charge of 
the institutions. So, it turns out that this minister is a friend of ours. We 
protested together at the time of Ben Ali. So, it makes a lot of things easier. He is 
a minister, but on a subjective level, the contact is permanent. But not 
necessarily about work. We keep the contact as friends. [...] It's not 
institutionalized. Although we have a Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, this 
link is not yet institutionalized. It requires reflection, innovation, and time to put 
in place institutional mechanisms.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
"On a personal level, I am on the mailing list of the forum, but on a professional 
level in the ministry they solicit us by their activities, they send us the results of 
their studies and they invite us to their press conference, to the public activities 
they invite us also to open or to animate, or for advertising and we are very 
involved with the forum and the flip side is that we are a very small ministry in 
the creation phase, lacking staff, we would like to be present everywhere [...]” 
(Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled) 
 
"But for us, what we already talked about three weeks ago [...] in a meeting with 
the minister in charge of relations with civil society, is that we said we need to 
have mechanisms with the government, creating mechanisms for even a small 
association can change the reality of people. You do not just rely on the Forum, 
or the League or the UGTT, because from our point of view, we cannot be 
everywhere.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
Another example for personal contacts through former members concerns the UGTT 
entering administrative positions: 
"No, he quits officially. He remains an ex-militant committed in his spirit, but all 
his activities, his responsibilities within the UGTT cease. But it will help because 
he is governor in the region of Siliana, with the general secretary of Siliana as a 
friend of him; they know each other for a long time.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
When it comes to personal contacts and the use of networks, the women movement with 
the ATFD and their special relation to the Ministry of Women are exemplary. The contacts 
between the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the analyzed organizations are on a 
personal basis as well. While I consider this to be a direct channel, there is also an indirect 
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effect as former members could spread ideas towards others. In this sense, former members 
in ministries combine direct and indirect ways of influence. Trough those channels and 
especially personal contacts, emulation and thus convincing other civil servants about the 
normative value of a solution seems easier realizable. Similarly, former external actors can 
bring new perspectives in the ministry and other civil servants can learn. As the exchange 
bases on trustful exchanges, coercion is seen as playing only a minor role.  
 
One Ministry that was often mentioned, but despite numerous attempts anybody 
responded on requests, is the Ministry of Social Affairs. Future research should address the 
perspective of this particular ministry. Given the importance of this ministry for 
organizations, it is to expect that the framing by civil servants is highly similar. 
 
Due to its wide network, the UGTT has a number of actual and former members that can 
establish personal contacts in every region of Tunisia. This personal link has a huge influence 
and can help influencing policies. However, influence on framing is limited, although the 
interviewees from the Ministry of Women showed a partly similar framing and underlined 
shared framings and values as seen in chapter six on the ministerial framing. 
7.2.2 Institutionalized exchanges 
The second channel does not necessarily include personal ties. Institutionalized exchanges 
include relations between ministries and organizations on a regular basis. Some of these 
institutional exchanges are even qualified as formal allies. Chapter six on ministerial framing 
already outlined how civil servants conceptualize civil society participation as well as how 
they justify their motivation to involve organizations. Examples for the inclusion of civil 
society are more prominent for some of the ministries. Nizar underlines the importance of 
civil society inclusion for the Ministry of Women: 
"It's because we work in sectors where the presence of civil society is very 
important. And in addition, it [the women movement] has a history of over 40 
years of existence especially on the rights of women [...] Because we speak; we 
act in the field of human rights, humanitarian rights, equal rights, of women's 
dignity, of the presence of women and the economic presence of women. So, the 
human rights league [LTDH] has been in existence for years, but also other 
feminist associations that have existed since then and have a lot of experience. 
Certainly, in other ministerial departments, I was in the [anonymized] and frankly 
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it is difficult to work with civil society in the field of governance and 
transparency” (Ministry of Women, Nizar) 
 
Similarly, institutional contacts exist for the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. A change 
in mindsets enables more involvement of civil society. 
"When we drafted the projects, we did not do it alone, we did it with civil society 
and finally with civil society experts, together with the other ministries. But most 
importantly we went to the regions to do consultations. We present the project, 
we have a feedback. We make a report and publish it. There we begin to see that 
civil society is starting to see that there is a feedback to their proposals. [...] 
Before 2011, it was with or against the regime. After 2011 this is no longer the 
case. It was the civil society that has a role to play so the means to give and the 
results to get. So, the state recognizes the independence of civil society, should 
no longer consider civil society as an enemy, even at the level of the structures of 
the state we even start to touch civil society, to listen, this is not obvious that it's 
all super. [...] On the other hand, civil society sees itself in a better position and 
seeks to establish closer relations with the state without being an extension of 
the state and seeks to position itself to advocate and seek claims and support 
certain segments of the population and causes and so on. So, the life of civil 
society becomes a little more active, a little less aggressive, because there is an 
element of trust that is being established within the state and civil society. So, 
what I'm saying is really embryonic phase.” (Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society, Khaled) 
 
The Ministry of Relations with Civil Society functions as coordinator of ministry-organization 
interaction, because ministries do not know how to interact. This also shows that many 
contacts directly address the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. 
“We would like to set up a structure that is listening to civil society in each 
ministry, be it something that as a network in each ministry structured by person 
[…], or a person besides the minister in his cabinet who is really listening to civil 
society and who informs the civil society about the [...] needs of the ministry but 
especially who allows the ministries to be in network with these people, 
summarize information, this information would be of the type: needs, claims, 
problems and of the other side if you have things to give, use this channel to 
disseminate this information or look for relationships. [...] They [the ministries] 
solicit by choice, then they want to make participation with the civil society but 
they want not to engage themselves, they ask you for a list, you are in relation to 
the civil aspect, we are putting a steering committee, we want to involve the civil 
society, choose for us.” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled) 
 
As a consequence, the Ministry of Relations with the Civil Society serves as gatekeeper for 
institutionalized contacts. 
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Examples for mixed commissions are diverse and as the two examples from the Ministry of 
Finance with an institutionalized as well as from the Ministry of Habitation with a 
partnership show: 
"At the ministry level, in 2013, a joint commission was created. So, mixed, that 
means it's made up of the ministry, representatives of the ministry, and 
representatives of civil society. Its objective is financial transparency. […] So, it's 
normally chaired by the Minister of Finance and there are interim chairs […] the 
general secretary of the ministry and the second of the civil society. And it has 
two secretaries, two rapporteurs. One from the ministry and one from the civil 
society” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
"It's a form of partnership and it gives satisfaction if we have the same 
objectives. That's what we found with ATIT and I Watch. For us it is an 
apprenticeship but also for them. It is a good collaboration and we are very 
satisfied. On a large scale we cannot do everything ourselves.” (Ministry of 
Habitation, Slim) 
 
Relations to civil society are more distant for example for the Ministry of the Interior. No 
common framing plays a role, but a basis for cooperation. Relations for example with the 
International Red Cross are institutionalized. Local Security Councils are examples of 
institutionalized civil society participation involving the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry 
of the Interior is seen as one of the open ministries towards civil society by civil servants 
although this perspective is not shared by civil society leaders. Khaled from the Ministry of 
Relations with Civil Society outlined that although the Ministry of the Interior was 
completely closed towards civil society under Ben Ali, it is now more open at least on some 
questions (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled). This perspective is supported by 
the Ministry of the Interior: 
"As a ministry we have more contacts, because it is the symbolic context. The 
consecration to security issues, so we are more solicited. We look at each 
request and ask what profile the organization has or we ask for coordination. We 
are always open […] certain observations are introduced and we are in the 
process of reviewing the code of ontology. All processes took the necessary time. 
Each time they were present, their position was taken into account. But in the 
end, it's the ministry’s responsibility. As far as civil society is concerned, it is a 
discussion within the limits of laws. We must make the institutional forces work. 
Civil society must work with the institutions so that there is another partner. A 
bit of criticism, that helps. It's another actor who controls. It is also requested by 
the security forces.” (Ministry of the Interior, Rania) 
 
From the perspective of the LTDH, there is some skepticism towards the Ministry of the 
Interior as well as the Ministry of Justice. 
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"There is the Ministry of the Interior, who was the great, the great guru, the 
ministry that ate us, who persecuted us, who pursued us, and so on. It must be 
said that in the 70s and 80s, the League of Human Rights had still managed for 
long periods to have a vis-à-vis inside […] There have been lucky times, there 
have been moments of good cooperation. And then very quickly we realized that 
we could not be treated as equal […]. So, it was necessary to cut this link […]. 
Well, the Ministry of Justice also had ups and downs. But overall all ministries 
were under the boots of the regime in place […] We are happy; there is a 
regulation that respects it now, that is a little bit in the rules of art.” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
As interviews suggest, a number of ministries hold contacts without fixed partnership or 
guidelines. The looser cooperation does not result in shared framings. These loose relations 
are discussed later under open consultations. This indicates that mechanisms can be the 
same as for personal contacts in case of trustful relations, but can be more distant and 
involve also forms of coercion.  
 
The contacts of the ATFD, the LTDH and the FTDES towards government are also present in 
media reports. The three organizations are among six organizations under the umbrella of 
the Euromed Human Rights Network, that the Minister for Constitutional Institutions, Civil 
Society and Human Rights, Kamel Jendoubi, in February 2016 encountered to consult on 
negotiations with the European Union and that later continued more formalized as part of 
the ALECA negotiations (Kapitalis 2016b; Kapitalis 2016c; L’Economiste Maghrebin 2016). 
 
The Ministry of Women, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of Habitation have institutionalized 
interaction with organizations. However, it is difficult to account for all institutionalized ties 
between organizations and ministries as no official information or processes exist. In 
addition, the border between informal or personal contacts that get institutionalized over 
time is blurred. There is a lot of habit in some of the interactions; other interactions are 
more distant and occasional. Organizations recognize differences in the level of inclusion by 
ministries and even persons: 
"Sometimes we made an influence on public decisions. […] So, we changed a lot, 
we blocked a lot of laws; we changed a lot of laws too. They have adopted many 
initiatives that we have done. There was blocking too, it depends, because as I 
told you, there is not a clear policy. So, it depends on time and interlocutor 
within the government. So sometimes it works, sometimes it does not work.” 
(FTDES, Mehdi) 
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Institutionalized channels and mechanisms of diffusion have been introduced at a certain 
time and now prevail because of expertise or agreements. As was shown in chapter six, 
selection processes for organizations are very diverse and thus especially organizations that 
became member of commissions at the right time have advantages (thus the older, 
established ones with the exception of Al Bawsala and I Watch). As became clear in chapter 
six, inclusion of organizations is in some cases a ‘trial and error’ process. Institutionalized 
interactions help to establish a common framing on the base of emulation, but it is 
complementary to other effects. 
 
One of the analyzed organizations is outstanding. The UGTT already had a consultative 
function under Ben Ali. Thus, the organization was consulted before the revolution. Now, 
this position prevails in a post-revolution context. While the UGTT represents eight hundred 
thousand Tunisians, the inclusion derives from a historic inclusion as is outlined shortly. 
The special role of the UGTT 
There is disequilibrium between the UGTT and the other organizations. For the UGTT, which 
has a lot of contacts towards the state and other actors and a well-defined network, the 
reputation is implicitly or naturally named as important. The historic role of the UGTT and its 
participation in the National Dialogue is often taken as justification for its inclusion. Similarly, 
researchers acknowledge that the UGTT played a key role supporting policies during the 
initial transition time which enabled the success (Wolf 2014a). 
"Yes, the UGTT, […] because finally, the UGTT has a history deeply rooted in the 
country in the national struggle for the independence of the country, in the 
construction of the country, and therefore, we cannot give criticism to the union, 
that it interferes in politics since for a long time, it listened to the cradle of 
political action and opposition within the country” (Ministry of Industry, Energy 
and Mines, Anis) 
 
The UGTT has a special position due to its tripartite configuration as labor union. However, 
the UGTT is more than a labor union and also a national regulator of policies. One may ask 
whether the UGTT is already a polity member. In the network analysis it became clear, that 
the UGTT is well connected and interwoven with the Tunisian state. Other researchers found 
similar results: Antonakis-Nashif argues that the UGTT is part of the core elite due to its role 
for national dialogue (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). This perspective is supported by my own data, 
supported by a number of interviews with civil servants. 
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"Really, the UGTT today and Utica if they want, they could make the law. 
Nevertheless, this quartet had a good recognition. Tunisians still respect these 
organizations even though the UGTT has had very hard blows for social and 
union complaints. And at the international level you know that this quartet was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, it was for the country and for the quartet and 
we forget the pride for the civil society and for us Tunisians it's something new.” 
(Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled) 
 
The UGTT has regular contacts towards ministries and UGTT leaders regularly exchange as 
the example by Ahmed shows: 
"Yes, there is an exchange. In all its forms; even personally. People call each 
other, whenever it is necessary; they call each other two to three times a day. 
[...] There is always a direct contact. And for example, the Secretary General can 
go personally to the Prime Minister, tell him: listen, it cannot pass, it will not 
pass. And generally, the government also tends to listen a bit. Because they 
know that if they completely ignore what the UGTT says, they will have a 
problem afterwards, at the implementation level.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
Especially the Presidency of the Government, and thus the instance that decides in case of 
conflict, reported many weekly exchanges: 
"It's the UGTT, […] we have even weekly meetings and we consider them as 
social partners and similarly there is pressure from these unions and sometimes, 
we are obliged to apply these guidelines to […] the other associations work […]. 
We have promulgated a decree that associates the civil society in the 
recruitment evaluation commissions of candidates […], to associate a little civil 
society as a control body. In the other projects we have projects concerning the 
civil service, the position of the women in the civil service, the rights of the civil 
servants, we associate the civil society to give ideas on the subjects […] and after 
this consultation then the laws are drafted according to the proposals of the civil 
society” (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar) 
 
Similarly, the UGTT (and the UTICA) get consulted for fiscal projects, something that 
originates from historic arrangements (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine). 
 
One special institutionalized form of access is the four plus four/five plus five arrangement. 
Depending on topics, four/five ministers and four/five representatives from the UGTT 
discuss topics on a regular basis. This institutionalized consultation and exchange occurs 
when necessary or as interviewees suggested at least once a month. 
"It was at the committee where we had a meeting this morning, at the 
negotiation committee, there are four representatives of the union and four 
ministers, Minister of the Public Service, Minister of Social Affairs, Minister of 
Finance and Presidency of the Government” (Presidency of the Government, 
Mokhtar) 
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"We always have a commission, we call it four + four, that is to say four of the 
executive board and four ministers, […] we ask for a dialogue with the 
government, and we have a research office. If we have a case, we take with us all 
the references, all the data, all the information, and we start negotiating with the 
government. If we arrive, we arrive. If not the President of the Republic or the 
President who can decide, otherwise we declare war. But, it's not: it's no equals 
we go to war. […] It is a democratic organization. We like to talk before.” (UGTT, 
Mohamed) 
 
The UGTT is consulted in different stages of the legislative process and by the Presidency of 
the Government and even before other organizations are consulted. 
"For example we are now working on the reform of the general status of the 
public statute, it is a very important law that concerns the entire civil service, […] 
we have worked for more than six months with the UGTT, it is a social partner 
but […] the second phase we will work in a seminar with the associations that 
have an interest in the public service to have their ideas and proposals before 
writing the first draft” (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar) 
 
A similar role is taken in relations with the Ministry for Education. Often UGTT and UTICA are 
named together underlining the tripartite configuration. Hamdi highlights especially the role 
of the two organizations for the reform of the education sector (Ministry of Education, 
Hamdi). On the other hand, the UGTT approaches different ministries at the same time, also 
together with partners. 
"Of course, the UGTT sometimes alerts the Ministry of the Interior, it alerts the 
Prime Minister and all that. And so, it makes things move. And we also ask 
people, normal citizens, so there is first of all the human rights league. It's a 
league that originated from about forty years [...] you had to make a complaint 
first, you had to write, not to keep quiet, let’s say.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
The functioning in a coalitional mode is thus used to create awareness on a topic. 
 
The UGTT approaches different levels of the administration: 
“We as a sectorial federation have direct relations with the administration, with 
the ministers, the administration at the central level. The regional unions have a 
direct relation with the regional leaders, the governors I do not know what. 
That's at the local level. All that is discussed at the national level is either at the 
federations or at the trade union headquarters.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
On the other hand, the perception of the UGTT is not always positive as we have seen before 
especially for articles. Slim from the Ministry for Habitation underlines the inference by the 
UGTT: 
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"Yes, there is contact with the UGTT. They try to change things. They see things 
and sometimes they intervene in an appointment. I do not like it, because the 
one who will be blamed is the government and not the UGTT. When it comes to 
decisions, the ministry is criticized.” (Ministry of Habitation, Slim) 
 
The UGTT has much influence, not only proposing as seen earlier but often blocking 
proposals. The UGTT operates also as veto power. 
"Yes of course. Even if the [...] UGTT can block sometimes, even without strikes. 
It can block by lobbying, by its alliances at the level of the administration, by 
several forms. But every time one agrees on one point, it goes much easier for 
everyone.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
"We as UGTT have never thought of being in power. This is our way of getting 
our country out of the crisis, of all the crises that can happen. We are a counter-
power; we will remain a counter-power that will create weight and balance. To 
create a balance as long as the balance is going to fall to the right. And […] we 
had difficulties especially at the level of right-wing parties. Especially the 
fundamentalist parties.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
This is completely in line with Dakhli’s argument that the UGTT acts even as veto player in 
the Tunisian landscape and filter law projects (Dakhli 2013). Due to the institutionalized 
character of interactions, the UGTT cannot just refer to emulation, but to coercion with the 
treat of strikes without risking their inclusion in those committees. The UGTT can serve as 
horizontal balance to the national government and take over one function of democracy, 
providing balance. However, the UGTT is a very heterogeneous organization. Different 
sections show different levels of activity. Especially the teachers and postal workers are seen 
as more likely to protest during the revolution (Willis 2016). 
 
The UGTT has privileged access to the Presidency of the Government and can enter ideas (or 
block) on another level. The organization has a different access to all mechanisms of 
diffusion. While the UGTT also has intense contacts to some of the ministries, the contacts 
to the Presidency of the Government are to be emphasized because a number of laws pass 
by the Presidency and thus can be modified or stopped there. In addition, the four plus 
four/five plus five mechanism is an institutionalized committee where ministers meet with 
their counterparts at the UGT. In comparison to the other organizations, the UGTT has much 
more influence on ministries and ministers. It consequentially uses not only the collective 
level, but also the individual level. This is less caused by common framings, but by the 
historical role played by the UGTT. This exchange is thus not based on a specific framing of 
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democracy, but on reputation and perceived power. However, the UGTT as well as the other 
organizations do not only use institutional access, but also protest as a way to directly 
influence the state. 
7.2.3 Hearings  
Another direct influence channel, which was not a focus of research, are hearings in 
parliament. Those were discussed during interviews and proved to be another relay. 
Organizations can not only serve as experts to the Ministry, but also to Parliament. The 
expert role is emphasized and consequentially learning of parliamentarians and to a certain 
degree emulation are possible. However, the mobilization or responsiveness of parliament is 
limited. The FTDES for example proposed a law on racism in 201664, together with the 
Réseau Euro-méditerranean des droits de l’homme and the Comité pour le respect des 
libertés et des droits de l’homme (Kapitalis 2016d). Fourteen parliamentarians supported 
the law proposal (Le Temps 2016). This shows the limited number of parliamentarians that 
can effectively be mobilized. None of the analyzed organizations (including the UGTT) 
expressed wide influence on parliamentarians. 
 
Those contacts that exist have not been verified with parliamentarians as it was not focus of 
research and resources were limited. Thus, the interview statements shall be threatened 
with caution. However, as parliament was rarely mentioned, it is certainly not an actor to 
overestimate. 
 
Nevertheless, I show how movements can influence policy via parliament. Official hearings 
by commissions are one way to influence parliamentarians: 
"We propose our [...] for example we pushed [...] since already the old [...] time 
of Ben Ali, to a law, an integral law against violence against women. We worked 
like crazy. We made proposals; we participated fully up to the end. There is also 
the other law, the law on treatment of human persons. Also, we had a hearing 
there, two weeks ago, at the assembly, to present our proposals in relation to 
this new law” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
Several interviewees mentioned personal contacts to parliamentarians that are used on a 
collective level. 
                                                     
64 A law on racism was finally passed in 2018 following some incidents. 
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"There are two members of my federation who are parliamentarians. [...] One 
who was secretary general of our federation in the 90s. Another was member of 
our federation until 2014 with me. They are both of the [...] Popular Front. [...] As 
parliamentarians they can help us, but they are in the minority. They can 
influence, they can help us in the discussions to better understand each other 
and make us understand other MPs, but to change [...] it's a bit difficult. Because 
it's a right-wing majority. It's a bit difficult, Ennahdha and Nida it’s like that. [...] 
there are laws that they discuss in advance to approve them. [...] It's not at the 
level of the members, it's the chiefs. It's the group leaders.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
"We have contacts with members of Parliament. We have friends as 
parliamentarians and we often see them. We pass messages through them. We 
have the leaders of the social movements, we have contacts with them. There is 
a large public, by the media.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
Another important element is the notion of independence, probably one reason why most 
leaders avoid talking about institutionalized contacts. 
"We do not have problems with the parties. [...] we distance ourselves from the 
political parties. So, we do not work with parties. If we are invited by political 
parties we do not attend. No, we do not attend because our image must not be 
influenced by attending party conventions. But we, all our reports, are sent to all 
political parties, without exception.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
In addition, relations to parliamentarians only reach to specific groups of parliamentarians as 
the independents for the FTDES or as the Popular Front for UGTT, ATFD as well as partly the 
LTDH (FTDES, Nejib and UGTT, Ahmed). The selectivity of contacts towards parliamentarians 
is expressed by the criticism of neoliberalism as by Sofien from the UGTT who criticizes 
Ennahdha and Nida for their economic perspective (UGTT, Sofien). 
 
It appears that parliamentarization of national politics is currently under way in Tunisia (on 
parliamentarization see Kriesi 2009). While the parliament does not yet play an important 
role for all parts of civil society it will probably be the next step to provide more detailed 
information (and lobbying) towards parliamentarians. 
 
As none of the organizations has enough impact on majorities, the diffusion via parliament 
and parliamentarian commissions is not that important for the organizations analyzed. It is a 
channel used, but chances for success are limited. In addition, laws can be influenced 
without necessarily passing by parliament. As we have seen under 7.1. on the legislation 
process, parliament and parliamentary hearings enter later than the initial consultations in 
policy making processes. 
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7.2.4 Open consultations 
Another element being part of the legislation process are open consultations by the 
ministries. Different to institutionalized mechanisms, those consultations are in most cases 
open to everyone; although they must be aware of hearings which requires at least being on 
a mailing list of a ministry or seeing the call for consultation. Consultations can also be 
demanded by organizations occasionally as in the case of the ATFD and the Ministry for 
Social Affairs or the Presidency. 
"Not regularly. That is to say that we made, we had exchanges with the minister, 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs [...] but we had contacts, we went to see the 
President of the Republic who welcomed us two times. So, we have 
relationships. […] We make our relations according to their response to our 
requests. That is to say if we realize that it is useless, we cut the link.” (ATFD, 
Sarah) 
 
"Of course, when we have requests, when we have problems. When, for 
example, as I told you to change the law, to intervene [...] we even went to the 
Minister of Social Affairs [...] for perhaps two years to defend a medical file of a 
girl who needed to be operated abroad. We intervene for social cases.” (ATFD, 
Myriam) 
 
Nour criticized that they get no feedback on open consultations, so no results become 
visible. On the other hand, for the law against violence against women, the ATFD was 
alongside the Ministry in different consultations, thus not only using personal contacts but 
also open consultations. 
"The Ministry of Women, for example, we have a whole [...] program for the 
comprehensive law against violence against women. We have our proposal. And 
already they have taken this into consideration and we are with them in the 
commissions, in the preparations, in the negotiations.” (ATFD, Myriam) 
 
It is to recall, that access differs from one ministry to another. 
"I do not want to name too many. I do not want to spit too much on some but 
[...] but there are [...] there are departments that are absolutely not used to work 
with [...]. There are departments. Well, the Ministry of Women has been so 
much spurred that’s okay. But otherwise there are departments that are not 
used to associate society and all this” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
Participation is not limited to the analyzed organizations as Maher and Safa from the 
Ministry of Agriculture emphasized. Especially for less politicized ministries I Watch and Al 
Bawsala positioned themselves as experts. 
"Again, as for the media, for associations, in Tunisia, civil society, there are 
thousands, but at the level of associations that are credible and are organized in 
a sustainable way, we do not count many. I consider for example [...] "I WATCH", 
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it is an association, [...] credible which is organized, and which has a Steering 
Committee” (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis) 
 
"[...] afterwards, the code of the law, the law that was proposed by the 
government for the vote in parliament, this law contained constraints for access 
to public information. These constraints were of public interest but the 
association "I Watch" has put pressure, great pressure on the government to 
remove this constraint. And the law passed with access to public information 
without constraint. And it is a great achievement for Tunisia. It's thanks to the 
association.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid) 
 
Federations of professional bodies serve as experts as well. As Aymen from the Ministry of 
Tourism underlined, for them the Federations in the sector are partners. Safa from the 
Ministry of Agriculture acknowledged that in some cases they are solicited on a general topic 
and in other cases on specific aspects. 
 
Open consultations are generally open to all actors, organized or not. It is mainly about 
knowledge transfer and learning. Among the four organizations analyzed, especially the 
ATFD uses open consultations to re-enforce their ideas. During the interviews Al Bawsala 
and I Watch, two organizations that work on transparency in administration and that were 
not analyzed, were named as very active in those consultations. These two organizations, 
founded after 2011, quickly built up a reputation among civil servants and have high chances 
of being invited for each consultation. As discussed before, civil servants try to create 
transparency and acceptance, two points that are particularly important for ministries with 
little experience with civil society participation. At least for ministries, a common perception 
of a problem or at least a similar framing play a role for open consultations. Open 
consultations are somehow neglected by the “old” civil society, a gap that is filled by other 
organizations. It would be interesting for future research to analyze the influence of these 
organizations on administration via open consultations in detail. 
7.3 Indirect and other channels 
7.3.1 Protest as mechanism for change 
The influence of protest on legislation and policies is limited. The limitations arise especially 
from the biased role of the media and some reserves on protest. As mentioned, protest 
passes in principle via the media and is especially regarded when media reporting on protest 
amplified. As a consequence it is regarded under indirect effects, while some minor direct 
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effects are possible for large mobilizations. However, protest itself can influence civil 
servants in particular and policy outcomes: 
"Dialogue, that's it. […]. So, after that, it was stopped. This movement was 
stopped and we said: We will study these protests. We are going to check is it 
true or is it not true, what is being criticized […]” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine) 
 
As outlined earlier, some ministries try to avoid protest. The real or perceived threat of 
protest is related to coercion. Consultation is seen as way to avoid protest. Thus, protest can 
have an effect, but this effect can already be achieved through the menace of protest. 
Maher from the Ministry of Agriculture for example explained they invite civil society so that 
they cannot say they were not asked and acknowledged that this is done to avoid protest 
(Ministry of Agriculture, Maher). Safa from the same ministry expressed that when protest 
arises on law texts, they will talk to the people protesting (Ministry of Agriculture Safa). 
Protest can also give inspirations and civil servants tend to respect claims made by 
protesters or to make organizations participate. In this sense, it is more than coercion and 
nearly learning as civil servants themselves hold limited knowledge. On the other hand, 
protest is evaluated either as positive or too much by civil servants, leaving a divided picture. 
"Protests are always considered a good sign of health […] if there are protests 
means that there are ideas. If these ideas are consolidated clear and acceptable 
why not revise our laws our texts and it is already the daily business of the 
Parliament.” (Presidency of the Government, Youssef) 
 
"Well, it's too late. But it does not matter in most cases even if we did not 
involve some associations or some professional organizations, we do it later. And 
we study the text well. If there is really a need to modify it, then it is modified 
according to [...] their proposals, which are generally relevant and objective 
proposals. So, if not, we try to talk to them and, therefore, to [...] how to say to 
[...] to explain to them” (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa) 
 
On the other side, civil society sees an impact through mobilization, but not in all cases: 
"Not just success. But there have always been impacts. That is to say, if an action 
was held, this action was very probable to succeed, […]. It [the UGTT] has a huge 
capacity for mobilization. It knows how to lobby; it knows how to mobilize from 
north to south and from east to west. It has this presence throughout the 
Tunisian territory. But if it does not stand an action, even if it is a right action, it 
does not have much chance to succeed.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
The analyzed organizations do not see mobilization and protest as a channel to utilize alone. 
An example is the position of the UGTT using strikes when dialogue fails. 
"In the majority of cases it is us who asks. Sometimes it's the ministry. Usually 
when you announce a strike or something like that. That's usually the ministry 
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that asks. Because it is looking for a solution. It always has proposals to unblock 
the situation, to seek solutions.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
Spontaneous protest is used as indicator of important topics that can be transferred towards 
political claims as Sami and Mehdi from the FTDES expressed. It does not only give ideas to 
civil servants but equally to movement leaders. Protest itself does not play an important role 
alone; it is mainly used to block as shown later or as an additional tool. Coercion is to see as 
complementary mechanisms of diffusion in the Tunisian case. For the analyzed 
organizations, protest is secondary to dialogue perhaps with the exception of the FTDES that 
uses spontaneous movements to enter into dialogue. Thus, it does not make sense to talk 
about protest as a separate mechanism of influence in the Tunisian national context. While 
protest does not touch all ministries, they are receptive to claims advocated through 
protest. 
 
The question emerges, whether direct contacts are not more effective, especially as some 
forms of protest, for example disruptive protest, is seen as negative, but would nevertheless 
solicit direct actions by ministries. Some protest can cause local or regional reactions like the 
provision of certain services or goods. Its effectiveness rests on lower levels than the 
national one and is more effective in specific cases than to influence legislation. It is much 
less about influence on democratic framing, but more about expressing contradictions with 
democracy. It cannot be excluded that public opinion itself plays a role, but the number of 
exact opinion polls is limited in Tunisia and an evaluation of the separate influence of public 
opinion alone appears very difficult. This left the media analysis that will be detailed later as 
important tool for information on public opinion. 
 
Meyer remarks that movements that have policy access will mobilize less (Meyer 2005). I do 
not support this perspective in the Tunisian case. While the UGTT has clearly policy access, 
they refer to contentious action, mostly to put additional pressure on policy makers and to 
strengthen their position. While regional levels are even more active, on a national level I do 
not agree that inclusion in policy processes alone reduces mobilization in Tunisia. 
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7.3.2 Media work and public opinion 
Traditional media are a limited tool in post 2011 Tunisia. While this does not completely 
contradict the indirect influence model, as public opinion can be influenced through other 
means like internal publications, Facebook and so on, the indirect effect model does at least 
not pass entirely by the media. 
 
From the analyzed organizations, especially the FTDES uses media to influence public 
opinion. The FTDES also addresses press conferences to authorities (Boats4People 2014). It 
is part of their repertoire in order to get heard and to create a reputation on topics. 
"For example, as I told you, there is a law on finance. So, we do a little study to 
express a point of view. We are doing a press conference. We are trying to 
sensitize the public on the choices that emerge from this law, on its 
shortcomings, on its limitations, and what kind of demands can be made in this 
context. And we rely a lot on two things: first of all, we have a group of MPs close 
to us. So, they are fed by analyzes, studies, proposals, so that they can play their 
role. And they help us to lobby at this level, parliament. And we also have a 
network of friends at the media, to help us do media campaigns and so on. So, 
we give them the material for them to publish, but also a direction for the 
demands and the lobbying. And we have studies, for example phenomena that 
we spot.” (FTDES, Nejib) 
 
"We have a very large media database, which exceeds eight hundred journalists. 
So, we have the means [...] we do a lot of press conferences. And we have an 
average of forty-five, forty to forty-five journalists per press conference. [...] we 
have published a whole critical reading made by lawyers and economists, which 
shows the shortcomings of this project. [...] and afterwards we made a national 
coalition. And so, you can push the government not to pass and adopt this 
project.” (FTDES, Mehdi) 
 
While the FTDES tries to influence media to its advantage, others, like the ATFD, are more 
skeptical towards media and doubt its effectiveness. Sarah for example criticized that her 
statements in the media have been manipulated (ATFD, Sarah). Comparably, other leaders 
expressed criticism. 
"The media invite very little women, especially women democrats. They are 
afraid of a critical discourse.” (ATFD, Hiba) 
 
"That's why I'm talking to you about the quality of links to journalists. It's very 
difficult. […] we talk to people who do not know anything, sometimes. Not even 
the question of women's rights, no curiosity. That is to say, they come to do 
interviews, they do not even read. There is no prior investigation work. 
Journalists who do this kind of investigation are rare. [...] We have already begun 
to sensitize journalists on the issue of women's rights, especially the issue of 
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violence [...] so there are journalists who have taken over our demands a bit, 
who said we will try to improve the situation at the level of the radio, stuff like 
that. But they expect a lot from us, that's what's terrible. That is to say, we open 
a point of discussion and we are forced to do all the work” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
While one could argue that this perspective is topic specific, also UGTT leaders criticize the 
media landscape. There are too many problems to be able to rely on media as a relay. 
"That is for example the report of the press to the UGTT. Before, the press was 
afraid of power and was also afraid of the UGTT. They dared not to criticize the 
UGTT. Now, at the time of the troika for example, they also supported the UGTT 
because most of the people were against the troika. Now that the former RCD 
has returned to power, the press is trying to play a role of support for the ruler, 
regardless of the opposition and independently of the UGTT. […] there's still a 
lack of maturity in the press, and it's coming. But with all that, I support a free 
press that criticizes us, and that hardens our life all the time, better than a press 
that is repressed.” (UGTT, Ahmed) 
 
"There are journalists who defend the UGTT, who believe in the UGTT, in the 
principles of the UGTT. [...] There are journalists who defend the UGTT; there are 
journalists who are enemies of the UGTT. [...] a journalist from Ennahdha should 
not be expected to defend the UGTT, so it's useless to convince him. But the 
others are more or less honest, even sometimes they criticize the UGTT but they 
criticize objectively” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
The UGTT also expresses that media coverage on them and their topics is huge. Especially 
Sofien states that the connection towards the TAP (Tunisian Press Agency) works well. This 
makes the media a bit more valuable to the UGTT. 
 
The media link becomes problematic as media is not seen as independent, neither by 
organizations, nor by civil servants. Cyrine from the Ministry of Finance for example clearly 
states, that media outlets close to political parties are well known. Similarly, Mokhtar from 
the Presidency of the Government expresses that media do not cover questions 
academically and are thus of limited use. In a similar direction argues Anis from the Ministry 
of Industry as discussed in chapter six. 
 
Ministries – and the department for communications – respond to media inquiries and the 
ministers get informed as interviews with civil servants from the Ministry of Habitation, the 
Ministry for Regional Development as well as the Ministry for Sport and Family indicated. On 
the other hand, the link via the media is sometimes unnecessary as Khaled as well as 
Mokhtar expressed: 
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"It's normal because if there are claims or problems, we will see them directly in 
the 20h […], everything is mediatized in public, everything is politicized. So, if 
there is a problem, a few hours and everyone is aware” (Ministry of Relations 
with Civil Society, Khaled) 
 
"When a subject issue is covered by more than one or two or three media or 
when the association chooses or addresses a request when it addresses a 
request to the Minister of the Public Service regarding a subject of the public 
service it reacts immediately because it concerns it to explain to people what it is 
doing, what he is working” (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar) 
 
Apart of the traditional media outlets, Facebook is equally regarded (Ministry of Regional 
Development, Marwa). While especially the FTDES relies on media, civil servants are not 
very receptive towards media reporting and ignore a lot of media coverage.  
 
I already underlined the missing information on public opinion. Especially the UGTT 
emphasizes links to the broader public: 
"We are connected with the people. And the people know very well that the 
UGTT does not have any interests to have seats or ministers or government, it 
has political interest that's it. We are with the people, with public opinion, and 
with the poor, with the poorest regions, we are defending the middle class, the 
poor class, the unemployed and even the equality of people. Between regions, 
between people.” (UGTT, Mohamed) 
 
As no systematic opinion polls are available and own data collection was limited to 
interviews and media articles, there is not much additional information on what people 
think about policies. 
 
Ministries as well as organizations – apart from the FTDES – doubt that media are useful in 
its current form. This is linked to the use of media as part as coercion as a diffusion 
mechanisms. The aim is often to put pressure on the state and less to provide new 
information or to convince the state over a democratic framing. As a consequence, the 
indirect channel via the media is insufficient not just for diffusing democratic framing, but 
also for spreading other ideas and policies. Even the FTDES, that are much more favorable 
towards the use of media, do not use the media as a single mechanism but in combination 
with others. On the other hand, especially the UGTT underlined its influence on public 
opinion, which is not surprising given the internal publications of the UGTT that reach wide 
parts of the Tunisian population. The UGTT has the advantage that the TAP takes over a 
number of statements directly, making these mechanisms more effective for the UGTT. As 
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analyzed in chapter five, this is mainly focused on salary negotiations and less on distinct 
political topics. 
 
It is to note, that frame construction is different when it comes to public frames. Thus, it is 
easier to identify organizational framing than a public framing related to organizations.  
There is much reporting on the government. As we will see under 7.5 framing is in some 
cases more consistent and may change over time, adding an additional layer. 
7.3.3 Other activities 
Further channels that emerged during interviews and that are used by all analyzed 
organizations are sensitization campaigns (focused on learning) that are open to many 
actors. Civil servants participate in seminars in order to enhance their knowledge or to build 
new contacts. Participation is not inclusive but depends on invitation by the organizations. 
Interviewees in ministries underlined that they do not follow every call. Exemplary is the 
description by Sarah, an ATFD leader: 
"We are trying to sensitize the police and we are talking to the police, for 
example when we invited them when we did the seminar on violence against 
women, we invited them when we worked on trafficking. Ms. [...] is a cadre who 
works there [...] and sometimes we go to the police station to accompany the 
women being victims of violence.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
Other activities include joint programs as outlined by Hamdi from the Ministry of Education: 
"So, the communes, […] after these elections, they will be responsible at the 
local level in all sectors, education, etc. […] for the second year, our ministry 
launched last year „School Month” […]. What is School Month? School Month is a 
program to renovate schools. This program is essentially based on the 
participation of civil society. […] Throughout a month, all civil society, individuals, 
citizens participate in the renovation of schools. This is a good example for us. It 
has changed many conditions of many schools.” (Ministry of Education, Hamdi) 
 
Another element is recruitment processes. Civil society organizations get included in 
recruitment processes, in order to achieve transparency. This perspective appears 
particularly utilitarian. 
"The transparency of the contest is important. It was a theory. There were 
regulations; our relationship with civil society is organized by law. Either for 
financing or we will offer funding for civil society or by the recruitments. The 
funding dossier is the same for all ministries. We have collaborations with civil 
society organizations, but it is imposed by law. There was an exceptional decree 
for 2016 with lighter procedures, but we must involve civil society as a condition. 
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So, you have to follow the procedures […] Finally, it was a guarantee for us. 
Because the image of the administration is deteriorating a little. There are 
people who insult us and this is an opportunity to show what we do. It was 
wonderful for them and for us. […] No, there were not even criteria, but they 
cannot say this or that organization. We asked in written form and we went to 
those who work the four to five who work on election observation or the like. 
We spoke with I Watch, Bawsala and ATIT and we agreed, there are conventions 
and so on.” (Ministry of Habitation, Kamel) 
 
The use of civil society for legitimacy has only very limited influence on the ministries apart 
from learning on procedures.  
 
Another activity are international development project. Civil society is a resource especially 
in relation to international cooperation: 
"As international cooperation we have the hat to mobilize more resources. 
National civil society is present on a limited level. This civil society is financed and 
at the same time participates in the formulation. Even the security forces 
participate through the unions that have seen a development since 2011.” 
(Ministry of the Interior, Rania) 
 
Certainly, other activities that were not covered by the interviews exist as well. The most 
important tools from the category “other” are perhaps the sensitization campaigns as well 
as joint projects. However, the influence is difficult to measure for civil servants and the 
wider society. It is questionable whether any mechanisms of diffusion of a democratic 
framing can be connected to those activities in an efficient manner. The other activities 
show that not every contact with the state is equally useful for the diffusion of ideas and 
policies. 
7.4 Summary on channels and mechanisms 
7.4.1 Former members and proactive early stage proposal 
Having outlined several channels, I now consider those that work effectively in more detail. 
Movements and organizations use different mechanisms to influence policy decisions, be it 
through coercion, learning or emulation. I underline especially the personal contacts that are 
based on a shared perception of problems -not necessarily a completely shared framing of 
democracy- as well as institutionalized mechanisms that allow organizations to be (officially) 
part of the legislation process. It is a mixture of individual and collective level contacts 
(compare Giugni and Passy 1998 on individual and collective contacts). 
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Many examples refer to the ATFD and the UGTT, as their contacts are particularly 
functioning well; the ATFD has more ideational influence and focuses more on emulation 
though. The relationship between the ATFD and the Ministry of Women is outstanding as a 
number of framings are shared and interactions are frequent. It presents nearly the ideal 
case of transmission of ideas and framings of democracy while we also have seen that the 
framing of democracy is not completely similar (chapters five and six). 
 
The LTDH has a more ambiguous relation to the Ministry of the Interior, more distant, more 
focused on learning as coercion is no option for the LTDH as the Ministry itself is seen as too 
powerful. The FTDES, on the other hand, focuses on press conferences and protest (mainly 
coercion), two measures that are evaluated as only partly efficient. Press is perceived as 
biased by a number of political actors. While it might be useful to influence public opinion, 
trust in media is limited among civil servants and movement leaders65. Protest can be useful 
and ministries do react, however, it is emphasized that protest is not necessary if protesters 
start with a dialogue towards political administrators. Protest is going too far for some civil 
servants leading to a preference for learning. 
 
In line with the framing of democracy by civil servants (see chapter six), civil society has a 
place in the Tunisian legislation process; however, it depends on ministries, but also on 
engagement, expertise and reputation for the organizations. Influence is not ever frame- 
oriented or focused on emulation, but can be distant and utilitarian. Less-organized protest 
has difficulties to enter decision making circles, notwithstanding how a problem is framed. 
 
The question of single or coalitional influence was temporarily set aside. As we have seen in 
chapter four, a social movement coalition exists. Having outlined mechanisms, I briefly 
return to the question whether it is single influence or coalition influence that influences 
policies. 
                                                     
65 There are only few regular surveys that did not allow a detailed comparison on public opinion 
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7.4.2 Coalitions or single influence 
While looking at channels of diffusion the question emerges whether coalitions or single 
influence by organizations and movements are more efficient. While certain mechanisms 
like institutionalized contacts are only open to single organizations, coordinated action is 
possible when several organizations insist on the same aspect at the same time. The same 
goes for personal contacts that can be solicited at the same time as the UGTT does 
sometimes. The most obvious coalitions are coordinated protest activities where several 
movements and organizations demand the same things amplifying the number and type of 
people they represent. Coalitions are important for coercion. 
 
In the Tunisian case, cooperation occurs on individual and collective levels. The Euromed 
Human Rights Network is an example where individual and collective levels get intertwined. 
While membership is organizational, leaders of organizations know each other due to long-
lasting relations and common struggles also facilitated by multi-membership. Diani and 
Moffatt argue for MENA countries that “there were few signs of cross-cutting memberships 
of interactions among associations that keep together organizational fields in Western 
societies and provide the basis for social movement modes of coordination”, but the study 
clearly shows the opposite (Diani and Moffatt 2016:34). At least in the Tunisian case, multi-
membership is common and the mix of individual and collective relations keeps the 
movement coalition together. This means that declarations by a coalition often include the 
Euromed Human Rights Network as well as the organizations involved, thereby doubling 
their involvement. 
 
As became clear from chapter four, coalitions are frequent. As coalitions are important for 
protest and as such for opposing law proposals, it is expected that a wide coalition of actors 
representing different parts of the Tunisian society and including the UGTT can positively 
influence the success of protest and coercion. No protest happens without a coalition of 
organizations. Similar to what Burstein and Hirsh describe, problem importance can be 
identified through the number of organizations demanding changes or the number of 
protest activities (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Thus, protest cannot be ignored if all analyzed 
movements use the same arguments. However, if protest does not mobilize a crucial mass it 
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will have no effects. Section 7.5 returns to this question with three examples of law 
proposals. 
7.4.3 Mechanisms, temporality and outcomes 
While a number of channels have been identified, there is no guarantee for success. 
Organizations use different mechanisms more or less effective. While the ATFD uses direct 
contacts as well as consultation with a focus on emulation towards the Ministry of Women 
and can claim some success in influencing legislation (section 7.5), the UGTT for example has 
direct links and institutionalized committees with ministries. It is difficult to evaluate the 
degree of influence of the UGTT as the content of discussions in those committees is not 
known, but given its position and networks that are confirmed by both sites, its influence is 
wide and at different stages for Tunisian legislation processes. Due to this wide integration, I 
argue that the UGTT has a much more flexible use of coercion, emulation and learning as 
mechanisms. The FTDES, on the other hand, uses press conferences, reports, as well as 
personal contacts. It is doubtful whether the mechanism via the media is sufficient to 
influence legislation or ideas, as traditional media is regarded with skepticism and the media 
analysis did not show enormous media coverage contrary to the UGTT. The transmission of 
unfalsified information via the media is seen skeptical by actors. The relation of the FTDES 
towards the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society is better than towards other analyzed 
ministries, something similar for the LTDH. As we have seen, influence does not only depend 
on the stage of the legislation process, but also on whether modes of influence exist for the 
organization in question. The LTDH is well connected when it comes to human rights, but 
only towards the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior where mechanisms have 
limited influence. Thus, the LTDH lacks other mechanisms of influence although being expert 
on human rights. 
 
When it comes to parliament, the channels are not often used and organizations prefer to 
stay independent. This is related to the missing chances of success. Chomiak argues that 
parliamentary opposition in Tunisia is weak and unable to demand substantial changes 
(Chomiak 2016). The reduced role of the parliament may be explainable as the ARP does not 
yet play its role as resources like offices or assistants for parliamentarians are missing 
(Cohen-Hadria 2017). From this perspective, organizations do not see the need to convince 
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all parliamentarians because chances of success are seen as low or their relative importance 
underestimated. On the other hand, Antonakis-Nashif argues that access to members of the 
constitutional assembly was important to influence policy processes (Antonakis-Nashif 
2016). Indeed, the referral to participatory democracy as in the constitution is important not 
only for organizations but also for civil servants. While the influence appears true for the 
initial process, members of parliament are no longer the main target of organizational 
activities, at least not for those analyzed. Thus, I would not overestimate contacts towards 
elected politicians. This is also in line with a recent report criticizing the parliament as more 
and more sidelined (International Crisis Group 2018). 
 
While some scholars see media access as important, I would again not overestimate the 
impact of the media in Tunisia (in contradiction to Antonakis-Nashif 2016). While contacts 
towards the media exist and are certainly important to put pressure, they are of minor 
importance when informing about policy proposals and reaching citizens. It is not crucial for 
approaching the state and influencing policy choices or ideas. Here, other ways of 
influencing appear more important. This is also the reason why the joint effect model as well 
as the indirect effect model might operate via public opinion and less via traditional media. 
However, as the research design focused on media coverage, public opinion could not be 
assessed by other means. The missing professionalization of the Tunisian media landscape is 
a limiting factor. While the general distinction between direct and indirect influence is 
useful, a focus on different detailed channels and mechanisms enables a more fine-tuned 
analysis qualifying those links. 
 
The ATFD has not the same connections as the UGTT, where leaders expressed; they had 
some contacts also during the Ben Ali regime while the ATFD was completely excluded. 
Using this argument, the UGTT stays in a far better position, because it was less repressed 
under dictatorship. This goes in the same direction as argued by Ratka and Roux. They 
underline that neither urban or student activists nor young unemployed or poor people from 
the interior managed to be included in a sustainable way in political decision making and the 
“establishment”, traditional civil society organizations and especially the UGTT, organized 
the transition (Ratka and Roux 2016). The UGTT clearly operates on another level than the 
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other analyzed organizations, also because of their frequent contacts to the Presidency of 
the Government. 
 
In terms of shared framings and perspectives the ATFD and the Ministry of Women appear 
as particularly close. At the same time, it is a channel focused on emulation that works 
effectively, leading to the conclusion that shared framings - not necessarily of democracy - 
are linked to personal contacts and can re-enforce each other. 
 
The expertise of the four analyzed organizations is evaluated lower by a number of civil 
servants when it comes to transparency, a field, where other organizations are preferred (I 
Watch, Al Bawsala and so on). As mentioned earlier, professionalization, taking initiative and 
showing presence are important to ensure being included. The importance of I Watch and Al 
Bawsala can be related to the expectations by civil servants that they can learn something 
from those organizations when it comes to transparency.  
 
Table 7.3 shows the influence of each organization as evaluated on the basis of interviews 
and network analysis using the distinction by Burstein and Linton (chapter 2.5) that is widely 
shared. While most of the organizations have either higher levels of access responsiveness 
for specific ministries or low access responsiveness, the UGTT has a facilitated access. This is 
also in line with higher agenda responsiveness as UGTT demands are more regarded by civil 
servants, but also more mediatized as we have seen earlier. On the other hand, the policy 
responsiveness is not high for the UGTT, because they cannot realize every policy they want; 
other actors are of importance. The output responsiveness is not very relevant to all 
organizations as it is mainly about the technical implementation of a law. On the other hand, 
especially when it comes to the application of legislation and thus impact responsiveness, 
the UGTT has a high impact especially on social issues as they are also able to demand goods 
and services for its members from the administration. The surveillance on the application by 
the UGTT is stronger than for other organizations.   
 
When it comes to the LTDH, access is limited for the Ministry of the Interior and more 
extensive for the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. Other ministries play less a role in 
my analysis. At the same time the LTDH is expert for human rights issues and security issues 
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and has some agenda setting power as seen in the media analysis. As the relevant ministries 
have to respect media coverage to a certain degree, the agenda responsiveness will vary 
considerably between the Ministry of the Interior and others. In this case we see interplay of 
different mechanisms. When the LTDH criticizes directly, the Ministry of the Interior will 
normally react. For policy responsiveness the evaluation is rather negative, however the 
LTDH does promote few own policy proposals. In the case were they were against a policy it 
changed only in one case something and this result is more related to the UGTT and 
Ennahdha (law on terrorism, law on reconciliation, to be shown later). As for the others 
output responsiveness is low, however the LTDH is very active when it comes to controlling 
prisons and implementation of human rights legislation.  
 
The ATFD has a privileged access to the Ministry of Women, but quasi no access to other 
analyzed ministries. When it comes to agenda setting, the ministry normally reacts to the 
topics set by the women movement as they are well integrated. The  policy responsiveness 
by the Ministry of Women is again high as several law proposals and their implementation 
during the last years show (apart the later discussed law on sexual violence, a law against 
sexual harassment or a law on heritage are other examples). Again, output responsiveness 
plays less a role,  state administration is mainly involved in the implementation. The impact 
responsiveness is only medium for some women issues. Generally, the ATFD starts again 
with agenda setting when a law is not applied or is not in line with the constitution. This 
emphasis of the constitution is to be interpreted as focus on emulation, by using the 
normative power of the constitution to demand changes. 
 
The FTDES has a very limited access and succeeds in agenda setting in the media, while it 
plays no role for the ministries analyzed. The Ministry for Relations with Civil Society is the 
only one where access is seen, the agenda responsiveness is seen as medium as the FTDES 
does a lot of media work. Policy responsiveness is again low, although the law on racism 
accepted in 2018 indicates some responsiveness. The FTDES takes up the demand for goods 
and services and thus coordinates also protest in order to achieve the application of 
legislation (as well as additional claims). Due to the diversity of topics the expertise for 
specific topics is not clear, limiting prospects for the initiation of effective learning. 
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Other actors are of importance for most of those types of influence and as the examples 
under 7.5 will show, even protest by the UGTT may not be sufficient to achieve a desired 
outcome. The impact of the UGTT is however higher than for the other organizations. 
Table 7.3 Type of influence according to organizations 
Type of influence Organization Degree 
Access responsiveness 
(access towards the state) 
 
UGTT High 
LTDH Low (for Min. Rel with Civ Soc. 
Higher) 
ATFD For Min. of Women high, others low 
FTDES Low (for Min. Rel with Civ Soc. 
Higher) 
Agenda responsiveness 
(agenda setting and reaction by 
state) 
UGTT High 
LTDH For Min. of Justice/Interior high, 
others low 
ATFD For Min. of Women high, others low 
FTDES Medium (depends on media) 
Policy responsiveness 
(proposing/opposing policy and 
reacton by state) 
UGTT Medium 
LTDH Low 
ATFD For Min. of Women high, others low 
FTDES Low 
Output responsiveness 
(implemention of legislation) 
UGTT Low 
LTDH Low 
ATFD Low 
FTDES Low 
Impact responsiveness 
(control of the application of 
legislation) 
UGTT High for social issues 
LTDH Medium for certain issues like 
torture 
ATFD Medium for some women issues 
FTDES Medium for certain social issues 
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While the channels mechanisms were outlined in an abstract way so far, I apply the findings 
from the first part of the chapter on three examples of legislation that were of importance at 
the time of interviews and that show the influence of movements. Those examples take up 
the arguments provided earlier to see whether movements are able to influence legislation 
on the basis of their democratic framing. 
7.5 Examples of mechanisms 
Building on the identified channels and mechanism of influence, the second part of chapter 
seven uses three examples that were prominent at the time of the interviews to show 
different degrees of influence, namely: the law on terrorism, accepted unmodified in 2015 
against large protests of civil society groups; the law on reconciliation that was finally 
accepted in parliament in 2017, which has been postponed since 2015 following wide scale 
protest from civil society; and the law on violence against women which is a modified 
proposition of the women movements, which has been promoted by the Ministry of Women 
and which was accepted in 2017. 
 
The selection of the three laws is data driven. It was not actively searched for the examples, 
but the law projects emerged naturally as topics during interviews. As they were among the 
salient topics for the organizations as well as some ministries, the interviewees included 
them in their argumentation. Following the first interviews that systematically showed the 
referral to those laws, those were included in the following interviews when prompting for 
examples. The data from interviews was then supplemented with a media analysis on the 
three laws including the claims promoted by every organization. In addition, other reports 
allow drawing a picture on alliances and coalitions for and against the laws that included the 
analyzed organizations. 
 
The three examples show no, mixed and extensive but still disputable influence on policy 
processes and realization of ideas on democracy. The chapter relates the democratic 
framings to connected claims in order to account for a full picture. As the laws themselves 
were not a focus of interviews, neither with leaders nor with civil society, no detailed 
questions have been posed. However, as they were important at the time of interviews, 
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several interviewees mentioned them. The analysis is thus focused on the media resonance 
of framing as well as interviews. 
7.5.1 The law on terrorism (loi organique n°2015-26) 
The law on terrorism, adopted by a large majority of the Tunisian parliament in July 2015 
and published in August 2015, includes the death penalty for certain acts of terrorism, 
arrests for fifteen days without access to a lawyer and was criticized especially by the left for 
including a broad definition of terrorism (France24 2015). Especially the missing safeguards 
against abuse were a point of criticism (Aliriza 2015b). According to the ATFD it threatens 
individual liberties: 
"Absolutely because the law against terrorism […] It’s true we are against 
terrorism but this law will destroy everything, we are against that law. But we 
have to […] terrorism yes, we have to fight this terrorism, but not with this law 
which will influence human rights, individual freedom. It’s bad for civil society.” 
(ATFD, Myriam) 
 
"If you have now the two poles, […] the fight against terrorism and the freedom 
of speech and all that […] then it’s the freedom of speech who pays for that law” 
(ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The FIDH and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation published a report criticizing the law on 
terrorism as partially incompatible with the constitution and being too vague on the term 
terrorism, the notion of human rights and the competencies hold by security forces; points 
that were equally criticized by other civil society organizations (FIDH 2015; Huffpost Tunisie 
2015b; Samti 2015). The law also gives additional power to security forces curbing civil 
liberties, something been criticized by civil society and political parties (Ghribi 2015). In 
addition, penalties for environmental terrorism and Takfir were included. The law was 
adopted with only few changes during the parliamentary discussions between March and 
July 2015 (DCAF 2015). 
 
In April 2015, forty-eight Tunisian and international organizations - among those the UGTT, 
LTDH, FTDES, ONAT, ATFD, or Al Bawsala- called for the respect of human rights as 
antiterrorism laws are used abusively, supporting torture and ignoring the right for a fair 
process (Nawaat 2015; Babnet 2015)66 . The protest on the law argued to lead to 
authoritarianism (Gharbi 2015). Among the organizations were eight international 
                                                     
66 The complete list can be found in the Annex 
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organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the FIDH and the 
Réseau euro-méditerranéen des droits humains (Amnesty International 2015). Al Bawsala 
for example called to abandon the law completely due to the problems in terms of human 
rights protection (Déjoui 2015). The LTDH criticized the law as not in line with the Tunisian 
legal system and international standards when it comes to access to lawyers, at the same 
time underlining the support for the fight against terrorism (Samti 2015). 
 
The coalition was large and diversified on the national as well as the international level. 
Given the reputation of the included organizations the protest had the heavyweights on 
their side. The areas of interest covered by the coalition against the law were very diverse, 
with especially those working on human rights but also the international actors being 
highlighted. 
 
In the aftermath of the Bardo attack the parliament approved the law on terrorism with only 
few modifications and against the protest of human rights organizations (DCAF 2015). Given 
the low number of parliamentarians that did vote against the law, the question emerges why 
civil society, although mobilized, could not convince more parliamentarians (ten abstentions, 
no vote against; Libération 2015; Samti 2015). 
Media coverage and movement positions 
Given the extensive press coverage on the topic itself (terrorism) and also on the law 
modifications, especially the UGTT and to a smaller degree the LTDH have had their voice in 
the media landscape; the ATFD played no role, the FTDES a smaller one than UGTT or LTDH 
(see Table 7.4). Interestingly, the LTDH has the same ratio of reporting on terrorism 
compared to the overall reporting on the LTDH as has the UGTT: This is not surprising given 
that the LTDH covers topics like freedoms, transitional justice and security issues and as the 
UGTT covers nearly all topics of national importance. 
 
The ideas promoted by the ATFD in media have not been regarded in detail as the ATFD was 
not covered on terrorism by media, except four mentions (Table 7.4). The ATFD was not 
included in the debate on terrorism. 
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Table 7.4 Number of mentions on terrorism in articles 
 ATFD FTDES LTDH UGTT 
Total mentions  
(in: La Presse/ Le Temps) 
4 (0/4) 27 (23/4) 52 (40/12) 374 (208/166) 
Ratio Mentions/  
Overall reporting on the 
organization67 
0,1 0,2 0,38 0,38 
Note: Separate searches for the term terrorism were performed for each organization as part of their claims. The last 
ratio takes the number of mentions of terrorism as part of claims and divides it with the total number of articles on the 
organization. Total number of articles: ATFD= 38, FTDES =137, LTDH = 136, UGTT= 991 
Given the wide civil society coalition against the law, it surprises that it passed. The framing 
of the law on terrorism is different according to organizations. Thus, a look at the mediatized 
perspectives indicates that perspectives have not been clear enough. It can be doubted 
whether a that diverse framing leads either to emulation, coercion or learning (especially for 
the latter best practices and alternative policies would have to be highlighted). 
 
The most common aspect visible in articles is the referral towards the Tunisian government, 
the national fight against terrorism and linking the economic situation and terrorism. When 
looking in detail at every mediatized framing by organizations, the framings appear as very 
diverse and partly unfocused. 
 
The LTDH is mentioned in relation to marches against terrorism that took place following the 
Bardo attacks, socioeconomic factors, repression of marginalized people in the name of 
terrorism, the fight against terrorism, disputes between police and courts on suspects, as 
well as the links of smuggling and terrorism. The LTDH demanded a national congress on 
fighting terrorism and was also named in relation to democracy or development and 
terrorism. Another topic was a visit of the LTDH president to the French president at that 
time, Francois Hollande, were they talked about Syria, Libya – in relation to Libya also on 
takfirist activities - and terrorism. The LTDH criticized torture on suspected terrorists, 
condemned terrorism and demanded the abolition of the death penalty for terrorists. In 
addition, the LTDH negotiated with ministries on religious teaching in line with terrorism. 
The LTDH connects torture and human rights with terrorism. However, few of the 
combinations are repeated across articles. While the LTDH has relatively the highest ratio of 
                                                     
67 For the ATFD, the 4 mentions of terorism are divided by the 38 articles on the ATFD. The same is done for the 
other organizations. Numbers on overall reporting are to be found in chapter three. 
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mentions on terrorism together with the UGTT, the included concepts are diverse and not 
consistently promoted. 
 
Articles on terrorism and the UGTT cover even more aspects than the ones on the LTDH. 
They discuss for example solidarity with France following terrorist attacks, the fight against 
terrorism and mobilization and protest against terrorism. Especially the mobilization of 
people against terrorism and the call for solidarity were reported several times as was the 
national cooperation with other organizations and the state to fight terrorism. The framing 
on the fight on terrorism is diverse itself. Terrorism is seen as opposed to the democratic 
development, the civic state, economic development, patriotism, freedoms and progress. 
 
The UGTT includes economic elements and connects the fight against terrorism with the 
fight against poverty in order to solve causes of terrorism. They insist that the costs for 
fighting terrorism cannot be covered cutting salaries and argue that jobs in education cannot 
be reduced because of the need to cope with terrorism. This perspective became more and 
more prominent in 2016 and has been repeated several times but only after the law 
proposal. It is however no perspective that was actively promoted by the LTDH for example. 
 
The UGTT insists that the fight against terrorism has to be a priority of the state. The 
opposition to the law linking it to human rights has been reported much fewer on although 
human rights are one of the common elements of the coalition as outlined in chapters four 
to six. The UGTT connects the fight against terrorism with its role as protector of the 
Tunisian democratic state. It called to stand united against terrorism and urged the Tunisian 
state to take over its responsibilities supporting the government capacity as well as security 
forces. The UGTT issued a number of declarations together with for example the parliament 
and calls to support the state. This framing is much in line with the focus on the government 
capacity, but is also not a dimension other organizations stressed a lot. 
 
The unionists underscored the role of the media when journalists got arrested and accused 
of supporting terrorism. In addition, the UGTT criticized that protest was discussed to be 
prohibited to fight terrorism and that the Lebanese Hezbollah was declared as terrorists. 
Like the LTDH, the UGTT called for a national congress on terrorism. 
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Looking at the diversity of topics shows that even UGTT framing on terrorism has not been 
consistent. The UGTT is named in line with national development without terrorism or with 
religious teaching to prevent terrorism. It demands international negotiations on how to 
cope with terrorism as well as international programs to counter terrorism on a cultural, 
educational and social level. The UGTT section on culture proposed cultural activities to fight 
terrorism. Another article links the juridical processes on the death of Chokri Belaid with 
fighting terrorism. Like the LTDH, the UGTT connected smuggling with terrorism. Education, 
the protection of children from terrorism and a culture of living have been opposed to 
terrorism and its culture of death. 
 
Mainly La Presse published declarations by the UGTT, while Le Temps often only recalled 
UGTT positions when reporting on the government. Le Temps criticized the ongoing 
mobilization of the UGTT that took resources from the fight against terrorism, but also the 
UGTT postponed some strikes to give more time for fighting terrorism. The public discussion 
of arguments in line with terrorism in the media is diverse and few aspects like mobilization, 
economic problems and terrorism as well as the call for solidarity are covered several times. 
 
The articles where the FTDES and terrorism were mentioned cover the World Social Forum, 
but also the criticism of the State of Urgency under the pretext of the fight against terrorism. 
Terrorism was mentioned in line with strengthening the state administration to counter it or 
with torture, socioeconomic conditions that favor terrorism, suicides, strategies or research 
against terrorism. 
 
Why did the civil society perform badly? Comparing the frame combinations of terrorism in 
media shows that apart from a focus on national fight against terrorism, there are few other 
key concepts that are consistently shared among movements and that get repeated across 
actors. There is also missing consistency of media coverage on terrorism in relation to the 
organizations. Only the UGTT has developed a relatively consistent framing that connects 
terrorism with the fight of poverty and economic development, however the organization 
also connects many other aspects to terrorism. Framing on terrorism and the law proposal 
were not related to another key frame that focused for example on rights and liberties as 
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was expected. It shows either nor common or only a bad involvement in terms of framing 
and poses questions on emulation. 
Interviews and why civil society performed badly 
Some extracts of interviews show that a law on terrorism was accepted, even though the 
implications for freedoms were criticized by organizations: 
"We are in favor, it’s necessary to fight terrorism, rigorously. We are in favor of 
it, but it does not give the government the right to […] that the people keep 
silent or what. It’s not in the name of [...] Let’s say fighting against terrorism 
would mean applying dictatorship. That’s the duality they want to impose on us. 
Either terrorism or dictatorship.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
"No, we weren’t […] we discussed and eventually we saw that it was quickly 
done, but overall the country needed this law […] overall, we consider that the 
country needed a law that allowed fighting terrorism, but nevertheless resecting 
human rights.” (FTDES, Sami) 
 
While the missing common framing and general acceptance for the fight on terrorism can 
explain the failure of civil society to change the law project, the organizations themselves 
tried to explain the process. Especially the ATFD has not been heard on the topic, although 
the ATFD positioned itself against the law: 
"Currently, for example regarding terrorism, there was a mobilization by the 
parties of democratic force as well as by associations to say that okay, we are 
against terrorism, we fight against terrorism, we need a law against terrorism, 
but it is not in the name of the fight against terrorism that one needs to limit 
individual liberties. It’s not in the name of terrorism, that one will arrest the 
youth while telling them what do you do with that guy, you are not married. So, 
it is not with this slogan that one will stop the freedom of speech of journalists. 
So, there was this fear, we expressed it, to not touch the freedoms in the name 
of the fight against terrorism.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
Sarah relates the fight against terrorism to hindering money laundering as well as to better 
social-economic conditions, another referral to economic elements that has also been found 
in other interviews. Leaders of movements are critical on the targets they approach as well 
as regarding the mobilization, especially in relation to other laws. 
"The law has been accepted because those who govern us are massively 
represented in parliament. So, it’s normal that they count on their alliance to 
make […] but because at the end of payoff there was a mobilization but which 
was not as important as for changing the constitution for example. The people 
did not feel as they felt it during the first-time during terrorist actions. And for 
the national reconciliation, there was a large resistance. In addition, that what 
happened, until now, it has not been presented, we still wait. If there is no 
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important mobilization, no important pressure by the political opposition, by the 
civil society […] we wait, we wait to see.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
"It passed because we are not, we are not participants in parliament. There are 
the parties. Always, we defend a principle that is the autonomy and 
independence of the UGTT. And we start to have relations with the parties, we 
tell that we are against […] we tell many things.” (UGTT, Mohamed) 
 
"It’s a failure, yes. Because it passed. Why hasn’t it been possible to […] because 
the parliamentarian majority was in favor of the law. The parliamentarian 
majority that we were not able to change […] we have not been sufficiently 
heard. It was also rashly. Every social movement needs time to position itself and 
to make some pressure” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The law on terrorism contradicts partially the assumptions made before in line with 
coercion, that a wide coalition can influence policies and ideas. Despite major coalitional 
protest activities and criticism by important heavyweights of the Tunisian civil society, the 
law passed with only few changes. Public opinion as well as parliament appeared more 
favorable towards the law than the named civil society organizations which nevertheless 
tended to accept the fight against terrorism as being important. This tacit acceptance has 
potentially undermined the conviction of organizations and thus the potential for emulation.  
 
Opinion polls showed that seventy percent of the Tunisian population perceived the threat 
of terrorism as too high; other polls show that forty seven percent of Tunisians saw in 
terrorism the most urgent problem (Guizani 2015; Samti 2015). The fighting terrorism frame 
appeared as more powerful than the democracy frame, while some actors tried to align the 
two. Youngs assigns that especially the government preferred the security narrative to the 
democracy narrative (Youngs 2015). The call for more security forces in the fight against 
terrorism was a narrative also used under Ben Ali as Yousfi recalls (Yousfi 2015). 
 
Framing has not been consistently focused on key concepts that could have been connected 
to terrorism. This is particularly surprising as the fight against terrorism was already used 
under Ben Ali to justify the persecution of Ennahdha and other actors. Given the final 
outcome, one additional argument that could be added is that the coalition eventually 
became too large and that the mechanisms used for influencing (street and media via 
coercion) were not enough. Another aspect highlighted by the interviews was the speed by 
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which the law was passed which left few opportunities to organize protest and quasi 
excluded involvement in consultation. 
7.5.2 The law on reconciliation (loi organique n°2015-49) 
The law gives amnesty to a number of those who committed financial and economic delicts 
under Ben Ali revealed after 2010, raising the suspicion of forgiving corruption and touching 
the question of transitional justice as well as economic development (Chellali 2015; 
Yardimici-Geyikci and Tür 2018). Estimations suggest that it takes between seven to thirteen 
thousand dossiers away from the Truth Commission which is currently responsible for those 
cases (Bobin 2015; Dahmani 2015; Delmas 2015). Those, who see the law positive, 
emphasized that economic activities foster if there is no longer the fear of persecution and 
that money hidden abroad can return (International Crisis Group 201668). 
 
The law first emerged in July 2015 and was put again on the agenda of parliament in June 
2016, what raised criticism especially from organizations such as Al Bawsala or I Watch 
(Huffpost Tunisie 2016d). Already in 2015 protest rose against the law but has been 
hindered by police forces in September 2015 under the State of Emergency after the Bardo 
and Sousse attacks (Bobin 2015; Delmas 2015). The law project was not considered urgent 
by parliament in 2016 and postponed with modifications demanded (Directinfo 2016b; 
Mosaiquefm 2016). It re-emerged in 2017 in a very modified and reduced form where for 
example businessmen were not included when it was accepted by the parliamentary 
commission on general legislation and referred to further discussion in other commissions 
(Krimi 2017). It was finally accepted by parliament in September 2017 with one hundred 
seventeen to nine votes (Huffpost Maghreb 2017). 
 
Already with the first discussion in parliament, the UGTT, the FTDES and opposition parties 
were against the law (Delmas 2015; Bellamine 2015; Marks 2017; International Crisis Group 
2016). In July 2016, civil society mobilized in Tunis against the law, still criticizing the project 
as going against the aims of the revolution and protest across the country continued 
(Huffpost Tunisie 2016a; Chaouch 2016). Among those protesting were the LTDH, I Watch, Al 
Bawsala, the FTDES, the Observatoire tunisien de l’indépendance de la justice, ASF, Amnesty 
                                                     
68 The International Crisis Group provides a detailed discussion around the law project and its links with 
transititional justice, International Crisis Group 2016 
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International and the Centre international de la justice transitionnelle (ICTJ) together with 
opposition party members (Chaouch 2016; Bellamine 2016). In a different petition, 
organizations like the SNJT, FTDES, Al Bawsala, the OCTT, the ATFD, ADLi, Al Karama, ATDD, 
ADDH, Labo’ Démocratique, OTE, ASF, OMCT and EUROMED aligned in opposition against 
the law (Shemsfm 2016). In 2017, an open letter by civil society organizations like Al 
Bawsala, Kolna Tounes, I Watch, the Observatoire tunisien de l’économie, Voix de Femmes, 
the OCT, the FTDES and others demanded the rejection of the law (Maghrebemergent.com 
2017). The FTDES established an informal cooperation with Nawaat to provide Nawaat with 
reports and arguments against the law on reconciliation (Gordner 2016). 
 
The role of a coalition against the law on reconciliation is underlined by an ATFD leader: 
"During our discussions around the law against terrorism, the law against 
reconciliation, the law on transitional justice, we have been in the group that 
fought for modifying the law on transitional justice, to allow a real transitional 
justice which takes into account the rights of women, which takes into account 
the different stages that have to be followed. The understanding of truth, that it 
shall be judged, […] the judgement, […] the necessity to be questioned, to be 
judged and then the reconciliation.” (ATFD, Nour) 
 
The protest was organized under the label “Manich Msamah” (I do not forgive) since 2015 
and organized protest such as on the 15th of July 2016 started in front of the headquarter of 
the UGTT (Chaouch 2016; Hmed 2016; La Presse 2016). As for the law on terrorism, coercion 
played a major role. However, polls show that around half of the Tunisian population had no 
idea about the law (Directinfo 2016c). Given the limited knowledge it is doubtable that 
unfavorable public opinion played a role for postponing the project which has been 
considered as a – temporary - success for Tunisian movements. 
 
The UGTT operated on another level, it was not part of the named declarations by 
organizations, but was among those protesting. Scholars like Marks remark that the UGTT 
could have stopped the law by threatening with a general strike (Marks 2017). The 
coalition(s) include organizations working on transitional justice (such as the LTDH), but 
shows a wider coalition across areas. 
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Media coverage and movement positions 
Similar to the law on terrorism, the ATFD gained only very little media coverage, while the 
larger organizations achieved more coverage, with the UGTT in lead on the question of 
reconciliation as Table 7.5 shows. However, in relation to the overall number of articles, 
FTDES and especially LTDH have been more prominently covered on reconciliation (Table 
7.5). 
 
Table 7.5 Number of mentions on reconciliation 
 ATFD FTDES LTDH UGTT 
Total mentions (La 
Presse/ Le Temps) 
4 (2/2) 23 (18/5) 41 (29/12) 155 (44/111) 
Ratio Mentions/ 
Overall reporting 
0,1 0,17 0,3 0,16 
Note: Separate searches for the term reconciliation were performed for each organization as part of their claims. The last 
ratio takes the number of mentions of reconciliation as part of claims and divides it with the total number of articles on 
the organization. Total number of articles: ATFD= 38, FTDES =137, LTDH = 136, UGTT= 991 
The media reports on the ATFD and reconciliation suffer from low numbers of articles; the 
articles including the ATFD see reconciliation as linked to violence against women and 
aggressors - so with a different meaning - or are generally covering reconciliation with what 
happened under Ben Ali. 
 
The articles on the FTDES report on press conferences on the civil society criticism of the law 
going against the revolution and the constitution. The connection with the revolution and 
the constitution has been repeated in press communication. The FTDES equally supported 
the Instance Vérité et dignité (IVD) in its work. The law on reconciliation is connected to 
corruption and reform of the institutions. The FTDES called prominent persons and the 
people to peacefully mobilize and protest against the law and created commissions to work 
against the law in terms of argumentation and communication. In line with transitional 
justice, the law is criticized as serving some business men. Especially the movements and 
mobilization against the law – and the determined civil society - have been highlighted 
several times during FTDES press conferences. Reports on the FTDES and reconciliation also 
cover national social reconciliation in terms of equality which is not linked to the law. 
 
The LTDH called to reform reconciliation and transitional justice, but also the law. The LTDH 
sees the law as linked to corruption and against the constitution. Those two elements have 
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also been evoked during a meeting of the LTDH with the parliamentary commission on 
general legislation. In addition, the LDTH saw the danger of confiding transitional justice. The 
LTDH consulted with the UGTT and the ONAT on that issue. At this occasion, the role of the 
national dialogue (without the Utica) on the law and the criticism by the organizations has 
been stressed. Equally, the LTDH showed support to modify the laws on the IVD and the 
process of transitional justice. LTDH and UGTT equally criticized that protest against the law 
was stopped by security forces. 
 
Arguments of the UGTT against the law on reconciliation focused on the link to the 
constitution and the need for transitional justice. The UGTT emphasized that every law on 
reconciliation should have a consensus within society. The three elements constitution, 
transitional justice and consensus are repeated and made the UGTT opposing the law in its 
form. The UGTT saw the danger of national political instability. It was named in connection 
to Manich Msamah which effectively underlines the role of the revolution, the constitution 
and corruption, but also inequality. Another aspect was the question of archives and that 
some of the archives should be resituated to allow real reconciliation. Reconciliation was 
demanded for the victims of January 1978. The international dimension as well as social 
reconciliation were named. The UGTT criticized that parts of the law on economic 
reconciliation have been included in the law on finance and that civil society was not part of 
the proposition process. There were also articles on reconciliation in Libya or salary 
negotiations, which were disregarded. 
 
The constitution, the revolution and corruption are re-emerging elements showing 
overarching combinations of arguments across organizations. As we have already seen, the 
constitution and arguably also the revolution are topics that can be mobilized for emulation 
due to their normative load. 
Interviews and the criticism of the old regime 
Some factors like the referral to corruption or the achievements of the revolution and the 
constitution can also be found in the interviews. 
"With this law on […] reconciliation […] so the corruption still exists. The 
blocking, it’s still there; the profiteers are still the same. We still see them. And 
this, it requires a lot of time for changing.” (ATFD, Myriam) 
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"In addition, today during this struggle which was conducted these days to 
question the law on reconciliation, are the young militants of the revolution, are 
also the women and men who fought against Ben Ali [Interruption] are the 
militants of human rights who are now threatened […,new interruption] So today 
it’s the law against terrorism which will give catastrophes, finally it will have 
disastrous consequences on human rights, on freedoms.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The already named interdiction of protest against the law in 2015 is seen particularly critical: 
"Because they did yesterday […] yesterday it was a gathering at the place 
Mohamed Ali, there at the UGTT to contest against the law on reconciliation. It is 
introduced by the President of the Republic, and that the police intervened to 
prohibit protesters to enter the Avenue Habib Bourguiba, in addition they 
verified a lot of identities of people, among those verified were the leader 
unions.” (UGTT, Moncef) 
 
"Yes, there is a lot of fear. For example, now, there is the Popular Front which 
asked for a demonstration against the law on reconciliation on Saturday, it was 
prohibited. And they aggress, he is very aggressive the Minister of the Interior 
and he says that they have information that there are terrorists which would 
infiltrate this demonstration.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
 
The protest is linked to freedom of association. During interviews, the law was also framed 
as return of the old regime: 
"That’s it, yes. They want to impose a law like this, and one turns a page and like 
nothing happened. So, everything they want that’s […] the businessmen you give 
me some money and that’s it, one is settled […] Now, especially during the last 
months, there is the civil life […], it encountered a small weakness, a small 
loosening. With the new law of Mister Essebsi […], so we tried to, the civil 
society, the progressive forces are on the way to unite again to struggle against 
this famous law which will [...] it’s another way to make the corrupt people of 
the old regime come back. And that’s another way to establish themselves step 
by step.” (UGTT, Sofien) 
 
The actions included not only the mentioned protest activities, but also reports for example 
by the FTDES: 
"There are a lot of things to do. So, ok there is […] a press release, one. Two, we 
do a critical lecture, that means every time for example there is a problem 
concerning the law on reconciliation, we, we do not agree. It’s simple; one 
shouldn’t say that I do not agree. Simply. No, we published a critical lecture 
elaborated by lawyers and economists, which shows the gaps of these projects. 
So, this is a substantive work. And you present it in public, […] now and later we 
made a national coalition. And by this you can push the government to not pass 
and adopt the project.” (LTDH, Medhi) 
 
Not only civil society was against the law, but also some political parties. One UGTT leader 
underlined the role of Ennahdha against the law: 
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"We are against. Yes, that’s it […] Now for example; the UGTT knows very well 
that on the form as it is, it will not be accepted. Because even Ennahdha being 
party at power will not accept it as it is now. So, there will be a modification of 
this […] for this modification there, the UGTT will participate in one or the other 
way. To create an acceptable version. If we arrive there, the UGTT certainly will 
be for it, will change position. Otherwise it will lead towards mobilization” (UGTT, 
Ahmed) 
 
The protest against the law on reconciliation was widespread in civil society. Not only the 
“old” civil society including organizations such as the UGTT, LTDH, SNJT or ATFD were 
included, but also newer civil society organizations such as Al Bawsala or I Watch. In 
addition, the protest had not only a national, but also an international dimension with the 
inclusion of Amnesty International or Euromed. The coalition was a bit smaller than the one 
against the law on terrorism.  
 
Framing was more consistent with a focus on corruption, the constitution, transitional 
justice and a return of the old system, reinforced by the repression by security forces. In 
addition, the law on reconciliation is a case where civil society posed a veto (reactive 
implementation), which was equally supported by an important bloc in parliament 
(Ennahdha). While the preconditions are similar to the law on terrorism, it was eventually 
not only the mobilization that achieved the delay and modification of the law, but the 
connection with a wider opposition. However, the mechanisms used were similar to the law 
on terrorism (coercion; protest and media) with more normative load (indicating emulation), 
this time with a temporary success of movements. It would be interesting to see, whether 
the position of Ennahdha would have been sufficient to block the law regardless of the 
positions of civil society. 
7.5.3 The law on sexual harassment (loi organique n°2016-60) 
The law was initially presented by the Ministry of Women; including different points like 
domestic violence, equality of women at the workplace and the creation of specialized 
institutions (Directinfo 2017). The law on sexual harassment was proposed in cooperation 
between civil society groups and with support of the EU, the UNFPA, and CREDIF with 
support by the Ministry of Women (Ben Taieb 2016). In July 2016 the law passed the 
ministerial council with higher punishments foreseen (up to 6 years prison) as well as 
modified articles especially in case of sexual harassment by relatives or in relation to the 
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current impunity in case of rape when the victim gets married to the aggressor 
(Businessnews 2016; Réalités 2016b). The law was discussed in parliament in February 2017 
with support from the Commission on Women and Family as well as the commission on 
rights, freedoms and external relations and was adopted without contestation on July 26th 
2017 (Kapitalis 2017; France24 2017). 
 
As Chennaoui outlines, the law on sexual harassment was in preparation since at least 2013 
and she highlights the conflicts between the Tunisian civil society and more conservative 
positions within Ennahdha and Nida Tounes (Chennaoui 2016). In addition, ATFD leaders 
(like Hiba or Nour) recall that there were previous law proposals and that they fought for 
such a law for a long time (ATFD, Hiba; ATFD, Nour). Hiba for example related the first 
proposal for a law on violence against women to the 1990s and outlined the continuous 
efforts by the women movement (ATFD, Hiba). Nour underlined that they worked for years 
to have the law against violence against women (ATFD, Nour). Not surprisingly, feminist 
activists and the ATFD welcomed the law, while still criticizing aspects like the unpunished 
rape under married people (Chennaoui 2016). The coalition for the law was relatively narrow 
and focused on the Tunisian feminist movement, as these were perceived as the experts. 
Media coverage and movement positions 
Compared to the other laws the law on sexual harassment achieved by far less media 
coverage as shown in Table 7.6; while the ATFD was covered in most articles. The ATFD even 
overturned the UGTT, which was named less frequently as can be seen in Table 7.6. 
Comparing the ratios, the media coverage of the ATFD on harassment is as high as the ratio 
of the LTDH on reconciliation. One can argue that the debate was shaped by the ATFD. This 
is less surprising given their specialization and focus on women rights. FTDES and LTDH 
played nearly no role in relation to the law, while the UGTT was of minor importance. 
Table 7.6 Number of mentions on sexual harassment 
 ATFD FTDES LTDH UGTT 
Total mentions (La 
Presse/ Le Temps) 
23 18/5) 5 (5/0)* 3 (2/1) 11 (4/7) 
Ratio 
Mentions/Overall 
reporting 
0,6 0,04 0,02 0,01 
Note: Separate searches for the term sexual harassment were performed for each organization as part of their claims. 
The last ratio takes the number of mentions of sexual harassment as part of claims and divides it with the total number 
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of articles on the organization. For the FTDES the search word has been modified towards “violence sexuelle” to get a 
proxy as the original search showed no result. Total number of articles: ATFD= 38, FTDES =137, LTDH = 136, UGTT= 991 
In media articles on the ATFD, discrimination was connected with parity and equality, as well 
as the need to protect women by law. The ATFD has published micro-studies on the 
frequency of harassment and discrimination illustrating the scale of the problem 
(combination of learning and emulation). The demand for the law was repeated each time 
harassment is covered. The demand is accompanied by a sensitization of society on the issue 
of discrimination of women, as well as by diverse civil society activities. The ATFD also 
problematized the voluntary touching of women in public transport69. Throughout a theater 
play they showed the atrocities and discrimination against women and the links and 
utilization of cultural activities as argued earlier. 
 
The arguments of the ATFD include consistently a demand for the law on sexual harassment. 
Although the number of articles on harassment is not very high, the demand for a new law 
was mediatized. It cannot be said with certainty that the arguments used by the four 
organizations were very consistent apart from the key words women and violence. Given the 
low number of media mentions it is doubtful whether public opinion and the diffusion via 
media played a role. Nearly only the women movement advertised the project and mentions 
in media remain limited. Compared to the other laws, media reports did not play a role. 
 
For the FTDES and the LTDH reporting on harassment is very restrained and thus difficult to 
interpret. When named in relation with sexual violence, the FTDES linked it to values and 
missing sexual education, familial violence but also illegal behavior. It also underlines sexual 
violence against children in rural areas. The LTDH is only mediatized in relation to 
harassment and the International Women Day, where they participated in activities with a 
coalition of women associations including the ATFD. The word search for harassment leads 
to articles criticizing the harassment of journalists. Given the close interaction of LTDH and 
ATFD as seen in chapter four, it is surprising that the LTDH was not more heavily involved. 
 
                                                     
69 At the time of writing in end 2018, the ATFD started together with other organizations large scale campaigns 
in relation to harassment in public transport. 
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The UGTT organized a conference on violence against women that caught the attention of 
journalists. Harassment is seen connected to the work place or public places and is linked to 
a demand for legislation in line with international conventions. The UGTT focused on 
harassment in public transports, which caused repeated media echo and complements the 
coverage of the ATFD. The search also gave results for harassment of journalists, workers or 
Tunisian regions which should be named, but which have not been analyzed as they were 
not related to violence against women. When harassment of women is meant, ATFD and 
UGTT seem to be close, but it is difficult to evaluate given the low number of articles. The 
public discussion of harassment of women remains very low. 
Interviews and several mechanisms 
Interviews with leaders of the ATFD suggest that mechanisms different than public opinion 
are at work (compare section 7.3): 
"We had direct contacts. First of all, we invite her [the minister] to our actions, 
we write and we had some contacts, we visited them. For example, for the law, 
in order to have a framework law against the discriminations and we are ready to 
work together. Because we are the organization with the most expertise in the 
domain of violence against women. So, we are the experts which elaborated 
first, for the ministry, we are the experts who did the proposition of the integral 
law on violence against women. And we want, as partners, we try to lobby and 
put pressure in order to be integrated as real partners that are susceptible to 
become involved. And currently we are part of certain structures, for example 
within the ministries that work on […] for example the violence against women, 
on rural women, on the conditions of rural women. We are also in some 
commissions that work on development.” (ATFD, Sarah) 
 
However, the influence via ministries was not without changes of the intentions of the 
women movement: 
"So, I wanted to give you the example of the law framework for which we 
struggle, the integral law against the violence against women. It has been 
deformed, the project was very good. And now the projects risks passing before 
[…] parliament, it’s a deformed project. Because in the ministries, there have 
been discussions around that project and they proposed a modification. We do 
not know the text now. But we know, through the information that we have, that 
the text has been deformed. So that the discriminations persist. So that the laws 
in favor of violence persist. For example, I don’t know, the rape conjugal or the 
marriage with […] the law that states that the marriage with the rapist will allow 
him not to pass before court, will stay eventually. And that’s a battle which will 
be strong and we hope to win it.” (ATFD, Yasmine) 
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While media reports showed no involvement of the LTDH, in interviews they expressed 
support for the law. 
"We currently create a coordination to invest our weight into civil society, in 
every case invest our weight for the announcement of the law […] the integral 
law proposal against violence against women. This coordination is guided by the 
feminist associations and we are under way to join by trying to, really, by trying 
to, to put in our weight because we have nevertheless 26 sections and if in the 
case that all the sections align, first take notice of the law proposal and 
understand the importance of that law proposal to avoid that women continue 
to be subject of discrimination.” (LTDH, Rim) 
 
Given the very small movement coalition behind the law, theory on coalitions would expect 
the law to fail. However, coercion is less relevant and other mechanisms are in place a 
because ATFD as well as the women movement are perceived as experts for the topic. The 
inclusion of former members of the women movement in ministries and other positions 
allowed placing the law. Soulayma, from the Ministry of Women acknowledges, that the law 
was elaborated in interaction with civil society: 
"Something that we did with the civil society, which was totally hostile [...] for 
example, I do not know, an approach […] for the enactment of a comprehensive 
law for the fight against violence on women, which was done by experts who 
themselves are in civil society, but there was a vision that may offend certain 
sensibilities, and that may hinder the path [...] and the process of this law. And 
who stayed for more than a year in the lockers, it could not be promulgated for 
that. So, for civil society, the point of assurance is that the strategic vision is that, 
today we ask this because there are emergencies. Once we have this law, we 
have a plea to convince everyone, we can go step by step for things, for issues 
that are problematic and use mainly advocacy before going to action.” (Ministry 
of Women, Soulayma - a) 
 
The current situation with rapists escaping punishment when marrying their victim, which 
was also discussed in media, might be another aspect that could have influenced public 
opinion70. The strong normative focus of the campaign stands for a focus on emulation. The 
targeting of ministries and parliament commissions played a more important role than any 
influence via the traditional media. It was nearly exclusively the women movement without 
the help from a coalition that achieved the acceptance of the law. A comparison with the 
other laws shows a very different mode of influencing and a reduced focus on coercion. It 
was the women movement with particular expertise in the field that proposed and pushed 
                                                     
70 As mentioned earlier, few information on public opinion is available 
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for the law connecting several key concepts. It was proactive and started from the beginning 
to lobby for that law. 
7.5.4 Conclusion on the laws 
The three law examples show different channels and mechanisms. Given the focus on 
coalitions and outcomes, the results indicate that several channels and mechanisms and 
their combination can lead to a desired policy outcome and are not always focused on large 
coalitions. 
 
As different channels are used to influence, chances of success vary, as do different policy 
areas. The law on terrorism has been adopted because movements failed to convince 
parliamentarians, especially those not close to the left. The law on reconciliation can be 
interpreted as temporary success of several coalitions against it, be it movement coalitions 
or parliamentarian actors, and as an example for reactive mobilization (coercion and 
emulation). Framing was more consistent against the law on reconciliation as Table 7.7 
shows. 
 
Only taking the first two examples would leave us with the conclusion that not movements 
themselves matter, but probably majorities in parliament or at least the combination of 
both. In addition, public opinion seemed favorable towards new laws on terrorism in the 
aftermath of the Bardo and Sousse attacks. 
 
The law on sexual harassment shows a different mechanism and long-term lobbying by 
Tunisian women movements. Thus, it can be interpreted as success enabled through the 
contacts towards administration and especially ministries (and not through public opinion). 
The normative focus of the campaign shows emulation. It has been shown that movements 
use relays not necessarily to promote their visions of democracy, but their policy claims. The 
size and resources of the coalition do not seem to be a decisive factor as representation and 
resources were higher for the other two examples. 
 
Table 7.7 provides a short summary of results from this comparative case study focused on 
the coalition and its reputation as well as consistency of media framing and main 
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mechanisms used. As is also to note, protest achieved only a postponement of a law project, 
but did not stop it as demanded by some mobilizing organizations. 
 
Table 7.7 Summary of results 
 Law on reconciliation Law on terrorism Law on sexual 
harassment 
Coalition 
 
At least 20 org. 
(mostly national) 
At least 48 org. (nat. 
and international) 
Tunisian women 
movement and 
Ministry of Women 
and Family  
Reputation/ 
Specialization 
A number of high 
reputation 
organizations included 
(quartet without 
UTICA), but also 
Ennahdha (pol. party), 
specialization in many 
areas 
A number of high 
reputation 
organizations included 
(ONAT, LTDH and so 
on), specialization in 
many areas 
ATFD, AFTURD with 
high profile on 
women issues 
Media  Mov. perspective on: 
Economy, corruption, 
revolution and the 
constitution. Mainly 
consistent across 
organizations. 
Mov. perspective 
diverse, reporting on: 
National solidarity, 
mobilization against 
terrorism, economic 
situation and terrorism 
– no clear common 
perspective 
Mov. Perspective on 
equality, parity, 
protection, mainly 
by the ATFD, 
effectively no 
alternative 
perspective in 
media 
Main 
mechanism 
Coercion (protest) Coercion (protest) Emulation  (direct 
contacts with 
Ministry) 
Desired 
outcome of the 
four movements 
No, but modified law No  Yes  
 
With the three examples it has not necessarily been shown that earlier stages of the 
legislation process are easier to influence -although it is the only really successful case-, but 
that different stages of the policy process have different chances of success depending on 
the channels and mechanisms used. 
 
Kriesi’s distinction between reactive and proactive movement success is particularly useful. 
It allows to distinguish different strategies. When listening to movement leaders, they see 
especially the reactive element of public opinion and mobilization as crucial. In order to not 
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fall back to a lower level for example for human rights protection, public opinion and 
pressure from the street as part of coercion play a role. However, when it comes to 
proactive policy changes especially the personal contacts towards ministers are important. 
The law on violence against women presents an example of proactive policy 
implementation. It is a counter example towards the influence of large movement coalitions 
but might serve as example for specialized coalitions as the ATFD was not alone, the AFTURD 
as well as other organizations similarly promoted the law. It shows that resources or a large 
number of members is not necessary for influence on legislation. 
 
I argue that it is no coincidence that the Ministry of Women and the women movement that 
have been identified to be particularly close in terms of framing are part of the efficient 
channels via personal contacts and commissions as well as through emulation. This reminds 
the findings of Banaszak, who argues that members of the women movement that enter 
administration are increasing the chances for outcomes (Banaszak 2005). In a similar vein, 
especially the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and LTDH and FTDES have close ties 
that translate in a similar vision, but this Ministry has less policy proposals. 
 
While the first two examples on law proposals show opposition towards a law, the last 
shows a law proposed by civil society. Given the different stages of policy development, 
direct contacts towards ministries play an important role in the first stage of the process, 
while at a later stage parliament and protest become more important. In terms of action 
repertoires, the street is often not the first mean of protest, as especially the UGTT enters 
first in dialogue and later – following failures in influencing the decision makers – opts for 
sit-ins or strikes. This sequencing of mechanisms is probably another point that made the 
law on reconciliation be accepted as a modified version after negotiations. 
 
It is not in every case about reputation and specialized contacts. Influence is not the same 
for the LTDH whose influence on for example the Ministry of the Interior appears as quite 
limited although having a very specific state-oriented network. The LTDH has not the same 
relays in the Ministry as has the ATFD. Similarly, the wide ties towards a number of 
ministries by FTDES and UGTT are no guarantee for implementing policy proposals leaving a 
lot of unsolved puzzles. Contacts do not automatically influence. 
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The public discussion in media is not that important as in Western contexts. I raised a lot of 
doubts on the efficacy of media. Indirect effects do not play a major role. Although 
movements focus on different core elements, it became not clear how those different 
positions work within movement coalitions. Further research on the delimitated positions 
within the Tunisian civil society could confirm or infirm the argument, that specialization is 
important for Tunisian movements. In the case of the most specialized coalition a success 
can be seen, while the most diverse coalition was not successful. 
 
It might be that theories on social movements do not fit well with the Tunisian context, 
although not all arguments go against their use. Another interesting point might be whether 
counter mobilization existed; something that would have been noticed when mentioned in 
articles on the organizations, but not if the organizations of interest were not mentioned. 
This can become a point of future research. 
 
Another question remains to be solved. Movements use the media to generate pressure on 
the government while the government ignores media reports. This may be a reality during 
the first years following any revolution. However, the government appears more and more 
responsive towards media reports; but again, especially digital media like Facebook have 
been highlighted. In this sense, a higher professionalization of the Tunisian media would 
enforce the mechanisms especially used by the FTDES, the active media work. While I would 
expect that the media sector could develop towards more professionalization having then 
consequences on policy processes, it is something to be verified in the future. 
7.6 Conclusion to chapter seven 
Chapter seven provides us with different insights. Different mechanisms are at work which 
need different types of channels. The channels identified refer to personal contacts or 
former members in important positions, occasional contacts that do not work perfectly, as 
well as institutionalized meeting structures (especially UGTT). Emulation in line with 
ideational impact is emphasized; however it is often about combinations with coercion or 
learning. 
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What are important channels and mechanisms? While for positioning a law personal 
contacts in ministries play a role, veto initiatives do not only rely on personal or 
institutionalized contacts, but also on public pressure and contacts towards parliamentarian 
majorities, using several mechanisms at the same moment. As I argued at the beginning of 
the chapter, depending on stages of the policy process, influence is possible by the use of 
different channels and mechanisms. The influence through the traditional media appears as 
relatively limited in the Tunisian case at least when it comes to ministries; it might be 
different for politicians. The problems in the media landscape translate consequentially in an 
orientation towards the direct effect model. 
 
The joint effect model has a limited fit for Tunisia as traditional media outlets are seen as 
biased in terms of promoting particular interests and lacking professionalism. The traditional 
media does not play the most important role in terms of public opinion but creates pressure, 
suggesting that the direct effect model is most adequate for the Tunisian context. It can be 
argued, that especially for the big questions, public opinion can play a crucial role and may 
be as important as the direct ties between ministries and organizations (see 7.5 on 
examples). 
 
Some ministries are easier to influence like the Ministry of Women, especially due to former 
movement members in the ministries. For other ministries, mechanisms are limited by very 
few channels, which consequentially limits the possibility of influencing framings, policies 
and processes. In addition, different stages of the legislation process create different access 
points. While the degree of openness differs from one ministry to another, resembling much 
political opportunity structure approaches, common framings and dense networks will 
together shape the capacity of organizations to influence legislation. The influence of the 
UGTT is certainly on another level and less oriented towards a similar framing. It appears 
that the UGTT is either not active in promoting its framing -although some similarities exist- 
or not efficient. However, civil servants acknowledge the organizational influence. 
 
During the proposal phase even narrow coalitions or individual organizations can influence 
legislation, while during the implementation phase broad coalitions of protest are more 
important. Amenta is right claiming that chances of influence are highest during the 
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proposal phase (Amenta 2006). However, this is not the only stage and might become 
irrelevant if a proposal is blocked later. I argue, that the possibility to influence is linked to 
whether it is a proactive or reactive approach as Kriesi or Kolb outlined (see chapter two). 
Proposal and opposition go hand in hand with different channels, mechanisms and 
repertoires. 
 
It appears that policy processes can be described as chaotic processes in Tunisia. There is not 
one actor that can influence legislation, but effectively several ones that make it difficult to 
account for the influence of movements and civil society. Similarly, pathways for movement 
influence are multiple, similar to the findings by Cress and Snow (Cress and Snow 2000). The 
most surprising element is nevertheless the reduced importance of parliament in a 
representative political system. Interviewees expressed a tendency towards approaching 
civil servants for changes instead of parliamentarians or politicians which might be a 
specialty for the Tunisian system. 
 
Given the missing resources in a number of administrative bodies, administration (and 
parliament) seems to depend on civil society in terms of expertise. Thus learning is 
particularly relevant. I agree with what Kriesi wrote about different contexts in relation to 
interest groups preventing others from entering: “The dependency will, however, not 
automatically open up the state to outsiders in the social movement sector; this will only be 
the case if the established interest groups are equally weak. On the contrary, a well-
resourced, coherently structured, and professionalized system of interest groups may also 
be able to prevent outside challengers from having access to the state” (Kriesi et al. 
1995:31). In this sense, the more stable inclusion of for example the UGTT poses problems 
for the inclusion of other, especially younger organizations. The Tunisian case shows an 
action field with uneven resource distribution that leads to more hierarchies (on uneven 
resources: Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Jasper 2014). As the old civil society holds more 
resources and hold a reputation, they are in a better position faced with newer emergent. 
This is confirmed by Ayari who states that former activists under Ben Ali are now playing an 
important role in the Tunisian political system (Ayari 2016). 
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While Martin sees the danger that movements and professionalized activists may take too 
much influence on state actors, because of increased state openness towards civil society 
the situation in Tunisia is different (Martin, G. 2015). The state consults with civil society 
including movement leaders, but this does not automatically translate in the desired 
outcomes. Ministries show a different degree of openness towards movements and specific 
actors leading to a very diverse picture. As mentioned earlier, the UGTT was named much 
more frequently - although not always positively - by civil servants. The FTDES was not 
mentioned at all as a partner by ministries and the LTDH was mentioned with reserves by 
the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
Is there an impact of movements? I see that there is effectively an impact of movements, 
especially of the women movement, while further impact is mitigated by other actors’ 
influence. In this sense one can argue that the law on sexual harassment was less discussed 
than the other laws, including fewer different actors. When a law project was more 
discussed, it was finally the parliament that had the last word and that turned against civil 
society. The law against sexual harassment is a case that relatively smoothly went through 
and that was a proactive mobilization of the women movement. One can speculate whether 
the Tunisian system does function better from the perspective of civil society when no or 
minor conflict occur. In the Tunisian case, there are also processes that have been described 
by Filali-Ansary as “Tawafuq”, building consensus or tacit acceptance among all actors 
involved through informal processes that base on citizens’ interests (Filali-Ansary 2015; 
International Crisis Group 2018). This sense of consensus seeking is widespread in the 
Tunisian political system. It helps civil society groups as it poses an opportunity to shape 
policies in order to reduce disagreement and protest. While it de-emphasizes coercion it also 
confirms an important role of civil society.  
 
Newer examples go in the same direction as my findings. The examples I gave show cases 
where especially the reactive mobilization was not or only partly efficient in changing law 
proposals. The proactive proposal however was successful. More recent examples on 
discrimination in public transport, equality in heritage and several other elements that were 
demanded by the women movement at the time of interviews and that get now realized are 
additional examples of an efficient cooperation between the Ministry of Women and the 
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women movement. In this sense, the women movement currently realizes many of their 
demands. 
 
This chapter also identifies many elements for future research. Future studies should 
investigate the role of personal contacts in more detail as well as their interaction with other 
mechanisms. Data needs to be collected on public opinion. This could emphasize the role of 
public opinion as mechanism for achieving outcomes which came too short due to data 
availability. The present data warns however on a too extensive use of traditional media 
data as proxy for public opinion. While bigger organizations receive more media coverage, 
the underlying mechanisms of influence may be different and not identifiable via media 
analysis. Research can however monitor the professionalization of journalists that can make 
the mechanisms via media more effective or assess the role of social media that was not a 
focus of this thesis. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Reflections and Conclusion 
Chapter eight is divided in five sections. The first critically presents the findings that have 
been outlined in the previous chapters. The second elaborates on the lessons that can be 
learned from the research. The third section then reflects on how the research has been 
conducted. The fourth section recalls some of the limits on the basis of reflections and 
evaluates the robustness of the research. The final short section is to see as some concluding 
remarks. 
8.1 Findings 
Chapter 8.1 summarizes the results of the former chapters. I first recall the research 
question: How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia? I similarly recall 
that the idea from the beginning was to retrace ideational impact, concretely the impact of 
movements through framing practices.  
 
The results show that ideational impact is terms of a diffused democratic framing is limited 
to dyadic constellations between organizations and specific ministries. However, notably 
one element of democracy, participatory democracy and an element that gets linked 
(economic factors) are factors that are found across actors; economic elements are also 
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present in the public debate. The research similarly showed that there is neither a clear 
common framing across organizations neither directly nor in public and that if there are 
common elements; those get linked to human rights, economic elements and participatory 
democracy. An even greater diversity is present on the state site where framing is much 
more limited with an emphasis on participatory democracy; social politics and economic 
development as common elements play also a role. 
 
Points of contacts by which frames can get diffused are diverse and of different 
effectiveness. Personal relays, official regular contacts, institutionalized forms of contacts 
and the public opinion are used, while especially the media is not that often used by 
organizations (except the FTDES). It became evident, that organizations mainly try to 
convince state actors, but can complementarily exercise pressure trough protest (emulation 
and coercion). There is limited evidence that movements spread their framings of 
democracy towards ministries, although some representatives with many interactions 
showed a similar framing. This similarity is notably related to former members in ministries 
and as outlined earlier to the perceived evaluation as ally.  
 
Before returning to the concluding findings, I recall the separate findings from chapter four 
to seven.  
8.1.1 Findings by Chapters 
Results from Chapter four on networks 
The first empirical chapter assessed the network configuration among civil society and 
towards the state. A movement coalition exists among the old Tunisian civil society including 
the analyzed organizations with the FTDES in a reduced role. The UGTT can serve as decisive 
element for mobilization of the coalition. The organizations are well established in the 
international human rights network. While there are regular contacts towards ministries, 
relatively few contacts to parliament exist. The UGTT is best integrated into the policy circle 
and has an outstanding position that was underlined in chapter four and discussed in 
chapter seven.  
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Organizations have their specific roles in a network, which translates in contacts towards 
specific ministries. When it comes to the relations of ministries, civil society in general was 
mentioned very often as ally. Ministries mentioned most prominently the UGTT that takes a 
central position in cooperation with ministries. All of the analyzed organizations have regular 
contacts to some ministries, however not all organizations got mentioned by ministries, the 
FTDES not at all as a partner or accepted actor, meaning that the options for influencing civil 
servants is reduced for the FTDES. The chapter showed that there is nevertheless 
interaction, however often very specific to one ministry and thus allowed to go on with the 
comparison of framings. 
Results from chapter five on framings on democracy hold by movements 
Chapter five looked at the framing of organizations and compared those with each other. 
Although movements are highly interconnected, they do not share a common framing of 
democracy. While human rights are at the core of the framing of democracy, movements set 
different foci of attention. While the ATFD and the LTDH are freedom oriented, the FTDES 
has an equalized profile with a slight focus on equality and the UGTT is slightly control 
oriented. Economic aspects play a role across organizations and a distinction between 
individual and collective rights can be made. A participatory democracy, where movements 
serve as intermediate between the people and the state, came up during interviews. It is not 
one framing of democracy, but several framings of democracy that are promoted, with 
specific roles taken over by each organization within a network. This supports the 
perspective that there is less common influence but more influence in bilateral interaction 
between an organization and specific ministries. 
Results from chapter six on framings on democracy hold by civil servants 
The sixth chapter analyzed the democratic framing of civil servants. The chapter poses 
doubts on common framings of democracy across ministries. For some ministries very 
limited framings of democracy exist only focusing on few elements. On the other hand, 
especially two ministries share a focus on human rights, namely the Ministry of Relations 
with Civil Society and the Ministry of Women. Those two ministries are also those where 
interaction was frequent with LTDH/FTDES and ATFD respectively. 
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When looking at all ministries together, especially the equality dimension and participation 
in a sense of a participatory democracy are highlighted. However, the results are probably 
overestimating the participation dimension as this was the main topic of the interviews. On 
the other hand, this bias cannot account for the dominance of this dimension over others. 
Participatory democracy plays an important role in line with its codification in the 
constitution and decrees. Some ministries and especially those rarely targeted by 
organizations have a utilitarian perspective on democracy focusing on participation and 
transparency. At the same time it is a very limited democratic framing. 
 
The strong presence of economic factors and economic development is similar to interviews 
with movements. Some framings emphasizing for example state capacity appear closer to 
the UGTT. Ministries show a heterogeneous picture in terms of democratic framing; there is 
little evidence that the same framings can be found across ministries. This means that the 
state as represented by civil servants does not have one perspective on democracy, but 
several ones.  
Results from Chapter seven on mechanisms of influence 
Chapter seven regarded the mechanisms behind ideational and policy influence. As overall 
influence is seen as limited, the focus shifted towards the channels of diffusion that are 
effective as well as the moments where civil society and state interact. The analysis shows 
that direct ways of interaction are more effective than indirect ones. In addition, chapter 
seven showed that most organizations try to convince the state that their perspective is 
normatively better (emulation) while similarly using pressure when necessary (coercion).  
Also learning through the provision of information is used. 
 
During different phases of the legislation process, different mechanisms of (ideational) 
influence are important. While the ATFD relatively successfully - as the example on the law 
on violence against women shows – uses personal contacts through relays in ministries and 
consultation mechanism for placing law proposals, the FTDES relies on the less effective 
mechanism of media and public opinion. In connection with the missing acceptance by 
ministries as a partner, the influence of the FTDES is limited. Their provision of information 
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whether respected by ministries or not can be interpreted as moves to increase learning of 
ministries.  
 
The UGTT is highly integrated into policymaking and uses institutionalized mechanisms, but 
also protest and public opinion when necessary. Due to its wide reach it has an exceptional 
position in the Tunisian system and is a strong veto-player and coercion plays a major role. 
The LTDH mostly uses direct contacts towards ministries that do not seem to work well due 
to reserves at the Ministry of the Interior. The LTDH tries to enforce learning when it comes 
to torture; combined with emulation. 
 
Indirect influence at least through the media is seen with skepticism. It is doubtful whether 
media can be a multiplier of movement positions. Organizations, a part of the FTDES, are 
less convinced and also civil servants in ministries are skeptical. Direct interactions appear as 
crucial in the Tunisian case. 
 
As the chapter demonstrated, civil society has a place in legislation processes and ministries 
have to consult, although they do at different stages of the legislation process. It is argued 
that movement coalitions are especially important for reactive mobilization, thus for 
protesting and opposing, while narrow coalitions and experts are able to influence early 
phases of the legislation process. Civil servants tend to be aware of coercion, thus the 
possible pressure from the street. Some civil servants like those from the Ministry of Women 
and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society apply a wider normative background that is 
not used by many of the other civil servants. Once used, emulation appears as effective in 
combination with direct interaction. Learning equally plays a role for many civil servants, 
reason why the expertise of organizations is something much appreciated.  
 
The three law examples showed, that especially for reactive demands, thus for opposing 
laws, civil society mobilization and coercion, even if it is widespread, is not sufficient alone. 
In the case of the three law projects, a more consistent framing across organizations – as for 
the law on reconciliation – appears to have caused at least the postponement and 
modification of the law. On the other hand, the two first examples raised the question on 
the influence of other actors, especially parliament. Given that parliament is neglected by 
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organizations to a certain degree, the influence of movements on parliamentarians is 
limited. The last example showed a successful formula of the women movement facilitated 
by the relay of a former member in the ministry, by similar views (emulation) and by their 
expertise (learning). 
8.1.2 Between euphoria and disillusion  
This section takes up the findings and highlights some elements for discussion. The section 
elaborates on examples where the diffusion of framing worked and others where there was 
up to no diffusion. 
Diffusion of democratic framing through interaction? 
There is limited evidence for the diffusion of democratic framing across actors. While there 
are some examples with the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil 
Society, it became clear that individuals brought those framings in ministries.  
 
Movements are able to influence the Tunisian legislation process. However, they have only 
limited influence on the framings of democracy in most ministries with few exceptions. On 
the other hand, framings of democracy are not similar across ministries, as are the ways how 
movements can influence ministries. Each ministry has its own processes guided by the 
obligation for civil society participation. Organized movements can influence directly, while 
protest itself at least creates attention. The interaction between civil society and state 
reminds a lot on Gramsci’s perspective on democracy where a developed civil society 
interacts with the state and can transform the state, meaning that political initiatives are in 
the hand of movements (compare Morera 1990). 
 
Status and especially reputation from the Ben Ali era do play a role, while resources do not. 
The women movement for example, although being relatively small in size and resources in 
comparison to the UGTT, is having an impact due to a perceived similar framing and 
personal as well as institutional contacts. Recalling the possible configurations presented in 
section 2.7, Figure 8.1 shows the degrees of interaction that are found and sets it in relation 
to the framing. Nearly all configurations exist on the continuum between interaction and 
degrees of framing similarity. The combination of few exchanges and different framings is 
rare (one example is the Ministry of Habitation). No exchanges and same framing were not a 
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focus of research; however, some organizations like the FTDES are not included in 
interactions with several ministries. Nevertheless, it is often a mix. One exception is the 
interaction between LTDH and the Ministry of the Interior that was confirmed by both sites 
but framings differ substantively. The framing of the civil servant from the Ministry of 
Education should be considered with caution as outlined earlier. Figure 8.1 clearly shows 
that the UGTT holds intensive contacts towards actors without sharing a completely similar 
framing. Thus, I argue that relations of the UGTT are less dependent on common framing, 
but exist due to its historic role and notwithstanding divergent framing of problems. This is 
in line with its role as labor union for some ministries where it is much more about salary 
negotiations. However, the Presidency of the Government and the Ministry of Finance for 
example discuss general political or fiscal questions with the UGTT. 
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LTDH – Min. Rel. With Civ. Soc.  
Much interaction 
Similar Framing of 
democracy 
ATFD – Min. of Women  
LTDH – Min. Int.  
UGTT – Min. of Habitation  
UGTT – Min. of Education 
ATFD – Min. of Rel. with Civ. Soc
FTDES – Min. of Education 
LTDH– Min. of Women  
UGTT – Min. of Regional Dev. 
UGTT – Min. of Rel. with Civ. Soc.  
ATFD– Min. of Industry 
ATFD– Min. of Sport 
ATFD – Min. of Regional Dev. 
FTDES – Min. of Industry 
FTDES – Min. of Agriculture UGTT – Min of Women 
FTDES – Min. of Regional Dev. 
FTDES – Presidency of the Gov. 
LTDH– Min. of Education 
ATFD –Min. of Finance 
UGTT – Min. of Finance 
UGTT – Min. of Sport 
UGTT – Min. of Tourism 
UGTT – Min of Agriculture 
UGTT – Min. of Industry 
Few interaction 
FTDES – Min. Rel. With Civ. Soc.  
ATFD – Presidency of the Gov. 
UGTT – Presidency of the Gov. 
ATFD– Min. of Agriculture 
Figure 8.1 Configurations of framing and interaction 
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Undemocratic framing 
I mentioned earlier that frames less in line with democracy do exist. Those framings 
compatible with autocracy are still observable.  One example is the partial ignorance of 
minority rights by for example the UGTT, but also by many ministries. This is in line with the 
focus on collective rights that often gets emphasized. LGTB rights are not acknowledged and 
are frames as something “not common” to Tunisia. Exemptions are the ATFD and the FTDES 
where especially the ATFD works with organizations on LGTB rights. Those are easier 
combinable with the ATFD framing that focuses on a free conduct of life, free choices for 
sexual orientation and practice.  While LGTB rights are the most striking example, one can 
enlarge this problem to neglect for minority rights and even women rights. Among many civil 
servants and especially UGTT representatives minorities do not exist, thus creating no need 
for the respect of minority rights.  
 
Another aspect going in the direction of undemocratic framing is the partial ignorance of 
elections. While this can be in line with the timing, where no elections were closed, elections 
were rarely emphasized and often discussed in line with decentralization. In line with this 
point is a few emphasized parliament. Due to the numerous problems discussed earlier 
(resources, shifting party alignments and so on), parliament is neither seen as important 
actor, nor does it get an important function attributed. From a civil society perspective it 
seems even that counter-powers in form of independent institutions are often seen as more 
important than parliament. It shows that parliament has yet to find its place in the political 
landscape and get a greater acceptance.  
 
Terrorism and how to cope with it is not just an issue discussed in Tunisia, but also across 
Western countries. The same discussions on the restriction of individual liberties and press 
freedom to ensure a better fight against terrorism are a much discussed issue in Tunisia. A 
strong state is for example emphasized by UGTT leaders (but often referred to a financial 
perspective) and of course by the representative from the Ministry of the Interior. Like in 
other countries, the fight against terrorism can have negative consequences on other 
dimensions of democracy. 
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From the analyzed organizations, the UGTT with its strong referral to state capacity and 
collective rights has a framing more compatible with autocracy than the other organizations. 
This may be explained by the missing complete rupture with the past and its ambiguous role 
under Ben Ali. This said, it is nothing dangerous to Tunisian democracy at the moment, as 
democracy as such is widely accepted among UGTT leaders.  
 
From the civil servants especially those from the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of 
Relations with Civil Society show a very democratic framing, while other framings are more 
compatible with autocratic political systems. The most striking example was when the civil 
servant from the Ministry of Tourism mentioned that it was more stable under Ben Ali 
emphasizing that the autocratic political system had a positive site. Other less democratic 
framings are relatively difficult to identify, the limited framing of democracy itself can 
nevertheless be interpreted as something dangerous to democracy. As civil servants do not 
have clear pictures about democracy apart the participatory elements, they cannot clearly 
defend it. While some representatives are capable to cover all dimensions of democracy, 
some are simply not, be it due to a strong administrative focus or a probably less politicized 
position that might persist from the Ben Ali period. Thus, the Tunisian state currently fails to 
build a clear vision of democracy that could orient its civil servants towards one or another 
direction. It is less about the desired form of democracy, but simply about a clear framing of 
democracy. Through this argument, I see limited framing of democracy as a real danger to 
Tunisian democracy.  
8.2 Lessons from the results 
As literature assigned from the beginning, influence and especially ideational influence is 
difficult to retrace. What however was found across interviewees was a referral to 
participatory democracy and elements of economic development. I argue that movements 
and civil society are heard because they achieved a participative approach based on 
consultation with civil society anchored in the constitution and legislation. Thus, civil 
servants have to consult, which facilitates access. Notwithstanding this access, it does only 
translate into ideational influence in few cases.  Discourses between ministerial 
administration and organizations do not always use the same language. The sensitivity for 
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each other’s vocabulary is not always present as different elements of democracy get 
emphasized in interaction. 
Back to the research question 
I recalling the research question: “How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in 
Tunisia?”  Framings of democracy are not often transmitted to the state as such. While some 
ministries have comparable positions to movements, there is no influence on the state but 
on specific ministries. Influence of the UGTT exists, even if the perspective on democracy is 
not similar. Given that the UGTT was already included – to a certain degree – under Ben Ali, 
this interaction is less dependent on framings of democracy. The opposite goes for the ATFD, 
where framing of women problems and of democracy resemble the ministerial perspective 
and where interaction is intense achieving even a desired policy outcome. The FTDES 
focuses on the “wrong” channels using mostly press, but could at least create attention for 
problems through protest. The LTDH is faced with at least one ministry with a very specific 
framing of democracy and a control-oriented perspective that absolutely not resembles the 
one of the LTDH. Although interactions exist, they are not very influential and do not, or only 
in a very limited way, shape perceptions of the Ministry of the Interior. There is no wide-
reaching framing of democracy that gets promoted as a consistent (master) frame across 
movements and society as we have seen in the media analysis. However, several sub-
elements are highlighted in interviews with few common elements like human rights or 
participatory democracy. There is still a lot of work for movements to convince Tunisian 
state actors on their perspective of democracy. Democratic framing diffuses not in general, 
but only in specific cases. 
 
Economic aspects and thus the output dimension play a role. The Tunisian democracy is not 
only judged on its outcome in coastal areas, but also on whether it can reduce protest, 
create economic development in the interior or shift protest towards conventional political 
participation such as voting instead of protest activities on the road.  
Networks and coalitions 
When it comes to channels for possible influence on ideas and policies, several channels like 
committees, former members in ministries, media work of protest exist. None of the 
selected organizations is a complete challenger that only uses protest in complete 
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opposition. All organizations comply with procedures of authorities to guarantee access. The 
UGTT performs on different levels. Not surprisingly, most of the interviewees underlined 
their independence from state authorities. This UGTT is at the same time regarded as too 
close to the government and as making politics but also as organizing too much protest as 
seen in media reporting. This permanent struggle translates into the internal functioning 
with the well-known differences between regional and sectoral branches and the national 
committee which was already present at the time of Ben Ali. 
 
Insights in relation to theory especially on coalitions remain limited. The questions in the 
literature related to coalitions - whether large or narrow coalitions are more effective or 
who works with whom - cannot be answered. Already the literature review was ambiguous 
on coalitions, something similar to the findings especially in relation to the law examples. 
From the three law examples, a narrow coalition, where all organizations were experts in the 
field, was successful. The very diverse and large coalition including the UGTT as well as the 
“old” civil society did not make a decisive effect but achieved important modifications of a 
law. While perceived coalitions were clear in interviews, the media analysis did not confirm 
the same links to the same degree. A distinction between the perceived networks and the 
networks identified through media analysis is made. Other elements of network theory like 
centrality of the UGTT as well as roles were identified throughout this research.  
 
Network structures were analyzed on a collective level, however, personal, not 
institutionalized contacts, are important as well. The networks of individuals could be 
detailed and compared to organizational ones enriching the analysis of outcomes and 
mechanisms. There is a clear interplay of personal and organizational contacts that became 
clear through the examples of all organizations.  
 
The policy making phase in which influence can be successful may be influenced by the size 
of a coalition. Influence in the draft phase of legislation does not need a wide basis but 
experts, while legislation in later phases can be influenced by the size and composition of 
protest. It is not the type of networks as such that shapes influence, but the type of 
networks in combination with the stage of the policy process. Similarly coercion is facilitated 
by a coalitional mode, while learning and emulation are independent. At the same time, 
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protest and the referral to treats for the revolution are the most visible sign of a democratic 
framing that searches to change legislation. The content of the other interactions, be it in 
committees or direct contacts remains largely invisible. This is first of all a methodological 
problem of the research on ideational as well as policy impact, as the more important 
interactions and the diffused content is more difficult to access when meetings are not 
public or without documentation. 
Diversity of democracy and looking beyond Tunisia 
Framings of democracy are diverse. The participation of civil society was an overarching 
topic that came up in most of the interviews, also because it was one of the main topics. 
Human rights and individual liberties play an important role as well. Hinnebusch criticizes 
that democracy in the MENA region meant just elections and independent judiciaries 
without political equality (Hinnebusch 2015). This is not the case in Tunisia where especially 
equality is underlined as important dimension of democracy. It is perhaps this difference 
towards other cases in the Middle East - that important organizations actively promoted not 
only electoral democracy, but also the equality dimension and human rights - that makes the 
Tunisian example successful. 
 
After some years in a democratic system, ministry employees do not always have a clue 
about new directives and on how to implement the new constitution. It is still a phase of 
cleaning up old legislation that needs to be brought in line with the new constitution. This 
will continue until this process is nearly finished which will be marked by the inauguration of 
the constitutional court as politicians will want to avoid too frequent referral to the court. 
What does all that mean for democracy in Tunisia? Democracy is not yet well anchored 
across the Tunisian state. There are very divergent and many limited perspectives on 
democracy that do not necessarily go in the same direction. There is no culture of 
democracy within most of the ministries. The mechanisms for civil society to participate are 
not transparent and open the possibility to specific actors taking over tasks as demanded by 
the government without transparent reasoning. It cannot be said that Tunisia is a 
majoritarian, egalitarian or freedom-oriented democracy. As in every state there are 
different tendencies, in the case of Tunisia very limited perspectives on democracy for some 
ministries. When it comes to frames, I argue that organizations are indeed “stronger” in 
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comparison to the state as frames are more consistent. The state administration lacks 
knowledge and often arguments. This has consequences of the causal direction as the state 
misses capacity to share organizational and movement’s framing and is consequentially not 
less capable to influence organizations in term of democratic framing. While limited 
democratic framing presents a danger for democracy as support may not be extensive in the 
administration, it is quite logic given the long-term processes of democratization. 
 
The presence and inclusion of civil society is also caused by the weakness of political parties 
especially in the years directly following the uprisings. This shows similarities to the Brazilian 
case where Hipsher analyzed that movement were active due to the weakness of political 
parties (Hipsher 1998). Thus, the future of political parties may determine whether 
mobilization and inclusion of civil society continues in the same way. Given the current wide 
acceptance of civil society among civil servants is a good sign for the strength and 
possibilities for the Tunisian civil society. At the end, it may however not necessarily 
translate in ideational or policy impact. 
 
The role of the economy is to underline. The framing of democracy in Tunisia may not be 
linked to liberalism as economic development model, but a more equal economic model, at 
least when it comes to organizational framing. This strong criticism of the economic system 
is even present among UGTT leaders that are seen as closer to the state. By linking 
democracy and economic development, argumentation takes a different direction then in 
Western countries where both are not necessarily seen as linked (see 2.4). While the 
relation towards economy is a difference towards Western countries, the criticism that 
social movement theories only fit to Western contexts, is not true. The framework on 
movements, framing and networks produced valuable results, without ignoring major 
aspects.  
One additional step: Influence on policies  
While I originally searched for ideational influence, networks and their qualification equally 
showed the channels for taking influence on policies. The success of a law proposed by the 
women movement without greater public debate, as the media analysis showed, contradicts 
a number of theoretical assumptions. Theory would expect a large but not too large 
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coalition to be more successful and media and public opinion to have an influence. As the 
law was not discussed in public, the question arises whether it is more about tacit 
acceptance or whether other actors than the ones identified by theory play a role. The 
absence of counter-movements is only partly convincing as especially Ennahdha with a more 
religious-conservative perspective has a great number of seats in parliament. Specific 
mechanisms, and in this case personal contacts and networks, allowed placing the topic on 
the agenda. That the perspective of women as a major group of voters is satisfied by the law 
might have helped, but this is only speculation and would need verification by insights on 
party strategies in Tunisia. 
 
The ATFD uses the texts of the constitution as a legal basis that stipulates the participation 
of civil society and the equality of men and women. Thus, the codification of civil society 
inclusion as well as basic values of equality helps the ATFD to get heard. Codification is a 
support for democratic frame diffusion in the case of the ATFD. The example showed that it 
is useful to identify mechanisms that are conditional or influenced by other factors like 
proactive or reactive activism or in other words whether emulation or coercion is preferred.  
 
When coming to decision making, movements have some veto power as consensus plays an 
important role in the aftermath of the revolution (Beau and Lagarde 2014). From a 
Gramscian perspective this finding indicates that civil society is on an equal level vis-à-vis the 
state, as the state is not able to dominate civil society as such (Morera 1990). This notion of 
consensus might be a specialty of the Tunisian political system, something to show by cross-
country comparison. It leads to an additional idea: The results from this research distinguish 
between reactive and proactive actions when it comes to policy proposals. It mentions 
especially the UGTT as a veto player, but the UGTT has at the same time not a shared 
framing with ministries they approach. At the same time this remark is in line with a focus on 
coercion as mechanisms, that not necessarily includes the promotion of democratic framing. 
As the UGTT operates mainly on this dimension, it appears logic that common framings 
would be less important. On the other hand and when it comes to emulation, proactive 
actions and eventually learning, common framing might be of importance, because actors 
need to become convinced of proposals. This discussion is a point to re-discuss as part of 
future research. 
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Unexpected findings and points for discussion 
While it was not expected that influence of civil society is enormous, the analysis reveals 
large differences between civil society and ministries. Given the importance scholars ascribe 
to civil society in Tunisia, it is surprising that only few ministries intensively interact with civil 
society. Apart from the UGTT, ministerial influence is very specific (ATFD) or nearly not 
existent (LTDH, FTDES). 
 
The framings on democracy of the LTDH are limited to one dimension which surprising given 
that they should be able to adapt to a democratic political system. It expresses a weakness 
of the LTDH, as they only cover very specific elements and has little access to other issues. It 
was not expected that the framing was limited to only one dimension.  
 
The diffusion of ideas on democracy does not only depend on networks and interactions, but 
on very specific elements such as former movement members in the administration. 
Common framings and values are highlighted when interaction is intense. The placement of 
former movement members in ministries enables a stronger diffusion of ideas. One can 
argue that inside actors are important relays for the diffusion of ideas, but also of policies. 
Emulation is consequentially favored by personal contacts, while we have seen that the 
importance of reputation can be associated with expectations about learning. 
 
In addition, ministries hold specific conceptions of democracy in the Tunisian context. The 
state itself does not know what it wants in terms of democracy, meaning that there is not 
(yet) an overarching vision on democracy. While there is some evidence for the diffusion of 
framings of democracy, this remains limited taking all ministries together. It is less surprising 
from a theoretical point of view, where democracy in Tunisia is not yet seen as completely 
stable. 
 
Another point, less surprising, but still some food for thought is the framing of impact and 
failures. Especially failures are often not framed as failures, but in line with a continuous 
struggle that has not (yet) been successful. This is in line with retrospective – more positive – 
framing in the form of storytelling to avoid the term failure. The framing of own actions 
stays positive. It poses at the same time limits for identifying especially failure, as not every 
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failure is framed as such. Framing is useful for analyzing success, but less for failure, because 
an outcome is often framed in a positive way in interviews. 
Ideas for future research 
To detail the influence of movements, further research is needed. For detailing on ideational 
influence of civil society, further research on the content of direct interaction is seen as 
important. While it often appears easier to rely on media, media reporting does not replace 
accounting for direct influence. While it is difficult to assess the content, more detailed 
interviews, concretely on specific channels for diffusion like the 4+4/5+5 arrangement are 
useful. Another way that is taken by this research is to use the proxy of policies that get 
implemented in the sense of an actor; however, the results still revealed a number of 
questions to be answered concerning the effectivity of coalitions, the role of influence of 
perceived influences that create entry points or policy influence of movements.  My 
research focused on examples from legislation that have been mentioned in interviews. 
While this showed particularly useful, a more detailed analysis of policy areas would be 
another point to be researched. The analysis, while showing interesting results, rested on a 
general level. The interviews could focus on one specific ministry and show the influence 
there instead of showing a cross-ministerial perspective which included a number of 
problems outlined earlier. A more detailed case of each ministry can clarify the obtained 
results and is necessary to gain a better understanding of effective mechanisms for each 
ministry. 
 
It would be interesting to research more on the framings in coalitions and how frames 
change in a coalitional mode. While it can be expected that organizations put forward 
original frames in their own actions, it could be necessary to adopt frames in coalitions as 
those rely on a common determinant that could be a more widely accepted frame that is not 
specific. Entering into a coalition may require (or not) a certain adaptation of other framings. 
This change of positions in coalitional modes is not researched yet and could have wide 
consequences in the Tunisian context as protest is nearly exclusively organized in networks, 
at least on a national level, requiring common positions in order to achieve influence. The 
interplay between different levels of organization may require a (limited) homogenization of 
framing.  
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Another interesting aspect is counter mobilization. As we have seen with the three examples 
for legislation, the women movement was particularly successful implementing their claims. 
One aspect that I did not discuss in detail, because only little information exists, is whether 
counter mobilization took place, so whether for example Ennahdha and related 
organizations mobilized against the law. For the other two examples with less success it can 
at least be expected that large parts of Nida Tounes and the UTICA were favorable and 
mobilized for the laws. This counter framing might have consequences that are not yet taken 
into account.  
 
An idea for future research is linked to the nature of my research when analyzing a specific 
point in time.  While we speak about democratization processes, I only regarded one 
moment in time, and so additional research over the process of democratization can deliver 
further insights. I embedded the findings in democratization processes, but a systematic 
analysis on different moments of democratization is a very interesting point. Like 
democratization bases on several possible pathways, movements influence depends on 
several channels and mechanisms. Is this simply a coincidence? We know that participation 
of civil society shapes democratization processes, however not as only factor. The 
differences in diffusion mechanisms and influence may be correlated to the uncertainty that 
accompanies democratization processes. Especially in the beginning, movements may or 
may not be included. It may be that this is effectively linked to the degree of activity of 
movements in terms of contributing to the build-up of a new political system. Once civil 
society ensured a certain access like in my case, it may be easier to have access to the state 
at least for established actors. A more detailed analysis of the whole democratization 
process and a comparison with other waves of democratization can deliver interesting 
results. 
 
Linked to my research as a specific moment, is the question of longitudinal data. 
Longitudinal data could help retracing changes in perceptions, network configurations and 
accesses. It would for example be interesting to use the archives of La Presse and Le Temps 
to assess the time before the Uprisings and see whether framing of democracy changed over 
time (keeping also the problems with media in mind). Longitudinal media data might, once 
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media is more professional, help to identify salient topics, something that was not possible 
for this thesis (however salary negotiations in the education sector is a salient topic at the 
time of analysis as were the three law examples). As outlined earlier, salient issues may have 
influenced the results, but there is no long-term data available to see what topics are salient 
for a specific period in Tunisia. An example might be the discussion of terrorism that caused 
an increased amount of framing on terrorism and individual liberties at the time of analysis. 
Longitudinal data can be interesting for the development of framings of democracy in 
ministries. It is to expect that a framing of democracy including at least some more common 
points than participatory democracy should develop in the years to come and retracing this 
development could help identify elements that led to a stabilization of democracy. 
 
There are many additional elements that could equally be regarded. Given the regional 
cleavages in Tunisia, a spatial comparison appears interesting and could be a point for future 
studies. While I analyzed the national level, it does not mean that organizations do not cover 
regional or local problems and those alliances and mechanisms can differ.   
8.3 Reflections 
Instead of summarizing reflections on theory and method under sections for each, I discuss 
both aspects in line with empirical results in several thematic sub sections. Those thematic 
subsections on ideational influence and more concretely on the impact on state actors’ 
decision making. Together with the ideas outlined earlier, this section evaluates the own 
approach and gives recommendations on improvements. 
8.3.1 Ideas and Impact 
Few consistent framing is not a weakness per se 
Common framings on democracy are difficult to identify although some elements were 
highlighted. The framing approach highlighted well the differences across organizations and 
towards the state. It was also useful for identifying specific orientations towards democracy. 
At the same time, it generated very diverse – though interesting – results. 
 
That framing did not generate more results is not a weakness of the approach as it showed 
the diversity of democratic framing. This important finding allows qualifying mechanisms 
remarking that not all mechanisms are based on common framings or shared perspectives. 
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The combination of networks and framing enables identifying key partners in interaction and 
evaluating links. An additional argument is important: A focus on political processes and 
opportunities could have been fruitful if more information on the Tunisian political system 
would have been available from the beginning in order to identify those processes and 
opportunities. While the thesis generated much of the required knowledge it is not to forget 
that knowledge on the Tunisian political system was rather limited before. I will turn to this 
argument later when discussing inductive and deductive reasoning. 
 
The limited findings do not mean that framing is irrelevant. Compared to the research by 
Cress and Snow, who underlined the importance of framing, my findings does neither 
contradict nor confirm the overarching importance of framing (Cress and Snow 2000). The 
findings let simply add some conditions for the importance of framing, mainly having relays 
that can directly diffuse framings. My results show that framing is specific for targets and 
that a consistent framing like the one by the women movement helps. 
 
The framing approach has its limits when it comes to analyzing coalitions and roles within 
those. While movements build coalitions, it became not entirely clear which framing 
elements are taken over as a common framing and which are not as introduced in 8.2. 
Among the four organizations human rights, economic problems and participatory 
democracy are elements widely shared. Other framings are quite different. It is an open 
question why those elements became more shared than others. Literature on coalitions and 
roles within coalitions should insist on how to determine the unique elements as well as the 
common elements within coalitions and how those influence outcomes. The question on 
when coalitions collapse or the choices of coalitions for the promotion of claims should be 
detailed in future research. The position of organizations needs to be better explained. One 
example is the FTDES. It could be that the FTDES is not excluded due to its slightly different 
framing, but due to very different repertoires used that make the old civil society hesitate. 
Related to coalitions, one can imagine different movements as clusters that approach and 
distance themselves from each other and that are always in move. This approaching and 
distancing would thus not only be determined by different framing, but also by different 
repertoires. The press work and the direct support for emerging movements could scare the 
old civil society as it was not part of their repertoires. Thus, to answer the question on roles, 
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specialization and what coalition mobilizes on what, to regard only the framing is not 
enough. Probably a much more interactive – and fluent – approach on actors continually 
being closer or more distant in terms of frames, repertoires and other factors is more 
adequate. 
Framing or political process theory? 
Could the framing approach have been replaced effectively by a political process theory 
approach? This would have missed the detailed analysis of the framing of democracy. On the 
other hand, it would perhaps have had the advantage of a more detailed approach on 
interactions between movements and the state as political process theories place social 
movements in relation towards the challenged institutional actors (McAdam and Schaffer 
Boudet 2012). Political opportunity structures, defined as “favorable political opportunities 
and access to mobilizing structures (established groups or networks) independent of elite 
control” could have been a focus as well (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012:15). Political 
process theory can add useful insights. Especially regarding established networks and 
groups, they offer a framework that helps to explain persistent relations in civil society. My 
approach was very sensitive towards opportunity structures and political processes; 
however there are some arguments that went against it. I shortly recall those reflections 
that go hand-in-hand with the limited knowledge on the Tunisian political system when 
beginning the research. 
 
The focus on perceptions and framings and not on opportunity structures appears useful as 
civil society organizations and movements shape the political system themselves although 
they are partly restricted by the same system. The most important factor from political 
opportunity structure approaches is the openness of ministries that effectively influences 
the possibilities of movements to gain access. In the Tunisian case it is however strongly 
influenced by the legal requirements to make civil society participate, introduced on 
demand of civil society when drafting the constitution. Another reason not to use political 
opportunity structures as a basis was the missing potential to explain the initial Uprisings 
that started without perceived political opportunity. The threat by police forces existed, for 
example in September 2015 when protesting against the law on reconciliation, but that even 
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motivated more protest as leaders expressed. From this perspective, at least some 
organizational leaders do not feel restricted by opportunity structures. 
 
Literature working on political opportunity structures can explain relations between state 
and social movements from a different perspective. However, a too general focus on 
political opportunity structures risks to focus on (perceived) structures and to be too focused 
on the state level. The results of this study show that political opportunity structures play a 
role, but not exclusively. The important dialogue of the UGTT with ministers for example is 
the product of mutual interactions and long-standing traditions. It is not only in the interest 
of the UGTT, but also of ministers as these get information they would not get without. 
Thus, if the opportunities would fall away, it would not only be disadvantageous for the 
UGTT, but also for the state. One can argue that theories on political opportunity structures 
are better to explain situations with clear power relations where one actor is stronger than 
another and can guide the behavior of other actors. For my research, I argue that indeed the 
approach on framing was useful to discover the (often limited) ideational influence. 
Observing internal and public discussions 
The methods chosen to analyze the different parts of the thesis showed partly adequate. 
While interviews generated interesting insights with limited generalizability, media analysis 
was used for the analysis of influence on public opinion. The interviews allowed having an 
authentic framing of democracy compared to the one that is available in the media and that 
is not ever similar, in the Tunisian case often dominated by reporting on the state. The 
media analysis allowed identifying frames that resonate in the public as well as who works 
with whom, but it covers only part of the discussion.  
 
The choice of types of media could have been better. Given the missing information at the 
beginning it seems reasonable that preference is given to information available and thus to 
traditional media. Facebook and social media played a role since the beginnings of the 
Uprisings and have been equally mentioned by civil servants and civil society leaders. It 
would have made equal, perhaps even more sense, to analyze Facebook and social media 
data on resonating frames. While newspapers were chosen because of more expected 
professionalization, this did not show true and social media data might have generated 
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better results. Detailed opinion polls could help to analyze the influence on public opinion, 
but were not available, leading to a preference for qualitative data collection. 
 
Interviews showed useful due to the exploratory nature that was caused by limited 
knowledge on the Tunisian context. Interviews were particularly helpful for the double 
purpose of identifying first a framing with a mixture of deductive and inductive elements as 
well as the focus on networks and allies. Interviews allowed the flexibility to insist on some 
points and clarify others. One limitation is however the duration of interviews that could 
ideally be longer to include more questions. Questions were oriented towards the collective 
level, while some more questions on the individual background could have been added. 
With the now available knowledge some more questions on the economic elements linked 
to democratic framing would be desirable. 
8.3.2 Tunisian democratic framing: fit of the Democracy Barometer 
What does democracy mean in a Tunisian context? 
The model of the Democracy Barometer fits with one notable exception, the role of the 
economy. As several scholars argued earlier, the economy is an important dimension that is 
connected to democracy (as is education that was found much less in framing). While the 
economy has not been completely excluded in the questions on democracy (it is seen as one 
of the outcomes), the role of those who are wealthy and their related power emerged 
regularly. While this is in line with Bühlmann et al.’s factor on transparency, the question re-
emerges, whether economic power should be placed more prominently, as it is perceived as 
main hindrance for democracy in Tunisia. 
 
The Uprisings connected the demand for jobs with the demand for more rights and 
democracy, so the prevailing importance of economic factors is logic. The question is, 
whether economic aspects are a constitutive element of the Tunisian democracy or are just 
connected because of its salience. Schmitter and Sika recently suggested that the demand 
for job security, social equality of economic development is linked to democracy in the 
whole MENA region (Schmitter and Sika 2017). The issues under economic aspects discussed 
range from salaries, to economic development and a modified economic system. It can be 
argued that especially economic output is used to evaluate the performance of the Tunisian 
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democracy. Thus, responsiveness of political actors becomes of even more important as 
there are still seen deficits among interviewees. The Democracy Barometer lacks a stronger 
output related element that would probably fit with the control dimension and could be 
interpreted in line with the government’s capacity to fulfill economic, social and other needs 
(Munck and Verkuilen 2002). At the same time, the transcending influence of economic 
elements on equality and corruption is to emphasize in the Tunisian case.  Beneath the 
importance of economic factors, the analysis showed different connections between 
dimensions. While scholars like Lauth and Schlenkrich showed that egalitarian, majoritarian 
and freedom-oriented versions of democracy exist, some of the sub dimensions are 
connected more often in specific countries. For some of the organizations especially 
representation and participation are connected (ATFD, FTDES). Another example is the link 
of corruption with fiscal regimes of the state under government capacity (UGTT). Further 
connections exist between human rights and rule of law.  
 
Connections across dimensions and few intra-dimensional connections might indicate that 
an element does not fit well in the dimension. Intra-dimensional relations are less surprising 
as they are part of the same concept; not-existent connections within one dimension can 
indicate a misfit. In the Tunisian case for example, public sphere was less connected to 
individual liberties and rule of law than the two to each other. Similarly, transparency got 
more connections towards the government capacity than to participation and 
representation. Thus, it might be more useful to summarize transparency in line with 
government capacity than with equality and representation and to more explicitly include 
economic elements under equality. This study delivered some insights, but a detailed 
analysis of correlations of sub dimensions could enable modifications to improve the 
Democracy Barometer and other measures of the quality of democracy. The consequent 
analysis of combinations of dimensions is crucial to better account for relations between 
concepts. Especially cross-country comparison becomes important to allow a wide 
applicability of the concept. 
 
When applying the concept of the Democracy Barometer, it can be difficult to clearly 
distinguish dimensions as they are overlapping and interacting. It makes it difficult to code. 
There are some additional problems with the Democracy Barometer as point of orientation. 
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In reality, it was easier to apply the three dimensions and then elements and not to use the 
third level. It is easier to identify especially the egalitarian perspective that is well expressed 
among the interviewees, other dimensions are more implicit. 
 
I used a mix of content and discourse analysis for assessing democratic framing as outlined 
in the method chapter. While this approach was seen as useful, it raises the question on 
whether statistics are adequate to account for qualitative data. This problem needed more 
elaboration and consequentially it was verified whether numbers represent perspectives 
across interviews or whether those represent only specific interviews and may have caused 
biases. This said, while potential and real problems have been indicated systematically, the 
data would be generally open towards a more detailed content analysis if more interviews 
would be included. For the articles, the analysis was much more content analyses oriented 
and used much more the numbers, while not neglecting the manual verification in each 
article.  
Democratization and movements 
The Tunisian case showed some results with regard to democratization that were already 
highlighted by other researchers. Among those are the role of movements and civil society 
not only for the initial mobilization, but also for consolidation. It remains discussable 
whether political parties or movements had or have a larger influence on democratic 
consolidation (as parties have not been analyzed in detail, it would be speculation to 
compare both). However, the inclusion of movements in the development of the new 
constitution enabled a participatory approach in the constitution. This demands ministries to 
consult and gives civil society more prominent roles in legislation processes. Thus, the 
Tunisian example shows that a codification of access can be a fruitful mechanism to make 
civil society participate from the beginning and to ensure a balance and wider inclusion. 
 
The impact of movements for democratization in Tunisia should neither be over- nor 
underestimated. While there is no general consistent framing of democracy that is 
promoted across organizations, several sub elements are demanded and democracy is 
reinforced. There is influence, however, it is not an exclusive influence as parliament and 
other actors have their say. A more differentiated perspective should be taken, including 
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movements having some influence (especially when participation is demanded by law), but 
not being the only actor influencing legislation. The question how a (fast) changing party 
system interacts with civil society and movements is a very interesting question for Tunisia 
that appears as crucial for better determining the influence of civil society. 
8.3.3 Do mechanisms of diffusion impact state actors decision making? 
As outlined under 8.1 ideational impact is limited. What even is more interesting is that the 
UGTT with a mostly compatible framing towards the state, although highlighting many 
differences is able to influence actors where ministries have limited or partly different 
framing. First, it is about perceived influence and second, it was mainly the network 
approach that highlighted those connections between the UGTT and the Tunisian state. The 
possible influence via interactions is not bound to ideational influence, but may translate in 
policy influence, especially when it comes to vetoes and coercion.  
Networks 
Networks and how actors are linked was very useful in identifying possible channels of 
influence-taking, so to see by which way ideas (or policies) can be transmitted. However, 
networks do not correlate with framings in all cases; like-minded actors or the compatibility 
of ideas is a facilitating factor.  
 
Another element already highlighted in the literature review, is the path-dependency of 
network structures. The network analysis gave an idea about network structures and 
explains why large parts of the younger civil society are excluded. The good position and the 
limited openness of the old civil society hinder access for younger organizations. If they find 
a niche, like Al Bawsala or I Watch (transparency), that is not well covered by other 
organizations and where a need by ministries (transparency for legitimacy) exists, access is 
possible. Thus, specialization is important, especially as civil servants underscored this 
element. 
 
Reputation plays a role in relation to inclusion. The inclusion of networks in the theory does 
not only enable to establish effective mechanisms of influence, but also to show inter-
movement interaction. The focus on networks was particularly useful, however the network 
analysis was only movement and ministry centered and did not regard the whole political 
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system. An extension of the network analysis towards the whole system can thus enable a 
more wide-reaching analysis. Changing network structures can become another point for 
future research. 
 
Reflections on diffusion 
With regard to diffusion, looking for a joint effect approach showed useful, but also 
highlights limitations. As detailed survey data is limited, the referral to media analysis was 
the only way to account for resonance of frames in public. The link via the traditional media 
does not (yet) functions effectively as a number of reserves exist. Thus, the direct influence 
approach appears more useful in the Tunisian context, something that can change in the 
future with more professionalization of the media. The missing “effectiveness” of the media 
as indirect mechanism does not only have consequences for this research. The reporting on 
some national organizations is more limited than on others causing problems for the media 
analysis of Tunisian organizations. If media does not adequately cover protest or is marked 
by limited professionalism, the effectiveness of media analysis poses problems in terms of 
validity as only specific elements of protest are highlighted. It raises doubts on research 
focused on protest event analysis in media as done by della Porta, when she underlines how 
protest reduced following the revolution (della Porta 2016). The ATFD is a good example to 
illustrate the bias towards some outcomes. While media reporting is very limited, they are 
realizing their claims and organizing protest. On the other hand, the ATFD does not seek 
media coverage. The problem could be the selection of media outlets; something I doubt, 
but what will be discussed reflecting on the method. 
 
The stage model for legislation was particularly useful to distinguish the possible diffusion 
channels and their influence on policies for each stage of the legislation process. I 
recommend the approach focused on diffusion and mechanisms as it allows highlighting 
ways of influencing in a context where little knowledge exists and thus in combination with 
exploratory research. The advantage when analyzing a country in transition is that policy 
changes, like the law on sexual harassment, are completed within a relatively short time 
frame and were thus already observable in a time frame of two years. Thus, the analysis of 
countries in transition and not just Tunisia can be beneficial for the analysis of policy 
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processes. At the same time more research is needed on the connection between ideational 
influence and concrete policy influence. 
Causal direction 
Ministries explained that they respect civil society positions in their legislation. By 
confirmation from the ministry, the causal direction is verified. As results are not 
generalizable, some reserves remain. It cannot be excluded that actors like the UGTT are 
influenced by administration in their framings on democracy, especially when it comes to 
compatibility of framings. This would probably be less related to democracy, as the framing 
on democracy by ministries is often very limited. While we have seen that this is not 
necessarily related to influence, interaction does not go in one direction, but certainly 
influences the perspective of organizations as well (for example building more trust in the 
administration as some interviewees expressed). The focus on civil society and networks as 
topic of interviews helped to gain an idea about influence and the direction of influence. The 
influence of other actors like political parties that are probably the missing element in the 
analysis of the examples has not been verified. 
8.4 Limits 
Although I indicated some shortcomings on methods and theory, the choices made at the 
beginning of the research appear still reasonable and useful given the limited information 
available at the beginning. With all the data available from this thesis, much better choices 
would be possible. It is however to keep in mind that much more research was published the 
last years also giving additional knowledge. The most foreseeable point was perhaps that 
Facebook and social media play a role. Other points like the importance of economic factors 
could have been expected to a limited degree, but not to its real extent. Although I did my 
best to reduce biases, especially the more Western perspective rests and should be kept in 
mind when coming to the conclusion. I elaborate more on some selected potential biases 
and evaluate their influence on results. I start with western biases, with the problems for 
tracing influence, the individual level and some remarks on the ministries and organizations 
included.  
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Biases and Western perspective 
The biases outlined earlier are important when it comes to the international perspective and 
orientation of organizations and civil servants; however, biases are not falsifying the results, 
but partially influencing these. The perspective on democracy is probably less Western style 
than mentioned by interviewees71. As mentioned it is highly probably that the most 
interested and Westernized participated leading to a potential bias. Some unique Tunisian 
elements like the strong connection towards economic aspects and representation of civil 
society have been outlined, so the specific Tunisian perspective of democracy has been 
shown although it is difficult to identify a widely accepted perspective on democracy. I 
cannot exclude that there rests a too Westernized perspective on Tunisian democracy 
although mechanisms have been taken to avoid this. The solution would only be to have a 
native Tunisian (or someone resembling) for interviews so that this problem would be 
reduced. A linked element is the influence of participation. Especially for civil servants, civil 
society participation was the main topic of discussion. I argue nevertheless that the 
overwhelming referral to this dimension can not only be explained by the topic. Civil society 
was much more discussed than it would probably have been when just having a normal 
framing. 
 
Another question is whether civil servants told me what they expected that I want to hear. 
This is also the reason why I verified across interviews. In addition, prompting questions 
have been posed through the interviews to see whether there is more “depth” or whether 
interviewees use only short answers without much content. This verification revealed the 
problems with one interview with the Ministry of Education that was consequentially 
threatened with much more caution and only used where the interviewee elaborated more. 
Beneath those simple answers, the opposite might have happened too. Interviewees were 
conscious about my role as researcher, which might have created a more elaborated 
“theorization” of democracy instead of repeating their normal arguments in line with 
democracy (vulgarized). Taken together, those points have been limited at during data 
collection and data interpretation, meaning that the incidence on results is minor.  
 
                                                     
71 On the other hand it is not that surprising that it is a Western perspective. Researchers such as Badie (1986, 
1992) discussed the imported state already some time ago. 
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For newspapers, it is difficult to estimate whether the inclusion of Arab newspapers would 
have changed the picture. Both editorial houses analyzed also publish in Arab and I do 
expect that reporting is based on the same original information. Adding another Arab 
newspaper would have caused problems in terms of language and would have created 
additional costs and taken more resources. Thus, the choice of two newspapers in French 
from two editorial houses appears as most cost efficient. Other research should 
systematically proof whether discussions in French and Arab-speaking media are effectively 
similar or not.  
The individual level 
One of the crucial questions is whether the individual level influenced the collective framing. 
While I ever insisted on the collective perspective, the answer is that the individual level 
nevertheless interfered in some cases that were transparently outlined throughout the 
research (for example the civil servant from the Ministry of Education). The choice at the 
end was not to use the instances where individual perspectives emerged and to verify the 
whole interview afterwards. An exclusion of the whole interview appeared unreasonable as 
nevertheless some collective perspectives got identified. The problem of individual levels is 
further accentuated for ministries as one civil servant stands basically for one ministry. It is 
highly recommended that future research focuses on several interviews per ministry. At the 
same time, the limited number of interviews per ministry poses an important shortcoming 
that creates additional caution when interpreting the ministerial perspective. The results are 
more robust for organizations than for individual ministries. Micro-level analysis of the 
biographies of activists similar to those conducted by Ayari can be of interest as well (Ayari 
2016). More research on the individual level can especially show differences between older 
and younger activists. 
 
The individual level can be a point for future research. As became evident during interviews 
and as existing research showed, there is a cleavage between the youth and old elites. As 
other researchers noted, those having negotiated the transition, were part of the older 
generation or repressed under Ben Ali (Cohen-Hadria 2017). According to Ayari the Tunisian 
elite had a somehow similar activist socialization (Ayari 2016). Goujon underlines that 
Tunisia has a lack of elite renewal since the revolution due to missing reforms (Goujon 
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2015). My data supported those perspectives. The interviewed representatives mostly 
belong to one social category: older, well-educated and socialized by worker rights activists, 
while younger activists fall in other categories as some of the additional interviews showed. 
Therefore, I focused on these old elite, also because they are in leading positions. The 
differentiation of younger and older activists may equally indicate the possibilities for 
influence (and be desirable from the perspective of an inclusive democracy). Future research 
could elaborate in more detail on the profiles of leaders and activists and look especially at 
younger activists and how those perceive democracy and mechanisms. 
Ministries and choice of organizations 
While ministries have been approaches by using several ways (mail, letter, phone, directly at 
the Ministry), some ministries responded better than others. The exclusion of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs is certainly a major shortcoming. As it is particularly important for many 
organizations, efforts to get an interviewee from that ministry were extensive. However, no 
interview was possible, suggesting that the ministry might have internal policies that inhibit 
research as different persons have been approached via different online and offline 
communication channels. As many intense interactions have been indicated by 
organizations, it can be expected that the Ministry of Social Affairs would have a perspective 
similar to the ones by the Ministry of Women or the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. 
Interviews with the Ministry of Justice would also have been interesting. For a counter-
position, interviews with the Ministries of Religious Affairs can be of interest as none of the 
organizations indicated contacts and the evaluation of Ennahdha and their closeness to this 
ministry suggest that a very different perspective on democracy might be taken by civil 
servants from this ministry. 
 
The focus of analysis could be more fine-tuned, notwithstanding the partly exploratory 
nature of research. As the analysis showed, contacts towards specific ministries are often 
more important than towards all or even more than two ministries. While this has been 
shown through the diversity of ministries included, it would be valuable to analyze the 
relations between organizations and specific ministries in more detail without covering the 
whole spread of ideas across ministries. Future research should focus on few ministries, but 
the initial choice to include all that have been mentioned by organizations appeared 
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nevertheless useful. The choice to target many different ministries would today – with the 
knowledge from the research – not be repeated. A preference would be given to at least 
three interviews per ministry and restrict the ministries even more. 
 
Another option for future research was already proposed by other researchers: According to 
Kolb, it would be more useful to focus on one policy issue instead of analyzing the domains 
when looking at outcomes (Kolb 2007). This was intended with the law examples; however, 
this section originates from data, where interviewees often mentioned the three laws. As it 
is difficult to foresee trends or to follow laws from the beginning, this was feasible and 
pragmatic, while more detailed analysis of one policy issue would allow to retrace (or not) a 
specific influence of movements. Concrete examples include women issues and the relation 
between the women movement and the Ministry of Women; social issues and the relations 
between the Ministry of Social Affairs (once accessible) and security issues and the relations 
between the Ministry of the Interior and the LTDH for example; although the Ministry of the 
Interior was difficult to convince on interviews and can cause additional barriers. 
 
The choice of organizations was bound to the old civil society with some additional insights 
from newer organizations. The choice of the FTDES defending environmental issues is not 
wrong, but environmental issues are not their most important element. As virtually no other 
organization was available, the FTDES is still acceptable but not an optimal solution. 
Especially the comparison towards Islamic activism might have been interesting and would 
add another layer for comparison. This could add another layer of influence when taking 
Islamic activism and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In addition, the interviews with the 
finally not included organizations revealed that access for younger organizations is much 
more limited.  This important finding could be elaborated more in future research where for 
example possible inclusion of newer organizations can be discussed. The research gave 
already two potential organizations for Al Bawsala and I Watch; two organizations that via 
open hearings gained more and more access to the state and that were capable of building a 
reputation among civil servants.  
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Tracing influence 
Tracing influence is nothing easy due to the numerous problems explained in the theory and 
method chapter. In addition, while I retraced contacts between civil society it does not mean 
that there is automatically an impact. Many of the channels used to identify the diffusion of 
frames are available options. As shown, not all channels of diffusion, nor all mechanisms 
outlined under 2.5 are used at the same time. I also argue that not all configurations can be 
known beforehand, so that there is effectively no other option as to collect data on a variety 
of channels and mechanisms when tracing influence. Even a first endeavor into influence of 
civil society needs to be repeated some time as configurations change.  
 
For analyzing ideational influence and diffusion numerous problems persist. In the last step 
of chapter seven I showed the influence on policies. This was intended as a finale step to 
show the influence of democratic framing on policies, it shows however also that by taking 
examples of law (projects) the influence of a consistent democratic framing becomes 
accessible.  The analysis of specific law helped a lot to see the limits of a common framing 
and networks. In the case of Tunisia exists the other advantage that legislation processes 
happen on shorter time frames than in established democracies, giving an opportunity to 
observe it on a short time frame.   
 
Still the question arises what other ways to assess the influence of movements exist. One 
option is to survey perceptions and attitudes on a longer time frame for the relevant actors 
to see the changes in democratic framing. While relatively time-consuming a long-term 
observation of democratic framings and their interaction can reveal ideational influence.  
The ideal would of course to take all relevant actors that can have an ideational influence 
into account. As shown in my analysis several possible interferences remain open, be it the 
influence of parliament as well as more details on each channel of diffusion. The ideal 
research would control for much more possible factors and more detail, but the question is 
whether this complete control is possible in political science. Research choices thus 
necessarily limit the scope of research towards specific elements, in my case towards the 
interaction of civil society and Tunisian ministries. Taking this perspective, my research 
cannot be more than a first assessment of those interactions and their influence on 
democratic framing. It is only one part of a greater puzzle of ideational influence. 
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8.5 A final word and post-script 
The thesis concludes with some final remarks on the overall situation in Tunisia. In the 
beginning I summarized the surprising Uprisings in 2011 that now build a ground for the 
analysis of a new political system that is unique in the region, an Arab democracy. This thesis 
built the ground for future analysis of this political system. When I started the thesis in 2014, 
little was written about the Tunisian political system and unfortunately this has not changed 
a lot when it comes to the functioning of the system. Scholars often repeat the original 
finding that social movements and civil society matter a lot in Tunisia because they look at 
the initial Uprisings. I showed in this thesis that a lot depends on the Ministries and 
organizations. We can speak about influence of the UGTT on several levels, but it would be a 
mistake to generalize on the entire civil society and on all movements. 
 
Towards the end of writing, some external factors for Tunisian democracy emerged. In 
March 2019, Algerian president Bouteflika, one of the last serving long-time leaders in the 
region, resigned due to mass protest. The implications for Algeria whether it becomes more 
democratic or instable are not yet to foresee and may influence neighboring Tunisia. At the 
same time, conflict intensified in April 2019 in Libya. While the Libyan conflict persists 
already some time and Tunisia is aware of it, a potential escalation can still cause migration 
towards Tunisia or destabilize border regions.  
 
Beneath those threats for the Tunisian political system and that is the positive sign for those 
who advocate civil society engagement, the inclusion of civil society happens regularly. 
Dependent on how the political system develops and what civil society and civil servants 
make out of it, this can further augment. A fallback appears unrealistic given the 
constitutional basis. The Tunisian democracy and perhaps Arab democracy (something 
difficult to say without other cases) is not that different from Western democracy, at least 
not when applying the concepts I did. What however is different is the strong connection 
between democracy and economy that is seen as important. While democracy in a Western 
context shall not bring jobs but realize the people will, the output of democracy gets 
connected to it in the Tunisian case. From a normative perspective one can say that this 
poses a problem for democracy because it is not made to create jobs. The raised 
expectations may be too high to be achieved and thus create dissatisfaction with the 
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political system or lead to a not that negative evaluation of the old system; both not the best 
options for democracy in Tunisia. The elections for parliament and president in 2019 will 
also show whether the Tunisian political landscape is divided or committed towards 
democracy. I am neither overenthusiastic nor pessimistic when it comes to democracy in 
general and civil society participation in particular. Tunisia has everything it needs to 
become a stable democracy. 
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